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5BINTRODUCTION 
 
 
After 20 years of implementing the opening-up policy，China has established a rudimentary market 
economy, but financial sector and state-owned enterprises reform are still lagging behind its 
economic development and no fundamental institutional transition have been achieved yet 
(Nicholas Lardy, 1998). Along with China’s economic development, commercial banks in China, 
especially the big four state-owned commercial banks (The SOCBs ), namely, the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), the China Agricultural Bank (CAB), the Bank of China (BOC), 
and the China Construction Bank (CCB), have accumulated appalling amounts of non-performing 
loans which have impeded further market-oriented reforms. Therefore, measures to reform the big 
four SOCBs are becoming a focal center of attention and are highly accredited as key to realizing 
ultimate goals of China’s banking reformF1F. Experiences show that, fragile financial systems have 
been one major source of financial unrest and political instability for many economies in recent 
years (World Bank, 1997), and the 1997 East Asia financial crisis has compelled the Chinese 
government to focus on its fragile financial system.  
The ultimate goal of China’s ongoing financial reform is to establish an efficient and stable financial 
system. Although urgency of the reform is unanimously understood, there are contentions about 
how to reform China’s banking system, which include: (1) order and priority of the reform of the 
SOCBs and state-owned enterprises(SOEs); (2) whether the SOCBs can be restructured and sold 
to domestic or foreign investors; (3) priority of reforming the SOCBs and fostering small private 
banks; (4) necessity of establishing a depository insurance company that is reminiscent of the 
Federal Depository Insurance Company of the USA; (5) resolution of outstanding non-performing 
loans of the SOCBs, and particularly, how to prevent continuous creation of new non-performing 
loans; (8) how to prevent local governments and SOEs from evading loans of the SOCBs.  
Although no consensus has been reached, insights of and answers to the above problems will 
undoubtedly influence China’s financial reform pathes and outcome. In order to get a better 
understanding of these problems, it is essential to probe into the internal logic of China’s financial 
institutional transition and choose policy suggestions that are most compatible with existing 
                                                        
1 The immediate goals of the SOCBs are to transform the four banks into modern style commercial banks with adequate internal management, 
clear management targets, sound financial conditions, and international competitiveness. it is planned that the goals will be realized in three steps, 
to wit, automatic management without government intervention, companization, and public listing (Wu Jinglian, 2002) 
1 
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systems. As Doglus North has pointed out, to depict institutional characteristics of an economy is 
the first step in restructuring an economy (North, 1994). North aslo blames the painful transitional 
process in East European economies for lack of understanding of the relationship between market 
and politics (North, 2002). 
14B .1 ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT  
In the past twenty years, role of government in economic development has been one of the most 
contentious topics among economists. Even to date, there has been no consensus as to whether 
government’s intervention has positive effects on the economic performance which many East 
Asia economies had been enjoying before the breakout of 1997 Southeast Asia financial crises. 
In new classic economic models, government has always been treated as a given variable and its 
decision-making process has been regarded as a black box in which government is assumed to 
be a “benign dictator”(Sheng,2002), to decide and implement public macroeconomic policies to 
maximize social welfare. However, this assumption denies the natural relations between politics 
and economics. As the neo-institutional economics find out that, government is not a single 
harmonious institution, but a group of institutions that pursue their own interests including political 
survival, political stability, or maximization of self-interests.  
Contrary to the traditional dichotomy of government and market, the neo-institutional economics 
stresses the role of institutions in analyzing influence of governmental on economic development, 
internalizes the decision-making process of government in analysis, and assumes that interests of 
policy-makers are not necessarily compatible with those of public interests. In its understanding of 
the role of government in economic development, the neo-institutional economics have provided a 
very useful analytical perspective. Just as the World Bank (1998) pointed out, Internalization of 
government in analysis opens new research areas. Generally speaking, researches using the 
neo-institutional economics on the role of government in economic development can be classified 
into three groups (see table1-1). The first is the market-friendly view, which believes that markets 
can function independently, and government has little effect on industry. The second is the 
developmental state view, which is opposite of the market-friendly view, believing that 
government’s intervention is very necessary to correct market failures, especially those pervasive 
in less developed economies. This view purports that it is impossible to achieve the economic 
performance that East Asia economies have enjoyed in the past 30 years without active 
government intervention. The third view is the World Bank view, which is, in fact, merely a 
balanced view between the above two positions. By using principles of the neo-institutional 
economics, especially those of the World Bank view, many economists have tried to understand 
role of government in many areas. Among which, Lawrence J. Lau analyzed the role of 
government in economic development based on observations of the experiences of China, 
Hongkong, and Taiwan (lardy, 1997); Hyung-ki Kim and Jun Ma used the case of Japan, Korea, 
and Taiwan to analyze role of government in acquiring technological capability (Hyung-ki Kim and 
Jun Ma, 1997); Tetsuji Okazaki used recently acquired historic data to analyze how the 
government-firm relationship helped to resolve the coordination failure in the post-war Japanese 
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economic recovery period. 
102BTable 1-1 Three Different Views about Role of Government in Economic Development 
 The Market-friendly view The Developmental State- View The World Bank view 
Role of government 
Restricted to only intervention aimed 
at improving market coordination 
As an alternative to market 
A compromise between Market 
Friendly view and State- development 
view 
Shared views 
Regarding the Walras Equilibrium as a paradigm; market and government as alternative mechanisms for 
resources allocation 
Policy implications Whether government should intervene economy 
Source: The World Bank (1996). 
In the case of China, the role of government is more active and pervasive than most of other 
economies due to the following reasons. First, at current stage, China is still in the process of 
transforming from a planned economy to the so-called socialism market economy and is still a 
preliminary market economy. Although the function of market has been increasing steadily, it is still 
confined to a limited scope. In fact, a main target of the ongoing economic reform is to establish a 
mature market economy in which market can play a more important role. At current stage,  
government is not only a complement to an immature market mechanism, but actually an 
alternative to the market mechanism in many cases. This position limits the role of the invisible 
hand of the market mechanism. Besides, as a transitional economy, behaviors of the government, 
constraints imposed on the government, and resources the government can employ are 
undoubtedly different from other developing economies including some East Asia economies or 
developed economies such as Japan and the USA. A research made by Roland (2001) found that 
in Russia, with the exit of government in many fields, mafia and many other informal organizations 
seized roles once performed by governments. These replacements have worsened social order 
and blocked establishment of a new market order in Russia. These important findings can serve 
as an example to illustrate the importance of government in transitional economies.  
Second, compared with governments of mature market economies, the Chinese government not 
only corrects market failures and provides public goods, but also manages SOEs including the 
SOCBs, which have been dominating its national economy. In other words, the Chinese 
government is not only a referee but also owner and manager of the SOCBs and SOEs. In 1996, 
the output controlled by government accounted for about 30 percent of China’s GDP (Bai.c, 1999). 
Direct involvement of government in management vindicates that government is not standing at an 
arm’s length to enterprises. One major goal for ongoing economic reform is to give inalienable 
autonomy of management back to SOEs. But due to policy burdens to wit, internalization of social 
security, med-care etc., and inadequate information to wit necessary to discern management 
responsibility and social burdens, it is very hard, or basically impossible to implement hard budget 
constraints of SOEs (Lin（林毅夫）, 1997). And reform measures to give management autonomy 
back to SOEs turn out to sharpen SOEs’ incentive to erode government’s profitability.  
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Third, historically speaking, China is a centralized country with more than 2000 counties. 
Therefore, interaction between central government and local governments is very important for 
realizing targets of the central government. In fact, the past twenty years have witnessed a 
process of decentralization which is very useful in explaining many economic phenomena (Qian, 
1998). In the case of China, local governments have become independent institutions with 
self-interests along with fiscal decentralization. Without internalizing local governments into 
analysis, it is impossible to explain the pervasive phenomenon that SOEs evade loans of the 
SOCBs with help of local governments or local courts. Another obvious problem is power 
interception, to wit, local governments intercept powers designated to SOEs by the central 
government. In other words, even if influence of the central government on SOEs has been 
weakened, influence of local governments has been strengthened. This is the essence of the 
so-called economic war-lordism of China (Lardy, 1998). 
Fourth, according to the neo-institutional economics, government’s decision-making process is not 
homogenous, but a compromise among factions and organizations. Therefore, taking 
self-interests of public officials into analysis is very necessary. In the case of China, public officials 
at various levels are appointed rather than elected. As a result, incentives and behaviors of both 
the central and local governments might be different from that of many others in which public 
officials are elected.  
15B .2 NON-PERFORMING LOANS AND ROLE OF GOVERNMENT: THE CASE OF 
CHINA 
55B1.2.1 Non-Performing Loans and the Role of Government 
Research shows that commercial banks bankruptcy has strong negative externalities (World bank, 
1997). To some extent, these are the most important lessons learned from the Great Depression 
of 1930s. Based on the understanding that the banking industry is different from other business, it 
is among the most regulated industries in the world (Frederic S. Mishkin, 1995).  
Despite heavy regulation of the banking industry, the NPLs problem is still a worldwide headache. 
Ever since the Second World War, many economies, both developed and developing, have 
suffered from the problem. The S&Ls crises of U.S. by the end of 1980s, the non-performing loans 
problem of Japan in 1990s, and the 1997 Southeast Asian financial crises are the most well known 
examples. However, as a worldwide problem, the NPLs problem in different economies does not 
necessarily share identical immediate causes. In the case of U.S. and Japan, both are mature 
market economies, the immediate factor blamed for causing the abnormally high level of NPLs in 
banks has been the sharp decline of market prices of collaterals as a result of macro-economic 
depression.  
The NPLs problem is inevitable for any individual commercial bank due to several observations. 
First, there are technical constraints on avoiding NPLs. One is the incompleteness of credit 
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contracts between commercial banks and borrowers. Freixas and Rochet defined incomplete 
contracts as “action of re-negotiating and re-sighing of contracts due to the impossibility of 
describing all contents in a contract in advance” (Freixas and Rochet, 1997). Incompleteness of 
contracts in turn resulted from the following two factors: contingencies and uncertainties that 
cannot be precisely defined, envisioned, and included in contracts. Further, even if banks can 
envision all uncertainties and contingencies, it is still impossible to integrate all risks into a single 
contract because implementation costs are too high. Second, beyond technical constraints, 
free-riding problem also prevents markets from producing enough information to eliminate 
asymmetric information. This leads to adverse selection, thus making market itself unable to solve 
the NPLs problem (Frederic S. Mishkin, 1995). In reality, acquisition of real risk information 
regarding banks is a collective action with the character of “concentrated benefits, diffuse costs,” 
or free-riding character of any public goods (Avinash K. Dixit, 1996:44). Hence, depositors are 
incapable of imposing effective market discipline to prevent banks from engaging in risky activities. 
Third, in practice, banks tend to take too much risks that may result in NPLs. Risky assets will 
provide higher earnings for a bank provided they can be paid off, but if they are not paid off, and 
then non-performing loans accumulate.  
In order to deal with the NPLs problem, banks are required to set aside certain amounts of 
earnings as loss provision, which include common loan loss provision and that of special loan loss. 
Loan loss provision interrelates with loan classification standards, which can be classified into two 
types in which role of government varies. One is the U.S. type with clear government guidelines. 
The other is laissez-faire style represented by the U.K., which has no formal government 
guidelines but informal moral suasions. However, even for the U.S. type, government only issues 
guiding classification standards as minimum requirements, and Individual commercial banks can 
implement their own loan classification systems provided they can be converted easily and 
accurately into the minimum standard set by the government. In such case, government believes 
that loan classification and loan loss provision are commercial banks’ own business; therefore, the 
role of government is to provide a “level playing field”. However, because loan loss provision will 
usually affect government’s revenue, therefore different tax rules may also provide different 
incentives, and thus may affect the results of NPLs resolution. The past 20 years have witnessed 
many banking crises due to insufficient loan loss provision, especially in developing economies 
(Vievien A. Beattie, 1995). Other measures implemented by government include the restriction of 
commercial banks from holding certain types of assets (such as stock transactions, and limiting 
loan concentration to particular industries, regions, or individual borrowers), another governmental 
regulation could be limiting banks from taking risky assets by setting specific requirement, such as 
capital adequacy ratios. 
However, in case the NPLs of an individual bank exceeded its assets, referred to as “technical 
bankruptcy”, the relevant commercial banks will face two possible fates determined by 
government. One is bankruptcy; the other is bail-outs. In the first case, decision to force the bank 
to go bankruptcy usually depends on the scope of the bank. If it were a small bank with limited 
impacts on overall banking system, government usually allows market mechanism to function. 
Concomitantly, if it were a very large bank and have profound impacts on financial system, then 
government usually choose to rescue. This is called the “too big to fail” principle, and has given 
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rise to many controversies.  
Researches show that China’s NPLs problem is one of the most serious of the world (see analysis 
in Chapter 3). Large amounts of NPLs pose potential threats for future economic growth and 
financial stability. Some scholars have even concluded that the greatest source of future 
macro-economic instability for China would come from its weak banking system (Nicholas R. Lardy, 
2000). Whereas, in the case of China, although some of the NPLs were a product of banks’ 
speculations in real estate and the stock market during the so-called “overheating” period in early 
1990s, NPLs caused by this reason accounts for a small portion of the NPLs (Zhou Xiaochuan, 
1998; Lardy, 1998). An investigation by the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), the central bank, on 
causes and composition of NPLs of the SOCBs since the opening-up reform indicates that, NPLs 
of the SOCBs were mainly caused by undue government intervention, poor performance of SOEs, 
and weak legal environments. Among which, about 30% came from the central and local 
governmental intervention, about 30% were due to credit supports to SOEs, about 10% resulted 
from an unsound legal environment, from neglect of law and from weak enforcement, 10% were 
caused by industrial (including military industry) reconstruction including closing down, merge or 
acquisition, uniting and transferring. Finally, only 20% of NPLs of the SOCBs was brought by poor 
credit management of commercial banks.  
Therefore, different causes of NPLs of the SOCBs call for creative ways to resolve China-specific 
nonperforming loans. The Resolution and Trust Corporation (RTC) of the United States 
exemplifies the role of government in NPLs resolution. In 1989, when the Savings & Loan industry 
(S&Ls) had been beleaguered by non-performing loans, the USA established that corporation to 
dispose of NPLs. The comparative successfulness of the RTC made it a paramount model around 
the world thereafter. Although the RTC experience demonstrates that it is very necessary for 
government to initiate actions against the NPLs problem in case NPLs threaten the stability of 
either the entire financial system or the whole economy, mixed performance of the RTC in different 
economies indicates that the RTC shoe does not fit all feet. And at very least it is subject to 
preconditions which need further analysis.  
56B1.2.2 Resolution of NPLs in China Calls for More Active Government Involvement  
As Ronald (2000) points out, China has finished reforms in nearly all-important economic sectors 
except financial sector (Roland, 2000). As a result, low efficiency of the financial sector becomes a 
bottleneck for further reform. Without successful resolution of the staggering amount of 
non-performing loans of the SOCBs, financial reform in China cannot be pushed forward. In fact, 
China has tried various measures to resolve the NPLs problem of the SOCBs, including resolution 
of “triangle debts among enterprises” in 1994 and establishment of the four asset management 
companies (AMCs) in 1999. After the write-off of nearly 143.93 billion US dollar in 1999 from the 
SOCBs, NPLs of the SOCBs had once again accumulated to a new record high of 180 billion by 
the end of 2002. Therefore, to analyze the role of government in the NPLs resolution, it is 
necessary not only to summarize experiences achieved in the past, but also to clarify existing 
problems and future improvement directions. 
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The ultimate goals of the NPLs resolution also call for active involvement of government. NPLs 
resolution in China has to meet two closely interrelated targets. One is to establish a modern 
enterprises system, and the other is to establish a sound modern banking system. The two goals 
are described frequently by the government as “hitting two birds with one stone.” However, two 
targets are more complicated than one and surely deserve some variation from the paramount 
module set by the RTC. What we are obliged to point out here is that a difference in targets does 
not mean that there are no similarities. In fact, costs and profits constraints also apply to the AMCs. 
Profits can be represented by many forms, which can be further categorized into visible and 
invisible profits. Visible profits refer to alleviation of financial burdens of SOEs and NPLs of the 
SOCBs. The focus herein is resolution of stock of bad debts. The concept of invisible profits refers 
to healthy growth and fostering of a sound credit culture, appropriate relationships between 
governments and SOEs, and the establishment of an adequate legal system, with an emphasis on 
implementing a mechanism that can effectively halt the emergence and existence of new flow of 
NPLs.  
In China’s situation, the immediate causes that account for the accumulation of NPLs are different 
from those of other economies. For instance, in the case of the U.S S&Ls crisis at the end of the 
1980s, a majority of NPLs were caused by the sharp downfall of the market price of mortgages 
held by the savings-and-loan. However, in China, most NPLs of the SOCBs have resulted from the 
state development policy, which cannot be alleviated with elapse of time. Therefore, the NPLs will 
keep accumulating. Various causes differentiate NPLs of the SOCBs from those of other 
economies in at least two aspects. One is that the NPLs of the SOCBs have nothing to do with the 
credibility of those banks; the other is that China’s NPLs reflect a kind of vented interests’ 
equilibrium that has been evolving in the past 50 years (see analysis in chapter 5).  
These positions would suggest that the SOCBs have no incentive to resolve whopping NPLs 
individually or voluntarily. The four SOCBs’ are all owned by the central government and the public 
usually regards them as an integrated group that cannot be separated. Therefore, resolution of 
NPLs is indeed a collective action for any one of the SOCBs. Besides, unlike that in other 
economies, research shows that NPLs have also strengthened the SOCBs’ bargaining ability with 
the government (Zhang Jie(张杰) , 1998). Under such circumstances, government’s active 
involvement is both inevitable and necessary.  
In brief, it is the immature market economy, government’s direct stakes in SOEs, the ultimate goals 
of the four AMCs, and lack of incentive by the SOCBs to resolute NPLs of their own that set the 
context of government’s policy choices and calls for a more active role of government in NPLs 
resolution in China. 
57B1.2.3 The central-Local Government Relationship in China and Role of Government  
Theoretically speaking, interests of local governments should be identical with those of central 
government. However, once local governments have their own stakes, they will behave 
opportunistically (see table 1-2). The relationship between central government and its multi-level 
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local governments is similar to that of principle-agent problem in business. The separation of 
ownership and management in modern firms brings about principle-agent problem, which has 
three aspects (1) the asymmetry of information exists between the owner and the manager; (2) the 
aspect of incompatibility of incentives for both sides; (3) the asymmetry of responsibility. Among 
the three aspects, the asymmetry of information is most important, because it determines the 
scale and seriousness of the next two aspects. In the case of SOEs, it is owned by the whole 
nation. Because it is impossible to be run by all the pepole, neither the central government, 
therefore, central government entrusts provincial governments with responsibility for SOEs. With 
the same mandarin process at various government levels, managers become the one who really 
mange SOEs. The level of mandation differentiates itself from private owned business, which is 
the dominant form of westedrn-style market economy. For SOEs, inclusion of local governments 
compicates the principal and agent chains. In the context ,both central and local governments are 
double-faced, both are principal representatives on one hand, and agents on the other. 
In the case of China, even the central government is not homogeneous; its policies are trade-off 
between relevant interests groups (Zhao, 1999). Before the transformation, sector interests was 
called ”vertical interests” (Tiao-tiao in Chinese); while the local governments self- interests was 
called “horizontal interests” (kuai-kuai in Chinese). Due to asymmetrical information between 
central government and each ministry(or local governments), vertical interests and horizontal 
interests influence or even dominate policy-making process on one hand, and determine results of 
central government’s policies on the other. Because industry-oriented interests has been broken 
since transformation, or at least been significantly weakened, the paper confines analysis mainly 
to interests-seeking motivation of local governments, and does not take interests of ministries of 
the central governments into consideration. 
103BTable 1-2 Competing Models of Central-province Relations 
Totalitarian Power is highly centralized. Provinces carry out central policy to the letter. Decentralization only takes place when the 
centre wants it to, and power can easily be recentralized if the need arises. 
Centralist Power is centralized, but there is a balance between political initiatives at the centre and those that originate in the 
provinces. General policy is formulated at the centre, but provinces are allowed flexibility in implementation. The 
central can decentralize or recentralization as it sees fit.  
Cellular Balance of power between central government and provincial governments. Power is not equally distributed among 
provinces with stronger provinces (e.g. Shanghai) economically dominating neighboring areas. Decentralization was 
an inevitable process and not controlled by the central. 
Source: Barnett (1967); Schurmann (1968) Donnithorne (1969 and 1972), and Lardy (1975). 
In planed economy, in order to implement the so-called catching-up policy, the central government 
had deprived autonomy of SOEs and financial independence of local governments, and directly 
controlled and allocated resources. In order to implement central planning successfully, the central 
government established gigantic organizational structure, and integrated local administration with 
sector administration. There were two parallel mechanisms to convey central government’s policy 
intentions to SOEs, one is central-government policy--industry-oriented ministries----SOEs; the 
other is central-local government----SOEs. During this period, both local governments and 
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industry-oriented ministries have little self-interests to pursue, local governments were only 
enforcement units; therefore, their role was too weak to neglect. 
Since 1978, fiscal decentralization reform has become a breaking point for China’s economic 
reform (Jib And Li, 1994). The decentralization helped buying supports of local governments for 
reform, and improved economic efficiency. In this regard, decentralization reform was initiated by 
the central government and served as a necessary ruling adjustment by the center (Jib And In, 
1994, pp.8). Nevertheless, to introduce economic decentralization in a politically centralized state 
has its own risks. On one hand, decentralization was limited to role of helping mobilizing local 
enthusiasm rather than embracing a new central-local relationship based on federal principles. On 
the other hand, the actual process of decentralization has gone far beyond the original intentions 
(Jib and Li.1994, pp.3). 
Along with decentralized process, conflicts of interests between the central and local government 
have surfaced. One of the most distinct features of China’s transition has been associated with 
devolution of authority from the central to local government (Lan and Weingast, 1996). Therefore, 
local governments at all levels have acquired authority as well as responsibility over local 
economies within their judiciary. To see degree of decentralization in China, consider, for example, 
relative importance of local governments’ expenditures. In 1994, expenditure of local governments 
represented 60% of governments expenditures, compared with 34% in industrialized economies 
and 22% in developing economies (World bank, 1996). 
Decentralization entails devolution of supervision power of state-owned enterprises from the 
central government to local governments. The economic process from 1978 has been 
characterized by Fang-Quan-Rang-Li (giving the necessary autonomy of management back to the 
management and allow them to retain certain percentage of profits). However, local governments 
intercepted the autonomy-given-back and empowered themselves with the powers that have 
belonged to central government. In the end, SOEs received very limited autonomy. During the 
1980s, state-owned enterprise supervised by local governments accounted for about 
three-quarters of the total industrial outputs of the state sector (Lin, 1997). 
The specific factor that facilitates local governments’ self-interests is the fiscal reform in 1994, 
which ensured financial independence of provincial governments. The connection between fiscal 
independence and strengthening of local governments’ intervention of SOEs can be found in the 
separation of revenue between the central and provincial governments based largely on 
ownership of SOEs. In order to increase revenues, local governments tend to appeal to local 
protectionism, give priority, such as tax exemption etc. to foster local SOEs. However, because 
local SOEs are main contributors of local fiscal incomes, local governments allocate many 
contributions (Tanpai in Chinese) not included in tax. Because allocation (Tanpai in Chinese) itself 
is not law-based revenue, local governments get more arbitration in deciding amounts. In this 
meaning, local governments’ intervention been strengthened. Specifically, local government’s 
dominant role for SOEs can be classified into two broad categories: one is for SOEs, local 
governments still play the patron for its own SOEs and have much to say about central owned 
SOEs that locate within their borders of reins; the other is for the state-owned banks (SOCBs). 
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Theoretically, central government directly supervises the SOCBs. Nevertheless, because the 
SOCBs’ branches are operating within boundaries of local governments and have many natural 
connections, local governments always try to exert greater influence on the SOCBs, One example 
is what some experts described as “localization of the SOCBs”, to wit, local branches of the 
SOCBs became the second fiscal source of local governments or become representatives of local 
governments to negotiate with the central government. 
16B .3 ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
In China, NPLs of the big four state-owned commercial banks (the SOCBs), namely, the Industrial 
and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), the China Agricultural Bank (CAB), the Bank of China 
(BOC), and the China Construction Bank (CCB), account for 80% of the total appalling NPLs of the 
whole banking sector. After the Asian financial crises in 1997, central government of China has 
followed suites of market economies and taken various measures such as policy NPLs write-off 
from the SOCBs, capital injections, establishment of asset management companies, and 
intensified banking supervision, to expedite resolution of both stock and flow of NPLs of the 
SOCBs.  
However, adjusted NPLs ratios of the SOCBs, to wit, NPLs ratios after effects of policy write-offs 
and switch of loan classification methods were excluded, show that, NPLs ratios of the SOCBs 
have not been reduced significantly as officially reported, and policy write-offs have been the main 
factor contributing to significant decrease of nominal NPLs ratios of the SOCBs. Even nominal 
NPLs ratios of the SOCBs are still much higher than those of international counterparts and 
domestic joint-stock banks. Furthermore, international experiences show that unduly high NPLs 
ratios have always been a primary fuse for bankruptcy of commercial banks as well as for banking 
instability. However, in case of China, although the SOCBs have been accumulating appalling 
amount of NPLs and been technically bankrupt since 1994, China has never experienced 
systemic banking crisis.  
Therefore, it is very necessary to review specific role of the central government in NPLs resolution. 
Only when specific causes of NPLs of the SOCBs have been correctly understood, can the 
government play a more effective and targeted role. For that purpose, it is very necessary to 
answer questions why do NPLs of the SOCBs still maintain at abnormal high levels after the 
central government has taken many positive measures followed suites of international 
experiences, and why the technically bankrupt SOCBs have not incurred banking crises in such a 
long time.  
The thesis tries to answer the above questions from perspective of soft budget constraints, a type 
of relationship between government and institutions to wit specific to China, by probing into 
internal and external institutional arrangements of the SOCBs within a unified framework of dual 
soft budget constraints.  
The thesis reveals mutually interacted and intensified relations between soft budget constraints of 
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the SOCBs and soft budget constraints of SOEs, proves that soft budget constraints of the SOCBs 
are crucial institutional arrangements for both maintaining stability of the technically bankrupt 
SOCBs and their continued accumulation of NPLs, and analyzes a self-accumulation mechanism, 
the so-called endogenous nature of NPLs of the SOCBs by integrating sunk costs model, 
gambling for resurrection model, and tragedy of the SOCBs as common land model. The thesis 
laid its emphasis on influence of dual soft budget constraints on rational expectations and actions 
of the SOCBs, SOEs and local governments.  
The endogenous nature of NPLs implies that formation and accumulation of NPLs of the SOCBs 
will persist and recur. Therefore, an important role of government in NPLs resolution in the case of 
China should be to harden soft budget constraints of commercial banks, especially that of the 
SOCBs. Otherwise, NPLs of the SOCBs are inevitable costs of implementing soft budget 
constraints of the SOCBs.  
Because cases of dual soft budget constraints combination are very limited, there are few 
researches on NPLs of the SOCBs from perspective of soft budget constraints, and this chapter 
blazes a trail in this area by systematically analyzing a specific endogenous nature of NPLs of the 
SOCBs. The endogenous nature of NPLs provides an original explanation for relationship 
between stock of NPLs and flow of NPLs of the SOCBs, and thus provides an original analytical 
framework for role of government in NPLs resolution in China’s case.  
The originality of the paper is that it systematically analyzes a unique identity of NPLs of the 
SOCBs that derives endogenously from institutional arrangement of the dual soft budget 
constraints. This identity determines that mechanism of formation and accumulation of the NPLs 
of the SOCBs in China is not only different from those of developed economies such as United 
States and Japan, but also those of many developing economies and transitional economies. The 
paper argues that endogenous nature of NPLs of the SOCBs determines that NPLs of the SOCBs 
will persist and recur in the future; therefore, resolution of NPLs of the SOCBs cannot simply follow 
suites of other economies, but should target at the endogenous nature of NPLs of the SOCBs. 
One of the most important role of government in NPLs resolution in the case of China is to harden 
soft budget constraints of commercial banks, especially that of the SOCBs. 
The paper concludes that because NPLs of the SOCBs have been endogenously derived from 
institutional arrangements of dual soft budget constraints, therefore, so long as regulatory 
authorities make efforts continually to harden budget constraints of both the SOCBs and SOEs, it 
is impossible to stop accumulation of NPLs of the SOCBs. However, because the internal relations 
of social, political, and economic in China are very complicated, and the country is ongoing 
unprecedented changes, it is unrealistic to analyze all these factors within one paper. Therefore, 
the research is tentative and need further follow-up researches. Besides, target of the paper is to 
explore a more efficient financial institutional arrangement for China. The emphasis of the paper is 
not to propose ideal detailed policy suggestions, but to grasp the internal logic of China’s financial 
institutional evolution. A deeper and clearer understanding of sources and path dependence of 
financial institutional evolution will undoubtedly enrich our insights. 
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Analysis on reasons of implementing soft budget constraints of the SOCBs has very important 
policy implication for ongoing banking reform in China. Now the SOCBs have all set up specific 
public listing schedules and reform process is expected to speed upF2F. After 20 years of reform, 
China has finally come to strike rings of ownership issue that once was taboo; this is a giant leap 
forward. However, analysis of the chapter implies that transformation of ownership itself, such as 
public listing or privatization, is helpful to ameliorate the internal management of commercial 
banks (World Bank, 1997); however, ownership transformation can mitigate soft budget 
constraints resulting from special principal-agent relationship, while soft budget problem resulting 
from policy burdens and too big to fail of the SOCBs cannot be eliminated or mitigated. This is a 
big lesson drawn from experiences of East European and former Soviet Bloc economies in their 
course of transition. The economies experiences showed that, after privatization, the once 
prevalent soft budget problem turned out to be strengthened rather than weakened (World Bank, 
1997). The case of Taiwan also demonstrates the same lesson. After being public listed for many 
years (the so-called MinYingHua in Taiwanese), the problem of soft budget has not been 
eliminated. By delving into the analytical framework of soft budget constraints, the thesis hereby 
contend that the issue of soft budget constraints should be accentuated by the central government 
and that measures targeted at resolving soft budget constraints of the SOCBs should be put in 
place at the next round of financial reforms.  
The rest of the thesis is divided into seven chapters:  
UChapter 2U gives a bird’s-eye view on the character of banking system in China. Adapting to 
purpose of the thesis, the chapter points out that China’s financial system has four outstanding 
structural features. Namely, indirect finance is dominant in financial market, state-ownership, 
oligopoly, and low profitability. Thus, the chapter provides an institutional analytical background 
and necessary introduction to China’s banking system. All these characters have direct relations 
with formation of soft budget constraints of the SOCBs in China, which will be analyzed in details 
in chapter six, therefore, chapter 2 is salient both for formation of soft budget constraints of the 
SOCBs and for discussing ways to harden soft budget constraints of the soft budget constraints of 
the SOCBs.   
UChapter 3U systematically analyzes nominal NPLs ratios of the SOCBs from 1994 to 2004, 
adjusted NPLs ratios after effects of loan classification standards and policy write-offs were 
excluded, and relative severity of NPLs of the SOCBs from different angles by comparing with 
international and domestic big banks and percentage of NPLs of the SOCBs to GDP and to fiscal 
income, and further discusses potential effects of non-performing non-credit assets on NPLs ratio 
of the SOCBs, thus reaching a comprehensive review of NPLs of the SOCBs, and laying an 
analytical base for further analysis on NPLs of the SOCBs. 
Adjusted nominal NPLs ratios and NPLs of the SOCBs show that although many positive 
measures have been implemented and regulatory goal of “double reductions” has been realized in 
                                                        
2 Since the beginning of 2003, the chief executive officers of the big four SOCBs  have expressed their desire to try to be the first SOCBs  to list 
publicly. However, their public-listing schemes are different. Among which, CICB wish to go public as a complete unit, while CCB wishes to go 
public by dividing into two parts and allows the better part of the bank go public –listing first. BOC wishes to go public-listing overseas. 
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terms of nominal NPLs ratios and NPL outstanding balance of the SOCBs since 2002, 
correspondent adjusted NPLs ratios and outstanding balance of the SOCBs have not reduced 
obviously if effects of policy write-offs and swifts of loan classification methods were excluded.  
Comparison of NPLs of the SOCBs with that of international banks and domestic financial 
institutions, percentage of NPLs to GDP and to fiscal revenue, percentage of NPLs ratio on book 
to GDP and to fiscal income show from different aspects that, although since 2000 both nominal 
NPLs ratios and NPLs of the SOCBs have continued to decrease, NPLs ratios of the SOCBs are 
still way higher than those of the world top 100 banks and big banks of emerging market 
economies, and much higher than those of domestic joint-stock commercial banks. A further 
analysis on non-performing assets beside loans shows that if part of non-performing assets 
closely related with NPLs were included, situation of NPLs of the SOCBs would be more serious. 
The preliminary analysis of the chapter implies: First, the write-offs of NPLs by the central 
government have been the major factors contributing to the significant decrease of nominal NPLs 
ratios of the SOCBs in recent years. Second, despite that many positive measures have been 
implemented and that internal control and management of the SOCBs have been strengthened 
gradually, even nominal NPLs ratios of the SOCBs have still been much higher than either those of 
international counterparts or domestic joint-stock commercial banks. These facts indicate that, 
NPLs problem of the SOCBs has not all been caused by poor management of the SOCBs. 
Therefore, formation and deterioration of NPLs of the SOCBs must be traced to historical or 
institutional reasons, and researches should pay more attention to the peculiarities of NPLs of the 
SOCBs. Third, for China’s regulatory authorities, after joint-stock reforms of the state-owned 
commercial banks, how to control newly added NPLs of the SOCBs and improve the SOCBs’ 
capacity to reduce NPLs by their own has became a very important topic. 
Although both NPLs ratios and NPLs of the SOCBs have been lingering at high levels for many 
years, systemic banking crisis has not broke out in China. This special phenomenon and 
underlying reasons should be an important precondition and a starting point for analyzing NPLs of 
the SOCBs.  
UChapter 4 U attempts to answer the question why the serious technically bankrupt SOCBs can still 
develop rapidly in such a long time from perspective of soft budget constraints, a kind of 
government-enterprises relationship. In fact, China’s Soft budget constraints of the SOCBs are 
very serious. The chapter calculates technical bankruptcy ratios of the SOCBs to illustrate degree 
of technical bankruptcy, and shows that, ever since commercialization reform took momentum in 
1994, the SOCBs have been in a state of technical bankruptcy. Analysis of the chapter points out 
that, in case of China, not only fiscal authorities and the central government, but also banking 
regulatory authorities and depositors have become supporters of soft budget constraints of the 
SOCBs.  
The chapter includes seven parts. Section 4.2 calculate technical bankruptcy situation of the 
SOCBs during the period of 1994 to 2004; section 4.3 define and clarify conceptual framework of 
soft budget constraints of the SOCBs; Section 4.4 gives literature review ; section 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7 
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discuss three forms of soft budget constraints of the SOCBs, to wit, direct capital injection by 
government leading to inseparability of national reputation from that of commercial banks, 
systemic liquidity supports by the PBOC, the central bank, and regulatory forbearance 
respectively.  
Analysis shows that, although the concept of soft budget constraints has been widely used after 
Kornai, most are widely used to describe phenomenon associated with enterprises and has rarely 
been used to analyze those of commercial banks, let along those of the SOCBs, Therefore, the 
chapter blazes a trail in this area by providing systemic literature review, definition, nature, 
evolution of soft budget constraints of commercial banks, and distinguishing between soft budget 
constraints of the SOCBs and soft budget constraints of SOEs. In order to deepen understanding 
of soft budget constraints of commercial banks, the chapter also probe into reasons why soft 
budget constraints of the SOCBs have not been noticed in the past by both market economies and 
planned economies and economic consequence of implementing soft budget constraints policy, 
thus the chapter provide a very useful conceptual framework for further analysis of soft budget 
constraints of the SOCBs. The chapter lay emphases on technical bankruptcy degree of the 
SOCBs both integrated or individually, and three expressions of soft budget constraints of the 
SOCBs, to wit, capital injections and policy write-offs by the central government, financing from 
and interests rates regulation by the central government, and regulatory forbearances. Analysis of 
the chapter shows that soft budget constraints of the SOCBs are pervasive and popular. 
The analysis on economic consequences of soft budget constraints of commercial banks indicate 
that, high NPLs ratios of the SOCBs might closely connected with recurring nature of NPLs of the 
SOCBs as shown in chapter 3. In chapter 5, by using the conceptual framework of chapter 4, we 
will further answer the second question why NPLs of the SOCBs have been lingering at high level 
even after policy write-offs and capital injections, and why NPLs ratios of the SOCBs have been 
much higher than those of stock-holding commercial banks. 
The analysis of this chapter shows that, from perspective of soft budget constraints, reform 
measures for the SOCBs since 1994 can be labeled as “reforms within soft budget constraints”, to 
wit, the SOCBs are immune to credible bankruptcy threats. Besides, because soft budget 
constraints policy are kind of specific relations between government and enterprises, and 
government has been pushing reforms of the SOCBs forward since 1994, therefore, purpose of 
various reform measures taken in the past 10 years by the central government can be seen as 
measures to maintain, supplement and intensify soft budget constraints policy of the SOCBs. The 
central government expects to achieve at least two direct goals by implementing soft budget 
constraints policy of the SOCBs. One is to stabilize the SOCBs, therefore overall banking system 
consequently; the other is to reduce NPLs of the SOCBs to an acceptable level. The analysis in 
this chapter reveals that many current researches and policies regarding reforms of the SOCBs 
have apparently not recognized importance of the soft budget constraints. Compared with mature 
market economies, soft budget constraints policy is a China-specific precondition for analyzing 
reforms of the SOCBs, and should be a starting point of discussing many problems faced by the 
SOCBs (see conclusion of chapter 3). Besides, because soft budget constraints policy also refers 
to a type of relationships between government and SOEs, soft budget constraints of the SOCBs 
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can also be a starting point of explaining relationship between the central government and the 
SOCBs.  
Therefore, the conceptual framework of soft budget constraints of the SOCBs provides not only a 
coherent explanation for relations and purposes of a series of reform measures of the SOCBs in 
recent years, but also offers a useful analytical tool for analyzing many problems that are still 
perplexing the SOCBs, especially the question why NPLs of the SOCBs recur and maintain at 
abnormal high levels since 1994 despite the central government has taken many positive 
measures followed suites of international experiences. Chapter 5 will probe into endogenous 
nature of NPLs of the SOCBs to explain the phenomenon from perspective of dual soft budget 
constraints. 
UChapter 5 Ulays emphasis on influence of dual soft budget constraints on expectations of the 
SOCBs, SOEs and local governments, and attempts to answer the following questions: first, 
institutional arrangements of transforming soft budget constraints of SOEs into NPLs of the 
SOCBs; second, reasons that the SOCBs are still acting as supporters of soft budget constraints 
of SOEs after policy wrote-offs of policy-related business in 1994 when commercialization reform 
of the state specialized banks began; third, reasons that enterprises hope to evade banking loans 
and successfully break a symbiosis relations between the SOCBs and SOEs when the SOCBs are 
supporters of soft budget constraints of SOEs. Answers to these questions are crucial for NPLs 
resolution and banking risks mitigation, and can serve as premises for discussing ways to harden 
soft budget constraints of the SOCBs. The chapter concludes that because NPLs of the SOCBs 
have been endogenously derived from institutional arrangements of dual soft budget constraints, 
therefore, so long as authorities make continuous efforts to harden budget constraints of both the 
SOCBs and SOEs, it is impossible to stop accumulation of NPLs of the SOCBs. Because cases of 
dual soft budget constraints combination are very limited, there are few researches on NPLs of the 
SOCBs from perspective of soft budget constraints, and this chapter blazes a trail in this area. 
The analysis of this chapter proves that soft budget constraints of the SOCBs are crucial 
institutional arrangements for continued accumulation of NPLs of the SOCBsF3F. The inevitability 
imposed by sunk costs and opportunism of commercial banks explains why the SOCBs still serve 
as supporters of soft budget constraints of SOEs after market-oriented commercial bank reform 
was initiated and non-state owned enterprises have already playing important role in economy. 
The above analysis will be more complicated by including free-riding financial stability provided by 
central government and over-using financial resources of the SOCBs by local governments. The 
analysis indicates that the dual soft budget constraints will influence accumulation of NPLs of the 
SOCBs from two aspects. One is that soft budget constraints of commercial banks weaken 
self-viability of commercial banks; the other is that soft budget constraints of SOEs weaken 
self-viability of SOEs. If managers of the SOCBs have no opportunism or moral hazards, sunk 
                                                        
3 Here the phrase of institutional arrangement indeed refers to that the dual soft budget constraints in China is a subjective institutional 
arrangement, but not the result of natural institution evolvement. Moreover, the existence and intensification of the dual soft budget constraints  
need a series supporting measures, so as to last for a long period of time. The current policies and measures of reform in China do not orient the 
goal of hardening soft budget constraints; on the contrary, many measures further intensify the expectation on soft budget constraints, such as 
debt-to-equity swap and a series of measures of mitigating and preventing financial risks taken by commercial banks. 
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costs decide that to issue new loans to loss-making enterprises or those with no self-viability 
becomes the best choice for the SOCBs with enormous loans issued previously and became sunk 
costs. Therefore, NPLs of the SOCBs are inevitable when the SOCBs still act as supporters of soft 
budget constraints of SOEs. Sunk costs are not unique to China, even in mature market 
economies, commercial banks are also forced to refinance many obvious unprofitable enterprises 
when considering sunk costs. Therefore, the dual roles of the SOCBs are mutually intensified. Due 
to failure of internalizing speculation costs, soft budget constraints of the SOCBs result in 
insensibility of SOCBs to risks of SOEs, strong path dependence, and gambling for resurrection on 
SOEs. 
The originality of the chapter is to analyze internal and external institutional arrangements of the 
SOCBs within a unified framework of dual soft budget constraints, reveals the mutually interacted 
and intensified relations between soft budget constraints of the SOCBs and soft budget constraints 
of SOEs, and indicates the self-accumulation mechanism of NPLs of the SOCBs by adapting to 
the sunk costs model and the gambling for resurrection model. Therefore, the paper provides an 
original explanation for relationship between stock of NPLs and flow of NPLs of the SOCBs, and 
thus provides an analytical framework for role of government in NPLs resolution in China’s case. 
Analysis of chapter 5 logically concludes that one specific role of government in NPLs resolution of 
the SOCBs in the case of China is to harden soft budget constraints of the SOCBs. Therefore, in 
order to find effective ways to harden soft budget constraints of the SOCBs, it is very necessary to 
understand why China has to implement soft budget constraints of the SOCBs in such a long time.  
UChapter 6 U analyzes three specific reasons to implement soft budget constraints of the SOCBs, to 
wit, special principal-agent relationship between the SOCBs and governments, policy burdens as 
supporters of soft budget constraints of SOEs, and negative externalities incurred by “too big to 
fail”, thus clarity direction to harden soft budget constraints of the SOCBs. Among the three 
reasons, special principal-agent relationship between the SOCBs and governments, policy 
burdens as supporters of soft budget constraints of SOEs are specific to China, while negative 
externalities are universally applicable.  
Different from common industrial and commercial enterprises, a commercial bank has two levels 
of principal-agent relationships. One is between owner and managerial personnel, and the other is 
between depositors and commercial banks. In order to protect interests of principals, principals of 
both levels will have to supervise the common agent, to wit, managerial personnel of commercial 
banks, and thus form two types of supervisions, namely, property rights supervision by owners and 
market supervisions by depositors. Purpose of property rights supervision is to maximize owners’ 
interests, while purpose of market supervision is to maximize depositors’ interests. In case of the 
SOCBs, with stable soft budget constraints expectation, their acts as agents have been restrained 
only by owners’ supervision. Therefore, management of the SOCBs makes optimal choices as 
agent. Management of commercial banks should reflect not only maximized interests of agents but 
also requirements of principals. Supervisions and constraints imposed by principals are of great 
significance for improving efficiency of management. 
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In the principal–agent relationship of the SOCBs, the SOCBs, as agent, face with multiple targets, 
whose actions will be affected by following factors: (I) parameters for different tasks assigned by 
principal; (ii) difficulty of evaluating these targets; (iii) maximization of agent’s utility function. In 
order to ensure that the SOCBs as agent will faithfully assume responsibilities in macroeconomic 
management, the central government has provided special incentives and control measures, to 
wit, officialdom for managers of the SOCBs, which can only be provided by government (see table 
6-1). Under such institutional arrangements, the rational choice for the SOCBs is to accord with 
demands of the government, and it ensures that the government and the SOCBs can maximize 
their utility simultaneously. By making full use of soft budget constraints policy, managers of the 
SOCBs not only satisfy demands of the principal, but also maximize their own utility, which 
includes incumbent consumption and possible promotion in future. Deviation happens to these 
two roles, therefore, it is difficult for the SOCBs to maximize profits. Finally, the SOCBs have 
become tools of the central government to satisfy needs of public interests with low efficient 
allocation of credit resources.  
With more than two decades’ reform and development, China has learned from experiences of 
mature market economies to build financial regulatory system and set up a series of regulatory 
standards. However, in order to adapt to real situation of the state-owned commercial banks, 
regulatory authorities in China has relaxed regulatory standards and chosen not to close insolvent 
financial institutions. According to the IMF (1998), these acts are typical regulatory forbearance, 
which means that regulatory authority loosens regulatory standards agreed ex ante purposely to 
adapt to problematic commercial banks and leads to incredibility of bankruptcy threats. When the 
state reputation and the commercial reputation of the four SOCBs cannot be separated, rational 
choices of regulatory authorities are to implement regulatory forbearance policy.  
UChapter 7 U further analyzes formation of soft budget constraints of the SOCBs by probing into 
relationship between gradual financial reform and formation of soft budget constraints of the 
SOCBs, thus discuss existence of soft budget constraints of the SOCBs from a more broader and 
objective horizon.  
CUhapter 8U logically concludes that, because NPLs of the SOCBs have endogenously derived from 
institutional arrangements of dual soft budget constraints, to wit, soft budget constraints of the 
SOCBs and soft budget constraints of SOEs, therefore, formation and accumulation of NPLs of 
the SOCBs are not only different from those of developed economies such as United States and 
Japan, but also from those of developing and transitional economies. The thesis accordant argues 
that, in the case of China, role of government in NPLs resolution of the SOCBs should not simply 
follow suites of other economies, but should target at the endogenous nature of NPLs accordingly. 
Therefore, role of government in NPLs resolution in the case of China is to harden soft budget 
constraints of commercial banks, especially that of the SOCBs. The central government must 
accentuate and initiate measures aimed at resolving soft budget constraints of the SOCBs in its 
financial reform package. One specific role of government in NPLs resolution of the SOCBs is to 
harden soft budget constraints of the SOCBs. However, hardening soft budget constraints of the 
SOCBs needs complementary financial reforms.  
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The last section further points out challenges for the government to harden soft budget constraints 
of the SOCBs. Although the central government does not have enough impetus to harden the soft 
budget constraints, the central government must harden soft budget constraints of the SOCBs. 
The thesis points out that, because soft budget constraints are an incentive mechanism and an 
important relationship between government and enterprises with a feature of public goods. One 
breakthrough is to divide the four SOCBs into several medium-sized or small-sized banks, so as to 
enhance credibility of bankruptcy threats of commercial banks, weaken capacity of local 
governments to overuse public resources, thus creating conditions for hardening soft budget 
constraints of the SOCBs in institutional arrangements, rebuilding incentive mechanism of 
commercial banks, and breaking endogenously vicious circle of NPLs.
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6BFEATURES OF CHINA’S FINANICAL SYSTEM: AN 
OVERVIEW 
 
 
A diversified banking system has developed very quickly in the past 50 years. By the end of 2005, 
China’s financial system includes 3 policy banks, 4 SOCBs, 12 joint-stock commercial banks, 113 
city commercial banks, 8 rural commercial banks, 709 urban credit cooperatives, 33586 rural 
credit cooperatives, 19 rural cooperative banks, and 192 branches and 209 representative offices 
of foreign banks. Non-bank financial institutions include securities firms, insurance companies, 
fund corporations, financial companies, trust and investment corporations and leasing firms (See 
figure 2-1).  
17B2.1 EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL BANKS IN CHINA, 1949--2005 
Since foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China’s banking system has 
experienced two fundamental structural changes. 
58B2.1.1 The Mono- Banking System, 1949-1994 
The Mono-banking system in China can be classified into three sub-stages. 
UInitial Period, 1949-1953 
The PBOC began to issue RMB; the legal tender of China, in December 1948, symbolizing the 
beginning of China’s banking system. 
UMono-Bank System Period, 1953-1978 
During this period, the PBOC executed all functions of financial business, and the BOC was a 
specialized department dealing with foreign currency business within the PBOC. In 1954, the CCB 
was established to specialize in fiscal appropriations of basic construction as a subordinate 
department of the Ministry of Finance, and was not a real commercial bank (Before 1994, the CCB 
was called the People’s Construction Bank of China). Established twice in 1955 and 1963 
respectively, the ABC had existed for a short period and was incorporated into the PBOC twice. 
2
コメント [FIC1]:  From what you 
have listed, there are nine different 
types. 
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UState Specialized Banking System, 1979-1994 
In February 1979, the ABC was set up again as a specialized bank operating in rural areas by 
separating agricultural lending business from the PBOC. Then in March 1979, the BOC was also 
separated from the PBOC, and became a state specialized bank specializing in foreign exchange 
business. In August 1979, the CCB was separated from the MOF, specializing in long-term lending 
business. In January 1984, the ICBC was separated from the PBOC, specializing in industrial and 
commercial lending, after the establishment of ICBC, the PBOC began to specialize in acting as a 
central bank, and the state-owned specialized banking system came into being.  
59B2.1.2 Real Commercial Banks Began To Evolve, 1994---    
The promulgation of the Commercial Bank Law of People’s Republic of China marked the 
formation of a modern financial system in China. Three policy banks, namely, the China State 
Development Bank, the China Export and Import Bank, and the China Agriculture Development 
Bank, were established in 1994. These banks took over policy business that had been carried out 
by the state specialized banks by peeling policy business off from the state specialized banks. The 
four specialized banks have been transformed into four commercial banks, namely, the ICBC, the 
BOC, the ABC and the CCB,. 
The law on People’s Bank of China and Commercial Bank Law of People’s Republic of China 
promulgated in 1995 further legalize the identity of the central bank and commercial banks. 
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192BFigure 2-1 Financial Institutions in China (till the end of 2005) 
Source: Prepared by the author.
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18B2.2 FEATURES OF FINANCIAL SYSTEM IN CHINA 
60B2.2.1 Commercial Banks Are Main Players in China’s Financial System 
Financial system can be classified into two types: one is bank-led financial system represented by 
Germany, in which commercial banks play a dominant role in allocating resources. For example, 
three comprehensive banks of Germany, the Deutsche bank, the Dresdner bank and the 
Commerz Bank, dominantly allocate most resources of enterprises. The other is market-led 
financial system represented by the United States, in which financial market plays an important 
role in allocating resources. Traditionally, China’s financial system belongs to the first type, where 
commercial banks are in a dominant position, which can be illustrated by both stock and flow of 
indirect and direct finance.  
UIndirect Finance Accounts For a Major Share in China’s Financial System  
Table 2-1 shows that in the financing outstanding every year, percentage of indirect finance has 
decreasing from 87% in 1995 to 73% in 2002. In the total flow of fund raising every year, new 
loans from banks account are much larger than other finance vehicles. Although in recent years 
capital market in China has gained momentum, direct financing accounts for a very small part in 
comparison with that of commercial banks as table2-1 shows, direct finance accounts for only 
1.36% and 0.9% in 1994 and 1995 respectively. By the end of 2003, indirect finance accounted 
for 97.11% of total new financing amounts (See table 2-2). 
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104BTable 2-1 Financing Structure in China, 1995-2002 
                                                                                                             (Unit：RMB 100 Million)  
Financing balance of securities market 
Year 
Outstanding Balance 
of Finance (a) 
Outstanding Balance 
of Loans (b) Bond balance (c) Stock financing balance (d) Financing balance in monetary market (e) 
Indirect Financing  
(b/a) 
1995 58,405.16  50,538  3,969.91 1,473.25 2,424  86.53 
1996 72,053.74  61,152.8  4,959.16 2,051.78 3,890  84.87 
1997 89,447.65  74,914.1  6,029.95 3,903.60 4,600  83.75 
1998 103,925.77  86,524.1  8,442.63 5,118.04 3,841  83.26 
1999 116,561.67  93,734.3  11,320.63 6,430.74 5,076  80.42 
2000 130,313.21  99,371.1  13,881.63 9,615.48 7,445  76.26 
2001 152,282.99  112,314.7  16,626.63 11,368.66 11,973  73.75 
2002 180,433.32  131,293.93  20,669.73 12,330.66 16,139  72.77 
Note: 
I: Bonds include treasury bonds and enterprise bonds. Shares include the financing balance share, loan outstanding share, H share and N share financing from domestic and foreign country. The occurring amount of bills 
represents the financing balance in money market (As the data are not very correlated, if the occurring amount substitutes the balance, which will overestimate the financing amount in bill market, total financing amount will 
be larger and proportion of indirect financing will be underestimated, but will not affect changing trend of indirect financing. 
Source:  Li JIAN, Analyze the Reform on SOE from the Macroeconomic View (Economic and Science Press, June 2004), 58 
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105BTable 2-2 Structure of Newly Added Finance, 1994-2003 
Average Share （％）  
Financing Means 1994 1995 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003
Indirect Financing 98.64 99.1 93.66 89.65 91.61 96.05 97.11 
Direct Financing 1.36 0.9 6.34 10.35 8.39 3.95 2.89 
Note: 
a: Proportion of indirect financing of current year= added financing amount of current year/(added financing amount of current year+ raised capital in 
domestic stock market of current year),  
Proportion of direct financing of current year=raised capital in domestic stock market of current year/ (added financing amount of current year+ added 
financing amount of current year). 
B: Data of the above table include only flow. 
Source: data of 2002 and 2003 are calculated based on the Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking (2003,2004), other data come from Yan Deyong, 
study on financial industry organizational theory, (China Financing Publishing House, 2004), 62 
 
106BTable 2-3 Structure of Indirect Finance and Direct Finance of Five Selected Economies, 1970-1985       
                                                                                                        (Unit:％) 
Item USA Britain Japan France German 
Indirect Finance 53 66 62 70 81 
Direct Finance 47 34 38 30 19 
Short-term Securities 3 7 0 0 0 
Commercial Loans 19 9 28 8 8 
Bonds 22 2 5 4 3 
Stocks 2 15 5 18 8 
Source: Li Jian, Structure Problem in Chinese Financial Development, (The China Rennin University Press, 2004. P247).  
UCommercial Banks and Their Role In Transmitting Monetary Policy 
In the case of China, transmission mechanism for monetary policy is as follows: the People's Bank 
of China（PBOC）→ commercial banks, other financial institutions →investment and consuming 
behavior of macroeconomic entities → national income. Therefore, at present, credit lending of 
commercial banks becomes a main channel of monetary transmission mechanism, under which 
the central bank controls the money supply by affecting the re-loans to commercial banks and 
changing rediscount costs. Besides, although base money is created by the central bank, its 
supply depends on the amount of vault cash in commercial banks. Third, derivative deposit 
function of commercial banks is very important to realize monetary policy. Under the condition, 
that reserve system exists and depositors do not withdraw deposits, deposits of commercial banks 
will create more deposits that are derivative. Therefore, in a bank-led financial system, commercial 
banks play an important role in the monetary policy transmission. In the case of China, the SOCBs 
determine the fate of monetary policy of the central bank.  
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61B2.2.2 State Monopoly 
Another telling characteristic of financial system of China is state monopoly, which can be 
analyzed from following two aspects. 
UThe SOCBs Have Monopolized Assets, Deposits and Loans of Banking System in China 
Table 2-4 shows that total amounts of assets, deposits and loans of the SOCBs have increased 
continuously, but percentages of the SOCBs in the whole banking system have decreased 
gradually. The assets of the SOCBs reached RMB 16.4887 trillion and deposits of the SOCBs 
reached RMB 10.1886 trillion, and their loans accounted for 58.91% of the total loans of the 
financial institutions. The deposits of the SOCBs reached RMB 13.9491 trillion, 60.29% of the total 
deposits in the whole banking sector. 
107BTable 2-4 Market Share of SOCBs, 1995-2004  
 (Unit: RMB 100 million, %) 
Assets Loans Deposits 
Year 
Total 
assets of 
all 
financial 
institutions 
Total 
assets 
of the 
SOCBs 
Percentage of 
total asset of 
the SOCBs to 
total financial 
assets 
Total 
loans of 
financial 
institutions
Total 
loans of 
the 
SOCBs
Percentage 
of total loan 
of the SOCBs 
to total loans 
of all financial 
institutions 
Total 
deposits of 
financial 
institutions
Total 
deposits 
of the 
SOCBs
Percentage of 
total deposits 
of the SOCBs 
to total 
deposits of all 
financial 
institutions 
1995 59897 46112 76.99 48086 37564 78.12 47850 33089 69.15 
1996 74467 55632 74.71 58232 44477 76.38 61716 42402 68.71 
1997 91774 68228 74.34 70691 54375 76.92 75310 51906 68.92 
1998 106412 78887 74.13 81493 62314 76.47 86628 59478 68.66 
1999 119872 88548 73.87 91160 69573 76.32 100340 69770 69.53 
2000 135434 98389 72.65 101816 76062 74.71 113231 77505 68.45 
2001 146281 101035 69.07 103957 72307 69.55 131245 87670 66.80 
2002 212034 133611 63.01 131464 81549 62.03 167944 110252 65.65 
2003 250623 154415 61.61 158535 96401 60.81 199941 127120 63.58 
2004.09 282459 164887 58.38 172966 101886 58.91 231364 139491 60.29 
Source: Statistical Quarterly Report of People’s Bank of China, 4th of 2004. Financial Institutions refer to deposit-absorbing institutions: 1) The SOCBs include the 
ICBC, the ABC, the CCB and the BOC 2) China Agriculture Development Bank 3) Other commercial banks including the Bank of Communications, the ICTIC 
Industrial Bank, the Everbright Bank, the Huaxia Bank, the Guangdong Development Bank, the Shenzhen Development Bank, the Merchant Bank, the Pudong 
Development Bank, the Xingyel Bank, the Minsheng Bank and the Yongfeng Bank. 4) City commercial banks 5) rural commercial banks 6) foreign banks 7) urban 
credit cooperatives; 8) rural credit cooperatives; 9) financial corporations.  
UNew Trend of Nationalization for Joint-Stock Banks 
Central government or local governments controlled most joint-stock banks, except the Minsheng 
Bank, either directly or indirectly. Among which, some are controlled by central government, such 
as the Bank of Communications; some are controlled by local governments, such as the Industrial 
Bank. Some even controlled by SOEs, such as the Huaxia Bank, which was controlled by the 
Capital Steel Company, thus controlled by government indirectly. The above two aspects indicate 
that Joint-stock commercial banks also have a characteristic of state monopoly. 
Table 2-5 reflects that assets, deposits and loans of the four SOCBs account for 63%, 70% and 
61% of the total amount in the whole banking sector respectively, while those of 40,000 urban 
コメント [FIC3]: Total this into 
one percentage of the total banking 
sector. 
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credit cooperatives, city commercial banks, rural credit cooperatives, and foreign-invested banks 
account for no more than 30% of the total accounts. Therefore, if combined with city commercial 
banks, which are directly controlled by local governments, SOCBs have controlled most assets, 
loans and deposits of China.  
108BTable 2-5 Structure of China’s Banking System, 2001 
 Number
Total Assets 
(RMB 1 billion) 
Market 
Share
(%) 
Outstanding 
Balance of Loans
(RMB 1 billion) 
Market 
share 
(%) 
Outstanding 
Balance of Deposits
(RMB 1 billion) 
Market 
Share 
(%) 
SOCBs 4 12208 62.6 7058 60.5 9736 69.6 
Policy bank 3 1772 9.1 1571 13.5 32 0.2 
Joint-stock commercial bank 10 2402 12.3 1054 9.0 1596 11.5 
Urban credit cooperative (City 
commercial bank) 
1049 
(109) 856 4.4 550 4.7 781 5.6 
Rural credit cooperative 37270 1875 9.6 1274 10.9 1727 12.4 
Foreign-invested bank 177 374 1.9 154 1.3 64 0.5 
Total 38622 19487 100 11661 100 13937 100 
Notes: the total asset of urban credit cooperative and rural credit cooperative did not amount to that released by the PBOC, because the “others” in the liability 
amount was considered as negative asset to be summed into the total asset. The total asset of the SOCBs was larger than that published by the PBOC. 
Because the PBOC excluded the current business of every SOCB. 
Source: Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking in 2002 
Table 2-6 lists the market share of deposits, loans and assets of the SOCBs and every joint-stock 
bank. It shows that the ICBC has the largest share in the lending market (deposit 22.85%, loan 
21.11% and asset 20.91 %). The ABC, the CCB and the BOC followed it in terms of market share 
by the end of 2003. The four SOCBs absorbed 64.84% of the total deposits and issued 59.45% of 
the total loans, and their assets accounted for 61.56% of total assets of financial institutions by the 
end of 2003. Combined with joint stock banks, amounts of the four SOCBs and joint-stock banks 
have accounted for 77.97%, 78.89% and 72.82% in China’s total amounts, in term of assets, 
deposits and loans by the end of 2003 respectively.  
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109BTable 2-6 Market Share of China’s Banking Industry 
Total Banking Deposits/ Total Deposits of banking 
industry 
Total Banking Loans / Total Loans of banking 
industry Total Banking Assets / Total Assets of Banking Industry                      Item 
Bank 
1996 1998 1999 2001 2002 2003 1996 1998 1999 2001 2002 2003 1996 1998 1999 2001 2002 2003 
ICBC 27.72 27.5 26.05 24.93 24.16 22.85 29.23 26.25 24.89 23.68 22.50 21.11 29.87 27.32 24.64 27.88 22.33 20.91 
ABC 13.87 14.28 14.24 14.56 14.76 14.99 14.69 16.24 16.57 14.66 14.55 14.31 12.07 13.47 16.47 16.32 14.04 13.94 
BOC 18.02 16.28 7.95 17.25 12.40 12.14 17.37 15.17 7.81 14.53 10.67 10.64 17.34 16.7 8.01 16.77 13.46 12.53 
CCB 17.01 16.17 15.49 15.77 15.48 14.86 16.28 14.95 12.03 13.41 13.44 13.39 17.49 15.89 15.47 17.85 14.54 14.18 
Bank of Communications 3.35 4.08 3.11 3.61 2.72 2.94 2.53 2.98 2.6 3.1 3.17 3.30 3.27 3.78 3.08 4.32 3.62 3.79 
ICTIC Industrial Bank 1.27 1.05 0.86 1.7 1.58 1.70 0.83 0.51 0.65 1.23 1.24 1.34 0.89 0.99 0.86 1.94 1.58 1.68 
Everbright Bank 0.4 0.51 0.52 1.4 1.39 1.50 0.35 0.33 0.39 1.3 1.22 1.36 0.39 0.56 0.77 1.71 1.51 1.57 
Merchant Bank 0.83 0.96 0.83 1.55 1.66 1.83 0.68 0.67 0.66 1.23 1.21 1.51 0.84 1.03 0.91 1.72 1.75 2.37 
Shenzhen Development Bank 0.3 0.31 0.28 0.61 0.55 0.56 0.22 0.2 0.22 0.48 0.41 0.55 0.25 0.29 0.27 0.78 0.78 0.77 
Guangdong Development Bank 0.62 0.7 0.64 1.06 0.89 1.03 0.64 0.55 0.53 0.89 0.86 1.05 0.62 0.8 0.68 1.23 1.03 1.20 
Xingye Bank 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.49 0.76 0.91 0.2 0.16 0.22 0.63 0.69 0.88 0.2 0.26 0.33 0.81 0.90 1.04 
Huaxia Bank 0.24 0.38 0.41 0.88 0.79 0.94 0.17 0.25 0.29 0.59 0.64 0.81 0.19 0.37 0.41 0.88 0.84 0.98 
Minsheng Bank  0.19 0.24 0.72 1.03 1.27  0.12 0.16 0.65 0.78 1.13 0.07 0.19 0.25 0.9 1.15 1.44 
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank 0.59 0.72 0.66 1.03 1.24 1.32 0.47 0.5 0.51 0.86 1.03 1.39 0.53 0.65 0.69 1.12 1.32 1.48 
Yongfeng Bank 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.1 0.07 0.08 
Housing&Savings Bank of Bengbu 0.006 0.007 0.007    0.001 0.006 0.006    0.005 0.006 0.006    
Note: Fujian Industrial Bank was reorganized and renamed as Industrial Bank in December 2002. Housing Savings bank in Yantai was reorganized and renamed as Hengfeng Bank in August 2003. 
Source: calculated according to Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking. 
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Table 2-7 lists percentage of household savings and deposits of the SOCBs combined with those 
of the Bank of Communications and the China CITIC Bank to total deposits of financial institutions. 
The percentage accounted for 68.79% by the end of 1999. 
110BTable 2-7 Percentage of Household Deposits of the SOCBs to Total Deposits  
Year 
National Household Deposits
(RMB 100 million) 
Retail Deposits of the SOCBs
(RMB 100 million) 
Percentage of Household Deposits to Total Deposit of 
the SOCBs 
1959 68.30 47.30 69.25 
1964 55.50 44.80 80.72 
1969 75.90 61.00 80.37 
1974 136.50 105.80 77.51 
1979 281.00 202.60 72.10 
1984 1,214.70 776.60 63.93 
1989 5,196.40 3,630.08 69.86 
1994 21,518.80 14,841.68 68.97 
1999 59,621.80 41,011.28 68.79 
Note: The SOCBs in the table also include the Bank of Communications and the China CITIC Bank. 
Sources: Data from 1959 to 1996 are from China Financial Statistics (1952-1996), among which data from 1959 to 1987 are from state-owned banks and data 
from 1988 to 1996 are from state specialized banks. Data from 1997 to 1999 are from China Financial Statistics (1997-1999), data of state-owned commercial 
banks are sum of the data of the SOCBs, the Bank of Communications and the CITIC Industrial Bank. 
 
111BTable 2-8 Percentage of Staffs and Institutions of the SOCBs, 1981-1997 
Year 
Percentage of staffs of the SOCBs to those of banking 
industry 
Percentage of institutions of the SOCBs to those of banking 
industry 
1998 83.36 92.18 
1999 83.74 91.77 
2000 82.62 92.88 
2001 81.14 92.02 
2002 80.33 91.09 
2003 79.65 90.48 
Note: 
a: Data of 1981 and 1985 in the table come from Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking of 1989; data of 1989, 1993 and 1997 come from Almanac of 
China’s Finance and Banking of 1998. 
B: The statistical base of the state banks: data of 1995 and before 1995 include data from People’s Bank of China, the ICCB, the ABC, the BOC, the CCB, 
Bank of Communications and CITC Industrial Bank. Data of 1996 and After 1996 include data of People’s Bank of China, China State Development Bank, and 
China Export-Import Bank of China, China Agriculture Development Bank, the ICCB, the ABC, the BOC and the CCB. 
Source: Li Jian and Li Jianjun, The Reform of State-Owned Commercial Banks, Analysis from a Macro Angle of View (Economic and Science Press June 
2004), 46  
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Table 2-8 lists the percentage of staffs and institutions of state-owned banks in China’s financial 
institution. The SOCBs account for a major share in terms of institution and staff. 
Table 2-9 lists profits share of China’s banking sector. At the end of 2001, profits of the SOCBs 
accounted for 66.71% of the total profits and those of joint-stock banks accounted for 33.28%. 
Thus, the SOCBs almost monopolized China’s profits in banking sector either directly or indirectly. 
The above analysis indicates that state monopoly is an obvious characteristic of China’s financial 
system. 
112BTable 2-9 Profits Share of China’s Banking Industry 
  （Unit：RMB 100 billion） 
Banks 1999 2000 Growth rate 2001 Growth rate Profits share 
ICBC 41.26 50.80 23.12 58.93 16.004  
ABC -3.55 2.97 183.62 11.52 287.88  
BOC 29.09 18.76 -35.51 26.46 41.04  
CCB 49.58 75.40 52.08 51.67 -31.47  
SOCBs 116.38 147.93 27.11 148.58 0.44 66.71 
Bank of Communications 26.85 20.25 -24.58 19.09 -5.73  
ICTIC Industrial Bank 11.39 9.24 -18.88 9.45 2.27  
Everbright Bank 6.7738 2.72 -59.82 1.76 -35.29  
Huaxia Bank 5.12 7.55 47.46 9.22 22.12  
Guangdong Development Bank 2.15 2.43 13.02 2.75 13.17  
Shenzhen Development Bank 6.05 4.63 -23.47 4.02 -13.18  
Merchant Bank 15.2 8.04 -47.11 14.31 77.98  
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank 11.77 -3.31 -128.12 0.29 108.76  
Industrial Bank 4.3786 3.20 -26.94 4.82 50.60  
Minsheng Bank 3.6052 2.39 -33.79 6.46 170.29  
Joint-stock Commercial Banks 68.66 57.14 -16.78 74.13 29.73 33.28 
Foreign Banks -12.948 0.05 100.39 1.96 3820 0.088 
Total    222.71  100.00 
Source: Prepared by author. 
62B .2.3 Oligopoly status of the four SOCBs 
China’s banking market belongs to a typical oligopoly market. The so-called oligopoly market 
refers to a market structure in which few firms dominate the majority of production or distribution of 
a certain goodsF4F. 
There are two methods judging the degree of concentration of an industry: absolute method and 
relative method. The former one includes the Concentration Ratio Index of an industry in term of 
CRn, or Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI), the latter includes the Lorenz Curve, the Gini 
                                                        
4 Gao Hongye, Western Economics (China Renmin University Press, 2004). 
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Coefficient. The absolute method mainly reflects concentration degree of the top-ranked firms in 
an industry, but it is difficult to figure out the scale of participating firms, while the relative method 
cares about discrepancy of scale among participating firms, paying no attention to concentration 
degree of top-ranked firms. Therefore, the chapter uses CRn index and the Lorenz Curve to judge 
concentration ratio of China’s banking industry. Concentration Ratio of Banking Industry can be 
expressed as: 
CR n ＝∑
=
n
i
iS
1
 
Where 
n= total firms in a industry 
Si= market share of firms in a industry 
Let n equals 4 to include the ICBS, the ABC, the BOC and the CCB by using data in Table 2-4, 
CRn index of Chinese banking industry in past years can be seen in Table 2-10. The CR4 indicates 
that concentration degree of the SOCBs has been declining in 2002 and 2003, but still maintains a 
monopolistic status from the aspects of assets, deposits and loans. The CR4 indexes of all the 
three aspects are over 60% (in 2003, the CR4 of loan was 59.45%, nearly 60%). 
113BTable 2-10 CR4 Index of China’s Banking Industry  
                                                                     (Unit :%) 
Year 
Item 1996 1998 1999 2001 2002 2003 
Deposits 76.62 74.23 63.73 72.51 66.80 64.84 
Loans 77.57 72.61 61.30 66.28 61.15 59.45 
Assets 76.77 73.38 64.59 78.82 64.37 61.56 
Source: Xieping and Jiaojinpu (1998). 
 
114BTable 2-11 Concentration degree of U.S. Banking Industry, 1976-2000 
Year 
Number of 
banks 
Percentage of total assets 
of the first1% top-ranked 
banks to total assets of 
banking industry 
Percentage of total assets of 
the first10% top-ranked 
banks to total assets of 
banking industry 
Percentage of total assets of 
the first1% top-ranked banks 
to total assets of the last 
40% banks 
Percentage of total assets 
of the first10% top-ranked 
banks to total assets of the 
last 40% banks 
1976 14419 55.8  78.1  15.6  21.8  
1980 14426 58.1  79.4  17.1  23.4  
1984 14388 55.6  79.0  16.2  23.1  
1988 12982 54.7  81.1  18.0  26.8  
1992 11363 54.0  81.1  17.6  26.5  
1993 10881 55.3  82.1  18.9  28.1  
1994 10381 56.7  83.5  21.2  31.2  
1995 9875 57.3  84.2  22.8  33.4  
1996 9465 60.9  85.0  25.8  36.0  
1997 9081 66.5  86.4  31.1  40.4  
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1998 8713 68.0  87.2  33.8  43.4  
1999 8520 68.5  87.5  35.5  45.3  
2000 8252 70.2  88.2  38.6  48.5  
Source: 
a: Ennis (2001), quoting from Lin Yifu, Zhang Qi, and Liu Mingxing, “International Comparison and Positive Analysis on Banking Structure,” http//jlin. ccer. 
edu. Cn/article. 
b: Sun Wuqin et al., Comparison on Financial Function in different Financial Structures (China Statistics Press, 2003), 174 
In recent 20 years, for U.S. banking industry, there was a tendency that assets were gradually 
concentrated in large-scale banks (see Table 2-11). However, CR4 and CR8 indexes of deposit, 
loan and asset (see Table 2-12) of the SOCBs in the year 2001 show that concentration degree of 
China’s banking industry was still far higher than that of United States. Besides, the concentration 
ratios of banking industry of transitional economies are overall higher than the average level. 
However, even comparing to other transitional economies, the concentration ratio in China’s 
banking industry is still quite prominent (see Table 2-13). 
115BTable 2-12 Comparison with Concentration Ratio of China and United States, 2001 
（Unit：%） 
Year Deposits Loans Assets 
China 72.51 66.28 78.82 CR4 U.S.   25.96 
China 80.77 73.14 88.51 CR8 U.S.   34.84 
Note: Figures of China are those of 2001, and those of United States are published on 30th June 2000.  
Source: data of United States come from Yang Deyong, Research on Organization Theory of Financial Industry (China Financial Publishing House, 2004), 
243. 
 
116BTable 2-13 Development Index of Banking Industry in Transitional Economies 
Nation CR3 (1997) Number of Banks (1999) Asset Share of State-owned Banks (1999)
Bad Debts/Total Loans 
(1999) 
Czechoslovakia 74.9 42 23.2 31.4 
Estonia 84.5 7 7.9 3.1 
Hungary 67.4 39 9.1 2.8 
Latvia 53.1 23 8.52 6.32 
Poland 42.3 77 25.0 14.5 
Slovenia 71.7 31 41.7 10.2 
Bulgaria 86.7 281 66 12.91 
Romania 85.0 34 50.3 36.6 
Russia 53.7 2376 41.9 13.1 
Slovak 84.5 25 50.7 40.0 
Source: Erik Berglof and Patrick Bolton (2001). 
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To judge the competition degree of an industry is crucial to understand the overall features of the 
competition structure. Learning from the method of separating market structure by the index of 
absolute concentration ratioF5F, it indicates that until the end of 2003, the competition pattern of 
China's banking industry had been classified into oligopoly Ⅲ, which means the competition in 
China’s banking industry had high or medium monopolistic competition (see table 2-14). Under 
this monopolistic environment, the joint-stock commercial banks, city commercial banks and 
foreign banks could not compete with the four SOCBs at all. 
117BTable 2-14 Concentration Ratio by the Bain Method 
Concentration Ratio 
Competition structure CR4 CR8 
OligopolyⅠ 75≤ CR 4   
Oligopoly Ⅱ 65≤ CR 4 ＜75 Or 85≤ CR 8  
Oligopoly Ⅲ 50≤ CR 4 ＜65 75≤ CR 8 ＜85 
Oligopoly Ⅵ 35≤ CR 4 ＜50 45≤ CR 8 ＜75 
Oligopoly Ⅴ 30≤ CR 4 ＜35 Or 40≤ CR 8 ＜45 
Competition CR 4 ＜30 Or CR 8 ＜40 
Source: Yang Deyong(2003). 
 
118BTable 2-15 Concentration Ratio of the Top 5 or 10 Banks in Aspect of Assets in Selected Economies 
 
Country 1980  1990 1995 
Germany    17(28) 
Japan 25(40)  30(45) 27(43) 
Italy 26(42)  24(39) 29(45) 
France 57(69)  52(66) 47(63) 
Spain 38(58)  38(58) 49(62) 
Switzerland 45(56)  45(57) 50(62) 
U.K. 63(80)  58(79) 57(78) 
Norway 63(74)  68(79) 58(71) 
Belgium 64(76)  58(74) 59(73) 
Canada   55(78) 65(88) 
Australia 62(80)  65(79) 67(79) 
Finland 63(68)  65(69) 74(83) 
Netherlands 73(81)  77(86) 81(89) 
Sweden 64(71)  70(82) 86(93) 
                                                        
5 Liu Haichao and Wang Zhifeng, “Analytical Method and Application of Industrial Market Competition Structure,” Journal of Hebei Industrial 
University, 3rd issue of 1998. Quote from Xie Ping and Jiao Jinpu, Reform of Chinese Commercial Banks, Economic and Science Press, 2002. 
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Note: Among the figures of 1980, the figure of France is in fact the figure of 1986; the figure of Italy is that of 1983; the figures of Finland and Netherlands 
are that of 1985; the figure of Switzerland is that of 1987. Among the figures of 1995, the figures of Japan, U.K., Belgium and Switzerland are in fact the 
figures of 1994; the figure of Finland is that of 1993. Data of concentration ratio include only commercial banks and savings banks. 
Source: annual report of Bank for International Settlement, 66th issue. Requoting from Wang Guohong, “Comments on Market Structure of Chinese 
Banking Industry,” Economic Review，2d issue of 2002.  
 
UPositive Analysis on the Concentration Ratio of China’s Banking Industry with Lorenz Curve 
The index of concentration ratios of an industry mainly reflects the concentration degree of the 
top-ranked firms. However, it is difficult to figure out whether the numbers and the overall scales of 
the participating firms achieve equilibrium or not. Therefore, in order to explain the oligopolistic 
conditions of China’s banking industry further, there is a need to use relative method.  
Western economists who analyzed the distribution of income and wealth first used the Lorenz 
Curve, which was then introduced to the analysis and computation of relative concentration ratio of 
an industry. In Figure 2-3, the horizontal coordinates indicate accumulative percentage of banks, 
which are arranged in order by scale from small to large. The vertical coordinates represent the 
accumulative market share of a certain percentage of banks. By linking the points of intersection in 
the graph, we can get a curve below the 45℃ line of equality termed Lorenz Curve, which reflects 
the concentration degree of banking industry. When all firms in an industry have the same scale, 
Lorenz Curve will become diagonal OS (line of equality). If firms are not in the same scale, Lorenz 
Curve is a curve below the diagonal OS (line of equality). The further Lorenz curve lies below line 
of equality, the more unequal distribution of firms is. By partitioning China’s banking industry into 4 
SOCBs, 12 joint-stock commercial banks and 113 city commercial banks, Lorenz Curve of China’s 
banking industry can be roughly drawn out in Figure 2-3 as curve OBL. It lies far away from the 
line of equality, which means the unequal scale of Chinese banks is extremely serious. The 
concentration degree of China’s banking industry is quite high and the unequal scale of China’s 
banks is extremely serious, therefore, China’s banking industry is a typical oligopoly market. 
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 194BFigure 2-3 the Lorenz Curve of China’s banking industry 
Source: Yang Deyong(2003). 
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The four SOCBs not only monopolized assets, deposits and loans, but also have a majority of 
institutions and staffs. Data about institutions and staffs of the four SOCBs in recent years is listed 
in Table 2-16. From the aspect of institution number, the ABC had the absolute advantage. Before 
2001, the ABC had more than 50 thousand institutions. Although the figure began to decline after 
the year 2001, the ABC still have 36,138 institutions by the end of 2003. At the end of 2003, the 
ICBC, the CCB and the BOC had 24129, 16613 and 11609 institutions respectively. Owing to the 
huge institution number, staff of the SOCBs also dominates financial market. The staff of the ABC 
had been always over 500 thousand. At the end of 2003, the ABC, the ICBC, the CCB and the 
BOC had 511425, 389045, 342967, 171777 staffs respectively, and the staff number of the 4 
SOCBs totaled 1415214. At the end of 2003, the national employment totaled 744.32 millionF6F; the 
percentage of staffs of the SOCBs to national total employment is over 19%. Data in Table 1-18 
excludes the staff number of 20 world banks and the 4 SOCBs in China in 2001 and 2002. 
Compared with banks of other economies, staff of the SOCBs was times of those of its 
counterparts.  
119BTable 2-16 the Number of Institutions and Staffs of the Four SOCBs, 1998-2003 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 Number of 
Institution 
Number of 
Staffs  
Number of 
Institutions 
Number 
of Staffs
Number of
Institution 
Number 
of Staff
Number 
of 
Institution
Number 
of Staffs
Number of 
Institutions
Number 
of Staffs
Number of
Institutions
Number 
of Staffs 
ICBC 39986 567230 36908 500000 31671 500000 28345 429709 25960 405558 24129 389045 
ABC 58466 524484 56539 539298 50546 509572 44418 594948 39286 547935 36138 511425 
BOC 15227 197547 14368 197534 12925 192279 12529 184529 12090 174919 11609 171777 
CCB 30470 378523 27889 324360 25767 320682 23921 316329 21391 306809 16613 342967 
Source: Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking (1999-2004); China Statistical Yearbook (1999-2004). 
63B2.2.4 Low Profitability of the Four State-owned Commercial Banks (SOCBs) 
Table 2-17 gives profitability of the four SOCBs in 2000 and 2001. Table 2-18 reflects the returns 
on asset (ROA) and the mean value of the four SOCBs in past years. From these two tables, we 
may have a general impression about the profitability of the four SOCBs. Figures in Table 2-19 are 
calculated with the data in annual reports of the four SOCBs: 
Costs/ Income Ratio  
In past years, costs/ income ratios of banks have been declining, but have still maintained at a 
high level. The ratios of the ABC and the ICBC have been relatively high. We can only get figures 
of the ABC from 2001 to 2003, during these three years the costs/ income ratio was extremely high: 
that of 2001 was bigger than1 and that of 2002 and 2003 were higher than 0.9. The costs/ income 
ratio of the ICBC tends to decline, but it was still as high as near 0.8 at the end of 2003. 
                                                        
6 Source: The China Statistical Yearbook 2004 
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Correspondingly, that of the BOC and the CCB was relatively lower, and by the end of 2004, the 
costs/ income ratio of the BOC was reduced to 0.66 and that of the CCB decreased to 0.39. 
Returns on Asset (ROA) 
The ROA of China’s banking industry in past years was about 0.2%, and increased to 0.49% in 
2004. ROAs of all the four SOCBs were not high. With the lowest ROA, ROA of ABC in 2001 and 
2003 was reduced by 0.1%, with exactly 0.1% in 2002. The second lowest one was the ICBC. It’s 
ROA reduced by 0.15% from 1999 to 2003, with the lowest one of 0.05% in 2003. The ROA of the 
CCB in the past years fluctuated between 0.2% and 0.3%. In 2003, its ROA was reduced to 0.01%, 
but increased to 1.24% in 2004. 
Returns on Equity (ROE)  
Overall ROE of China’s banks was not high enough, either. The ROE of the ABC was only 1% or 
2%. The ROE of the SOCBs was about 2% or 3%. Except year 2003, ROEs of the CCB have been 
maintained above 4% and even climbed to 24.85% in 2004. The ROE of the BOC was about 3% 
or 4%, and even rose to 10.29% in 2004. 
Owing to the large staff number of the four SOCBs, per capital profits of the four SOCBs were not 
satisfactory. Among the four SOCBs, the ABC had the most staffs but the least profits, which were 
RMB 1.9 thousand, RMB 5.3 thousand and RMB 3.8 thousand from 2001 to 2003 respectively. 
The per capita profits of the ICBC rose from RMB 8.3 thousand in 1999 to RMB 16.1 thousand in 
2002, but reduced to RMB 6.4 thousand in 2003. The per capita profit of the CCB in past years 
was about RMB 15000 thousand. In 2003, it decreased to RMB 1.2 thousand because of writing 
off after verification and its per capita profits achieved RMB 141.1 thousand calculated based on 
the staff number in 2003. As the largest one of the four SOCBs, the per capita BOC was RMB 40 
or 50 thousand in 2002 and 2002, and RMB 26.7 thousand due to the action of writing off after 
verification. 
The per capita equity conditions of the ABC were the least satisfactory. From 2001 to 2003, its per 
capita equity was more than RMB 200 thousand. The per capita equity of the ICBC was RMB 360 
thousand before 2001and rose to RMB 440 thousand after that. Per capita equity of the CCB 
increased from RMB 350 thousand before 2003 to RMB 550 thousand after 2003. The BOC had 
the most per capita equity among the four SOCBs, which rose gradually from about RMB 430 
thousand in 1997 to about RMB 1180 thousand in 2004. 
The conditions of per capita assets were like those of per capita equity. From 2001 to 2003, the per 
capita assets of the ABC were below RMB 7 million. The per capita assets of the ICBC increased 
gradually from about RMB 7 million in 1999 to RMB 13.56 million in 2003, and that of the CCB 
rose from RMB 7 million in 1999 to RMB 11.38 million in 2004. The per capita assets of the BOC 
went up from RMB 12.64 million in 1997 to RMB 24.86 million in 2004. 
The above analysis on ROA, ROE, among many other indexes of the SOCBs in past years shows 
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that profitability of the four SOCBs is not very satisfactory. A comparison with the world top banks 
also clearly illustrate this point (see table 2-20, table 2-21, table 2-22, table 2-23, table 2-24 and 
table 2-25). 
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120BTable 2-17 Profits Structure of the Four SOCBs, 2000-2001 
                                                                                                                                    (Unit: RMB 100 billion)
THE ICBC THE ABC  THE BOC THE CCB 
Year Item Total % Total %  Total % Total % 
Operating revenue 1789.04  882.05   1367.8  1044.37  
Interests income 1765.56 98.19 865.37 98.11  1260.59 92.16 992.39 95.02 
Fee income 26.08 1.45 11.98 1.36  69.08 5.05 23.45 2.25 2000 
Other operating revenue 6.4 0.36 4.7 0.53  38.13 2.79 28.55 2.73
Operating revenue 1621.81  855.38   1054.31  1082.86  
Interests income 1582.43 97.57 830.81 97.12  955.19 90.6 992.62 91.67 
Fee income 30.65 1.89 18.2 2.13    32.56 3.01 2001 
Other operating revenue 8.73 0.54 6.37 0.75  99.12＊ 9.4 57.68 5.32 
Note: Fees and other operating revenues could not be distinguished in non-interests income item in the Income Statement of the BOC ( 2001). 
Source: Prepared by author. 
121BTable 2-18 ROA and Mean of the SOCBs, 1990-2002 
                                                                                                                                  (Unit: %)
Year THE ICBC THE ABC THE BOC THE CCB Mean For ROA 
1990 1.41 0.21 0.72 0.37 0.68 
1991 1.43 0.23 0.75 0.28 0.68 
1992 1.13 0.18 0.72 0.19 0.56 
1993 0.42 0.26 0.57 0.24 0.37 
1994 0.16 0.04 0.30 0.20 0.18 
1995 0.15 0.16 0.24 0.36 0.23 
1996 0.16 0.14 0.25 0.31 0.22 
1997 0.08 0.03 0.18 0.11 0.10 
1998 0.11 -1.12 0.35 0.08 -0.14 
1999 0.11 -1.24 0.05 0.23 -0.21 
2000 0.14 0.01 0.36 0.19 0.18 
2001 0.41 0.10 0.38 0.14 0.26 
2002 1.41 0.21 0.72 0.37 0.68 
Source: Prepared by author. 
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122BTable 2-19 Profitability of the Four SOCBs, 1997-2004 
Index 
Year Bank Costs/income ratio ROA Average ROE Profits per person (RMB 10 thousand) Per capita equity (RMB 10 thousand) Per capita assets (RMB 10 thousand) 
1997 BOC 0.93 0.37% 10.65% 4.67 43.83 1264.46 
1998 BOC 0.97 0.20% 4.06% 2.87 70.64 1417.25 
ICBC 1.06 0.12% 2.27% 0.83 36.30 707.97 
BOC 0.98 0.15% 3.01% 2.24 74.35 1470.09 
1999 CCB 0.96 0.23% 4.64% 1.53 32.95 678.59 
ICBC 0.91 0.13% 2.78% 1.04 37.50 799.57 
BOC 0.83 0.14% 2.80% 2.38 85.01 1647.61 
2000 CCB 0.89 0.30% 6.57% 2.35 35.81 789.47
ICBC 0.91 0.14% 3.20% 1.43 44.51 1009.75 
ABC 1.03 0.05% 0.87% 0.19 22.38 424.89 
BOC 0.74 0.24% 3.62% 4.29 118.37 1821.73 
2001 CCB 0.78 0.19% 4.30% 1.63 37.98 874.08 
ICBC 0.89 0.14% 3.66% 1.61 43.94 1177.83 
ABC 0.91 0.10% 2.13% 0.53 24.83 543.23 
BOC 0.63 0.26% 4.30% 5.40 125.58 2054.61 
2002 CCB 0.73 0.14% 4.01% 1.40 34.95 1004.92 
ICBC 0.79 0.05% 1.45% 0.64 43.83 1356.94 
ABC 0.97 0.06% 1.39% 0.38 26.98 683.19 
BOC 0.62 0.12% 2.46% 2.67 108.50 2236.71 
2003 CCB 0.62 0.01% 0.22% 0.12 54.31 1036.33
BOC 0.66 0.49% 10.29% 12.19 118.38 2486.04 
2004 CCB 0.39 1.24% 24.85% 14.11 56.78 1138.53 
Note: Figures of costs/income ratio, average ROE and per capita profits in the table are calculated based on profits after tax. The figures of per capita profits, per capita equity and per capita assets of the BOC and the CCB in 2004 staff 
number of the two banks in 2003 to calculate. 
Source: calculated by the annual reports of the four SOCBs. 
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123BTable 2-20 Profitability of the SOCBs and Some Selected Banks of the World  
Average ROE (%) Average ROA (%) 
Bank  
Pre-tax Profits  
(US$ 1 million/ RMB 
100 million) Rank
Rank in Last 
Period 
Current 
Ratio Rank
Rank in Last 
Period 
Current 
Ratio 
Costs/income 
Ratio 
Citigroup 22772 49 36 38.8 156 127 2.08 54.99 
Mizuhou Group -18828 968 926 -53.1 966 961 -1.74 55.4 
HSBC Holdings 9650 192 211 24.8 361 400 1.27 59.44 
Deutsche Bank 3722 462 680 14.9 654 827 0.47 78.75 
Wooribank 1596 270 NA 21.9 416 562 1.1 41.7 
Bank of Taiwan 137 796 603 4 788 640 0.21 64.92 
ICBC 834 802 820 3.7 831 872 0.41 64.96 
BOC 1666 671 713 7.6 702 764 0.38 37.89 
ABC 352 848 891 2.2 857 925 0.1 91.41 
CCB 524 800 782 3.8 833 837 0.14 56.72 
Source: Quoted from Jiao Jinpu, Research on International Competitive Power of Chinese Banking Industry (China Economics Publishing House, 
2002),  
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124BTable 2-21 Top Banks in 9 selected Economies 
Rank Country and Bank 
Tier 1 Capital 
(US$ 1 million) 
Number of 
Staffs 
Profits Per 
Person (1000 
US$) 
Per Capita Equity
(1000 US$) 
Per Capita Equity 
(1000 US$) 
 U.S.      
1 Citigroup 41,889 184,914 50.13 226.53 3,615.96 
2 Bank of America 36,877 170,975 47.07 215.69 3,612.69 
5 Chase Manhattan Group 24,121 72,683 82.28 331.87 5,033.85 
10 Bank One Corporation 19,654 88,628 50.38 221.76 2,950.49 
 JAPAN      
7 Bank of Tokyo- Mitsubishi 22,074 17,878 8.72 1,234.70 33,489.20 
9 Sakura Bank 19,899 16,330 -359.22 1,218.55 23,847.76 
11 Fuji Bank 19,590 13,976 -394.82 1,401.69 25,631.30 
13 Sanwa Bank 17,745 13,747 -391.07 1,290.83 30,433.77 
 U.K.      
3 HSBC Holdings 29,352 132,285 49.82 221.88 3,663.72 
22 Barclays Bank 13,495 786,000 40.60 171.69 4,495.76 
23 National Westminster Bank 13,389 64,400 55.33 207.90 4,804.67 
31 Lloyds TSB Group 12,111 77,200 64.97 156.88 3,190.69 
 SWITZERLAND      
8 Union Bank of Switzerland 20,525 48,011 61.59 427.51 14,285.93 
14 Credit Suisse Bank 17,579 36,775 55.50 478.01 12,888.73 
138 Zuricher Kantonal Bank 2,583 3,727 31.39 693.05 12,071.91 
166 UBS 2,051     
 ITALY      
42 Saint Paul Real Estate Bank  9,423 24,527 78.32 384.19 7,559.14 
45 UniCredito Italiano 8,420 35,600 41.69 236.52 4,823.88 
64 Bank of Roma 6,014 28,276 15.07 212.69 4,319.74 
66 Banca Commercial Italian 5,903 28,479 36.27 207.28 4,641.60 
 FRANCE      
4 de Caisse Nationale Credit Agricole 25,903 86,100 43.73 301.16 5,308.21 
27 Banque Nationale de Paris 12,824 52,404 33.18 244.71 7,233.15 
29 Industrial Bank 12,521 58,600 34.27 213.67 7,637.29 
36 Credit Mutuel 10,737 45,300 26.25 237.02 6,323.64 
 GERMANY      
12 Deutsche Bank 18,680 75,306 62.58 248.05 9,727.43 
25 Dresdner Bank 13,042 48,948 31.95 266.45 8,728.88 
32 HVB 11,853 25,146 108.88 471.37 13,409.57 
33 Commerz Bank 11,760 27,912 51.91 421.32 13,662.90 
 AUSTRALIA      
48 National Australia Bank 7,522 40,300 38.19 162.46 3,232.22 
82 ANZ Bank 4,940 30,827 31.24 160.25 2,585.72 
90 The Commonwealth Bank off Australia 4,673 30,743 26.77 152.00 2,605.24 
101 Westpac Bank 3,957 33,222 32.72 119.11 2,457.41 
 KOREA      
113 Wooribank 3,227 11,526 -119.73 279.98 6,017.96 
154 Kookmin bank 2,231 11,916 31.05 187.23 5,304.04 
171 Shinhan Bank 1,984 4,446 7.20 446.24 7,256.19 
251 Korea Exchange Bank 1,221 5,889 -118.19 207.34 5,590.08 
 CHINA      
6 ICBC 22,213 567,230 0.74 39.16 689.69 
18 BOC 14,712 202,147 2.10 72.78 1,479.16 
65 CCB 5,988 386,000 3.15 15.51 526.21 
88 ABC 4,802 538,800 0.18 8.91 352.81 
Source: The Economist, 7th issue of 1999. Quoted from Jiao Jinpu, Research on International Competitive Power of Chinese Banking Industry (China 
Economics Publishing House, 2002), 123. 
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127BTable 2-24 Comparison with Scale Factor between Four SOCBs in China and World Top Banks, 2002        
                                                                                （unit: US$ 1 billion）  
Tier 1 capital  Total asset  Equity/ asset 
Staff  
 
Bank Rank Amount  Rank Amount  Rank Percentage  
Citigroup U.S. 59,012.00 1 1,097,190 605 5.38 250,000 59,012.00 1 1,097,190 
Mizuho Japan 29,092.23 2 1,080,764 964 2.69 30,944 29,092.23 2 1,080,764 
HSBC Holdings 
U.K. 38,949.00 7 759,246 647 5.13 184,409 38,949.00 7 759,246 
Deutsche Bank, 
Germany 23,848.57 5 795,255 942 3.00 77,442 23,848.57 5 795,255 
Wooribank, Korea 7,737.26 73 144,578 607 5.35 18,373 7,737.26 73 144,578 
Bank of Taiwan 
（Taiwan，China) 3,478.44 113 66,555 633 5.23 6,919 3,478.44 113 66,555 
BOC 21,915.84 23 434,188 663 5.05 184,529 21,915.84 23 434,188 
ICBC 21,529.73 18 577,093 871 3.73 429,709 21,529.73 18 577,093 
ABC 16,435.31 32 359,606 738 4.57 490,999 16,435.31 32 359,606 
CCB 12,955.43 29 372,488 897 3.48 419,157 12,955.43 29 372,488 
Source: Li Jian and Li Jianjun, The Reform of State-Owned Commercial Banks, Analysis from a Macro Angle of View (Economic and Science Press June 2004), 
280. 
 
125BTable 2-22 Comparison with Safety Index of the SOCBs and Selected World Top Banks  
                                                                              (Unit: %) 
Capital Adequacy Ratio NPLs ratio 
Bank 2001 2002 2001 2002 
Citigroup 10.92 11.25 2.67 1.85 
Mizihou Group 10.56 9.53 6.46 6.89 
HSBC Holdings 12.99 13.30 3.00 2.99 
Deutsche Bank 12.10 12.60 4.80 NA 
Wooribank 10.23 10.47 2.62 1.90 
Bank of Taiwan 16.33 15.56 3.34 2.90 
ICBC 4.57 5.54 21.41 25.69 
BOC 8.50 8.15 27.51 22.49 
ABC 1.44 NA 21.41 30.07 
CCB 3.79 6.91 19.35 15.78 
Source: 
126BTable 2-23 Comparison with Liquid of the SOCBs and Selected World Top Banks  
                                                                     (Unit: %) 
Index Index Implication 
Mean Value of the 
SOCBs 
Mean Value of Joint-stock 
Commercial Banks Citigroup HSBC Holdings 
Liquid asset ratio  Liquid asset/total asset 44.1 28.2 12.9 15.0 
Loan/deposit ratio Total loan/total deposit 87.0 68.7 104.7 92.7 
Source: Li Jian and Li Jianjun, The Reform of State-Owned Commercial Banks, Analysis from a Macro Angle of View (Economic and Science Press June 
2004), 284. 
128BTable 2-25 Ranks of the SOCBs in World Top1000 Banks, 1998-2002 
Bank             1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
ICBC 6 10 7 10 16 
BOC 18 21 18 11 15 
ABC 88 20 21 23 25 
CCB 65 32 29 28 37 
Bank of Communications 129 130 108 94 102 
CITC Industrial Bank NA NA 318 291 291 
Source: Prepared by author by data from relevant issued of The banker 
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7BNOMINAL NON-PERFORMING LOANS, ADJUSTED 
FACTORS, AND SEVERITY OF NON-PERPORMING 
LOANS OF THE STATE-OWNED COMMERCIAL 
BANKS, 1994-2004F7F  
 
 
19B3.1 INTRODUCTION 
After the Asia financial crisis in 1997, China’s NPLs problem has arose great attention at home 
and abroad, and numerous researches have been conducted (See Table 3-1, 3-2). However, 
existing analysis on NPLs of the SOCBs have many defects. The first is mixed usage of many 
conceptions, such as non-performing loans, bad loans, loss loans, problem loans, non-performing 
claims, non-performing debts, and non-performing assets. However, different concepts have 
different calculation standards and scopes, therefore, NPLs ratios classified by different concepts 
cannot compare directly. The second is lack of credible statistics data. Before 2000, NPLs of the 
SOCBs had been regarded as confidential by both commercial banks and regulatory authorities. 
Since 2000, the PBOC has pressed the SOCBs to replace term-based loan classification standard 
with risk-based loan classification standard. In 2003, the SOCBs except the ABC had released 
NPLs data in their annual reports. In June 2003, the PBOC transferred its banking regulation 
function to newly founded China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), which, in order to 
improve transparency, has begun to disclose quarterly NPLs. However, at that time, the CBRC 
disclosed only integrated NPLs of the four SOCBs and only has begun to release NPLs of the four 
SOCBs respectively since 2004. The third is switch of NPLs classification standard, which made 
data hard to compare even for any one of the SOCBs itself. Before 2000, all the SOCBs had 
implemented term-based loan classification standard. After 2000 banking regulatory gradually 
recommended the risk-based loan classification standard, however, it was not until 2003 that the 
ABC adopted the risk-based loan classification. Because definitions are different, NPLs ratios of 
the SOCBs during 1994 to 2003 are not coherent. The fourth is that policy write-offs of NPLs of the 
SOCBs also affected comparability of NPLs ratios. The central government had written off NPLs 
from the four SOCBs in 1999, 2004 and 2005 respectively. Therefore, even for the same bank, 
policy write-offs make it impossible to compare NPLs data before and after NPLs wrote-offs 
directly, let along comparison with different commercial banks domestic or international. 
                                                        
7 The chapter was published in the December issue of the Journal of Financial Research, 2005. 
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129BTable 3-1 Estimation of NPLs of the SOCBs by International Institutions 
 time Sources Media or literature Estimation of NPLs  
1997 Wall Street Journal Wall Street Journal The NPLs ratio in China was 20%. 
1999 
Huang Yiping from 
Australian National 
University 
Dispose of NPL in Chinese Banks
Technically, the four SOCBs had lost the liquidation capacity with the NPLs ratio of more than 30%. It was 
possible to have a banking crisis at any time. It is appraised that the reorganization costs of the banks accounted 
for 18.8% to 25% of the GDP in 1999. 
22June 
2001 
Nicholas Lardy 
(Senior researcher of 
Brookings Institution) 
Financial Times June 22, 2001 
Although large amount of non-performing assets were transferred to the state-owned AMCs, new non-performing 
assets continued to emerge rapidly. The NPLs in China accounted for 40% to 75% of the GDP in 2000. China 
needed to speed up the reorganization of the loss –making state-owned manufacturing enterprises and build up a 
business credit environment; otherwise, China would face an overall fiscal and banking crisis. 
4Oct.2001 Christopher·Lingle Far Eastern Economic Review 4 Oct.2001 
The problems in China were more serious than those in Japan. If 50% of the loan outstanding were NPLs, half of 
banking deposits had disappeared. 
 
Professor 
Lester Thurow 
（MIT university） 
MIT university workshop The economic data released by Chinese government was not correct. 
25Oct 2001
Assistant Professor 
Edward Steinfeld 
（MIT university ） 
MIT university workshop The NPL accounted for 25% of GDP and would continue to increase. 
26Oct. 
2001 
Huang Yasheng 
(Harvard University ） MIT university workshop The NPLs accounting for 40% of the total asset in the banking sector may arouse financial crisis. 
20 
Dec.2001 David••Lager 
Far Eastern Economic Review 
Dec 20, 2001 
China was in difficulty. To restrict the loans to SOEs may reduce the NPLs in the banks but may increase the 
unemployment ratio and more bankrupt enterprises. However, if the banks failed to accomplish the mercerization 
reform, the reform in the banks was doomed to fail and may arouse financial crisis. 
15 
Jan.2002 Washington Post Washington Post 
Ernst&Young research report estimated that the NPL amount in China was RMB 480 billion, accounting for 44%. 
That meant that China’s loan problem was more serious than that in Japan. 
11June 
2002 Oriental Daily Oriental Daily The NPLs ratio of four SOCBs was 34%, 10% higher than that estimated by PBOC. 
18July2002 Zhang Jiadun Far Eastern Economic Review The NPLs ratio in China’s banking sector was at least 50% and large amount of NPLs exist in the newly added loans. It is estimated the recover ratio of NPL was 20% and it is easy to arouse banking crisis in China. 
7 Aug.2003 Philip Sage The Asian Wall Street Journal The excessive NPLs and the increasing government lending may lead to the economic and political crisis. Not only the economic affairs but also the political affairs may spillover to the banking crisis in China. 
Scholars or 
institutions 
26Aug.2003 Reuters Reuters The NPLs ratio of the CCB was decreased to 12.3%, decreasing by 3.67% over that in the beginning of 2003. 
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Autumn in 
2003 Financial Times Financial Times There are large amount of NPLs of RMB 500 billion to RMB 700 billion in China’s banking sector. 
At the end 
of 1996 Moody Moody The NPLs in China accounted for 35% to 70% of the total loan. 
11May2002 S&P Moody New York Times The loan problem in China arouses worry. The bad loans in China are several times higher than those in Japan.
15Jan.2002 FITCH analyst Washington Post 
According to the international accounting principles, the large banks in China would have had went bankrupt for 
many times. By the risk-based loan classification method, the NPLs ratio of four SOCBs was greatly above 35%, 
whose capital adequacy ratio was lower than 8% set by the Basel Agreement. 
9May2002 S&P S&P It is impossible for the four SOCBs to reduce the NPLs ratio to 15% within 5 years, which is the target of PBOC.
2003 S&P S&P The NPLs ratio of Chinese banks was appraised as 45% in 2002. 
Rating agencies 
2004 S&P S&P At the end of 2003, the NPLs of Chinese banks accounted for 40% of the total loans in the banking sector. 
1998 Merrill Lynch Corporation Merrill Lynch Corporation The average bad loan ratio of four SOCBs was 29%. 
1998 J.P Morgan J.P Morgan The average bad loan ratio of four SOCBs was 36%. 
1Sep.2002
France 
Lyonnais 
Securities 
France Lyonnais Securities 
By the term-based loan classification method, the NPLs ratio of BOC, ABC, ICBC and CCB were 24.12%, 
35.06%, 25.7% and 14.92%. By the risk-based loan classification method, the four ratios were 27.51%, 42.12%, 
29.80% and 19.35%. 
2002 Ernst&Young Ernst&Young The NPL amount totaled RMB 4139 billion in China, among which RMB 3300 billion was the NPL portfolio of four SOCBs and four AMCs. 
Investment bank 
or consultancy 
corporation  
11Nov.2003 Ernst&Young Ernst&Young The NPLs ratio released by ICBC of 22% was a correct one. 
2001 IMF People's Republic of China: 2004 Article IV Consultation 
Before the NPLs are transferred to the AMCs, the average NPLs ratio from official estimation was 25%. After that, 
the NPLs ratio was still 25%, lower than that estimated by the market. 
2002 IMF People's Republic of China: 2004 Article IV Consultation 
The potential loan loss in the banking sector accounted for 45% to 70% of the GDP. The NPLs in the banks 
(include those transferred to the asset management corporation accounted for 56% to 78% of that year’s GDP.
International 
Monetary Fund 
(IMF) 
2004 IMF People's Republic of China: 2004 Article IV Consultation By the end of 2003, the capital adequacy ratio of BOC and CCB was 6.98% and 6.51%. 
International 
Settlement Bank 1997 
International settlement 
bank International settlement bank It was estimated that the NPL in China was RMB 120 million in 1996. 
Source: Prepared by author. 
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130BTable 3-2 Estimations and Reports of NPLs of the SOCBs by Domestic Sources, 1990--2003 
 Domestic official reports Domestic media reports 
1990    The NPLs of four SOCBs accounted for 20% to25% of the outstanding loans.F8F 
According to the data released by National Bureau of Statistic of China, in the beginning of 1994, the NPLs of four SOCBs 
were RMB 316 billion, accounting for 20.4 % of the total loan.F9F                                                     
At the end of 1994, the NPLs of four SOCBs accounted for 20.2%, among of 
which past due loan 11.5%, idle loan 7.7% and loss loan 1.3%.F10F 
Dai Xianglong, the previous governor of PBOC and other senior officials in Chinese financial circle expressed that the 
NPLs accounted for 20% of the total loans at the end of 1994.F11F   
At the end of 1994, the NPLs of four SOCBs were RMB 220 billion, 
accounting for 12.12% of the total loans.F12F 
1994  
  At the end of 1994, the NPLs of the SOCBs were RMB 532.3 billion.F13F 
According to the data released by National Bureau of Statistic of China, at the end of 1995, the NPLs of Chinese banking 
sector were RMB 600 billion.F14F                                                                        
At the end of 1995, the NPLs of four SOCBs were more than RMB 900 
billion, accounting for 25% of the total loans, among which were loss loans of 
RMB 300 billion.F15F 1995  
Dai Xianglong, the previous governor of PBOC and other senior officials in Chinese financial circle expressed that the 
NPLs accounted for 22% of the total loans at the end of 1995.F16F   
At the end of 1995, the NPLs ratio of 4 SOCBs was 20%.F17F 
According to the data released by National Bureau of Statistic of China, in 1996 as the increase of loss SOEs and bankrupt 
enterprises, the total non-performing claims exceeded RMB 1 trillion. F18F  
At the end of 1996, the NPLs of four SOCBs exceeded RMB 1 trillion.F19F    
1996  
  The NPLs of four SOCBs accounted for 20% to 25% of the total loan 
outstanding.F20F                                                      
                                                        
8 Research Information of the State Council Research Center, 19 December, 2000 
9 Du Xinlin, “Further Improvement of the Credit Management of Commercial Banks: Choices and Measures of Realizing the Sound Circle of Credit Asset of Commercial Banks, ” Bing Tuan Staff members’ University Journal, 
3 issue, 2000 
10 “Preventing the Arising Financial Risks,” Macroeconomic Management, 7th issue, 1996 
11 “Research on Non-performing Assets of State-owned Commercial Banks”, Study on Financial Problem, 10 issue, 2002 
12 Han Qiang, “the Stock Disposal and Incremental Prevention of the Non-performing Loans of State-owned Commercial Banks of China,” Qinghai Finance, 10 issue, 1999 
13 Zhu Jian, “Reality and Institutional Causes: Mechanism Analysis on the Debt Crisis Creation between Banks and Enterprises,” Journal of Fujian Normal University, 2 issue,1999 
14 Du Xinlin, “Further Improvement of the Credit Management of Commercial Banks: Choices and Measures of Realizing the Sound Circle of Credit Asset of Commercial Banks, ” Bing Tuan Staff members’ University 
Journal, 3 issue, 2000 
15 Han Qiang, “the Stock Disposal and Incremental Prevention of the Non-performing Loans of State-owned Commercial Banks of China,” Qinghai Finance, 10 issue, 1999 
16 “Research on Non-performing Assets of State-owned Commercial Banks”, Study on Financial Problem, 10 issue, 2002 
17 “The Cause and Prevention Measures of Non-performing Loans of State-owned Commercial Banks,” Price Journal, 12 issue,1998 
18 Du Xinlin, “Further Improvement of the Credit Management of Commercial Banks: Choices and Measures of Realizing the Sound Circle of Credit Asset of Commercial Banks, ” Bing Tuan Staff members’ University 
Journal, 3 issue, 2000 
19 Han Qiang, “the Stock Disposal and Incremental Prevention of the Non-performing Loans of State-owned Commercial Banks of China,” Qinghai Finance, 10 issue, 1999 
20 Research Information of the State Council Research Center, 19 December, 2000 
 59
The statistical data released by PBOC in the first half of 1997, the non-performing assets of the SOCBs accounted for 
more than 20% at the end of 1996.F21F 
The NPLs ratio of commercial banks was 22.2%.F22F  
The NPL of SOCB was 21%.F23F   
Dai Xianglong, the previous governor of PBOC and other senior officials in Chinese financial circle expressed that the 
NPLs ratio was 25% at the end of 1997.F24F 
  
1997  
HK China news agency released, the ratio of NPL (include bad and loss loans) was almost 20%. In the press conference of 
Dai Xianglong, governor of PBOC in Beijing explained the bad loan problem in China in public for the first time. It was 
reported only 5% to 6% loans would fail to recover, so it clarified the wrong report that the bad loan of state-owned banks 
was 25% to 30%. Da Xianglong said that there were two types of normal loan and non-performing loans. The 
non-performing loans were classified as past due, idle and loss loans. At the end of 1997, these three types accounted for 
25% of the total loans, among of which less than 2% was loss loans, others was mostly idle loans.  F25F 
  
Dai Xianglong, governor of PBOC expressed at the end of 1998. The bad loan ratio of SOCB was 2.9%, most of the past 
due and loss loans became bad loans. If three items were summed up, the NPL would not exceed 10%.F26F               
Research center of Chinese economy of Beijing university believed that there 
are about 2% loss loans in the 24% of the non-performing assets. F27F 
  The NPL accounted for 20% to 25% of the outstanding loans in the four 
SOCBs. In 1998, the loss loans accounted for 2.9% of the total loans of the 
SOCBs.F28F                                                 1998  
 At the end of 1998, the NPLs ratio of four SOCBs was about 35% and the 
non-performing asset ratio was 22.3%. (At the end of 1998, the total credit 
asset was RMB 9.48 trillion with the presumption of no non-performing 
assets. F29F              
Xie Ping, director of research bureau of PBOC expressed that the NPLs ratio of the SOCBs was 25%.F30F                 At present the past due, loss and idle loans accounted for 25% of the total 
asset, most of which are dead loans.F31F 
1999  
  At present, the past due, idle and loss loans accounted for 20% of loan 
outstanding in the banking sector. More than 900 billion RMB are hard to 
recover. The NPLs ratio in less developed regions was higher than that in the 
developed regions, some of which was 40%.F32F                           
                                                        
21 “Thoughts of Non-performing Loans of State-owned Commercial Banks,” Shanghai Jiaotong University Journal, 1 issue,1999 
22 Securities Times, 20th September, 1998 
23 Cao Yonghai, “Research on Dissolving the Non-performing Assets of Commercial Banks,” Journal of Financial Study, 2 issue,1997 
24 The Research on Non-performing Asset of State-owned Commercial Banks,” Study on Financial Problem, 10 issue of 2002. 
25 HK Takongpo, January 20, 1998  
26 HK Takongpo, March 12, 1999   
27 China center for economic research of Peking University effective policy portfolio of seeking multi-economic goals Economic Research, page 7 in the 4th issue,1998 
28  “Research on Non-performing Assets of State-owned Commercial Banks”, Study on Financial Problem, 10 issue, 2002 
29  “Research on Non-performing Assets of State-owned Commercial Banks”, Study on Financial Problem, 10 issue, 2002 
30 HK Wenweipo, October 21,1999  
31 Zhu Jian, “Reality and Institutional Causes: Mechanism Analysis on the Debt Crisis Creation between Banks and Enterprises,” Journal of Fujian Normal University, 2nd issue,1999 
32 Han Ping and Xi Youmin, Analysis on the Credit Risk of Commercial Banks of China in the Economic Transitional Period, Modern Economic Science, 4th issue,1999 
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  The NPLs ratio in Chinese banking sector was 10%, among which loss loan 
ratio was 2.9%F33F   
  At the end of 1999, the NPLs ratio of commercial banks was about25% and 
the ratio of loss and idle loans was almost 8%.F34F                 
On July 19 2000, Dai Xianglong, governor of PBOC expressed the NPLs ratio would be less than 20% after the 
non-performing asset peeled off.F35F                                                                             
It is estimated that the NPLs ratio of Chinese financial institution was25% 
and the NPLs ratio in part of financial institutions was higher than 25%.F36F 
  The NPLs ratio of four SOCBs was about 25%.F37F  
  Wu Jinglian believed that the NPLs ratio of four SOCBs was 33.37%.F38F      
2000 年 
  In 2000, the NPL outstanding of ICBC was RMB 967.6 billion and the NPLs 
ratio was 34.43% F39F 
According to the statistics released by PBOC, the NPLs ratio of four wholly SOCBs at the end of 2001 was 25.36%. The 
ratio of ICBC decreased by 3.65%, the ratio of ABC decreased by 4.65%, the ratio of BOC decreased by 4.07% and that of 
CCB decreased by 3.18%.F40F  
 
According to the statistics released by ICBC, at the end of 2001, By the risk-based loan classification method, the last 
three types NPLs accounted for 29.8% of the total loans, 4.65% lower than that of previous year. By the term-based loan 
classification method, the NPLs accounted for 25.7% of the total loans, 3.59% lower than that of previous year.F41F       
 
In 2002, Zhang Enzhao, former governor of ICBC expressed the NPLs ratio of CCB was 19.3% at the end of 2001. F42F   
2001  
Tang Shuangning, vice president of CBRC said the NPLs in four SOCBs were RMB 1765.6 billion, with a decrease of RMB 
90.7billion, by the term-based loan classification method.F43F  
 
Dai Xianglong, previous governor of PBOC declared in the end of April 2002 the NPLs ratio of SOCB was 24.54%, 1.19 % 
lower than the beginning of 2002.F44F 
By the risk-based loan classification method, the NPLs ratio of four SOCBs at 
the end of 2002 was 26.1%.F45F 
2002  
ICBC declared on October 15 2002, the NPLs ratio decreased to 26.4% at the end of September, 3.71 lower than that of 
previous year.F46F 
 
                                                        
33 HK Wenweipo, 15 Novermber,1999  
34 China Economic Times, 10 November, 2000    
35 Economic Reference, 20 July, 2000 
36 Financial Research, 25 Feburary, 2000  
37 China Economic Times, 27 December, 2000   
38 Keynote speech made by Wu Jinglian in 2004 China international conference on finance on July 9, 2004 
39 China Business Post 
40 China Finance Net 
41 Xinhua News Agency 
42 China Securities News 
43 Shanghai Securities News 
44 China Securities News 
45 International Financial News 
46 www.macrochina.com.cn 
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At the end of 2002, By the risk-based loan classification method, the NPLs ratio of CCB was 15.36%, 3.99% lower than 
that at the beginning of 2002.The NPLs ratio of the central banking group was 22.37%, 5.14% lower than that at the end of 
2001. The NPLs ratio of ICBC was 25.52%, 4.26 % lower than that at the beginning of 2002. ABC did not release the NPLs 
ratio just release the decrease of 4.7% over that at the beginning of 2002.F47F                                          
 
According to the data of PBOC, at the end of 2002, the weighted NPLs ratio of four SOCBs averaged 26.12%.F48F   
According to the annual report of BOC in 2002, the NPLs ratio was 22.49 % at the end of 2002 by the risk-based loan 
classification method.F49F 
 
The NPL and NPLs ratio of ICBC of ICBC in 2002 decreased from RMB 794.8 billion to RMB 759 billion, from 30.12% to 
26.01%, decreasing by 35.8 billion and 4.11% respectively.F50F 
 
By the term-based loan classification method, the NPL of financial institution decreased by 4.5% to 19.8% at the end of 
2002. The NPLs ratio of the four SOCBs decreased by 3.95%to 21.4% at the end of 2002. By the risk-based loan 
classification method, the NPLs ratio of four SOCBs decreased to 26.1% by 4.92 % at the end of 2002.F51F   
 
By the risk-based loan classification method, the NPLs of four SOCBs were RMB2077 billion, decreasing by RMB 78.2 
billion at the end of 2002.F52F 
 
On29May2003, Liu Mingkang, president of CBRC released in the press conference held by the State Council Information 
Office, the NPLs ratio of four SOCBs decreased to 24.13% by the end March 2003. By the end of 2002, the weighted NPLs 
ratio averaged 26.12%, which decreased by 1.99% to 24.13 at the end of March 2003.F53F 
By the risk-based loan classification method, the NPLs ratio of the financial 
institutions was 19.6% and that of the SOCBs was 22.2% at the end of July 
2003.F54F 
Xinhua news agency reported that the NPLs ratio of CCB has decreased by 3.67% to 12.23% from January 2003 to 
August 2003.F55F 
The NPLs ratio of ICBC was 21.74% in 2003.F56F 
S According to the statistics of PBOC, NPLs ratio of four SOCBs was 22.19% by the end of June 2003.F57F At the end of 2003, the NPLs ratio was 15.19%, decreasing by 4.69% over 
that in the early 2003.F58F 
2003  
Securities Times reported that NPLs ratio of four SOCBs was 21.38% at the end of September 2003.F59F At the end of 2003, the NPLs ratio of the SOCBs was 20.36%.F60F 
                                                        
47 International Financial Times 
48 www.macrochina.com.cn 
49 Shanghai Securities Times 
50 Auditing Result of Liability, Asset and Financial Statement of ICBC in 2002, National Bureau of Auditing 
51 China Monetary Policy Report in 2002, PBOC 
52 Shanghai Securities News 
53 Shanghai Securities News 
54 China Economic Times 
55 Xinhua News Agency 
56 The first Finance Daily 
57 Financial Times 
58 China Economic Net 
59 Securities Times 
60 China Securities Net 
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According to the statistics released by CCB, by the risk-based loan classification method, the NPLs ratio has decreased to 
12.91% by the middle of June 2003, 2.99% lower than that in the early 2003. According to the statistics released by BOC, 
by the risk-based loan classification method, the NPLs ratio has decreased to 19.16% by the end of June 2003, 3.33 % 
lower than that in the early 2003. According to the statistics released by ICBC, by the risk-based loan classification 
method, the NPLs ratio has decreased to 22% by the end of June 2003, 3.5 % lower than that in the early 2003.F61F 
Wu Jinglian said the NPLs ratio of four SOCBs in 2003 decreased to 
20.36%.F62 
 
In December 2003, Liu Mingkang, president of China banking regulatory commission released in the press conference 
held by the State Council Information Office, the NPLs ratio of four SOCBs by the end of September were about 22% by 
the risk-based loan classification method.F63F  
 
According to the statistics of CBRC, the NPL outstanding of financial institution in both domestic and foreign currency at 
the end of 2003 was RMB 2.4 trillion, decreasing by 157.4 billion RMB than that in the early 2003, the NPLs ratio was 
15.19%, decreasing by 4.69% than that in the early 2003. The dual goal of reducing both the NPLs ratio and NPL 
outstanding was realized. The NPLs ratio of four SOCBs was 16.86%, 4.71% lower over that in the early 2003.F64F 
  
According to the statistics of CBRC, the NPL outstanding of ICBC was RMB 720.757 billion with the NPLs ratio was 
21.24%, the NPL outstanding of ABC was RMB 698.517 billion with the NPLs ratio was 30.67 %, the NPL outstanding of 
BOC was RMB 351.714 billion with the NPLs ratio was 7.92%, the NPL outstanding of CCB was RMB 193.521 billion with 
the NPLs ratio was 9.12 %F65F 
  
By the risk-based loan classification method, the National Bureau of Statistic of China released that the NPLs ratio of main 
financial institution was 17.8% at the end of 2003.F66F 
By the risk-based loan classification method, the NPLs ratio of ICBC was 
21.3 % at the end of 2003 with annual decrease rate of 4%. 
By the risk-based loan classification method, the NPLs ratio of ICBC was 21.3 % at the end of 2003 with annual decrease 
rate of 4%.F67F 
 
Yang Mingsheng, governor of ABC declared that the NPL outstanding decreased by 6% by the risk-based loan 
classification method in 2003.F68F   
The spokesperson of BOC declared that the NPLs ratio of BOC was 15.92%, decreased by 6.45% over the previous year 
by the risk-based loan classification method.F69F   
Source: Prepared by author. 
 
                                                        
61 China News Website 
62 Keynote speech made by Wu Jinglian in 2004 China international conference in finance on July 9, 2004 
63 China Youth Daily 
64 Shanghai Securities News 
65 Zhong Jinghua, “Analyzing the Reasons and Disposal Measures of Non-performing Assets of State-owned Commercial Banks,” Shenzhen Finance, 11th issue, 2004 
66 Chiannet   
67 Shanghai Securities News 
68 People’s Daily 
69 People’s Daily
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The above problems not only affect our judgment of trend of NPLs of SOCBs from 1994 to 2004, 
but also affect our judgment of severity of NPLs of the SOCBs. Based on the understanding that 
NPLs of the four SOCBs is crucial for China’s financial stability and a precondition for successful 
banking reform, this chapter will analyze NPLs of the SOCBs from 1994 to 2004, attempting to 
facilitate further analysis.  
The rest of the chapter is divided into four sections. 3.2 gives a systematic review about nominal 
NPLs ratios and outstanding balances of the SOCBs based on official disclosure from 1994 to 
2003; 3.3 estimates adjusted NPLs ratios and outstanding balances by excluding effects of both 
swifts of loan classification standards and policy NPLs write-offs; 3.4 evaluates severity of NPLs of 
the SOCBs by comparing NPLs ratios of the SOCBs with that of top 100 world banks, top 50 Asian 
banks, top 100 central European banks and joint-stock commercial banks in China, calculating 
proportion of adjusted outstanding balance of NPLs of the SOCBs to central fiscal revenue and to 
GDP; 3.5 further discuss potential effects of non-performing assets of SOCBs on nominal NPLs 
ratio of the SOCBs; 3.6 is the conclusion. 
20B3.2 NOMINAL NON-PERFORMING LOANS RATIOS OF THE STATE-OWNED 
COMMERCIAL BANKS, 1994--2004 
64B3.2.1 Nominal Integrated Non-performing Loans (NPLs) Ratio and Outstanding Balance of 
the Four State-owned Commercial Banks (SOCBs), 1994-2004 
Before 1994, the four SOCBs were state specialized banks serving the central government. In 
1994, the Law of the People's Republic of China on Commercial Banks was promulgated by the 
state Congress, and policy business previously carried out by the four specialized banks had been 
transferred to the three newly founded policy banks, and the four SOCBs began to form thereafter. 
Therefore, analysis of NPLs of the SOCBs should begin from 1994. However, during 1994 to 2003, 
neither banking regulatory authorities nor the SOCBs had disclosed information of NPLs ratio 
systemically. Researches on NPLs of the SOCBs have to depend on the following three sources to 
obtain NPLs data.  
The first source is reports, lectures or academic papers. Data obtained from these sources turn out 
to be different from each other, and have two obvious tendencies. One is that, compared with 
researchers’ estimations, those of official sources tend to underestimate NPLs of the SOCBs. For 
instance, at a news conference held by the State Council on January 20, 2000, Mr. Dai Xianglong, 
then governor of the People’s Bank of China, announced that NPLs ratio of the four SOCBs was 
only 2.7% by the end of 1999. Even includes past due and idle loans, NPLs ratio of the SOCBs 
was between 8% and 9%. If this estimation were credible, then by the end of 1999, NPLs of the 
four SOCBs would be less than RMB 740 billionF70F. However, in 1999, the central government had 
transferred RMB 1.4 trillion NPLs from the SOCBs to four newly established AMCs, nearly double 
the estimation of 740 billion made by Daixianglong. Besides, it is worthy to point out that the RMB 
                                                        
70 At the end of 1999, loan outstanding balance of the SOCBs reached RMB 7369.585 billion. 
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1.4 trillion wrote-offs includes only NPLs that had realized before 1995. Therefore, official data 
obviously tend to underestimate real situation of NPLs of SOCBs. Second, compared with data 
estimated by domestic scholars or research institutions, those by foreign scholars or research 
institutions tend to be more pessimistic (see table 3-1, table 3-2). For example, the Moody rating 
corporation estimated that NPLs ratio of the SOCBs was between 35% and 70% for the year 1996, 
while those estimated by domestic research institutions was from 20% to 29%; in 2003 the 
Standard&Poor estimated NPLs ratio of China was about 40%, while NPLs ratio disclosed by the 
CBRC was only 24.13%. 
Second source is indirect estimations of liability situation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). As 
majority of loans of the SOCBs have been issued to SOEs, therefore, liability situation of SOEs 
should approximate NPLs ratios of the SOCBs. For example, by cooperating with the 
Development Research Institution of Japan Overseas Coordination Fund twice in 1996 and 1997 
respectively, the Economic Research Institute of China Academy of Social Science (CASS) had 
carried out investigations on situation of more than 800 SOEs in four provinces including Jilin, 
Sichuan, Hunan and Jiangsu. The investigation shows that the average overdue liability ratios of 
three sample enterprises had increased from 29.8% in 1991 to 35.5% in 1995, increase of the 
ratio indicates that more enterprises could not pay banking loans on time. In such cases, banks 
tend to book overdue loans as normal by issuing new loans to enable relevant enterprises to pay 
interests or principles, while SOEs usually book overdue as liability, thus can reflect a more real 
status of loans of the SOCBs. Furthermore, in the example, 800 enterprises spreading through 
Jilin, Sichuan, Hunan and Jiangsu provinces, and locating in northeast China, southwest China, 
middle China and southeastern coastal areas respectively. Therefore, data are typical and 
representative. However, data from this source were both limited and not continuous. 
The third source is investigations conducted by branches of the SOCBs or of the PBOC. However, 
due to different economic development or management level, data from this kind of investigation 
are also not very typical and limited. 
In order to ensure data’ consistency and credibility, the chapter estimates NPLs ratios of the 
SOCBs based on officially released data (See table 3-3). Although the Almanac of China’s 
Finance and Banking has begun to release risk-based NPLs ratios of the SOCBs since 2002, 
nominal NPLs of the SOCBs from 1994 to 2001 can be obtained by knitting spatial official 
disclosures about proportional changes over previous years. Correspondingly, outstanding 
balance of NPLs of the SOCBs can be calculated from disclosed outstanding balance of loans of 
the SOCBs from relevant issues of the Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking (See table 3-3). 
Since 2004, along with transfer of supervision function to the newly established CBRC, NPLs of 
the SOCBs had been disclosed by the CBRC correspondingly. Obviously, as pointed out already, 
official disclosures are usually lower than those estimated by both domestic and foreign research 
institutions. However, before 2004, the SOCBs lacked not only incentives to release NPLs ratios or 
outstanding balance in accordance with prudential accounting principles voluntarily, but also had 
necessary means to cover or even hide true situation of NPLs. Therefore it is safe to conclude that 
NPLs recognized by the SOCBs undoubtedly belong to NPLs, and those have not been 
recognized by the SOCBs are not necessarily not NPLs. Based on this understanding, although 
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officially disclosed data adopted by this paper might be relatively conservative, NPLs ratio 
obtained such can at least be considered as bottom line of NPLs of the SOCBs. 
Table 3-3 reveals that after 1999 both NPLs ratios and outstanding balances of the SOCBs have 
decreased significantly. NPLs ratio was as high as 39% in 1999, and reduced to 19.74% in 2003, 
to 15.57% in 2004 and further to 10.12% in the second quarter of 2005. Correspondingly, NPLs of 
the SOCBs has decreased from RMB 2502.747 billion in 1999 to RMB 1575.1 billion in 2004 
within five consecutive years. The NPLs have further decreased to RMB 1013.4 billion in the 
second quarter of 2005. Since 1999, NPLs of the SOCBs has reduced by RMB 1500 billion within 
five and half years. 
   131BTable 3-3 Nominal Ratio and Outstanding Balance of NPLs of the SOCBs, 1994-2005 
Year Nominal NPLs ratio (%) Nominal Outstanding Balance of NPL  (100 million) 
1994 6371.26  20% 
1995 8597.33  22% 
1996 11574.69  24.40% 
1997 14279.88  27% 
1998 21453.21  35% 
1999 25027.47  39% 
2000 19521.80  29.18% 
2001 18773.80  25.37% 
2002 22080.60  26.10% 
2003 19641.30  19.74% 
2004 15751.00 15.57% 
Q2 2005   
Source: Prepared by author. 
65B3.2.2 Distribution of Ratios and Outstanding Balances of Nominal Non-Performing Loans of 
the State-Owned Commercial Banks, 1994-2004 
Before 1999, NPLs ratios and outstanding balances of the four SOCBs were regarded as 
integrated, and disclosure of NPLs ratios of each SOCBs was spatial. Then in 1999, the BOC 
began releasing NPLs in its annual report. However, the ABC did not disclose its NPLs until 2003. 
Table 3-4, table 3-5, table 3-6 and table 3-7 are risk-based NPLs ratios of the ICBC, the BOC and 
the CCB from 1999 to 2004.  
Nominal NPLs ratios indicate that both ratios and outstanding balances of NPLs of the SOCBs 
have obviously reduced since 1999. Among which, NPLs ratios of the ICBC based on risk-based 
loan classification method have been decreased from 39.47% in 1999 to 18.99 % in 2004, those of 
the ABC has been decreased from 42.12% in 2001 to 25.04% in 2004, that of the BOC has 
decreased from 37.42% in 1999 to 5.12% in 2004, and that of the CCB has decreased from 
15.74% in 2000 to 3.9% in 2004. Thus, by using nominal data, NPLs ratios of the BOC and the 
CCB can compare with even those of top international banks.
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132BTable 3-4 Nominal Ratio and Outstanding Balance of NPLs of the ICBC, 1999-2004 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
 
Outstanding Balance 
(100million) 
Ratio
（％） 
Outstanding Balance
（100million） 
Ratio
（％）
Outstanding Balance
(100million) 
Ratio
（％）
Outstanding Balance 
(100million) 
Ratio
（％）
Outstanding Balance
（100million） 
Ratio
（％）
Outstanding Balance
(100million) 
Ratio
（％）
By the Term-based Loan
Classification Method             
Total Amount of NPLs 9579.85 39.47 8309.99 34.43 7919.89 29.78 7598.78 25.69 7207.57 21.24 9579.85 39.47
Overdue 2563.04 10.56 2382.21 9.87 1691.42 6.36 1177.81 3.98 733.97 2.16 2563.04 10.56
Idle 5174.62 21.32 4482.04 18.57 4497.16 16.91 4586.18 15.51 4605.92 13.58 5174.62 21.32
Loss 1842.19 7.59 1445.74 5.99 1731.31 6.51 1834.79 6.20 1867.68 5.50 1842.19 7.59
By the Risk-based Loan
Classification Method             
Total Amount of NPLs 7710.97 31.77 7071.82 29.30 6837.49 25.71 6570.20 22.21   7710.97 31.77
Substandard 1728.11 7.12 1356.44 5.62 446.79 1.68 213.92 0.72   1728.11 7.12
Doubtful 5177.05 21.33 5162.67 21.39 5935.93 22.32 5930.57 20.05   5177.05 21.33
Loss 837.36 3.45 552.71 2.29 454.77 1.71 425.71 1.44   837.36 3.45
Source:  the Financial Times and the annual report of the ICBC (2001 to 2004) 
 
133B Table 3-5 Nominal Ratio and Outstanding Balance of NPLs of the ABC, 2001-2003 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 
 
Outstanding Balance
(100 million) Ratio（％）
Outstanding Balance 
(100 million) Ratio（％）
Outstanding Balance 
(100 million) Ratio（％）
Outstanding Balance
(100 million) 
Ratio
（％）
By the term-based Loan Classification Method         
By the Risk-based Loan Classification Method         
Source: The China Huarong Asset Management Corporation, the Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking (2003), and the annual reports of the Agriculture Bank of China.
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Source: Annual reports of the BOC. 
135B Table 3-7 Nominal Ratio and Outstanding Balance of NPLs of the CCB, 2000-2004 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
  Outstanding Balance（100million） 
Ratio
（％）
Outstanding Balance
(100million) 
Ratio
（％）
Outstanding Balance 
(100million) 
Ratio
（％）
Outstanding Balance
（100million） 
Ratio
（％）
Outstanding Balance
(100million) 
Ratio
（％）
By the Term-based Loan Classification Method           
Total Amount of NPLs   2913.93 19.35 2680.32 15.17   2913.93 19.35
Overdue     821.89 4.65     
Idle     1289.21 7.30     
Loss     569.22 3.22     
By the Risk-based Loan Classification Method           
Total Amount of NPLs 2144.74 15.47     2144.74 15.47   
Substandard 737.56 5.32     737.56 5.32   
Doubtful  1353.11 9.76     1353.11 9.76   
Loss 91.50 0.66     91.50 0.66   
Source: Data of 1999 are from the Financial Times; data from 2000 to 2004 are from annual report of the ICBC from 2001 to 2004. 
134BTable 3-6 Nominal Ratio and Outstanding Balance of NPLs of the BOC, 1999-2004 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
 
Outstanding Balance 
(100 million) 
Ratio
（％） 
Outstanding Balance
(100 million) 
Ratio
（％）
Outstanding Balance
(100 million) 
Ratio
（％）
Outstanding Balance 
(100 million) 
Ratio
（％）
Outstanding Balance
100 million） 
Ratio
（％）
Outstanding Balance
(100 million) 
Ratio
（％）
By the Risk-based 
Loan Classification 
Method             
Total Amount of NPLs 6054.59 37.42 4096.04 27.20 4360.20 27.51 4085.31 22.49 3517.14 16.29 1099.20 5.12
Substandard 2129.19 13.16 1422.78 9.45 1089.01 6.87 656.79 3.61 630.88 2.92 612.89 2.86
Doubtful 3010.88 18.61 2062.60 13.70 2344.15 14.79 1554.43 8.56 1163.23 5.39 329.31 1.53
Loss 914.52 5.65 610.66 4.05 927.04 5.85 1874.09 10.32 1723.03 7.98 157.00 0.73
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21B3.3 SWITCH OF LOAN CLASSIFICATION STANDARD, POLICY WRITE-OFFS, 
AND ADJUSTED NON-PERFORMING LOANS OF THE STATE-OWNED 
COMMERCIAL BANKS, 1994-2004 
NPLs ratios of the SOCBs from 1994 to 2005 as shown in table 3-3 are nominal ratios affected by 
external factors such as increase of loans, choices of NPLs classification standards, incentive to 
disclose real information by commercial banks, policy write-offs, as well as many other factors. All 
these factors prevent us from getting a more objective understanding of real situation of NPLs of 
the SOCBs. This paper will analyze adjusted NPLs ratios and outstanding balances of the SOCBs 
by excluding impacts of switch of loan classification standards and policy write-offs. The adjusted 
NPLs ratios of the SOCBs indicate that after 2000 the SOCBs have not realized “double reduction” 
target as propagandized by government. 
66B3.3.1 Switch of Loan Classification Standard and Its Effect on Nominal NPLs Ratios 
Evolution of Loan Classification Standard in China 
Loan classification standards can be roughly divided into two types. One is term-based loan 
classification standard, which has also been termed as four-category-loan classification method 
(referred to as “Yiyu Liangdai” in Chinese). According to this standard, non-performing loans 
include past due, idle and loss. Another is risk-based loan classification standard, which has been 
adopted by most market economies. According to this standard, loans are classified as normal, 
special attention, substandard, doubtful and loss, while the last three types are regarded as NPLs. 
Before December 2001, the General Principles of Issuing Loans issued by the PBOC had required 
commercial banks to adopt term-based loan classification standard. Consequently, NPLs were 
classified into past due, idle, and loss. Therefore, nominal NPLs ratios of the SOCBs from 1994 to 
2001 as shown in table 3-3 are term-based data. Since 2002, all SOCBs except the ABC have 
adopted risk-based loan classification standard. Resultantly, NPLs ratio of the SOCBs before 2002 
cannot be compared with those after 2002 until being adjusted. 
In planning economy, there was no need to classify bank loans because both SOEs and SOCBs 
were owned by the state and there was no borrower-lender relation between banks and 
enterprises. In that period, banks were not commercial banks, and loans were not commercial 
loans in its real terms but subsidies from the state. Therefore, it is not necessary to introduce loan 
classification method. It is only after the introduction of commercial bank-oriented reform aiming at 
transforming the four SOCBs into profit-focused enterprises that loans begin to be classified 
roughly by each SOCB’s internal classification method. The year1988 saw the introduction of 
accounting standards for commercial banks and insurance companies by the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) which classify banking loans into four categories, to wit, normal, overdue, idle, and loss and 
regard the last three types as NPL. Later in 1996 the new enacted general rules on loans changed 
definition of overdue and idle loans formulated in accounting standards for commercial banks and 
insurance companies. In the general rules on loans allow loans overdue as short as only one day 
to be calculated as overdue, loans overdue two years rather three years in the former accounting 
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standards be calculated as idle loans, and overdue loans lent to enterprises with grim expectation 
to survive. This simple and practical classification method had played important role in calculating 
NPL in the context of accounting, financial standards, and enterprises of that period. China’s 
non-performing loans (NPLs) are of three types including bad loans (Daizhang daikuan), doubtful 
loans (daizhi daikuan), and overdue loans (yuqi daikuan) F71F. Bad loans are loans that have not 
been repaid after the borrower has been declared bankrupt and gone through liquidation. Doubtful 
loans are outstanding loans with overdue against the prescribed period (including extension 
period), or any loans and/or overdue loans against the prescribed period (excluding bad loans) on 
which production ceased to exist or project has been stopped; Overdue loans are any outstanding 
loans (excluding bad loan and doubtful loan) which fail to be repaid when due or not repaid after 
the due date has been extended (General lending rules, 1996). 
However, with development of market economy, the limit of classification method surfaced and 
forced regulatory authorities to reshuffle loan classification methods by replacing four-tier 
classification system with the so-called five-tier loan classification system. The limitation of 
four-tier loan classification can be summarized as follows.  
First, it cannot disclose the true status of a line of credits. It is not all loans undue is in good 
condition, especially in the case of long term loans, which the borrower has lost means to pay and, 
therefore, de facto NPL, whereas in terms of four tier loan classification system should be 
regarded as normal. Therefore, the classification system cannot help banks discover and prepare 
for credits risk. Secondly, the terms used to evaluate loans lack flexibility and cannot denote the 
real risks associated with a loan. For example, in terms of four classification system a loan 
overdue as short as one day will be counted NPL while practice of many international famous 
banks is to count the same loan as NPL only when it overdue three months. In contrary to overdue 
loans, the definition of bad loan is over restrictive, which are confined to specific cases in a laundry 
list prescribed by the MOF, and de facto bad loans that are not in the list can be calculated into bad 
loans. Thirdly, the four-tier loan classification method facilitates individual commercial banks to 
manipulate NPL status to meet different purpose. For instance, in order to meet evaluation 
requirements about NPL ratio, banks can take the advantage of four-tier loan classification system 
to hide true status of bad loans by keeping extending line of credits or by issuing evergreen loans. 
Another example is the manipulation of the amount of bad loans. According to four-tier loan 
classification system and related stipulations of MOF, only loan loss resulted from liquidation of 
bankrupt borrower or guarantor can be calculated into bad loan. Therefore, even when a borrower 
is technically bankrupt, loans cannot be classified as bad loans unless real bankruptcy. In 1998, 
the People’s Bank of China (BOC), China’s central bank, had implemented a pilot scheme of 
introducing five-tier loan classification in Guangdong Province, a prosperous southeast China 
coastal province. The five-tier loan classification method has many advantages that effectively 
overcome shortcomings of four-tier loan classification method. 
Loan classification standards and effects on Non-performing Loans 
In practice, NPLs ratio calculated by the risk-based loan classification standard is usually higher 
                                                        
71 The Guideline on Risk-based Loan Classification (the PBOC, 1998). 
 70
than those by term-based loan classification standard are.F72F In July 1998, a trial of risk-based loan 
classification in Guangdong province showed that NPLs ratios by risk-based loan classification 
method were much higher than those by the term-based loan classification standard. This 
unexpected result had once become a main reason for stopping implementing the risk-based loan 
classification trial. Reasons that term-based loan classification standard tends to underestimate 
NPLs ratio might be as follows: first, term-based standard fails to evaluate changes of payback 
probability correctly, and many undue loans will be classified, as normal despite principals are de 
facto impossible to be paid back. Second, to evaluate loan quality by term factor might distort 
lending behavior of banks. In order to hide real status of loans, the SOCBs might repeatedly 
extend payment date to satisfy NPLs ratio ceiling set by management. Third, nominal loss loan 
can easily maneuvered by artificial factors. According to requirements of the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF), one precondition for loss loan is that both borrower and guarantor must have been legally 
liquidated and fails to repay principals or interests after liquidation. Thus, even if an enterprise has 
no prospect, and had become insolvent de facto, relevant commercial banks cannot classify 
related loans as loss until the enterprise entered legal bankruptcy procedure (See Table 3-8). 
136BTable 3-8 Comparison of the Term-based Loan Classification Method and the Risk-based Loan Classification Method  
Difference Term-based loan classification Risk-based loan classification 
Classification 
Rule 
Based on the term management, this method 
considers the maturity of contract as the 
judgment standard. 
This method focuses on whether the borrower can repay the principal 
and interests in full and on a timely basis and consider the risk 
management as the classification basis. The situation of the borrowers 
will directly affect the quality of banking loans. 
Classification 
level 
Loans are divided into four categories: pass, 
past due, idle and loss, with the last three 
recognized as NPLs 
Loans are divided into five categories: pass, special mention, 
substandard, doubtful and loss, with the last three recognized as NPLs. 
                                                        
72 China’s loan classification system can be roughly classified into three stages. Before 1983, in which the policy of so-called Bo-Gai-Dai 
(appropriation-for-lending) was implemented, little or no efforts had been paid to classify bank loans based on their quality, because there was no 
market exit mechanism for SOEs and loans are viewed as an alternative of government capital injection. Then, with the introduction of the policy of 
Bo-Gai-Dai (appropriation-for-lending), the necessities of classifying loans and writing bad debt off evolved slowly. The first stage is between 1983 
and 1988, with a feature of having ceilings on the portion of loans that could be classified, irrespective of the actual quality of a bank’s loan portfolio. 
Within this framework, though each of the major banks had its own system and standard for classifying NPLs, it is, actually speaking, meaningless. 
The second stage is between 1988 and 1999, a system of four-tiers loan classification had been set forth. Loans were classified into normal, 
overdue, doubtful, and bad debt, with the latter 3 being regarded as NPLs. At this period of time, before the “General Rule on Loans” was formally 
presented by the central bank in 1995, the basic guideline had been the “Financial Regulations on Financial Institutions and Insurance Companies” 
issued by the MOF. The General Rule on loans, taking effect on August 1, 1996, inherited the four-tier classification method, only made some 
adjustment to the definitions of overdue and doubtful loans. The third stage starts from 1998. The central bank verified the “Guideline on Risk-based 
Loan Classification”, and encouraged banks to adopt a risk-based, internationally compatible new system of loan classification including five 
categories (normal, special mentioned, substandard, doubtful, and loss). From the perspective of risks analysis confronting China’s banking system, 
the newly introduced risk-based one is undoubtedly an ideal standard. However, due to the following two reasons, we’d rather use the older 
four-tiered one in the following analyses. First, the new guideline is not compulsory, all financial institutions do not follow it. In 1998, the People’s 
Bank of China took Guangdong province, an prosperous coastal province, to conduct experiments. Since then, though the big four SOCBs have 
followed suit and adopted the classification method, no information has been released yet. Second, even if all financial institutions adopt the 
guideline and adequate information is published, we still have enough reasons to doubt the accuracy and accountability. Because the poor loan 
documentation of the SOCBs made the convertibility from the old rating to the newly established one inaccurately. Besides, the essence of the new 
loan classification system lies in its dynamic rating process, we can not expect most of long-term loans to be converted into the proper category with 
limited, inaccurate, and out-of-the-date loan documentation. Many banking regulators and commercial bank managers expressed such a concern. 
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Judgment 
criteria of 
repayment 
possibility of 
the borrowers 
Based on the term-based loan classification 
method, banks emphasize the profits of 
borrowers and neglect the cash flow of the 
borrowers; emphasize the guarantee of the 
borrowers and enterprise credit ratio and 
neglect the income from the core business. 
There is only one criterion for the possibility of 
borrower’s repayment in the term-based loan 
classification method. 
The classification of loans should be based on the assessment of 
repayment ability of borrowers and consider the normal business 
revenues of borrowers as the primary source of repayment, while treating 
loan guarantees as a secondary source of repayment. When judging the 
possibility of repayment, we first analyze the primary source of repayment 
and then analyze the secondary source of repayment. This method has 
multi-judgment standard on the possibility of repayment of borrowers. 
Exposure 
extent of loan 
risks 
According to the term-based loan classification 
method, an undue loan is considered as 
normal loan, overdue loans with one day or 
more are considered as NPLs. As this method 
is lack of thorough analysis and understanding 
of the actual situation of the borrowers, the 
classified results are not correct or fail to reflect 
the risks extents; meanwhile they will not give 
much help to the follow-up management of the 
loans. Actually, some loans in the so-called 
normal loans have problems while a portion of 
loans in the NPLs is very safe. Obviously, this 
term-based loan classification cannot 
accurately and timely reflect the operational 
changes’ effect on the loan quality and fail to 
fully expose the inner risks of the loans, so as 
not to discover and prevent the loan risks and 
display the precaution role in the early period. 
The risk-based loan classification method adopts multi-standards to have 
an overall and systematic analysis of the borrower’s situation, which can 
expose the problems and its cause of loans. The classified results are 
more reliable than that of term-based loan classification, so that it can 
fully expose the real value and risk extent of the loans, and can fully and 
dynamically reflect the quality of the loans and play a role of early 
precaution. 
Analysis 
Technology of 
Loan 
Classification 
The results from term-based loan classification 
come from the basic information materials of 
banking accounting data, which are not very 
scientific and reliable. 
 
The result of risk-based loan classification needs large quantitative 
analysis of financial statement and cash flow and some qualitative 
analysis of credit supporting and non-financial factor, with some 
comprehensive and overall analysis. The conclusion can be reached 
after analyzing the financial and non-financial, quantitative and qualitative 
information under a set of scientific indicator system, unified standard 
and standardized operational procedures. As the information of cash 
flow’s particular role on the risk-based loan classification, which is a 
complete new analysis content, the analysis of the cash flow is an 
analytical method and technology focused by the risk-based loan 
classification. Furthermore, because of the backward and 
less-standardized accounting environment in China, the non-financial 
factor will become more important role in the risk-based loan 
classification. 
Requirement 
for loan 
classification 
The term-based loan classification method is 
easy to operate without special requirement on 
the operation environment, i.e., the basic work 
on the loan classification. The necessary 
materials are the accounting book materials 
and credit management materials. 
Risk-based loan classification is a scientific and new loan classification 
method, which provides higher requirement on the basic work than that in 
the term-based loan classification. In the process of loan classification, 
commercial banks should meet at least the following six requirements. 1. 
Sound internal control system and sound credit policies and procedures; 
2. Effective organizational structure for credit management; 3. Separation 
of loan approval from loan release; 4. Sound documentation system to 
ensure the integrity of loan documents; 5. Sound information 
management system to ensure that the management of commercial 
banks receives all important credit information on a timely basis; and 6. 
Mechanisms to ensure that borrowers provide reliable and accurate 
financial information. 
Loan loss 
provision 
system 
Under the term-based loan classification, bank 
just withdraws 1% of the loan balance as the 
loan loss provision at the end of year (specific 
financial institutions are allowed to withdraw 
1.5%), which is not related with loan-term. 
Under the risk-based loan classification, commercial banks establish the 
loan loss provision according to the prudential accounting principles. A 
scientific and rational loan loss provision system not only requires to 
withdraw the general loan loss provisions from the loan balance in some 
proportion but also requires to withdraw the special loan loss provision 
and specific loan loss provision based on different levels, to wit to say the 
withdrawal of the loan loss provision is not directly related with the 
risk-based loan classification. 
 
Compare with 
international 
standards 
It is not suitable to compare the term-based 
loan classification with the international 
practice, so it arouses some unnecessarily 
misunderstanding on our commercial banks 
internationally, even leads some international 
banking credit rating institution lower the credit 
rating of our commercial banks. 
The risk-based loan classification learns from the general act and 
development trend of the loan classification, which can be compared with 
the international practice. 
Focus of credit 
management in 
banks 
Bank’s credit management focused on the risk 
loans formed or will be formed and failed to 
timely identify the potential internal risks in the 
factors of cash flow and non-financial factor. 
The credit management  
Credit management under the risk-based loan classification method 
covered the completely loaning cycle from the release to the 
disappearance of the loans in the banking book. It adopted a dynamic 
and whole-process monitoring, timely classified the levels of the loans 
according to the repayment probability of borrowers and adopted all kinds 
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of measures to strengthen the management and collection. To wit to say 
that the banking loan management under the risk-based loan 
classification method solves monitoring problems of the undue loans, 
establish an examination and monitoring system of the loan quality during 
the whole credit activity. Therefore, the banking managerial personnel 
can scientifically predict the possible loan loss, to reduce the loan loss to 
the minimum extent. 
Impact of 
professional 
and specialized 
credit 
management 
Does not provide special requirement of the 
knowledge and capacity on the related 
personnel. 
For the risk-based loan classification method with high content of 
knowledge, the credit personnel, credit management personnel and the 
monitoring personnel in the central banks should master the basic 
knowledge of the financial accounting, economy and finance, law and 
regulations, should master the overall analytical technology of analyzing 
the financial condition, cash flow, credit support and non-financial factors, 
should have strong analytical and judgmental capacity and operational 
experiences, so as to correctly use the term-based loan classification 
method. This provides higher requirement for them, who should 
experience a professional training to be qualified on this position. This will 
further promote the specialization and professional trend of the credit 
management in China. 
Source: prepared by author. 
Table 3-9 and table 3-10 show the discrepancy of NPLs ratio calculated by the two classification 
standards. According to annual reports of the SOCBs, the largest and the smallest discrepancy 
between ratios by the two classification methods is 7.7% and 3.4%, with an average discrepancy 
of 5.18%. According to the financial almanac, the biggest and the smallest discrepancy between 
the two classification standards is 7.06% and 3.39%, with an average discrepancy ratio of 4.85%. 
The data in Table 3-11 are from seven typical investigations by branches of the SOCBs. In which, 
the largest and the lowest discrepancy between NPLs ratios of the SOCBs by the two 
classification methods is 17.9% (case 4, data of 2002) and 6.52% (case 7, data of 2003), with an 
average discrepancy of 10.4%. It is evident that due to regional differences, discrepancy 
calculated by data from annual reports tends to be larger than that calculated by data from the 
Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking. 
Based on the above calculated average discrepancy data, the paper estimates the discrepancy 
between NPLs ratio calculated by the two loan classification standards to be 5%, and then use this 
estimation to adjust ratios and outstanding balance of NPLs of the SOCBs (see table 3-12). 
According to those investigations as in table 3-11, it is safe to conclude that 5% is a very 
conservative estimation. 
137BTable 3-9 Estimated Discrepancy between NPL Ratios of the ICBC and the ABC by the Risk-based Loan 
Classification and the Risk-based Loan Classification (Data from Relevant Issues of Annual Reports of the banks) 
(Unit: %)
The ICBC  The ABC 
NPLs ratio 1999 2000 2001 2002  2003 
By the Risk-based Loan Classification Method 39.47 34.43 29.78 25.69 30.66 39.47 
By the Term-based Loan Classification Method 31.77 29.3 25.71 22.21 25.15 31.77 
Discrepancy  7.7 5.13 4.07 3.48 5.51 7.7 
Source: Annual Report Of The ICBC (1999, 2002), and the ABC (2003). 
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138BTable 3-10 Estimated Discrepancy between Nominal NPLs ratios of the SOCBs by the Risk-based Loan 
Classification and By the Risk-based Loan Classification (Data from Relevant issues of the Almanac of China’s 
Finance and Banking) 
                                                                                                    (Unit: %) 
 
NPLs ratio SOCB ICBC ABC BOC CCB  
Year 2001 2002 2001 2002 2001 2002 2001 2002 2001 2002  
Risk-based Loan Classification Method 26.12 29.8 26.01 42.12 36.65 27.51 25.56 19.35 15.28   
Term-based Loan Classification Method 21.41 25.7 22.47 35.06 30.43 24.12 18.79 14.92 11.89   
Discrepancy 4.71 4.1 3.54 7.06 6.22 3.39 6.77 4.43 3.39   
Source: The Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking (2003), and Li Yang and Wang Guogang (2000). 
 
139BTable 3-11 Estimated Discrepancy between Nominal NPLs ratios of the SOCBs By the Risk-based Loan 
Classification and By the Risk-based Loan Classification (Case Studies by branches of the PBOC) 
                                                                                             (Unit: %)
NPLs ratio Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 Case 7 
Risk-based Loan Classification Method 37.53 38.19 37 72.6 43.95 86 29.52 
Risk-based Loan Classification Method 25.16 32.63 21.7 54.7 37.32 77.4 23 
Discrepancy 12.37 5.56 15.3 17.9 6.63 8.6 6.52 
Source: Prepared by author. 
a. Case 1 is about the Shiyan City in the 1st quarter of 2002( Gu Yuqing, Ding Meirong, Ling Ronghua and Ji Shenghua, 2002). 
b. Case 2 is about the Ping Dingshan city at the end of 2002( Li Yuanyuan, Huang Hui and Xing Hongjie, 2003). 
c. Case 3 is about the ABC in some cities at the end of December 1997(Li Hongyang, 1999). 
d. Case 4 is about the data of sub-branch in some city at the end of 2002. ( Yin Minghua, Yu Senlin, Wei Tang, 2003) 
e. Case 5 is about the Shuang Yashan city at the end of June 2002(Yan Hongyan and Lin Yuqiong, 2003). 
f. Case 6 is about the ABC in You County in Zhuzhou city at the end of June 2002( Zhang Shenglong, 2001). 
g. Case 7 is the data of the financial institution in Linfen city at the end of June 2003. 
67B3.3.2 Policy Write-offs and Its Effect on Nominal NPLs Ratios 
The central government has implemented large-scale policy write-offs of NPLs from the SOCBs in 
1999, 2003 and 2004 respectively. In 1999, four AMCs were established to resolute the wrote-off 
NPLs from the four SOCBs (See table 4-8). By the end of 2003, the central government had 
injected capital into the BOC and the CCB to facilitate joint-stock reform, and the CCB and the 
BOC wrote off loss loans of RMB 56.9 billion and RMB 140 billion respectively. Then in 2004, the 
CCB and the BOC once again wrote off doubtful loans of RMB 128.9 billion and RMB 149.8 billion 
respectively, and sold to the Cinda AMC at half of book value. In the mid-May 2005, the ICBC 
wrote-off RMB 246 billion-loss loans to the Huarong AMC, and In June 2005, the ICBC sold 
doubtful loans of RMB 459 billion to the four AMCs in 35 asset packages. These large-scale policy 
write-offs have significantly reduced NPLs ratio and outstanding balance of the four SOCBs. 
Without these policy write-offs, nominal NPLs ratio might be much more serious (Table 3-13). 
However, data before and after the write-offs cannot be compared directly. First, write-off amount 
is different from each bank. Second, write-off time for each bank is also different. Based on the 
understanding that policy write-offs changed only agent responsible for NPLs disposal, therefore, 
in order to clarify real trend of NPLs ratio of the SOCBs from 1994 to 2004, nominal NPLs ratio in 
table 3-13 must be adjusted.  
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68B3.3.3 Case of Xinxiang City 
Occasional piecemeal statistical figures disclosed by branches of the People’s Bank of China 
prove that real situation coincide with the adjusted data calculated by the thesis. Table 3-19 is 
based on a field research on the non-performing loans of Xinxiang city of Henan Province. The 
data reveals that NPLs ratio had been at staggeringly 62.23% before policy write-off to the AMCs, 
and remains at 48.72% after the write-off in 1999F73F, still far higher than those of economies 
plagued by the 1997 Asian financial crisis. 
140BTable 3-19 The NPLs Sold To AMCs And Number Of Enterprises To wit Going To Be Carried Out In The 
Debt-Equity Swap In Xinxiang City in the year of 1999, Henna Province   
(In 10 Thousand RMB)  
                                  CICB     ABC     BOC     CCB 
The planned amount of NPLs to be sold to the AMCs (a) 99472 88934 20911 5684. 8
The real amount of NPLs sold to the AMCs (b) 99472 80500 20911 56848
Percentage Of b to total NPLs 24.8% 41.28% 28.3% 38.21%
Percentage Of NPLs after partly sold to the AMCs 57.83% 60.76% 30.14% 61.28%
Change of NPLs ratio after partly sold to the AMCs -1.5 -7.87 -7.43 -9.52 
Source：Prepared by Author. 
69B3.3.4 Adjusted Non-performing Loans (NPLs) of the State-owned Commercial Banks 
(SOCBs) and policy implication 
Adjusted ratios and outstanding balances of the SOCBs from 1994 to 2005 after excluding impacts 
of policy write-offs and loan classification standards are shown in table 3-12 and table 3-13. 
The adjusted ratios and outstanding balances of the SOCBs indicate that, after 1999, both ratios 
and outstanding balances of the SOCBs have failed to realize the policy target of “double 
reductions” as officially announced. NPLs ratios of the SOCBs were still as high as 55%, and 
reduced to 49% and 43% in 2001 and 2002 respectively. Since 2003, NPLs ratio of the SOCBs 
has further reduced to 34%. Meanwhile, outstanding balance of NPLs reached peak with the 
amount of RMB 370 million in 2000 and lingered at that level in the following five consecutive 
years. The adjusted ratios and outstanding balances of NPLs imply that the obvious decrease of 
both nominal NPLs ratios and outstanding balances after 1999 owed largely to policy write-offs.
                                                        
73 The example of Xinxiang city can be conservatively generalized. Not long ago, the Bank of China, the best of the SOCBs, 
declared in its annual report 2000 that the NPLs ratio for the bank is a surprisingly 28%, instead of formerly admitted 10.29% 
two years ago. Considering that other SOCBs admitted NPLs ratio is two times of that of the Bank of China, it is safe to 
estimate that the ratio of non-performing loans for the other three SOCBs is above 50%, as figures of XinXiang city. 
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141BTable 3-12 Adjusted Ratio and Outstanding Balance of NPLs of the SOCBs, 1994-2005 
Nominal NPLs  NPLs by the Risk-based Loan Classification Method  NPLs Amount After Excluding the policy Write-offs 
Year NPLs ratio Outstanding Balance (RMB 100 million） NPLs ratio Outstanding Balance (RMB100 million)  NPLs ratio Outstanding Balance (RMB 100 million） 
1994 20.00% 6371.26 25.00% 7964.08  25.00% 7964.08 
1995 22.00% 8597.33 27.00% 10551.27  27.00% 10551.27 
1996 24.40% 11574.69 29.40% 13946.56  29.40% 13946.56 
1997 27.00% 14279.88 32.00% 16924.3  32.00% 16924.3 
1998 35.00% 21453.21 40.00% 24517.95  40.00% 24517.95 
1999 39.00% 25027.47 44.00% 28236.12  44.00% 28236.12 
2000 29.18% 19521.80 34.18% 22866.86  55.11% 36866.86 
2001 25.37% 18773.80 30.37% 22473.8  49.29% 36473.8 
2002 26.10% 22080.60 26.10% 22080.6  42.65% 36080.6 
2003 19.74% 19641.30 19.74% 19641.3  35.79% 35610.3 
2004 15.57% 15751.00 15.57% 15751  34.11% 34507 
Q2 2005 10.12% 10134.70 10.12% 10134.7  35.89% 35940.7 
Note: 
1. 5% is added to the nominal NPLs ratios from 1994 to 2001 as shown in table3-3, thus obtaining adjusted NPLs ratio by risk-based loan classification method. 
2. Based on outstanding balance of NPLs by risk-based loan classification method, RMB1400 billion is added to the outstanding balance of NPL since 2000; RMB196.9 billion is added to the outstanding balance of NPL since 2003; 
RMB278.7 billion is added to the outstanding balance of NPLs since 2004, and RMB705 billion is added after 2005, thus obtaining NPLs ratio after write-off 
Source: Prepared by author. 
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142BTable 3-13 Adjusted Ratio and Outstanding Balance of NPLs of the SOCBs, 1999-2004                                        
(Unit: % and 100 Million)
 The ICBC  The BOC The CCB The ABC 
 Nominal NPLs Adjusted NPLs  Nominal NPLs Adjusted NPLs Nominal NPLs Adjusted NPLs Nominal NPLs Adjusted NPLs 
Year 
NPLs 
 Ratio 
Outstanding 
Balance 
NPLs 
 Ratio 
Outstanding 
Balance 
NPLs 
 Ratio 
Outstanding 
Balance 
NPLs 
 Ratio 
Outstanding
Balance 
NPLs 
 Ratio 
Outstanding 
Balance 
NPLs 
 Ratio 
Outstanding
Balance 
NPLs 
 Ratio 
Outstanding
Balance 
NPLs 
 Ratio 
Outstanding
Balance 
1994 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1995 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1996 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1997 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1998 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1999 39.47 9579.85 39.47 9579.85 37.42 6054.59 37.42 6054.59 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2000 34.43 8309.99 51.32 12386.99 27.2 4096.04 44.74 6737.04 15.74 2182.17 40.15 5566.2 33.24＊ 4933.6 82.03＊ 12176.63
2001 29.78 7919.89 45.11 11996.89 27.51 4360.2 44.17 7001.2 19.35 2913.93 37.65 5669.93 42.12 6933.7 63.13 10391.7 
2002 25.69 7598.78 39.47 11675.78 22.49 4085.31 37.03 6726.31 15.17 2680.32 30.77 5436.32 36.65 7011 54.73 10469 
2003 21.24 7207.57 33.25 11284.57 16.29 3517.14 35.01 7558.14 9.12 1935.21 24.79 5260.21 30.66 6954.89 45.9 10412.89
2004 18.99 7036.44 29.99 11113.44 5.12 1099.2 30.92 6638.2 3.9 873.45 24.5 5487.45 26.73 6923.26 40.08 10381.26
Note: 
a. The method to calculate the adjusted NPLs ratio of the ICBC, the ABC, the BOC and the CCB is as follows: for ICBC, RMB 407.7 billion is added to the NPLs outstanding balance by risk-based loan classification from 2000 to 2004. RMB264.1 billion 
is added to the NPLs outstanding balance of the BOC by risk-based loan classification from 2000 to 2004, RMB140 billion is added to the NPL outstanding balance from 2003 to 2004 and RMB 149.8 billion is added to the NPLs outstanding balance in 
2004. For the CCB, RMB 275.6 billion is added to the NPL outstanding balance by risk-based loan classification, RMB 56.9 billion is added to the NPLs outstanding balance from 2003 to 2004, RMB 128.9 billion is added to the NPLs outstanding 
balance in 2004. For the ABC, RMB 345.8 billion is added to the NPL outstanding by risk-based loan classification from 2000 to 2004. 
b. For the CCB, nominal NPLs ratio of 2000 is calculated by the term-based loan classification; therefore 5% is added to get the ratio by risk-based loan classification method. 
c. For the ABC, calculated by the nominal NPLs of the SOCBs and nominal NPLs of the ICBC, the BOC and the CCB in 2000, nominal NPLs of the ABC is calculated by the outstanding balance between nominal NPLs of the SOCBs and that of ICBC, 
the BOC and the CCB; while after nominal NPLs divided by NPLs of that year, obtaining the adjusted NPLs ratios. As nominal NPLs ratio of the SOCBs in 2000 is calculated by term-based loan classification and nominal NPLs of the ICBC, the BOC 
and the CCB is calculated by the risk-based loan classification, therefore, NPLs ratio and nominal NPLs are relatively low. 
Source: Prepared by author. 
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22B3.4 THE NOMINAL AND ADJUSTED NON-PERFORMING LOANS RATIOS OF THE 
STATE-OWNED COMMERCIAL BANKS: AN INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC 
COMPARISION 
70B3.4.1 A Comparison with the World Top 100 Banks  
Due to availability of data, this paper compares NPLs ratio of the SOCBs with that of the world top 
100 banks, the Asia top 100 banks, and the Middle European top 100 banks from 2001 to 2004. 
Table 3-14 lists means and medians of NPLs ratios for the world top banks, the Asia top banks, 
and the Middle Europe top banks in 2001, 2003, or 2004, both including and excluding that of the 
SOCBs. The mean for NPLs ratios of the world top 50 banks in 2001 was 3.74% and that for the 
top 100 banks was 3.61%. During the same period, ranks and NPLs ratios of the four SOCBs were 
as follows: the ICBC ranked 10 with a NPLs ratio of 29.8%, the BOC ranked 11 with a NPLs ratio of 
27.5%, the ABC ranked 23 without releasing NPLs ratio, and the CCB ranked 28 with a NPLs ratio 
of 19.35% (the Banker). NPLs ratios of the SOCBs are much higher than those of world banks in 
the same period. After the SOCBs being excluded, mean for NPLs ratios of the world top 50 banks 
in 2001 was just 2.67% and that for the world top 100 banks was just 2.88%. In 2001, after the 
SOCBs being excluded, the highest NPLs ratio was 20.8% while the lowest was only 0.08%. It is 
very clear that the majority of NPLs ratios of top world banks have below 5% (See table 3-3. table 
3-6, table 3-11 and table 3-13).  
The mean for NPLs ratios of the 2002 world top 50 banks was 4.51 % and that for the 2002 top 
100 banks was 3.73 %. The rankings and NPLs ratios of the four SOCBs in the same period were 
as follows: the BOC ranked 15 with a NPLs ratio of 22.49 %, the ICBC ranked 16 with a NPLs ratio 
of 25.7 %, the ABC ranked 25 with a NPLs ratio of 30.07%, and the CCB ranked 37 with a NPLs 
ratio of 15.78 %. It is obvious that NPLs ratios of the SOCBs were greatly higher than those of 
world banks during the same period. After the SOCBs being excluded, the highest NPLs ratio for 
the world top 100 banks was 9 % and the lowest was only 0.1%, and the majority of top world 
banks were below 5% (See the table 3-14). For the world top 50 banks, after the four SOCBs 
being excluded, the mean of NPLs ratio for the top 50 banks was just 2.51%, 2% lower than that 
included the SOCBs. The mean for the NPLs ratios of the top 100 banks was only 2.61%, 1% 
lower than that of China (See table 3-13, table 3-14 and table 3-15). 
The mean for NPLs ratio of the world top 50 banks in 2004 was 2.73% and that for the top world 
100 banks was 2.37%. The rankings and NPLs ratios of the four SOCBs in the same period were 
as follows: the BOC ranked 11 with a NPLs ratio of 5.12 %, the CCB ranked 25 with a NPLs ratio 
of 3.92 %, the ICBC ranked 32 with a NPLs ratio of 18.99%, and the ABC ranked 37 without 
releasing NPLs ratio. It is noted that, although NPLs ratios of the BOC and the CCB have greatly 
reduced, NPLs ratios of the SOCBs were still much higher than those of top world banks. After the 
SOCBs being excluded, the highest NPLs ratio of the 2004 world top banks was 16.35% and the 
lowest one was only 0.1%. The majority of NPLs ratios of most top world banks were below 4% 
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(See table 3-13). After the SOCBs being excluded, mean of NPLs ratios for the top 50 world banks 
was 2.19%, 0.5% lower than that included the SOCBs. The mean of NPLs ratios for the top 
world100 banks was just 2.09%, 0.3% lower than that included the SOCBs. 
Above comparisons show that NPLs ratios of the SOCBs have been the highest of the world even 
after implementation of policy write-offs. For example, in 2001 the BOC and the CCB ranked 11th 
and 28th respectively among the top world 100 banks. Meanwhile, NPLs ratio of the ICBC and the 
BOC ranked first and second respectively. Furthermore, if the ABC had disclosed its NPLs ratio of 
2001, then top three banks with the highest NPLs ratio would all be the SOCBs. Among the 2002 
world top 100 banks, NPLs ratios of the ABC, the ICBC, the BOC and the CCB were the highest. 
In 2003, in terms of NPLs ratios, the ABC, the ICBC, the BOC ranked top three sequentially, and 
the CCB ranked five. In 2004, because the ABC did not disclose its NPLs ratio, the ICBC ranked 
the top of the world top 100 banks, while the BOC ranked 11. 
143BTable 3-14 Mean and Median of NPLs ratio of the SOCBs (Data in the bracket are corresponding data 
excluding the SOCBs)                                             
                                                                                                (Unit: %)
 The World Top 100 Banks The Asia Top 100 Banks in
The Middle Europe Top 100 
Banks  
Year 2001 2002 2004 2001 2003 2001 2003 
Mean of NPLs ratio 3.74 （2.67） 
4.51 
（2.51） 
2.73 
（2.19） 
7.04 
（5.29） 
6.37 
（4.46） 10.38 8.32 Top 50 Banks 
Median of NPLs ratio 2.17 （2.07） 
2.31 
（2.22） 
2.07 
（1.94） 
4.20 
（3.65） 
3.07 
（2.55） 8.01 4.40 
Mean of NPLs ratio 3.61 （2.88） 
3.73 
（2.61） 
2.37 
（2.09） 
7.33 
（6.21）
6.11 
（5.32） 9.45 9.04 Top 100 Banks 
Median of NPLs ratio 1.92 （1.84） 
2.12 
（1.98） 
1.59 
（1.21） 
4.50 
（4.00） 
3.57 
（3.05） 6.20 5.69 
The Smallest Value of NPLs ratio
Among the Top 100 Banks  0.08 0.10 0.10 0.45 0.32 0.00 
The Largest Value of NPLs ratio Among
the Top 100 Banks  
27.51 
（20.80） 
30．07 
（9.00） 
18．99 
（16.35） 29．78（22.60）
30．07 
（24.70） 28.00 
Note: Original data are from the Banker of relevant issues (2002, 2003, 2004), and prepared by author. 
71B3.4.2 A Comparison with NPLs Ratio of Commercial Banks in Developing and Transitional 
Economies 
NPLs ratios of commercial banks in developing economies are relatively higher than those in 
developed economies (See table 3-4, table 3-5, table 3-6, table 3-7, table 3-9 and table 3-10). 
However, even compared with NPLs ratios of commercial banks in developing economies, those 
of the SOCBs is also among the highest. For example, average NPLs ratios of the Asia top 50 
banks (excluding Japan) was 7.04% and mean for NPLs ratios of the top Asia 100 banks was 
7.33%. Table 3-4, table 3-7 and table 3-9 shows that the majority of NPLs ratios of Asia top 100 
banks (excluding Japan) was below 10%. After the SOCBs being excluded, the highest NPLs ratio 
was 22.6% and the lowest was 0.45%. Average NPLs ratio of the top 50 banks was 5.29%, 1.7% 
lower than that included the SOCBs. The average NPLs ratio for the top 100 banks was 6.21 %, 1 
% lower than that included the SOCBs. Average NPLs ratio of the top 50 banks in Asia (excluding 
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Japan) in 2003 was 6.37% and the mean for the Asia top 100 banks was 6.11%(See table 3-13 
and table 3-14). Table 3-14 shows that NPLs ratios of majority of Asia top 100 banks (excluding 
Japan) were lower than 10%. After the SOCBs being excluded, the highest NPLs ratio is 24.7% 
and the lowest is 0.23%. The average NPLs ratio of the Asia top 50 banks is 4.46%, 1.9% lower 
than that included China; that of the world top 100 is 5.32％, 0.8% lower than that included China. 
Furthermore, even compared with those of commercial banks in Middle European economies, 
NPLs ratios of the SOCBs is also much higher. For example, in 2001, the highest NPLs ratio of the 
Middle Europe top 100 banks was 28% while the lowest one was zero, mean of NPLs ratios of the 
top 50 was 10.38% and that of the top 100 was 9.45%. The majority of NPLs ratios of the Middle 
Europe top 100 banks was below 15% (see figure 3-3), greatly lower than those of the four SOCBs. 
In 2003, the highest NPLs ratio of the Middle Europe top 100 banks was 43% and the lowest one 
was 0.07%, mean of NPLs ratios of the top 50 was 8.32 % and that of the top 100 banks was 9.04 
%. Majority of NPLs ratios of the Middle Europe top 100 banks were below 10% (see figure 3-9) 
greatly lower than those of the SOCBs in the same period. 
195BFigure 3-1 Distribution of NPLs Ratios of the World Top 100 Banks, 2001 
Note:  
1. In figures from figure 3-2 to figure 3-10, horizontal axis stands for the ranking and the vertical axis stands for NPLs ratio. In the 
note, the content in the bracket is country, ranking and NPLs ratio of banks respectively. From  
2. a. ICBC (China,10,29.78%)，b. BOC (China,11,27.51%),c. Shinsei Bank (Japan,80,20.8%),c. CCB (China,28,19.35%). e.Bank 
of Communications(China,94.16.12%), f.Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation (Japan,6,10.20%), g. United Overseas 
Bank(Singapore,62,9.3%), h.Banco  Bradesco (Brazil,88,8.70%), I. Banco do Brasil (Brazil,98,7.4%). J. Resona Group 
(Japan,42,7.27%), k.Credit Lyonnais (France,59,7.40%), I. Mizuho Financial Group (Japan,3,6.46%) , l. BNP Paribas 
(France,15,5.7%). 
3. As some data of NPLs ratio have not been disclosed, the scatter diagram of NPLs ratio distribution does not include the 
following 25 banks: Industrial and Commercial Bank of China，UFJ Holding，Royal Bank of Scotland，HypoVereinsbank，
Agricultural Bank of China，Rabobank Nederland，Societe Generale，Credit Suisse Group，Fortis Bank，Dresdner Bank，Groupe 
Caisse d'Epargne，Groupe Banques Populaires，Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale，Bayerische Landesbank，Landesbank 
Baden-Wurttemberg，SanPaolo IMI，DZ BANK Deutsche Zentral-Genossenschaftsbank，Bankgesellschaft Berlin，Banca di 
Roma，Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale，Chuo Mitsui Trust &Banking，Nykredit Group，Aozora Bank，State Street Corp，
Golden State Bancorp. 
Source: Prepared by author. 
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196BFigure 3-2 Distribution of NPLs Ratios of the Asia Top 100 Banks, 2001 (Excluding Japan) 
Note:  
1.a.ICBC (China,1,29.78%), b.BOC (China,2,27.51%), c.AMMB Holdings(Malaysia,81,22.60%), d.Thai Farmers 
Bank(Thailand,56,20.72%), e.CCB(China,4,19.35%) f.Bank BNI(Indonesia,98,19.54%), g.Siam  Commercial 
Bank(Thailand,46,18.5%) , h.Metrobank(Philippines,62,17.2%), I. Bank of  Communications(China,14,16.12%), j.Shengzhen 
Development Bank(China,88,14.84%) , k.Bangkok Bank(Thailand,43,14.7%) l.Maybank(Malaysia,18,14.5%), m.Bank of 
Baroda(India,61,12.39%), n.Thai Military Bank(Thailand,85,12.30%), o. ICICI Bank(India,39,10.66%). 
2. As some data of NPLs ratio haven’t been released, the scatter diagram of NPLs ratio distribution of the top 100 banks(excluding 
Japan) in Asia 2001 excludes the following 31banks: Agricultural Bank of China, State Bank of India, Hua Nan Commercial Bank, 
Bank of East Asia, China Everbright Bank, Krung Thai Bank, Macquarie Bank,Taiwan Business Bank, CITIC Industrial Bank, Bank 
of the Philippine Islands, National Bank of New Zealand, Bank of Shanghai, International Bank of Taipei, China Minsheng Banking 
Corp., Canara Bank, Farmers Bank of China, Industrial Bank of Taiwan, Punjab National Bank, Fujian Industrial Bank, Hong Leong 
Bank, Guangdong Development Bank, Central Trust of China, China Merchants Bank, Liu Chong Hing Bank, Southern Bank Berhad, 
Bank of Western Australia, Bank of Ayudhya, Taichung Commercial Bank, Far Eastern International Bank, Huaxia Bank. 
Source: Prepared by author. 
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197BFigure 3-3 Distribution of NPLs Ratios of the Middle Europe Top 100 Banks, 2001 
Note: a. Bank Gospodarki Zywnosciowej(Poland,25,28%), b.Vseobecna uverova banka(Slovakia,18,26.36%),c.Slovenska 
sporitel'na (Slovakia,23,25%), d. Stopanska Banka a.d. Skopje(Macedonia, Republic of,66,24.6%), e. UniBanka 
(Slovakia,86,24.2%), f.ING Bank Slaski(Poland,10,22.73%), g.Bank Przemyslowo-Handlowy BK (Poland,3,20.2%), h. Nordea Bank 
Polska (Poland,75,19.00%), I. Bank Handlowy w Warszawie (Poland,1,18.44%), j. Banca Commercial Romania 
(Romania,8,17.90%), k.Raiffeisenbank(Czech Republic,73,17.74%), l. Bank Pekao(Poland,2,14.7%), m. Zagrebacka Banka 
(Croaria,13,15.06%), n.Gorenjska Banka (Slovenia,40,15.08%), o. Bank Ochrony Srodowiska (Poland,31,14.2%), p.Bank 
Wspolpracy-Europejski (Poland,87,13.9%), q.BRE Bank(Poland,12,11.8%), r. Ceskoslovenska obchodni banka (Czech 
Republic,4,10.4%), s. Romanian Savings Bank (Romania,48,10.02%) 
Source: Prepared by author. 
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198BFigure 3-4 Distribution of NPLs Ratios of the World Top 100 Banks, 2002 
Note： 
1.a. ABC (China,25,30.07%), b.ICBC(China,16,25.69%), c.BOC(China,15,22.49%), d.CCB(China,35,15.78%), e.Capitalia Gruppo 
Bancario(Italy,69,8.3%), f.United Overseas bank(Sinapore,80,9.00%), g.Countrywide Financial Corporation(USA,89,8.78%), h.DBS 
Bank(Sinapore,87,6.1%), I.Shinsei Bank(Japan,75,5.80%), j. Mizuho Financial Group (Japan,6,6.89%), k.Credit 
Lyonnais(France,52,6.8%)。 
2．As some data of NPLs ratio haven’t been released, the scatter diagram of NPLs ratio distribution of the top 100 banks in the world 
in 2002 excludes the following 25 banks: Deutsche Bank, ABN AMRO Bank, Rabobank Nederland, Societe Generale, Credit Suisse 
Group, Abbey National, Groupe Banques Populaires, Bayerische Landesbank, Dresdner Bank, KBC Bank, Landesbank 
Baden-Wurttemberg, Caja de Ahorros y Pen.de Barcelona-la Caixa, DZ BANK Deutsche Zentral-Genossenschaftsbank, ANZ 
Banking Group, WestLB, Commonwealth Bank Group, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena, Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale, 
Nykredit Group, State Street Corp, Svenska Handelsbanken, Forenings Sparbanken (Swedbank), Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken, 
State Bank of India, Erste Bank. 
Source: Prepared by author. 
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199BFigure 3-5 Distribution of NPLs ratios of the Asia Top 100 Banks, 2002 (Excluding Japan) 
Note: 
a. ABC (China,3,30.07%),b. ICBC (China,2,25.69%),c. BOC (China,1,22.49%),d. Bangkok Bank (Thailand,38,25.9%),e. Kasikorn 
bank (Thailand,58,24.3%), f. Siam Commercial Bank(Thailand,65,24.2%), g. AMMB Holdings (Malaysia,57,18.92%), h. CCB 
(China,4,15.78%), I. RHB Bank Berhad (Malaysia,45,15.7%), j. Bank of Communications(China,15,13.5%), k. Punjab National 
Bank(India,67,12.38%). 
Source: Prepared by author. 
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200BFigure 3-6 Distribution of NPLs Ratios of the Central Europe Top 100 Banks, 2002 
Note: 
1.a. ABN AMRO Bank (Polska) (Poland,72,43%), b. Bank Polskiej Spolozielczosci (Poland,90,30.94%), c. ING Bank Slaski 
(Poland,9,26.5%), d. Bank Handlowy w Warszawie (Poland, 2, 22.37%), e. Bank Przemyslowo-Handlowy PBK (Poland, 4, 22.3%), f. 
Bank Pekao (Poland, 1, 21.27%), g.SKB banka d.d.(Slovenia,51,28.62%), h. Gorenjska anka (Slovenia,43,24.22%), i. Istrobanka 
(Slovakia,92,23.27%). 
2. As some data of NPLs ratio haven’t been released, the scatter diagram of NPLs ratio distribution of the top 100 banks(excluding 
Japan) in Asia 2002 excludes the following 28 banks: ANZ Banking Group, State Bank of India, Maybank, Hana Bank, Chinatrust 
Commercial Bank, Bank of East Asia, Chohung Bank, China Merchants Bank, International Comm'l Bank of China, China Everbright 
Bank, Krung Thai Bank, St.George Bank, National Bank of New Zealand, Taiwan Business Bank, Bank of Shanghai, Bank of the 
Philippine Islands, Metrobank, Siam City Bank, Hong Leong Bank, Industrial Bank of Taiwan, Guangdong Development Bank, Bank 
of Western Australia, Huaxia Bank, Beijing City Commercial Bank, Bank of Ayudhya, E.Sun Bank, Chekiang First Bank, Chinese 
Bank. 
Source: Prepared by author. 
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201BFigure 3-7 Distribution of NPLs Ratios of the World Top 100 Banks, 2003 
Note： 
1.a. ABC(China,36,30.07%), b.ICBC (China,25,21.24%), c.BOC (China,29,16.29%), d.CCB(China,21,9.12%), e.UFJ Holding 
(Japan,24,8.5%), f.Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation (Japan, 9,5.6), g.. Societe Generale (France, 23,5.8%), h.Banca 
Intesa(Italy,34,5.84%), i.Capitalia Gruppo Bancario(Italy,70,12.39%), j.United Overseas Bank(Singapore,90,8.1%), k. Resona 
Holdings (Japan, 62,6.7%), l. Countrywide Financial Corporation (USA, 66,5.46%). 
2. As some data of NPLs ratio haven’t been released, the scatter diagram of NPLs ratio distribution of the top 100 banks in the world 
in 2003 excludes the following 26 banks: HBOS, UBS, ABN AMRO Bank, Lloyds TSB Group, Credit Suisse Group, Groupe Banques 
Populaires, Commerzbank, Royal Bank of Canada, Bayerische Landesbank, KBC Bank, Abbey National, Landesbank 
Baden-Wurttemberg, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, DZ BANK Deutsche Zentral-Genossenschaftsbank, ANZ Banking 
Group, Eurohypo, Nykredit Group, Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale, State Bank of India, Forenings Sparbanken (Swedbank), 
DBS Bank, Allied Irish Banks, Bank of Ireland, Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Madrid, Erste Bank, Banco Popular Espanol. 
Source: Prepared by author. 
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202BFigure 3-8 Distribution of NPLs Ratios of the Asia Top 100 Banks, 2003 (Excluding Japan) 
Note: 
1.a.ABC(China,4,30.07%), b.Bankok Bank (Thailang,23,24.7%), c.ICBC(China,25,21.24%), d.BOC (China,1,16.29%), 
e.Kasikornbank(Thailand,46,16.85%), f.RHB Bank Berhad(Malaysia,56,15%), g.AMMB Holdings(Malaysia,64,16.25%), h.Siam 
Commercial Bank(Thailand,68,17.5%), I. Bank of Ayudhya(Thailand,69,16.22%), j.Bank of Communication (China,14,13.31%), 
k.Maybank(Malaysia,19,12.72%), l.Metrobank(Philippines,84,13.64%).  
2.As some data of NPLs ratio haven’t been released, the scatter diagram of NPLs ratio distribution of the top 100 banks(excluding 
Japan) in Asia 2003 excludes the following 22 banks: ANZ Banking Group, State Bank of India, DBS Bank, National Agricultural 
Coop. Fed., Chinatrust Financial Holding, Hana Bank, China Merchants Bank, CITIC Industrial Bank, International Comm'l Bank of 
China, St.George Bank, Krung Thai Bank, Korea First Bank, National Bank of New Zealand, Punjab National Bank, Taiwan Business 
Bank, Bank of the Philippine Islands, Beijing City Commercial Bank, Guangdong Development Bank, CITIC Ka Wah Bank, E.Sun 
Bank, Ta Chong Bank, Central Trust of China. 
Source: Prepared by author. 
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203BFigure 3-9 Distribution of NPLs Ratios of the Middle Europe Top 100 Banks, 2003 
Note: 
a.ABN AMOR Bank(Polska)(Poland,85,43%), b.Kredyt Bank(Poland,45,28.3%), c.Jubanka(Serbia and Monteneqro, 61,26.27%), 
d.ING Bank Slaski(Poland,12,25.05%), e.Bank Pekao(Poland,2,24.7%), f.Gorenjska Banka d.d. Kranj(Slovakia,39,22.5%), 
g.Stopanska Banka a.d. Skopje(Macedonia, Republic of,76,20.9%), h.Bank Przemyslowo-Handlowy PBK(Poland,6,19.1%), i.BRE 
Bank(Poland,19,16.8%), j.SKB banka(Slovakia,52,18.02%), k.Bank Ochrony Srodowiska(Poland,51,16%), l.Fortis Bank 
Polska(Poland,53,13.6%). 
Source: Prepared by author. 
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204BFigure 3-10 Distribution of NPLs Ratios of the World Top 100 Banks, 2004 
Note： 
1.a.ICBC (China,32,18.99%), b.Capitalia Gruppo Bancario (Italy,64,16.35%), c.Banca Intesa (Italy,30,7.50%), d.BOC 
(China,11,5.12%), e.BNP Paribas (France,10,4.49%), f.State Bank of India (India,93,5.33%), g.Shoko Chukin Bank 
(Japan,92,5.12%). 
2. As some data of NPLs ratio haven’t been released, the scatter diagram of NPLs ratio distribution of the top 100 banks in the world 
in 2004 excludes the following 20 banks: HBOS, Rabobank Group, ABN AMRO Bank, Lloyds TSB Group, Credit Suisse Group, 
Groupe Banques Populaires, Agricultural Bank of China, National Australia Bank, Commerzbank, Bayerische Landesbank, Caja de 
Ahorrosy Pen.de Barcelona-la Caixa, DZ BANK Deutsche Zentral-Genossenschaftsbank, Landesbank Baden-Wurttemberg, ANZ 
Banking Group, HSN Nordbank, Nykredit Realkredit Group, Westpac Banking Corparation, Bank of Ireland, Skandinaviska Enskilda 
Banken, Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale. 
Source: Prepared by author. 
72B3.4.3 A Comparison with Domestic Joint-stock Commercial Banks   
Following establishment of Bank of Communications in 1986, many joint-stock banks have been 
developing quickly in China. After a series of reconstructions and reorganizations, there are total 
12 joint-stock commercial banks left in China, namely, the Bank of Communications, the ICTIC 
BankF74F, the Everbright Bank, the Huaxia Bank, the Minsheng Bank, the China Merchant Bank, the 
Guangdong Development Bank, the Pudong Development Bank, the Shenzhen Development 
Bank, the Xingye BankF75F, the Hengfeng Bank, and the China Zheshang Bank. Because all these 
joint stock commercial banks were establishment to promote regional economic development, 
therefore, local governments control all these joint-stock commercial banks, which are small in 
scale and poor in corporate governance. Some joint-stock commercial banks also have been 
plagued by NPLs problem like the SOCBs. Among these joint-stock banks, some banks, such as 
the CITIC Bank, the Everbright Bank, the Bank of Communications (NPLs ratio was 13.31% in 
2003) and the Shenzhen Development Bank (NPLs ratio was 11.41% in 2004) have very high 
NPLs ratios, while others, such as the Huaxia Bank, the Merchant Bank, the Pudong Development 
Bank, the Xingye Bank and the Minsheng Bank (NPLs ratio was 1.29% in 2003 and 1.31% in 
2004), have relatively lower NPLs ratios (See figure 3-11). In fact, NPLs of some joint-stock 
commercial banks are so sound that can even compare with those of many commercial banks in 
mature market economies.  
                                                        
74 In November, 2005, the name of the bank was changed into the China CITIC Bank. 
75 Before 2004, the bank was called Fujian Industrial Bank. 
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Figure 3-11 is a comparison of NPLs ratio of the SOCBs with those of major joint-stock commercial 
banks. To be comparable, NPLs ratios calculated by term-based loan classification standard are 
adjusted by adding 1.5%, the average discrepancy between NPLs ratios by term-based data and 
risk-based ones. 
It is obvious that NPLs ratios of the SOCBs are much higher than those of joint-stock commercial 
banks. For example, in 1996 nominal and adjusted NPLs ratio of the SOCBs was 29.4% and 
24.4% respectively. In the same year, only the Shenzhen Development Bank disclosed its NPLs 
ratio of 8.82%. The nominal and adjusted NPLs ratios of the SOCBs have been much higher than 
those of joint-stock commercial banks. In 1997, nominal NPLs ratio of the SOCBs was 27% and 
the adjusted 32%. While In the same year, NPLs ratio of the Minsheng Bank was only 3.44%, 
while ratio of the Shenzhen Development Bank was19.26%, much lower than 27% and 32%. In 
1998, nominal NPLs ratio of the SOCBs was 35 % and the adjusted one was 40%. The NPLs 
ratios of joint-stock banks in the same year were all much lower than 35% and 40%. For example, 
that of the Shenzhen Development Bank was 21.99%, of the Pudong Development Bank was 
10.5% and of the Minsheng Development Bank was 7.62 %. In 1999, nominal NPLs ratio of the 
SOCBs was 39 % while adjusted one was 44%, while those of joint-stock banks were also much 
lower than 39%. For example, that of Shenzhen Development Bank was 23.61%, the Merchant 
Bank was 21.05%, the Pudong Development Bank was 10.4%, and the Minsheng Development 
Bank was 10.2%. In 2000, the nominal NPLs ratio of the SOCBs was 29.18% and the adjusted 
one was 55.11%. Meanwhile, the NPLs ratio of the Shenzhen Development Bank was 23.26%, the 
Merchant Bank was 13.62% and the Pudong Development Bank was 13.17%. Those of other two 
joint-stock banks were both below 10%. In 2001, the nominal NPLs ratio of the SOCBs was 
25.37% and the adjusted one was 49.29%. Meanwhile, the NPLs ratio of the Shenzhen 
Development Bank was 16.34%, the Merchant Bank was 10.25%, and those of other four 
joint-stock banks were all below 10%. In 2002, the nominal NPLs ratio of the SOCBs was 26.1% 
and adjusted one was 42.65%. Meanwhile, the NPLs ratio of the Bank of Communications was 
14.22%, the Everbright Bank 13.13%, the ICTIC Bank was 10.35%, the Shenzhen Development 
Bank was 11.61%, and those of other five joint-stock banks were all below 10%. In 2003, the 
nominal NPLs ratio of the SOCBs was 19.74% and the adjusted one was 35.79%. Meanwhile, that 
of the Bank of Communications was 13.31%, and the NPLs ratios of other eight joint-stock 
commercial banks were all below 10%, among which, five were lower than 5%. In 2004, the 
nominal NPLs ratio of the SOCBs was 15.57% and adjusted one 34.11%. Meanwhile, the nominal 
NPLs ratio of Shenzhen Development Bank was 11.41% and those of other six joint-stock 
commercial banks were all below 6%. These comparisons show that the nominal and adjusted 
NPLs ratios of the SOCBs are much higher than those of joint-stock commercial banks, especially 
than that of the Minsheng Bank, the Huaxia Bank and the Industrial Bank.  
It is very necessary to point out that, due to availability of data, we have not compared NPLs ratios 
of the SOCBs with those of city commercial banks and urban credit cooperatives. According to 
available data, average NPLs ratio of city commercial banks was 14.45% and 11.7% at the end of 
2003 and 2004 respectively. By the end of the second quarter of 2005, the highest NPLs ratio of 
city commercial banks was 10.43% (CBRC, 2005). At the beginning of 2005 the average 
non-performing assets ratio for urban credit cooperatives was more than 30%, greatly higher than 
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those of both the SOCBs and joint-stock commercial banks. Therefore, if city commercial banks 
and urban credit cooperatives were included, NPLs ratios of urban credit cooperatives would be 
even higher than those of the SOCBs with a narrow gap. 
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205BFigure 3-11 NPLs Ratios of the SOCBs and Joint-stock Commercial Banks, 1994-2005 
Source: Prepared by author. 
73B .4.4 Proportion of NPLs of the SOCBs to GDP and to Central Fiscal Income, 1994-2004 
Figure 3-12 shows the proportions of outstanding balances of NPLs of the four SOCBs to GDP 
and to central fiscal income from 1994 to 2005. During the 11 consecutive fiscal years from 1994 
to 2004, proportions of NPLs of the four SOCBs to GDP have been exceeding 10%. Among which, 
the proportions were above 15% in 8 years and were above 20% in 4 years. In 1999, that 
proportion even reached 30.5%. 
The proportion of NPLs to central fiscal income can also demonstrate severity of NPLs problem of 
the SOCBs. Figure 3-12 shows that, outstanding balance of NPLs of the SOCBs has been 
exceeding central fiscal income from 1994 to 2003 (excluded 2003). Among which, the lowest 
proportion of NPLs to fiscal income was 110%. In 1999, that proportion even reached 218%. The 
proportion of outstanding balance of NPLs of the SOCBs to central fiscal income in 2003 was only 
90.45%, as a direct result of policy write-offs in that year. If used adjusted NPLs ratio, the 
proportion to central fiscal income would be increased to 99.52%, and outstanding balance of 
NPLs would reach RMB 2161 billion.
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144BTable 3-15 NPLs Ratio of Commercial Banks in Various Economies  
 Peak value in 1980s 1990s 
Country Year ％ 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
West Europe                 
France           5.9 5.1 4.3 4.3 4.4 … 
German           5 4.6 5.1 4.9 5… … 
Italy           9.1 8.5 7.7 6.7 6.5… … 
Luxemburg            0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 … 
Spain           2 1.5 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 
Sweden           2.6 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.3 
Britain           3.1 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.3 … 
Asia                 
India       23.6 19.5 16.5 16.5 14.4 14.7 12.8 11.4 10.4 … 
Indonesia       12 10.4 11.2 2 48.6 32.9 18.8 11.9 5.8 … 
Korean        14.5 13.5 16.5 7.4 8.3 6.6 2.9 1.9 … 
Malaysia 1988 32.9 20.6    10.2 6.1 3.5 3.6 18.6 16.6 15.4 17.8 15.8 … 
Philippine  1986 19.3      2.5 2.6 3.2 11 12.7 14.9 16.9 15.4 … 
Thailand 1983~1988 15 9.7    7.5 7.7 7 12.4 42.9 38.6 17.7 10.5 15.8 15.9 
Hong Kong        2 2.1 2 2.8      
European 
Emerging 
Economy 
                
Bulgaria*      6.6 6.8 12.6 14.6 12.9 16.4 13.9 8.2 7 5.5 9 
Croatia***           11.4 11.8 10.6 7.2 5.8 6.3 
Czech 
Republic 
 50 33 2.7 19.3 22.1 35.8 32.7 28.1 26.5 20.7 21.9 19.9 13.7 8.8 8.6 
Estonia           1.4 1.7 1 1.3 1.6 … 
Hungary   2.6 9.4 20.7 25.6 30.2 10.3 7.2 3.6 4.9 3.6 4.1 4.6 5.8 … 
Latvia           6 6 4.6 2.8 2 1.9 
Lithuania**           12.9 12.5 11.3 8.3 6.5 5.3 
Poland    16.5 26.8 36.4 34.7 23.9 14.7 11.5 10.9 13.2 14.9 17.8 21.4 … 
Russia6        5.9 5.1 3.5 17.3 13.4 7.7 6.3 6.1 … 
Slovak 
Republic 
     12.2 30.3 41.3 31.8 33.4 31.6 23.7 15.3 15.4 11 … 
Slovenia       22 13.2 14.3 12.5 5.4 5.2 5.2 7 7 … 
Ukraine           … 35.8 29.6 25.1 21.9 … 
Romania        5.9 5.1 3.5 4.6      
China           … 29 22 31 28.2 … 
Others                 
Australia           0.7 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.6 
Canada           1.1 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.6 1.6 
Japan           6.1 5.8 5.7 8.4 7.2 … 
USA           1 1 1.2 1.5 1.6 1.5 
Argentina 1985 30.3 16    8.6 12.3         
Venezuela 1983 15.6 3    24.7 10.6         
Mexico 1982 4.1 2.3    19 19.1         
Chile 1983 15.5 2.1    1 1         
Colombia 1984 25.3 2.2    2.2 2.7 16.5 16.5       
Ecuador 1983 17.4               
Uruguay 1986 45.9               
Note: Because NPLs definitions are different, in different economies, the NPLs ratio cannot be directly compared. 
Source: Prepared by author. Original data are from the International Financial Statistics, the MF(1990,1996,1997)，the the Bank 
Overview(June 1998) and the Banker( July 2003). 
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  145BTable 3-16 Percentage of NPLs of the SOCBs to GDP and to Central Fiscal Revenue, 1994-2005  
                                                                 (unit：100million,%) 
Year 
Estimated amount 
of NPL NPLs ratio GDP Central Fiscal Income Percentage of NPLs to GDP
Percentage of NPLs to 
Fiscal Income 
1994 6371.26 20% 46759.40 5218.10 13.63% 122.10% 
1995 8597.33 22% 58478.10 6242.20 14.70% 137.73% 
1996 11574.69 24.40% 67884.60 7407.99 17.05% 156.25% 
1997 14279.88 27% 74462.60 8651.14 19.18% 165.06% 
1998 21453.21 35% 78345.20 9875.95 27.38% 217.23% 
1999 25027.47 39% 82067.50 11444.08 30.50% 218.69% 
2000 19521.8 29.18% 89468.10 13395.23 21.82% 145.74% 
2001 18773.8 25.37% 97314.80 16386.04 19.29% 114.57% 
2002 22080.6 26.10% 105172.30 18903.64 20.99% 116.81% 
2003 19641.3 19.74% 117251.90 21715.25 16.75% 90.45% 
2004 15751 15.57% 136515.00  11.54%  
Q2 2005 10134.7 10.12%     
Source: prepared by author. 
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206BFigure 3-12 Percentage of NPLs of the SOCBs to GDP and to Central Fiscal Revenue, 1994-2004 
Source: Prepared by author. 
23B .5 NON-PERFORMING NON-CREDIT ASSETS AND NON-PERFORMING LOANS 
OF THE STATE-OWNED COMMERCIAL BANKS, 1994-2003 
The above comparison of NPLs ratios of the four SOCBs with the world top 100 banks and the 
Asia top 100 banks, percentage outstanding balance of NPLs to GDP and to central fiscal income 
clearly show that, although NPLs ratios of the SOCBs have decreased continuously since 1999, 
even nominal NPLs ratios of the SOCBs have been the highest in the world, let along adjusted 
NPLs ratios of the SOCBs. 
It is noteworthy to point out that, the above discussion did not consider effect of non-credit assets 
on NPLs ratios. Otherwise, NPLs problem of the SOCBs would be much worse. Generally 
speaking, assets of the SOCBs can be classified into foreign assets, reserve assets, claims on the 
central government, claims on other financial institutions and claims on other non-financial 
institutions, with the last three usually being referred to as claims.  
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Therefore, the following relationship stands:  
Non-Performing Assets > Non-Performing Claims > Non-Performing Loans 
For the SOCBs, non-credit assets includes interests receivable, hidden loss, loss on housing 
welfare reform, loss on inter-banking borrowing, loss on self-run entities，loss on legal cases, 
trusts needed to be dealt with, loss on assets of urban credit cooperatives, loss on items off 
balance sheets, repurchase of securities, loss on money paid in advance to buy enterprises' bonds, 
loss on equity, and many other items. Compared with large banks in other economies, non-credit 
assets of the SOCBs have been featured by numerous types, complicated contents, and high 
potential loss. 
Before 1996, proportion of total non-credit assets of the SOCBs to total assets had remained at 
16%. The proportion rose to 38% in 2003 and further to 36% in 2004. In addition, it is reasonable 
to predict that the proportion will rise further in the future (See table 3-17).  
146BTable 3-17 Non-credit Assets of the SOCBs, 1994--2003 
                                                                                   (Unit: 100 million and %) 
Year Assets Loans 
Non-credit 
Assets 
Percentage of Non-credit 
Assets 
Non-performing 
Non-credit Asset Ratio 
Non-credit 
Asset 
1994 38206.5 31856.32 6350.18 16.62%   
1995 45986.5 39078.76 6907.74 15.02%   
1996 55631.5 47437.27 8194.23 14.73%   
1997 68228.3 52888.44 15339.86 22.48%   
1998 78886.6 61294.88 17591.72 22.30%   
1999 84190.7 64173 20017.7 23.78%   
2000 92977.2 66901.3 26075.9 28.05%   
2001 101034.7 74000 27034.7 26.76% 8.70% 2352 
2002 135496.02 84600 50896.02 37.56% 8.70% 4428 
2003 156400.05 99500 56900.05 36.38% 8.70% 4950 
Source: Prepared by author. Original data are from the Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking (1995-2004). 
While amount of non-credit assets of the four SOCBs has been increasing, quality of non-credit 
assets has continued to deteriorate. In order to get real situation of non-credit assets of the 
SOCBs, the PBOC had carried out nation-wide investigation on losses of non-credit assets of the 
four SOCBs from December 2001 to February 2002. The result shows that loss ratio of non-credit 
assets of the SOCBs in 2001 was around 8.7% (PBOC, 2003). The data disclosed by annual 
reports of the ICBC show that non-performing ratio of non-credit assets of the ICBC was 8.99%, 
7.02% and 5.47% in 2002, 2003, and 2004 respectively (See table 3-18). Although ratio of 
non-performing non-credit assets investigated by the PBOC was much lower than NPLs ratio of 
the SOCBs (25.37%) in the same period (see table 3-3), and the ratios of non-performing 
non-credit assets released by ICBC were greatly lower than the corresponding nominal NPLs ratio 
of 25.69%, 21.24% and 18.99% (see table 3-4), too, many typical investigations demonstrate that 
severity of non-credit assets in state-owned banks might be significantly underestimated and ratio 
of non-performing non-credit assets would be higher than 8.7%. Take example of a branch of the 
SOCBs in Chongqing. Non-credit assets amounted to 12.95% of the total and the expected loss 
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ratio of non-credit assets turn out to be as high as 88.13%, much higher than NPLs loss ratio 
(Financial Times, 29 June 2003). According to the investigation made by Liu Haiwen from 
Resident Special Office of State Auditing Bureau in Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei provinces, the 
non-performing ratio of non-credit assets was also much higher than 8.7%. At the end of June 
2003, the outstanding balance of non-credit assets in one branch of ICBC in north China reached 
RMB 5.46642 billion, accounting for 3.09% of the total amount. Take the example of three 
secondary branches of A, B and C in one province, the risk non-credit assets reached RMB 
729.97 million, accounting for 1.92% of the total amount, whose the expected loss reached RMB 
525.98 million and the expected loss ratio 72.06% and whose actual loss reached RMB 74.4 
million and actual loss ratio only 10.19%. Among them, interests receivables were RMB 342.37 
million and the expected loss ratio was 63.57%. 95% of interests receivable in branch A’s balance 
sheet were owed for more than three years. Affected by objective factors, most of enterprises 
borrowed loans went bankruptcy with the limited value of liquidation. Mortgages assets reached 
RMB 229.43 million and expected loss ratio was 21.81%. The potential risks, such as 
underestimation of real value, high potential losses and difficulty in disposing, cannot be neglected. 
The investigations also show that the expected loss ratios judged by the banks themselves are 
significantly underestimated. For example, the legal fees needed to dealt with reached RMB 327.7 
million and the expected losses can not be compensated reached RMB 770 thousand. Actually 
even if the banks won most of the legal cases, the compensation percentage will be very limited. 
Besides, the inter-bank offered amount needed to deal with of branch B reached RMB 1.16 million 
and expected to have no loss. However, the fact is, most of the inter-bank fund were failed to get 
back, some relevant banks even refused to sign on the letter of demand, let along to liquidate the 
fund. 
147BTable 3-18 Non-Credit Assets of the ICBC,2001-2004 
                                                                                    (Unit: 100 million and %) 
Non-credit Asset 
Year Outstanding Balance (％) 
Non-performing 
Asset 
Non-performing 
Asset Ratio 
Risk Assets of 
Non-credit asset
Non-performing Ratio 
of Non-credit Asset 
2001   9774.89 22.53% 1855  
2002 17880.18 37.43% 9216 19.29% 1607.17 8.99% 
2003 19071.7 36.13% 8546.98 16.19% 1339.41 7.02% 
2004 19864.38 35.03% 8122.85 14.32% 1086.41 5.47% 
Source: Prepared by author. Original data are from Annual Report (2004) of the ICBC. 
In fact, in the case of China, some non-credit assets of the SOCBs are de facto NPLs. Quality of 
non-credit assets is closely connected with NPLs of the SOCBs, First, non-credit assets are 
directly connected with credit assets. For example, non-credit assets such as interests receivables, 
legal case fees, mortgage assets, and inter-banking offering all bear the risks of credit assets. 
Second, classification method for non-credit assets has not been standardized. In order to deal 
with non-credit losses hard to be dealt through other channels, many branches of the SOCBs 
consider non-credit asset as an account, which can be adjusted to needs. However, even 
calculated by 8.7%, non-credit assets of the SOCBs including interests receivable, hidden losses, 
mortgage assets, industrial investment and loss on legal cases have incurred loss of RMB 495 
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billion (see table 3-17). 
Obviously, the nominal and adjusted NPLs of the SOCBs calculated above did not include relevant 
non-performing non-credit assets. Therefore, if part of losses of non-credit assets closely 
connected with NPLs were included, NPLs of the four SOCBs would be hundreds of billions more 
and adjusted NPLs ratios would also be several percentages higher correspondingly. 
24B3.6 CONCLUSION 
The chapter systematically analyzes nominal NPLs ratios of the SOCBs from 1994 to 2004, 
adjusted NPLs ratios after effects of loan classification standards and policy write-offs being 
excluded, the relative severity of NPLs of the SOCBs from different angles by comparing with 
international and domestic counterparts, the percentage of NPLs of the SOCBs to GDP and to 
fiscal income, and further discusses potential effects of non-performing non-credit assets on NPLs 
ratio of the SOCBs, thus reaching a comprehensive review of NPLs problem of the SOCBs, and 
laying an analytical base for further analysis on reasons of continuous accumulation of NPLs of 
the SOCBs. 
Adjusted nominal NPLs ratios and NPLs of the SOCBs show that, although many positive 
measures have been implemented by the regulatory organization and the regulatory goal of 
“double reductions” has been realized in terms of both nominal NPLs ratios and outstanding NPLs 
of the SOCBs since 2002, correspondent adjusted NPLs ratios and NPLs of the SOCBs have not 
reduced obviously.  
Comparison of NPLs of the SOCBs with those of international banks and domestic shareholding 
commercial banks, percentage of NPLs to GDP and to central fiscal revenue show from different 
aspects that, although since 2000 both the nominal NPLs ratios and outstanding NPLs of the 
SOCBs have been decreasing, NPLs ratios of the SOCBs are still way higher than those of the 
world top 100 banks and big banks of emerging market economies, and much higher than those of 
domestic joint-stock commercial banks. A further analysis on non-performing assets shows that if 
part of non-performing assets closely related with NPLs were included, situation of NPLs of the 
SOCBs would be more serious. 
The analysis of the chapter implies: 
First, the write-offs of NPLs by the central government have been the major factors contributing to 
the significant decrease of nominal NPLs ratios of the SOCBs in recent years. 
Second, despite that many positive measures have been implemented and that internal control 
and management of the SOCBs have been strengthened gradually, even nominal NPLs ratios of 
the SOCBs have still been much higher than either those of international counterparts or domestic 
joint-stock commercial banks. These facts indicate that, NPLs problem of the SOCBs has not all 
been caused by poor management of the SOCBs. Therefore, formation and deterioration of NPLs 
of the SOCBs must be traced to historical or institutional reasons, and researches should pay 
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more attention to the peculiarities of NPLs of the SOCBs. 
Third, Although both NPLs ratios and outstanding NPLs of the SOCBs have been lingering at high 
levels for many years, systemic banking crisis has not broke out in China. This phenomenon and 
underlying reasons should be an important precondition and a starting point for analyzing NPLs of 
the SOCBs. 
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8BNON-PERFORMING LOANS, TECHNICAL 
BANKRUPTCY, AND SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS 
OF COMMERCIAL BANKS IN CHINAF76 
 
 
25B4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Since the commercialization reform gained momentum in1994, the four SOCBs have been 
plagued by appalling NPLs. Therefore, accordingly, since the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, the 
central government has taken a series of positive measures including capital injection in 1998, 
2004, and 2005 respectively, policy write-offs of NPLs, and establishment of the four assets 
management corporations (AMCs) in 1999, to speed up NPLs resolution of the SOCBs. Since 
2000, both nominal NPLs ratios and outstanding NPLs of the SOCBs have begun to decrease 
steadily. However, as Chapter 3 indicates that, after effects of the write-offs of NPLs by the central 
government and loan classification methods switch were excluded, neither adjusted NPLs ratios 
nor outstanding balances of the SOCBs have been reduced significantly as officially claimed. 
Furthermore, comparisons of NPLs ratios of the SOCBs with those of the world top 100 banks in 
2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004, the Asia top 50 banks in the year of 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004, the 
central Europe top 50 banks in the year of 2001, 2002, and 2003, and joint-stock commercial 
banks in various years in China show that, even nominal NPLs ratios of the SOCBs have been 
much higher than those of not only the world top 100 banks, the central Europe 50 top banks, and 
the Asia top 50 banks, but also than those of joint stock commercial banks in China, let along by 
using adjusted NPLs ratios. Calculation shows that, since 1994, all the four SOCBs have been 
technically bankrupt.  
According to the basic hypothesis of neoclassical economics, budget constraints are applicable to 
all enterprises in market economy. In other words, management of and decisions by any market 
player must be confined to its own recourses, otherwise, bankruptcy is inevitable. By using soft 
budget constraints as a benchmark, many researchers have predicted that NPLs and the 
correspondent technical bankruptcy of the SOCBs will shake depositors’ confidence, resulting in 
bank runs and systemic banking crises. Nevertheless, contrary to these predictions, ever since 
1994, the four SOCBs have continued to enjoy stable deposits growth and rapid development, 
                                                        
76 The chapter will be published in the Journal of Financial Research. 
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and the phenomenon that the technically bankrupt SOCBs have not incurred banking crises in 
such a long time does not confer with the basic hypothesis of the neo-economics, and has been 
regarded as a myth by scholars. However, as many researchers have pointed out, the main 
reasons that the technically bankrupt SOCBs can survive and develop are implicit supports from 
the central government. According to Kornai’s soft budget constraints theory (1980), the fact that 
government fails to force insolvent SOCBs to go bankrupt through non-market measures is typical 
soft budget constraints.  
In the thesis, soft budget constraints refer to the phenomenon that in order to prevent insolvent 
enterprises from being forced to go bankruptcy; the central government provides various supports 
through non-market arrangements. This chapter systematically analyzes nature, features, and 
forms of soft budget constraints of the SOCBs, and points out that in the case of China, not only 
the central fiscal authority and the central government, but also the banking regulatory authorities 
and even numerous depositors have became supporters of soft budget constraints of the SOCBs. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. 4.2 calculates technical bankruptcy of the SOCBs 
from 1994 to 2004; 4.3 provides a conceptual framework of soft budget constraints of commercial 
bank(s); 4.4 gives literature review of soft budget constraints and the originalities of the paper; 4.5, 
4.6, and 4.7 discuss three forms of soft budget constraints of the SOCBs, to wit, direct capital 
injection by the central government, systemic liquidity supports from the PBOC, the central bank of 
China, and regulatory forbearance respectively; 4.8 delineates economic consequences of 
implementing soft budget constraints of commercial banks; 4.9 is conclusion. 
26B4.2 NON-PERFORMING LOANS AND TECHNICAL BANKRUPTCY OF THE 
STATE-OWNED COMMERCIAL BANKS, 1994-2000 
Let A stands for total assets of a commercial bank, L stands for total liabilities, and E stands for 
paid-in capital. For a commercial bank, the following equation stands:  
A=L+E 
A decreases along with accumulation of NPLs, and can be compensated by two means, one is by 
loan loss provision, the other is by paid-in capital, which is the last means to fill the gap between 
loan loss provision and outstanding balance of NPLs by commercial banks. In case the sum of 
loan loss provision and paid-in capital is still insufficient to compensate loan losses, to wit: 
 A≤L+E 
This state is defined as technical bankruptcy in the thesis. Let Lp stands for loan loss provision, 
then, technical bankruptcy of a commercial bank can be illustrated by technical bankruptcy ratio: 
Technical Bankruptcy Ratio (%) =( Lp＋E) / NPLs        (1) 
When the ratio is smaller than one, it implies that the value of interests-bearing assets of a 
commercial bank is lower than its liabilities. The lower the ratio is the severe situation of technical 
bankruptcy of the related commercial bank.  
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It is necessary to point out that, for calculation convenience, the above calculation formula 
standardizes recovery ratio of NPLs as 0%. In other words, the formula assumes that loss ratio of 
any kind of NPLs are 100%. However, this assumption does not accord with reality. According to 
the risk-based loan classification standard, NPLs of a commercial bank includes substandard, 
doubtful and loss, and recovery ratios for the three types vary accordingly. Empirical data show 
that recovery ratio for substandard, doubtful and loss is between 10-30%, 30-50% and 0% 
respectively (see table 4-1).  
Let L stands for total loans, Lp stands for loan loss provision, C stands for paid-in capital, and η3, η4 
and η5 stands for proportion of Substandard, Doubtful and Loss loans to total loans respectively. 
Based on empirical figure in table 4-1, this chapter assumes that recovery ratio for the three 
category loans is 20%, 40% and 0% respectively. Thus, technical bankruptcy ratio can be 
expressed more accurately as: 
( )3 4 50 . 8 0 . 6
pL C
L η η η
+
+ +
                           (2) 
                
Based on formula (2), the chapter calculates the technical bankruptcy ratio of the four SOCBs 
during the period of 1994 to 2004 (Table 4-2). The calculations indicate that during the period, 
NPLs of the SOCBs have far exceeded the sum of paid-in capital and loan loss provision, to wit 
the SOCBs have been in a state of technical bankruptcy.  
148BTable 4-1 Empirical Data for Recovery Rate of Different Types of Loans by different Banks or Economies 
                                                                                  (Unit：％) 
 Pass Loan Special-mention Loan Substandard Loan Doubtful Loan Loss Loan 
U.S. 0-1.5 5-10 20-35 50-75 100 
Hungary 0 0-10 11-30 31-70 71-100 
India 0-2.5 NA 10 20-100 100 
Indonesia 1 3.5 10 50 100 
Korea 0.5 2 15 50 100 
Malaysia 1.5 NA 20 50 100 
Philippines 2 5 25 50 100 
Russia 1 NA 20 50 100 
Thailand 1 2 20 50 100 
China 0 2 25 50 100 
A bank(China) 1 5 20 50 100 
B bank(China) 0 1-3 30-50 50-70 70-100 
C bank(China) 0 0 0-10 10-90 90-100 
Arthur Andersen 1 2.5 20 65 100 
Price water house Coopers 1 5 25 50 100 
Source: Zhengjie, the Management and Application of the Loan Risks Classification (China Financial Publishing House), 2002. 35 
Note: Recovery rate represents the probability of potential loss. The bigger recovery rate is, the less losses will be.  
The technical bankruptcy ratios of the SOCBs reveal that, among the SOCBs, the situation of the 
ABC is the most serious (table 4-3, table 4-4, table 4-5, and table 4-6). Since 2005, the situation of 
the BOC and the CCB has been improving and technical bankruptcy ratio curve of the two banks 
has been rising consequentially. Rising technical bankruptcy ratio curves indicate improvement of 
repayment capacity of the concerned commercial banks. Nevertheless, as following analysis 
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shows, this is just a direct result of capital injections and the write-offs of NPLs by the central 
government, not efforts of the two banks. The capital injection and the write-offs of NPLs by the 
central government increased the numerator and decrease the denominator of formula (2), thus 
increasing the technical bankruptcy ratios. 
It is worthy to point out that, the above calculated degree of technical bankruptcy of the four 
SOCBs is still underestimated due to the following factors. First, NPLs ratios calculated in formula 
(2) is just nominal ratio. As chapter three showed, the adjusted NPLs ratio by excluding influence 
of change of loan classification standard and policy write-offs of the SOCBs would rise 
dramatically. Consequently, technical bankruptcy ratios in table 4-2 have been underestimated. 
Second, NPLs data used in the above-calculated ratios included only NPLs and loan loss 
provision, and did not include non-performing non-credit assets. However, as chapter 3 shows, the 
proportion of non-credit assets to total assets of the SOCBs has been increasing in recent years, 
and quality of the non-credit assets has been deteriorating meanwhile,. Therefore, if the non-credit 
assets of the SOCBs were being included, the technical bankruptcy situation of the SOCBs will be 
more serious. 
149BTable 4-2 NPLs, Capital Adequacy, and Technical Bankruptcy of the SOCBs, 1994-2004 
(Unit: RMB 100 million) 
Year 
paid-in 
capital Total Loans 
Total 
Assets 
Loan loss 
Provision 
Capital 
Adequacy
Loan Loss 
Provision 
Recovery 
Ratio NPLs Ratio 
Technical 
bankruptcy 
ratio 
1994 1848.2 30995 38194.9 319  0.01 20.00 0.35 
1995 1788.5 37563.8 45366.6 450.81  0.01 22.00 0.27 
1996 2609.13 36252.89 59479.5 430.31 0.04 0.01 24.40 0.22 
1997 2739.09 44823.69 72134.5 362.05 0.04 0.01 24.00 0.19 
1998 5587.47 53611.02 82529.2 304.71 0.07 0.01 35.00 0.24 
1999 5696.77 57456.22 91763 713.06 0.06 0.01 39.00 0.2 
2000 5977.43 58250.69 98388.9 602.3 0.06 0.01 29.18 0.24 
2001 6628.53 64662.81 103248.7 1015.99 0.06 0.02 25.37 0.32 
2002 6405.57 80394.91 136480.48 904.08  0.01 26.12 0.28 
2003 6807.59 94247.77 154284.7 1522.89  0.02 19.74 0.43 
September 
2004. 
6751.2 101886.4 164886.6 774.9  0.01 15.71 0.47 
Source: prepared by author. 
Note：1. The data from 1994 to 1995 are from the China Financial Yearbook (1996), 
2. The data from 1996 to 2001 (except NPLs ratio and NPL amount) are from the An Analyze the Reform on SOE from Macroeconomic perspective by the 
Economic Science Press, June 2004;  
3. The data from 2002 to 2003 are from the China Financial Yearbook (2003, 2004).  
4．The data of 2004 are from the Quarterly Statistics Report of Q4, 2004, PBOC. 
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207BFigure 4-1 Technical Bankruptcy Degree of the the SOCBs, 1994-2004 
Source: Prepared by author.
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150BTable 4-3 NPLs, Capital Adequacy, and Technical Bankruptcy of the ICBC, 1999-2003 
(Unit: RMB 100 million)
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 Balance （％） Balance （％） Balance （％） Balance （％） Balance （％）
Total loans 24271.22 100.00 24135.91 100.00 26594.66 100.00 29578.37 100.00 33929.37 100.00
By  the Risk-based loan classification            
NPLs 9579.85 39.47 8309.99 34.43 7919.89 29.78 7598.78 25.69 7207.57 21.24
Substandard  2563.04 10.56 2382.21 9.87 1691.42 6.36 1177.81 3.98 733.97 2.16
Doubtful  5174.62 21.32 4482.04 18.57 4497.16 16.91 4586.18 15.51 4605.92 13.58
Loss  1842.19 7.59 1445.74 5.99 1731.31 6.51 1834.79 6.20 1867.68 5.50
By the Term-based loan classification method           
Total NPLs 7710.97 31.77 7071.82 29.30 6837.49 25.71 6570.20 22.21   
Past due NPLs 1728.11 7.12 1356.44 5.62 446.79 1.68 213.92 0.72   
Idle NPLs 5177.05 21.33 5162.67 21.39 5935.93 22.32 5930.57 20.05   
Loss NPLs 837.36 3.45 552.71 2.29 454.77 1.71 425.71 1.44   
Receivable Provision 5070.26  4282.31  4402.75  4422.33  4354.13  
Actual Receivable 166.09  103.77  80.46  135.28  209.78  
Provision Balance -4904.17  -4178.54  -4322.29  -4287.05  -4144.35  
Source: Prepared by author. 
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151BTable 4-4 NPLs, Capital Adequacy, and Technical Bankruptcy of the ABC, 1999-2003 
By the Risk-based loan classification  By the Term-based loan classification 
Total loans Total NPLs Substandard Doubtful Loss Total NPLs Past-due Idle Loss 
Year 
Outstanding 
(RMB 100 
million) %
Outstanding
(RMB 100 
million) % 
Outstanding 
(RMB 100 
million) % 
Outstanding
(RMB 100 
million) %
Outstanding
(RMB 100 
million) %
Outstanding
(RMB 100 
million) %
Outstanding
(RMB 100 
million) % 
Outstanding
(RMB 100 
million) %
Outstanding
(RMB 100 
million) %
Provisions 
as 
required 
Actual 
provisions
Provisions 
as 
required-
actual 
provisions
1999 24271.22 100 9579.85 
39.4
7 
2563.04 10.56 5174.62 21.32 1842.19 7.59 7710.97 31.77 1728.11 7.12 5177.05 21.33 837.36 3.45 5070.26 166.09 -4904.17 
2000 24135.91 100 8309.99 
34.4
3 
2382.21 9.87 4482.04 18.57 1445.74 5.99 7071.82 29.3 1356.44 5.62 5162.67 21.39 552.71 2.29 4282.31 103.77 -4178.54 
2001 26594.66 100 7919.89 
29.7
8 
1691.42 6.36 4497.16 16.91 1731.31 6.51 6837.49 25.71 446.79 1.68 5935.93 22.32 454.77 1.71 4402.75 80.46 -4322.29 
2002 29578.37 100 7598.78 
25.6
9 
1177.81 3.98 4586.18 15.51 1834.79 6.2 6570.2 22.21 213.92 0.72 5930.57 20.05 425.71 1.44 4422.33 135.28 -4287.05 
2003 33929.37 100 7207.57 
21.2
4 
733.97 2.16 4605.92 13.58 1867.68 5.5         4354.13 209.78 -4144.35 
Source: Prepared by author. 
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152BTable 4-5 NPLs, Capital Adequacy, and Technical Bankruptcy of the CCB, 2002-2004  
Year 
Paid-in capital 
(RMB 100 million) 
Total loans 
(RMB 100 million)
Total assets 
(RMB 100 million) 
Loan Loss 
provision (RMB 
100 million) 
Core capital 
adequacy ratio 
Capital 
adequacy ratio
(capital/ assets)
Loan Loss 
Provision 
Ratio NPLs ratio
Total NPLs 
(RMB 100 million)
Technical 
bankruptcy 
ratio 
2002(Before capital injection) 1072.36 17663.88 30831.95 154.95 5.78% 6.91% 0.01 15.17%  0.46 
2003(After capital injection) 1862.3 19959.9 35530.7 543.59 5.88% 6.51% 0.03 4.30% 852.52 2.8 
2004 1947.44 22255.85 39047.85 538.29 8.57% 11.29% 0.02 3.92% 873.45 2.85 
Source: Prepared by author。 
Note:1. data from the Annual report of the  CCB in 2003 and 2004. 
2.the capital adequacy ratio of CCB in the year 2003 is calculated based on the data after the capital injection of US$ 22.5 billion into CCB on December 2003, and some items are subtracted according to a more prudent standard set by the banking 
regulatory authority. Therefore, the data of capital adequacy ratio are not comparable with those in 2002. If recalculating the related data according to the standard before the capital injection and adopting the same calculation approach with 2002, 
the Core capital adequacy ratio of CCB in 2003 is 5.17%, and the capital adequacy ratio is 7.58%.  
 
153BTable 4-6 NPLs Ratio, Capital Adequacy Ratio and Loan Loss Provision Ratio of BOC 
Year 
Paid-in Capital 
(RMB 100 
million) 
Total loans 
(RMB 100 
million) 
Total assets
(RMB 100 
million) 
Loan Loss 
provision (RMB 
100 million) 
Core capital 
adequacy ratio 
Capital adequacy 
ratio 
(capital/ asset) 
Loan Loss 
provision 
ratio 
NPLs 
ratio 
Total NPLs 
(RMB 100 
million) 
Technical 
bankruptcy Ratio 
2002(Before capital injection) 2194.26 17391.76 35361.69 267.11 7.11% 7.69% 0.02 23.37% 4291.73 0.57 
2003(After capital injection) 2037.52 19211.31 39799.65 164.32 6.18% 6.98% 0.01 16.28% 3512.24 0.63 
2004 2053.51 20716.93 42704.43 228  10.04% 0.01 5.12% 1099.2 2.08 
Source: Prepared by author. 
Note: 1. Data from the Annual report of the BOC (2003, 2004). 
2. Investment risks of non-performing asset and equity are differently weighted when calculating core capital adequacy ratio and capital adequacy ratio before and after capital injection, therefore the two data cannot be compared directly. 
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27B4.3 TECHNICAL BANKRUPTCY AND SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS OF 
COMMERCIAL BANKS 
International experiences show that unduly high NPLs ratio is a primary reason for bankruptcy of 
many commercial banks as well as for instability of banking sector in many economies. According 
to the IMF(1998), since 1980s, financial problems incurred by unduly high NPLs ratio of banks has 
accounted for more than 66% of all financial instability of member economies, and more than 58% 
of the financial crises were incurred by unduly high NPLs (1998). The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis 
has also been blamed to be induced by vast amount of accumulated NPLs of commercial banks in 
those affected economies (Hu Zuliu, 1998).  
Different from most economies in the world, in China, ever since 1994, only one regional 
commercial bank, the Hainan Development Bank, had been closed by the government due to 
insolvency. However, although the SOCBs, many city commercial banks and urban credit 
cooperatives have been technically bankrupt since 1994, the technical insolvency did not incur 
systematic banking crisis. The fundamental reason is that the government will not enforce rules 
according to ex ante liquidation regulations. 
Obviously, according to Kornai's definition (1980), China has implemented typical soft budget 
constraints of the SOCBs, which refers to an economic phenomenon that when an economic 
organization is in the state of technical bankruptcy, government do not initiate liquidation 
processF77 Fand will bail the troubled organization out through non-market arrangements. The 
concept of soft budget constraints was originally coined by Kornai (Kornai, 1979, 1980), a famous 
Hungarian economist to explain an economic phenomenon once rifle in planned economies that 
individual economic organizations excessively depend on ex post supports provided by 
government or governmental agencies to bail them out in case of insolvency (at least to 
externalize expenses). The benchmark of soft budget constraints is hard budget constraints 
(HBCs), which refer to economic phenomenon that in market economy activities of any economic 
organization are limited by their own resources.  
In planned economies, soft budget constraints had once been very common for SOEs. In order to 
prevent insolvent SOE from going bankruptcy, government has to add investment, provide 
subsidies or tolerate tax arrears. In soft budget constraints of SOEs, government is the principal 
while management of SOEs is the agent. With stable soft budget constraints expectation, 
managers of SOEs will never feel bankruptcy threats. Thus, soft budget constraints expectation 
changed an important precondition for ex ante decision-making of SOEs, and incurs ex ante moral 
hazard, which accords with the hypothesis of rational economic man (Kornai, 1986; Roland, 2003). 
From perspective of incentive mechanism, soft budget constraints always imply a kind of 
inefficiency (Roland, 2003; Lin Yifu, 2004). Soft budget constraints once have been a significant 
incentive mechanism for SOEs in planning economies will distort behaviors and lead to capital 
                                                        
77 Commercial banks in China include SOCBs, joint-equity commercial banks, city commercial banks and so on. Although the ownership of these 
commercial banks is different, to some extent, soft budget constraints exists all of them. This paper focuses mainly on those of the SOCBs. 
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distribution and operation inefficiently.  
The framework of soft budget constraints has been used widely to explain various economic 
phenomenons for planned economies. However, as Roland pointed out (2000, P206), although 
the soft budget constraints concept was put forward based on observation of behavior of SOEs, 
nowadays soft budget constraints have become an integrated part of economics jargon, and its 
significance and scope of applicability have far exceeded planned economy (Roland, 2000). 
Researches indicated that soft budget constraints are not peculiar to planned economies and 
transitional economies such as China, but are common even for mature market economies. 
Economic reality proves that soft budget constraints concept have universal significance and can 
well explain many economic phenomenon (Kornai, 1980, 1986; Cui Zhiyuan, 1999). In recent 
researches, the conceptual framework of soft budget constraints has become a useful tool to 
explain behaviors of economic organizations, and become a basic analytical framework for 
economic analysis. 
74B .3.1 Conceptual Framework of soft budget constraints of Commercial Banks  
Soft budget constraints of commercial banks in this paper refer to economic policies and economic 
phenomenon that when commercial banks are on brink of insolvency, government resorts to public 
resources and provide supports through non-market means such as capital injection, NPLs 
write-offs, regulatory forbearance, and many other means, to prevent them from going bankruptcy. 
Strictly speaking, soft budget constraints of the SOCBs analyzed in the paper began from1994. 
Before 1994, the state-owned banks were state specialized banks with policy burdens that should 
have been shouldered by fiscal authorities (Lin Yifu, 2004), and were not commercial banks in real 
sense. Therefore, there had no soft budget constraints of commercial banks then. It is not until 
1994, the year that the Law of the People's Republic of China on Commercial Banks has been 
enacted, that the SOCBs became real commercial banks. 
The basic reference for soft budget constraints is budget constraints theory of the neo-classical 
economics. Theoretically speaking, all formal institutional arrangements or informal policies that 
will weaken budget constraints and hence weaken bankruptcy threats for commercial banks can 
be referred to as soft budget constraints of commercial banks. However, it is necessary to clarify 
that soft budget constraints of commercial banks analyzed in this paper do not include the 
following two types. First, rescue activities based on market principles, such as merge or 
acquisition of insolvent commercial banks by healthy financial institutions. When a commercial 
bank is in a state of technical bankruptcy, there has several ways to rescue. For instance, when 
the Baring Bank had to announce bankruptcy after speculation failure on derivatives by Nick 
Leeson, the Dutch Banking group (ING) decided to purchase all shares of the Baring, and thus 
prevented the investment bank from going bankruptcy. According to Kornai’s definition, this kind of 
bailout is a type of soft budget constraints. However, soft budget constraints of commercial banks 
discussed in this chapter do not include this kind of rescuing behaviors due to two reasons. One is 
that, although external economic organizations became supporters of soft budget constraints by 
bailing out insolvent banks, they evaluate investment risks independently and have to bear all 
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harmful consequences deriving from the investment decision. In contrast, when government bails 
out insolvent commercial banks, government will utilize public funds and will not be responsible for 
potential losses. Another reason is that, to bail out insolvent commercial banks by merging or 
acquisition is a very common practice even in market economies. Based on the above 
understandings, soft budget constraints of commercial banks analyzed in this chapter do not 
include rescue behaviors by economic organizations based on market principle, and are only 
confined to rescue behavior by government based on non-market principle.  
Second, analysis of this chapter does not include institutional soft budget constraints. Cui Zhiyuan 
(1999) has distinguished policy soft budget constraints and institutional soft budget constraints. 
Institutional soft budget constraints of commercial banks refer to institutional arrangements that 
soften market discipline and change rational expectations, modes of behavior, and incentive 
mechanism of market players. For example, compared with unlimited corporation system, limited 
share-holding corporation system, in which any Hshareholder Hs’ responsibility is limited to amounts 
he/she has invested, mitigates shareholders’ risks and softens budget constraints for a corporation. 
Therefore, limited share-holding corporation system is a kind of institutional soft budget constraints. 
Another instance is that, when bank-run happens to a well-performing bank due to asymmetric 
information, central bank will provide liquidity supports, Under such a circumstance, central bank’s 
rescue also mitigates market failure resulted from negative externalities of commercial banks, and 
thus financial stability provided by government is a kind of public goods to a certain extent. 
However, because central banking system intensifies speculation tendency of commercial banks, 
it is also an institutional soft budget constraints. Theoretically speaking, all formal institutional 
arrangements that weaken budget constraints of a commercial bank and hence weaken 
bankruptcy threats to banks can be termed as institutional soft budget constraints of commercial 
banks. Similar example also includes deposits insurance system. In contrast, policy soft budget 
constraints of commercial banks refer to management decision or customs determined by political 
will on a case-by-case basis. Examples include U.S. government’s rescue of Long-Term 
Investment Companies or rescued the Continental Illinois Bank, among many other examples. 
Most institutional arrangements of soft budget constraints of commercial banks, such as the 
limited corporation system, the central bank system, and the deposit insurance system, have been 
existing in not only market economies, but also in transitional economies for a long period of time. 
Therefore, the paper regards institutional soft budget constraints as provided preconditions, and 
confined to only policy soft budget constraints of the SOCBs. 
75B4.3.2 Dual Soft Budget Constraints: Soft Budget Constraints of Commercial Banks and of 
Enterprises 
From the definition of soft budget constraints of commercial banks, it is obvious that formation of 
soft budget constraints needs at least two bodies: body of soft budget constraints and supporter(s) 
of soft budget constraints (Kornai, etc., 2002). The body(s) of soft budget constraints refers to 
economic organization(s) that cannot be viable without external supports. For instance, in planned 
economy, when a SOE became insolvent, government has to rescue by providing fiscal or 
financial subsidies. In such cases, SOEs are bodies of soft budget constraints. Supporter(s) of soft 
budget constraints is (are) governmental agency (agencies) that transfers (transfer) public 
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resources to save bodies of soft budget constraints. For example, when fiscal authorities provide 
fiscal subsidies or taxation allowance to insolvent SOEs, fiscal authorities became supporters of 
soft budget constraints; when central bank provides liquidity or injects capital to commercial banks 
in order to avoid bankruptcy, central bank became supporter of soft budget constraints of 
commercial banks.  
Soft budget constraints can be further classified into soft budget constraints of commercial banks 
and soft budget constraints of SOEs. Distinctions between the two are as follows (see table 4-7). 
First, body of soft budget constraints is different. In soft budget constraints of SOEs, enterprises 
are bodies of soft budget constraints and fiscal authorities or commercial banks are supporters of 
soft budget constraints. While in soft budget constraints of commercial banks, commercial banks 
are bodies of soft budget constraints, and fiscal authorities, central bank, regulatory authorities, 
and even depositors may all become supporters of soft budget constraints. In which, central bank 
acts as supporter of soft budget constraints of commercial banks mainly by providing liquidity, 
fiscal authorities by injecting capital, and regulatory authorities by implementing regulatory 
forbearances such as permitting commercial banks to change capital calculation standards to 
adapt technical bankrupt commercial banks. It is worthy to point out that, because commercial 
banks are a kind of special enterprises, depositors are in fact the ultimate supporter of soft budget 
constraints of commercial banks. Besides, in some cases, international organizations, such as the 
IMF or the World Bank may also become supporters of soft budget constraints of commercial 
banks. 
Second, modes of expression are different. Expressions of soft budget constraints of SOEs 
include fiscal subsidies, forbearance for tax arrears, earmarked loans (policy loans) or other types 
of loans by commercial banks for loss-making enterprises, and so on (Roland, 2003). In contrast, 
expressions of soft budget constraints of commercial banks mainly include capital injection, unduly 
liquidity supports, and systemic regulatory forbearance (see detailed analysis in section 4.5, 
section 4.6, and section 4.7). 
Third, different scope. Soft budget constraints of SOEs had once been rifle in planed economies, 
while have been very rare in market economiesF78F. Compared with general business, commercial 
banks are special because they have strong negative externalities and frangibilities, and therefore 
more likely to implement soft budget constraintsF79 F by regulatory authorities or governmental 
agencies than to other economic organizations. Soft budget constraints of commercial banks exist 
not only in transitional economies, but also in market economies; have not only institutional soft 
budget constraints of commercial banks, such as central bank system, depository insurance 
system, and special bankruptcy procedures, but also many policy soft budget constraints of 
commercial banks at discrepancy of government. This chapter focuses on policy soft budget 
                                                        
78 Soft budget constraints of enterprises can only be seen in the case of bailing out large-scale enterprises, such as rescuing the Chrysler 
company by the U.S. government in 1980s. 
79 See section 6 in this paper: reasons to implement soft budget constraints and reform of the state-owned commercial banks. A recent example of 
soft budget constraints of commercial banks is that Japanese government injected capital into Risona, the fifth biggest banking group, which was at 
the brink of bankruptcy, to ensure the safety of the whole financial system. Another example is that the Japanese government nationalized 
Ashikaga Bank in Dec. 2003. 
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constraints of the SOCBs. 
154BTable 4-7 Comparison with soft budget constraints of Commercial Banks and soft budget constraints of 
Enterprises 
 
Body Of soft 
budget 
constraints 
Supporter(s）of soft 
budget constraints Primary Expressions Causes  Prevalence Degree 
soft budget 
constraints of 
commercial 
banks 
Commercial 
bank 
Central bank, state 
fiscal authorities, 
depositors, etc. 
Regulatory forbearance, 
state credit replaces the 
credit of commercial bank, 
constant capital injection 
and peeling NPLs off 
Too big to fail; role 
as supporter of 
soft budget 
constraints of 
SOEs; 
state-ownership
Institutional soft 
budget constraints of 
commercial banks is 
common. 
Policy-related soft 
budget constraints of 
commercial banks is 
common, too. 
soft budget 
constraints of 
enterprises 
Enterprise SOCBs, fiscal authorities, etc. 
Fiscal subsidies, 
earmarked loans (policy 
loans) from banks 
Policy burden; 
state-ownership
Prevailed in planned 
economy, occasionally 
happens in market 
economy. 
Source: Prepared by author. 
Dual soft budget constraints in China have following features. First, China implements not only 
typical soft budget constraints of the SOCBs, but also typical soft budget constraints of SOEs; 
second, dual soft budget constraints have been lasting for a very long period. If we regarded 
implementation of replacement of fiscal revenue appropriation for SOEs with banking loans policy 
in 1983 as outset of soft budget constraints of SOEs, and regard enactment of the Commercial 
Bank Law in 1994 as outset of soft budget constraints of the SOCBs, then, soft budget constraints 
of SOEs have been implemented for more than 20 years and soft budget constraints of the 
SOCBs have been implemented for at least 10 years. Third, market participants in China regards 
the dual soft budget constraints as a provided precondition for choices, and this expectation has 
been strengthened. Fourth, the current ongoing reform measures have not aimed at hardening the 
dual soft budget constraints, in the contrary, the dual soft budget constraints policy have even 
been intensified to a certain degree. The above features determine that the dual soft budget 
constraints in China are complicated by their special relationship. Therefore, policies of hardening 
soft budget constraints of the SOCBs and policies of hardening soft budget constraints of SOEs 
must be bounded up together; it is useless to push ahead anyone along.  
28B4.4 LITERATURE REVIEW  
In the past 20 years, significant progress has been made in soft budget constraints studies. After 
Kornai, researches on soft budget constraints have been focusing on two directions: one is 
economic consequences of soft budget constraints; the other is causes of soft budget constraints.  
The soft budget constraints have been widely used to explain many economic phenomena of 
planned economies. Although the concept of soft budget constraints derived from observations of 
SOEs in planed economies, and has been widely used to explain economic phenomenon of 
socialism, it later becomes a frequent-used economic vocabulary, and its significance and 
practicability has long beyond socialist economy (Roland, 2000). Research indicated that soft 
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budget constraints is not peculiar to planned economies or transitional economies, it also widely 
exists in mature market economies, and therefore has a universal significance (Kornai, 1980, 1986; 
Cui Zhiyuan, 1999). In recent researches, the conceptual framework of SOFT BUDGET 
CONSTRAINTS has been used to describe many behaviors of economic organizations. In 
addition, explanation of soft budget constraints has been expanding and has become a basic 
conceptual framework for economic research. Besides, soft budget constraints have been widely 
cited as primary causes for inefficiency of some economies, especially transitional economies.  
By using soft budget constraints concept, Kornai (1980) believed that competing demand for 
production factors resulting from soft budget constraints was the primary reason of insufficiency in 
planned economies. After Kornai, Goldfeld and Quant (1988, 1999), Hillman, Katz and Rosenberg 
(1987) and Qian Yingyi (1994) built formal models respectively on the influences of insufficiency. 
Goldfeld and Quant (1988, 1999) set up a series model of soft budget constraints and believed 
that quantity of subsidies that the loss-making enterprises gained partially depended on quantity of 
resources input by these enterprises in rent seeking. Goldfield and Quant use these models to 
explain how soft budget constraints lead to increasing demand for productive factors and how 
socialist economy result in insufficiency. Hillman also studied the consequences of government 
rescue for factor demands. In their models, enterprises face an uncertain output price, and lower 
target price would impel the government to rescue them, otherwise the enterprises would have to 
cut down employment and government also have to take harmful consequences of increasing 
unemployment. Gomułka (1985) brought forward the concept of flexible budgets. He stated though 
that if soft budget constraints finally resulted in the long-term insufficiency, the budget should be 
not only soft, but also be more elastic than price, because sufficiently increasing price could 
counteract the unduly demand and improve the insufficiency. Huang Haizhou from the University 
of London and Xu Chenggang (1999) from the London School of Economics (LSE) studied soft 
budget constraints s influences on financial crisis within the institutional framework of budget 
constraints. They argued that the Asian financial crisis fundamentally resulted from the soft budget 
constraints of enterprises implemented by the local financial institutions; soft budget constraints 
not only affect efficiency of financial markets, but also distort market information, resulting in 
asymmetric information in the aspect of the solvency of banks and inevitably resulted in adverse 
selection in the inter-bank lending markets. Therefore, when liquidity shocks surfaced, even well 
operating banks could not gain external loans to ease liquidity, therefore bank runs happen, and 
further deteriorate the problem of adverse selection, result in collapse of inter-bank loan market, 
make all investors trapped in the financial panic and finally lead to breakout of financial crisis. This 
research implies that the best policy for government to avoid financial crisis is to rescue all the 
banks that lack liquidity and it is rather important to increase transparence in banking sector. 
However, the goal of improving transparency cannot realize just by depending on government and 
regulatory authorities, but also by reforming monetary system and hardening soft budget 
constraints of enterprises and commercial banks. 
However, a most important work for studies on soft budget constraints is to find reasons, and this 
has been the most popular field of researches. There are two explanations of causes of soft 
budget constraints: exogenous and indigenous causes. The exogenous explanation blames 
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existence of soft budget constraints to various exogenous causes. Based on different explanations, 
the exogenous ones can be further classified into few detailed theories, such as paternalism, 
pursuit of goal of full employment or seek political support by government, and many other causes. 
The first theory is preservation and development of Koran’s idea of paternalistic government. The 
reason that government aids an bankrupt enterprise is that government will not accept series of 
harmful consequences such as unemployment due to bankruptcy of the enterprise. This is quite 
clear in a rigidly stratified system. Schaffer (1998) established a game model with the belief that 
soft budget constraints derived from paternalism; therefore, government could not successfully 
establish a rigid image that would definitely not rescue trapped enterprises. Besides, enterprises’ 
incomplete information about pliable image (like paternalism) or rigid image of government also 
helps them to build a likely-to-aid image or the rigid image of government. Boycko et al. (1996) 
believed that public officials take subsidies measures to maintain employment rate of enterprises, 
to consolidate their positions. Meanwhile, Boycko et al. put content into a model though his theory 
of privatization. They thought that since subsidies derived from paternalism preference of public 
officials, it was authentic that they provided subsidies for enterprises through soft budget 
constraints. The second theory believes that soft budget constraints derive from public officials’ 
influences on behaviors of enterprises. Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1994) thought that it would be 
better to say that behavior of public official reflect their obvious political motivations rather than 
economic motivations, because political leaders could consolidate their political basis through 
increasing employment and output. Therefore, when public officials may control and manage 
enterprises directly or negotiate with enterprises efficiently, profitability of enterprises would 
decrease because it should satisfy non-economic motivations of public officials. As returns, public 
officials would make up for losses of enterprises through implementing soft budget constraints 
such as providing subsidies for these enterprises. This point of view is comparatively similar to the 
exogenous theory with distinction that the indigenous theory puts strong emphasis on political 
motivations of public officials. The third theory argues that right of control possessed by insiders 
result in soft budget constraints. Implications of insiders’ rights of control have two aspects: on one 
hand, insiders can seek personal gains through abusing this power; on the other hand, because 
insiders lay much stress on rights of control and other related interests, when enterprises are 
facing difficulties, insiders would try all measures to seek government’s intervention or seek capital 
to rescue bankrupt enterprises through personal relations. Li Daokui (1997) of the University of 
Michigan argued that when enterprises were facing difficulties, stress on rights of control of 
enterprises laid by insiders led to soft budget constraints. Li Daokui et al., (1998) used the data of 
SOEs from 1980 to 1994 after the economic reform and opening-up policy, utilized three groups of 
data: employment of nonproductive personnel in enterprises, low-returns investment below 
average profits margin in society and profits sharing of enterprises over government regulated 
amount as respective metrical indexes of different theories on causes of soft budget constraints. 
They did empirical test on theory of causes of soft budget constraints and probed into various 
functions and influences of different determining factors on fiscal losses of enterprises. The 
statistical tests indicated that key reasons of enterprises incurring losses lie in employment of 
nonproductive personnel, low-returns investment and unduly profits sharing of enterprises. 
Positive analysis supports the three theories of causes of soft budget constraints, including 
influences of public officials, asymmetric information between debtors and creditors. 
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The second explanation regards soft budget constraints as indigenous. Both government and 
creditors are active to allocate additional investments derived from an unfinished and inefficient 
project, because marginal benefits of additional investment could be higher than marginal costs 
when the project is abandoned (Lin Yifu, 2004). Dewatripon and Maskin (1995) made original 
contributions on how to understand endogenous mechanism of soft budget constraints. Their main 
arguments are that initial funds injected into enterprises are all sunk costs. Therefore, for investors, 
continue to invest loss-making enterprises and not to liquidate them will optimize their interests. In 
this case, soft budget constraints relationship exists between investors and enterprises. More 
widely, the Dewatripon-Maskin model helps us to understand that soft budget constraints can be 
seen more generally as a problem of dynamic commitment. With soft budget constraints, 
enterprises lack incentives of active and efficient production, or are inclined to operate inefficiently, 
because enterprises know they can gain extra fiscal aids. Hardening soft budget constraints 
means to create an authentic commitment signal that government (or banks) will no longer give 
enterprises extra fiscal aids. Qian Yingyi (1994), Berglof and Roland (1997), and Wang Yijiang et 
al.(1998) further developed the Dewatripon-maskin model respectively. Emphasis of their 
researches can be symbolized as a two-period model: in period one, without well knowing quality 
of a project, a bank or other creditor invests. Thereafter, if the project is a good one, a bank will 
continue to provide money. When a bank gradually recognized that it supports a poor project and 
loans in period one has become sunk costs, it will be harder for a bank to judge whether to 
continue investment or not. If a poor project has a bright future, and a bank has realized that, it is 
much better to continue the second-period investment than stop immediately at the end of period 
one, a bank will provide loans continuously before formation of soft budget constraints. Although 
causes and channels of forming soft budget constraints are various, sequence structure used in 
these theoretical models is the same. Meanwhile, another similarity of these models is that all soft 
budget constraints result from lack of authentic bankruptcy threats. Therefore, Berglof and Roland 
believe that these theoretical developments are evolutions of the basic sequence model of soft 
budget constraints. Based on this understanding, they discussed causes of soft budget constraints 
and mechanisms to harden. 
In recent research on banking theory, definitions of soft budget constraints are different from that 
of Kornai (1980), and all are expansions of the conception of Kornai. Compared with Kornai’s 
model of ex post rescue to loss enterprises due to paternalistic reason, which has been developed 
by many other economists, model of high-risks speculation and model of adverse selection 
indicate more important essence. In the ex-post aid model, government and other institutions 
injected capital into loss-making enterprises out of the benign wish that they will not go bankrupcy, 
and expected no repayment of the injected premium. In the model of high-risks speculation of 
bank and the model of adverse selection, debtors’ choice of continuous borrowing is made to 
maximize benifits. In the former model, in order to get rid of fiscal embarrassment, banks are even 
willing to invest in high-risk projects, which can bring higher profits with a tiny probability, in spite of 
negative expected returns of the projects. In the latter model, banks’ decisions on whether to issue 
loans to certain projects are full embodiment of the principle of maximized returns. 
However, in nearly all researches on soft budget constraints, general enterprises are regarded as 
bodies of soft budget constraints, and commercial banks are regarded as supporters of soft 
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budget constraints of enterprises. No academic papers have regarded commercial banks as 
bodies of soft budget constraints. For instance, Berglof and Roland (1998) summarized five 
primary causes of the formation of soft budget constraints between banks and enterprises by 
reclassifying relevant theoretical models: (I) anticipation on ex post returns when capital injection 
continues; (ii) when there exists extreme strong interdependence among enterprises, complicated 
interests relationship out of interdependence will lead to a huge opportunity costs for hardening 
soft budget constraints; (iii) it is hard to find a better investment choice; (iv) owing to existence of 
deposit insurance and resurrection expectation of enterprises, many people have incentives to 
conceal current situation of bad debts; (v) banks rent-seek the implementation of soft budget 
constraints. The research of Berglof and Roland also assumed that commercial banks are 
supporters of soft budget constraints of enterprises. Thus, the five causes of formation of soft 
budget constraints between banks and enterprises are in fact answers to why banks implement 
soft budget constraints of enterprises. In order to explain why little research regarding the SOCBs 
as bodies of soft budget constraints, the question why government implements soft budget 
constraints of commercial banks must be answered.  
Reasons that little attention has been paid to commercial banks as bodies of soft budget 
constraints might be as follows. First, there is no need to study soft budget constraints of 
commercial banks in market economy. Similar to developing and transitional economies, 
institutional arrangements of soft budget constraints of commercial banks such as central bank 
system and depository insurance system exist widely in market economies. However, unlike those 
in developing and transitional economies, policy-related soft budget constraints of commercial 
banks are very rare in market economies. Bankruptcy of commercial banks has strong negative 
externalities, thus many researches equate analyses on soft budget constraints of commercial 
banks to researches on specialties of commercial banks or researches on special cases such as 
“too big to fail”. However, a research by Shi Huaqiang and Peng Xingyun (2003) points out that, 
too big to fail is only one form of soft budget constraints of commercial banks. When the too big to 
fail principle combines with monopolized banking system or state-ownership, soft budget 
constraints of commercial banks have more comprehensive implications, and therefore have 
particular importance for incentive mechanism of commercial banks. 
Second, there is no need to study soft budget constraints in planned economy either. The concept 
of soft budget constraints derived from studies on SOEs in planned economies, and then had no 
commercial banks at all. The state specialized banking system then were controlled by fiscal 
authorities who had been real supporter of soft budget constraints of SOEs and merely served as 
institutions to implement subsidies. In planned economies, fiscal authorities had been very 
influential while banking sector had been very weak. As component of fiscal authorities, 
state-owned specialized banks used to be cashier of fiscal authorities. Therefore, in planned 
economy, banks were not commercial banks in real term as those in market economies; neither 
did concept of soft budget constraints of commercial banks exist. It is normal for researches to 
focus on soft budget constraints in which SOEs as body of soft budget constraints then. 
In this chapter, the SOCBs are bodies of soft budget constraints, and the Ministry of Finance, the 
central bank, the China Banking Regulatory Commission, and depositors are supporters of soft 
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budget constraints of the SOCBs. Based on different supporting methods, expressions of soft 
budget constraints of the SOCBs can be classified into four types. First, capital injections and 
policy write offs. Second, Liquidation supports and other policy supports including interests’ rate 
regulation. Third, regulatory forbearance. Fourth, depositors’ confidence, to wit, they continue to 
save money with the SOCBs, therefore maintaining liquidity of the SOCBs. The above four forms 
of soft budget constraints of the SOCBs support each other, among the fourth form, to wit, 
depositors as supporters of soft budget constraints of the SOCB depend on the other three types. 
From aspect of soft budget constraints of the SOCBs, nearly all reform measures adopted by 
Chinese government since 1994 can be seen as tools to sustain, supplement, and strengthen soft 
budget constraints of the SOCBs. 
29B4.5 THE FIRST FORM OF SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS OF THE 
STATE-OWNED COMMERCIAL BANKS: CAPITAL INJECTION AND POLICY 
WRITE-OFFS 
76B4.5.1 The RMB 270 Billion Capital injection to the SOCBs in August 1998 
In 1998, the central government injected RMB 270 billion into the four major state-owned banks by 
issuing thirty-year special coupon-bearing treasury bonds with annual interest rates of 7.2%. At the 
beginning of 1998, the central government reformed depository reserve system of commercial 
banks and lowered required deposits reserve ratio. Consequently, more than RMB 240 billion 
deposits reserves deposited with the PBOC can be utilized by the SOCBs. By taking advantage of 
this opportunity, the People’s Bank of China (the PBOC) required the four SOCBs to deposit RMB 
270 billion to a special account of the PBOC as advancement fund of this re-capitalization program. 
The capital injection was implemented in three steps: 
First, the four SOCBs bought RMB 270 billion special treasury bond issued by Ministry of Finance 
(MOF). Thus, amounts of reserves reduced by RMB 270 billion, bond assets increased by 270 
billion, while liability side and total amount of asset of the four SOCBs did not change. 
Treasury bonds (assets)  
RMB 270 billion 
Reserve funds (asset)  
RMB 270 billion  
Second, the MOF announced to inject RMB 270 billion capital into the four SOCBs by issuing 
treasury bonds. For the commercial banks, the paid-in capital item and the reserves item in the 
liability account increased RMB 270 billion. To wit: 
Reserve funds (asset)  
RMB 270 billion 
Paid-in capital (owner’s equity)  
RMB 270 billion  
Third, after the above two steps, paid-in capital added by RMB 270 billion, and bond assets added 
by RMB 270 billion. Therefore, the accounting process finished.  
Treasury bond (asset)  
RMB 270 billion  
Paid-in capital (owner’s equity)  
RMB 270 billion  
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77B4.5.2 the Nearly RMB 1400 Billion NPLs write-offs of the SOCBs by the Central Government 
In 1999 
In April 1999, the central government established four AMCs, namely, the Cinda AMC, the 
Huarong AMC, the Great Wall AMC and the Orient AMC, and wrote off about 1400 billion NPLs 
(Including debt-to-equity swap. Up to 2000, the four AMCs have accomplished evaluation, signed 
up agreements of debt-to-equity swaps with 580 enterprises, and implemented RMB 405 billion 
debt-to-equity swaps) from the balance sheet of the four SOCBsF80F (see table 4-8). 
155BTable 4-8 The Four Asset Management Companies of China 
Name Established Year and paid-in Capital Transferred NPLs Debt-to-equity Swap Capital Source 
Huarong 
AMC 
Established on September 19, 1999 in 
Beijing, the corporation with registered 
capital of RMB 10 billion, wholly 
financed by the MOF. 
Acquired RMB407.7 
billion from the ICCB
Until the end of 1999, the framework 
agreement of debt-to-equity swap with 
RMB23.347billion was signed with 34 
enterprises. 
Issue 10 year-bond of 
RMB313billion and 
re-lend RMB94.7billion 
from the PBOC 
Great 
Wall 
AMC 
Established on October 18, 1999 in 
Beijing, with registered capital of RMB 
10 billion, wholly financed by the MOF. 
Acquired RMB 407.7 
billion from the ICCB
Until the end of 1999, the framework 
agreement of debt-to-equity swap with 
RMB1.76billion was signed with 7 
enterprises. 
Re-lend RMB 
345.8billion from the 
PBOC 
China 
Orient 
AMC 
Established on October15, 1999 in 
Beijing, with registered capital of 
RMB10 billion, among which RMB6 
billion capital and RMB0.5 billion 
foreign exchange which was financed 
by the MOF. 
Acquired RMB 
264.1billion from the 
BOC 
Until the end of 1999, the framework 
agreement of debt-to-equity swap with 
RMB19.3billion was signed with 31 
enterprises. 
Re-lend RMB 
116.2billion from PBOC 
and issue 10 
year-bond of 
RMB160billion to the 
BOC 
Cinda 
AMC 
Established on June 20, 1999 in 
Beijing, with registered capital of 
RMB10 billion, wholly financed by the 
MOF. 
Acquired RMB 
275.6billion from the 
CCB and acquire 
RMB100 billion from 
National 
Development Bank
Until the end of 1999, the framework 
agreement of debt-to-equity swap with 
RMB 28.26 billion was signed with 48 
enterprises, among of which 
RMB20.6billion is main creditor 
debt-to-equity swap and RMB7.66billion
is non-creditor debt-to-equity swap. 
Issue bond of 
RMB247billion with 10 
years term and issue 
10 year- bond of 
RMB100 billion, others 
are re-lend from the 
PBOC 
Source: Prepared by author. 
78B4.5.3 The second Capital injection and Policy Write-offs of NPLs of the SOCBs by the 
Central Government  
The central government injected US$45 billion foreign exchange reserves into the BOC and the 
CCB, and again transferred doubtful loans of US$2700 billion of the two banks to the Cinda AMC 
in December 2004 (see table 4-9). 
The CCB’s way of capital injection and NPLs write-offs  
First, Loss write-off. At the end of 2003, the CCB transferred original paid-in capital, provisions and 
profits of the year 2003 into risk reserves account to write off verified loss assets. In 2003, RMB 
56.9 billion Loss and RMB 28.1 billion non-credit assets of the CCB had been written off, and in 
May 2004, RMB 56.9 billion loss loans have been transferred to the Cinda AMC. 
Second, Doubtful loans write-off. In June 2004, RMB 128.9 billion doubtful loans were sold to the 
Cinda AMC at 50% of book value through public bidding among the four AMCs. 
                                                        
80 This burden is an explicit fiscal burden, which has to be finally borne by the fiscal authorities. However, by establishing the four Asset 
Management Corporations, government can delay its fiscal payment. 
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Third, capital injection. As approved by the State Council, the Central Hailing CompanyF81F injected 
US$22.5 billion (RMB186.2 billion) into the CCB in late 2003. After the capital injection, paid-in 
capital of the CCB was increased to RMB186.2 billion. According to the 2003 annual report of the 
CCB, compared with that of 2002, core capital adequacy ratio rose from 5.78% to 5.88%, while 
capital adequacy ratio of the CCB decreased from 6.91% to 6.51%. 
 
208BFigure 4-2 Capital Injection and NPLs Write-offs of the CCB, 2004 
Source: Prepared by author. 
The BOC’s way of capital injection and NPLs write-off  
First, loss write-off. At the end of 2003, the BOC transferred original paid-in capital and profits of 
2003 into risk reserves account to write off verified loss assets. In 2003, RMB 140 billion loss loans 
of BOC were wrote off, and in May 2004, RMB140 billion loss loans were transferred to the China 
Orient AMC. 
Second, NPLs write-off. In June 2004, RMB 149.8 billion doubtful loans of the BOC were sold to 
the China Cinda AMC at 50% of the book value through public bidding among the four AMCs. 
Third, capital-injection. As approved by the State Council, the Central Huijin Company injected 
US$22.5 billion (equivalent of RMB186.2 billion) into BOC in late 2003. After the capital injection, 
the BOC had RMB186.2 billion paid-in capital. According to the 2003 annual report of the BOC on 
28 May 2004, compared with that of 2002, core capital adequacy ratio rose from 7.11% to 6.18% 
and capital adequacy ratio of the BOC decreased from 7.69% to 6.98%. 
                                                        
81 The Central Huijin Company is a state-owned company established by  the State Council. Its major function is to fulfill rights and obligations as 
investor of important financial institutions such as the Bank of China and the China Construction Bank, to support them carrying out reform 
measures and improving corporate governance, and to pursue reasonable returns of government’s capital injection. 
Capital 
Injection 
Central Huijin Company  
Write off the loss loan of 
RMB 56.9 billion and 
non-credit asset of RMB 
28.1 billion, which are 
transferred off the balance 
sheet 
US$ 22.5 billion 
(RMB 186.2 
billion) at the end 
of 2003  
The CCB 
Write-off 
In June 2004, the 
doubtful loans of RMB 
128.9 billion were sold 
at 50% of book value 
by public bidding 
The Cinda AMC 
Write-Offs 
At the end of 2003, the owner’s 
equity, reserve and profit in 2003 are 
transferred to risk provision 
In May 2004, loss loans of RMB 56.9 billion 
were transferred. 
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209BFigure 4-3 Capital Injection and NPLs Write-offs of the BOC, 2004 
Source: Prepared by author. 
The ICBC’s way of capital injection and NPLs wrote-off  
First, capital injection. In April 2005, the central government injected US$15 billion (equivalent of 
RMB 124 billion). At the same time, original paid-in capital by the MOF of RMB 201.6 billion was 
divided into two parts: one was about RMB 124 billion as capital owned by the MOF and the rest of 
RMB 77.6 billion as loss provision of the ICBC. In this new capital structure, the MOF and the 
Central Huijin Company owned 50% share of the ICBC respectively. At the end of 2004, core 
capital of the ICBC was about RMB170 billion. In late 2004, the total assets of the ICBC were RMB 
5700 billion, and core capital adequacy ratio before and after the capital injection was 3% and 
4.35% respectively. According to requirements of the State Council, as the first step, the ICBC 
should increase its core capital adequacy ratio to 6% through various means, and then should 
raise the ratio to above 8% by issuing subordinated debts. 
Second, Loss loans disposal. In middle May 2005, RMB 246 billion loss were put in a joint account 
supervised by the MOF and the Central Huijin Company, and were entrusted to the China Huarong 
AMC. It is estimated that the accounts will be written off after a few years. Funds to absorb the joint 
account loss include profits income tax of the ICBC, dividends that the Central Huijin Company 
and the MOF will be paid in the coming few years, and the RBM 120 billion paid-in capital of the 
MOF. 
Third, doubtful loans resolution. In June 2005, RMB 459 billion doubtful loans were divided into 35 
packages by regions, and then bided among the four AMCs. Resultantly, the China Great Wall 
AMC received 17 packages worth of RMB 256.99 billion and accounted for 56% of the total 
doubtful NPLs; The China Orient AMC got 10 packages worth RMB 121.2 billion; the China Cinda 
AMC received 5 packages worth RMB 58.1 billion, and the China Huarong AMC received 3 
separate packages worth RMB 22.71 billion.  
Write Off 
Write-Offs  
22.5 billion USD (RMB 
186.2 billion) at the end of 
2003 
At the end of 2003, the original paid-in capital, 
provisions and profits of 2003 were 
transferred to risk provisions account 
The Central Huijin 
Company 
The BOC 
In June 2004, the 
doubtful loans of 149.8 
billion RMB were sold 
with the 50% comparable 
price（比价） by public 
bidding. 
The Cinda AMC 
Loss Loans of 140 billion 
RMB are transferred off 
the balance sheet 
The China Orient AMC 
In May 2004, loss loan 
of RMB 140 billion are 
transferred.
Capital Injection 
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210BFigure 4-4 Capital Injection and NPLs Write-offs of the ICBC, 2005 
Source: Prepared by author. 
30B4.6 THE SECOND FORM OF SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINS OF THE 
STATE-OWNED COMMERCIAL BANKS: FINANCING FROM AND INTERESTS 
RATES REGULATION BY THE PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA 
From 1999 to 2000, in order to write off non-performing assets of the SOCBs, the central bank 
financed RMB 94.7 billion to the Huarong AMC, RMB 345.8 billion to the Great Wall AMC, RMB 
116.2 billion to the Oriental AMC and RMB 3 billion to the Cinda AMC. The total financing provided 
to the four financial AMCs by the central bank reached RMB 535 billion and became the main 
channel of issuing base money of that year (Liyang and Peng Xingyun, 2001) (see table 4-10). 
156BTable 4-9 A Comparison with Capital Injection for the CCB，the BOC and the ICBC 
Difference Capital Structure Original paid-in capital Disposal of Loss Loans Disposal of Doubtful Loans 
The BOC and 
the CCB 
Central Huijin 
Corporation hold 
100% of the capital 
base 
All of the original owner’s 
equity is used to write off 
the doubtful loan 
The owner’s equity, reserve and 
profits in 2003 are all transferred to 
risk provisions. The loss loan in 
2003 are underwritten and 
transferred off the balance sheet.
 
public bidding among the four 
AMCs 
The ICBC 
MOF and Central 
Huijin Corporation 
hold 50% equity 
respectively 
Divide the original 
paid-in capital into two 
parts, between which 
124 billion as paid-in 
capital of the MOF and 
77.6 billion as provisions 
of the bank. 
Are the MOF and Huijin Corporation 
allocated the loss loans to the 
escrew account, which is entrusted 
to China Huarong. It is estimated 
those loss loans are written off by 
profits, bonus, and equity. 
The doubtful loans form 35 
asset packages， which are 
sold to the four AMCs by public 
bidding. Each AMC received 
some asset packages. 
Source: Prepared by author. 
 
Central Huijin Company 
ICBC
In June 2005, US$ 15 billion 
(amount to RMB 124 billion) Capital Injection 
RMB Original 201.6 financial funds 
124 billion financed by MOF
RMB 77.6 billon as 
ICBC’s provision 
Loss loan of 
RMB 246 billion  
Escrew account owned by 
MOF and Central Huijin 
Huarong AMC 
Trust to dispose 
in May 2005 
In June 2005, the doubtful 
loan of RMB 459 billion made 
up of 35 asset package, which 
will be sold to the 4 AMCs 
through public bidding.
17 asset packages for Changcheng AMC with 
the amount of RMB 256.99；10 for China Orient 
AMC with the amount of RMB 121.2 billion，5 
for Cinda AMC with the amount of RMB 58.1 
billion，3 for Huarong AMC with the amount of 
RMB 22.71 billion  
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157BTable 4-10 Amount of Financing from the PBOC, 1999--2005 
(Unit: RMB 100 million) 
Year 
Total financing 
from the 
PBOC 
Financing to depository 
money banks 
Financing to 
non-monetary 
financial institutions 
Of which: Financing to 
specific depository 
Institutions 
Financing to other 
financial institutions 
1999 19207 15373.9 3833.1   
2000 22119.56 13519.19 8600.37   
2000 19858.91 11311.6 8547.31   
2002 19527.91 9982.56 9545.35 2305.08 7240.27 
2003 19238.76 10619.47 8619.29 1363.34 7255.95 
2004 19289.29 9376.35 9912.94 1047.85 8865.09 
April, 2005 18686.45 8901.96 9784.49 934.4 8850.09 
Note: The PBOC. 
Then, from 2000 to 2001, the Cinda AMC had borrowed another RMB 44.5 billion from the central 
bank to purchase NPLs of RMB 44.5 billion from the CCB and the State Development Bank. Thus, 
together with the 535 billion, the central bank had borrowed RMB 604.1 billion to the four AMCs for 
the 1999 NPLs write-off from the four SOCBs (see table 4-11). 
158BTable 4-11 Distribution of the PBOC Financing Among The SOCBs, 1997-2003 
ICBC BOC ABC CCB 
Year 
Amount of 
Financing  
(RMB 100 million) 
Growth 
rate 
(%) 
Amount of 
Financing  
 (RMB 100 million) 
Growth 
rate 
(%) 
Amount of 
Financing  
 (RMB 100 million)
Growth 
rate 
(%) 
Amount of 
Financing  
(RMB 100 million)
Growth 
rate 
(%) 
1997 1,780.12  1,808.88  2,055.94  372.11  
1998 407.62 -77.1 1,237.01 -31.61 3,522.53 71.33 42.8 -88.5 
1999 265.99 -34.75 898.7 -27.35 3,960.71 12.44 40.9 -4.44 
2000 240.01 -9.77 222.97 -75.19 1,267.00 -68.01 46.2 12.96 
2001 327.26 36.35 986.3 342.35 1,538.06 21.39 41.2 -10.82 
2002 216.46 -33.86 950.03 -3.68 1,529.58 -0.55 36.71 -10.9 
2003 383.99 77.4 682.38 -28.17 1,518.96 -0.69 34.86 -5.04 
Source: The Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking (1998-2004).  
On 30 June 2004, the Cinda AMC again borrowed RMB 160.484 billion five-year loans from the 
central bank to purchase NPLs of the SOCBs. On 27 June 2005, in order to purchase the write-off 
of doubtful loans from the ICBC, the four AMCs again borrowed a total amount of RMB 459 billion 
from the central bank. Therefore, the four SOCBs had borrowed RMB 619.5 billion from the 
central bank to purchase NPLs of the SOCBs. Thus, together with the borrowing in 1999, the 
AMCs had borrowed RMB1223.6 billion from the central bank to purchase the two NPLs 
wrote-offs from the SOCBs. 
Since 1995, besides direct financing to facilitate purchase of wirte-offs by the AMCs from the 
SOCBs, in order to increase profitability level of the SOCBs, the central bank has also increased 
margin between lending rates and deposits rates, and thus forcing depositors to provide implicit 
subsidy (see table 4-12). It is estimated that since 1999, along with widening of margin between 
lending interests rates and deposits rates, subsidies provided by depositors to the SOCBs have 
been estimated to exceed RMB1trillion (Li Yang and Peng Xingyun, 2003). In this arrangement, 
depositors unconsciously become the ultimate supporters of soft budget constraints of the 
SOCBs. 
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159BTable 4-12 Margin between Lending Interests Rates and Deposits Interests Rates, 1980-2004 
 Interests rate for deposits (1) Interests rate charged for loans (2) Interests rate Margin (=(2)-(1)) 
1980-1-1  3.96 5.04 1.08 
1980-4-1  5.4 5.04 -0.36 
1982-1-1  5.4 7.2 1.8 
1982-4-1  5.76 7.2 1.44 
1985-4-1  6.84 7.92 1.08 
1985-8-1  7.2 7.92 0.72 
1988-9-1  8.64 9 0.36 
1989-2-1  11.34 11.34 0 
1990-4-15  10.08 10.08 0 
1990-8-21  8.64 9.36 0.72 
1991-4-21  7.56 8.64 1.08 
1993-5-15  9.18 9.36 0.18 
1993-7-11  10.98 10.98 0 
1995-1-1  10.98 10.98 0 
1995-7-1  10.98 12.06 1.08 
1996-5-1  9.18 10.98 1.8 
1996-8-23  7.47 10.08 2.61 
1997-10-23  5.67 8.64 2.97 
1998-3-25  5.22 7.92 2.7 
1998-7-1  4.77 6.93 2.16 
1998-12-7  3.78 6.39 2.61 
1999-6-10  2.25 5.85 3.6 
2002-2-21  1.98 5.31 3.33 
2004-10-29 2.25 5.58 3.33 
Source: Prepared by author. Original data are from the PBOC. 
31B4.7 THE THIRD FORM OF SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINS OF THE STATE-OWNED 
COMMERCIAL BANKS: REGULATORY FORBEARANCE 
With more than two decades’ reform and development, China has learned from experiences of 
mature market economies to build financial regulatory system and set up a series of regulatory 
standards. However, in order to adapt to real situation of the state-owned commercial banks, 
regulatory authorities in China has relaxed regulatory standards and chosen not to close insolvent 
financial institutions. According to the IMF (1998), these acts are typical regulatory forbearance, 
which means that regulatory authority loosens regulatory standards agreed ex ante purposely to 
adapt to problematic commercial banks and leads to incredibility of bankruptcy threats. When the 
state reputation and the commercial reputation of the four SOCBs cannot be separated, rational 
choices of regulatory authorities are to implement regulatory forbearance policy.  
79B4.7.1 Technically Insolvent State-owned Commercial Banks Have Been Permitted to 
Develop Rapidly 
Capital adequacy ratio of a commercial bank represents its capacity of dealing with risks and 
protecting depositors. It is clearly specified by relevant laws and rule that the capital adequacy 
ratio of commercial banks in China should not below 8%. However, before 1994, the four SOCBs 
were wholly state-owned commercial banks by then, whose capital had been appropriated by the 
MOF. After 1994, capital of the SOCBs was mainly supplemented by their own profits and retained 
earnings. However, as non-performing assets of the four SOCBs have been continuously 
expanding, capital adequacy ratio of the SOCBs has been decreasing accordingly. Figure 4-4 
reflects that the capital adequacy ratio of the four SOCBs before the capital injection in 2003 have 
always been below 8%, far less than both international and domestic standards. Furthermore, 
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even nominal capital adequacy of many financial institutions still have fraudulent capital 
supplement practices such as injecting capital by borrowing money, giving back capital by issuing 
loans to shareholders, and many other forms (International Finance, 19 July 2004). All These 
practices lead the nominal substandard capital adequacy ratio of the SOCBs even lower. 
Generally speaking, regulatory authorities should require banks to correct problems that might 
harm interests of depositors of commercial banks by implementing punitive measures based on 
severity of those problems to prevent continual deterioration. For example, in the USA, before 
declaring bankruptcy of commercial banks, the regulatory authorities will adopt at least nine 
measures to require banks to correct within a definite term, with a main purpose of not allowing the 
unhealthy banks to develop further, lest it harm the interests of healthy banks and depositors. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, the four state-owned commercial banks have been in a state of technical 
bankruptcy since 1994. According to the Law of the People's Republic of China on Enterprise 
Bankruptcy, the Law of the People's Republic of China on Commercial Banks, and other 
regulatory rules, the regulatory authorities should implement regulatory measures to the SOCBs 
whose capital adequacy ratio fail to conform to the regulatory requirements. However, role of the 
regulatory authorities in China has basically been industry protector, failing to adopt explicit 
regulatory measures to commercial banks and has no independent rights to punish those banks in 
accordance with related rules and regulations. From 1994 to 2004, although the SOCBs have 
always been in the state of technical bankruptcy, the SOCBs still have experiencing rapid 
development in terms of deposits, loans and other businesses. Compared with 1994, branches of 
the SOCBs have increased by almost 50% in 2004, whose total assets increased by almost 6 
times (See figure 4-5). 
 
211BFigure 4-5 Capital Adequacy Ratio of the SOCBs, 1994-2000 
Source: Prepared by author. 
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212BFigure 4-6 Total Assets of the SOCBs, 1952-2002 
Source: Prepared by author. 
 
213BFigure 4-7 Household Savings Rate of China, 1979-2000  
Source: Prepared by author. 
80B4.7.2 Strict Market Entry to Maintain Soft Budget Constraints Policy of the SOCBs 
Soft budget constraints policy of the SOCBs leaves the SOCBs excessively depend on deposits. 
Relaxing the market access may divert deposits of the SOCBs, thus affecting their liquidity. In 
order to sustain the soft budget constraints policy in the SOCBs and to reduce the pressure on 
liquid capital in the SOCBs, the regulatory authority has been maintaining a strict policy of market 
access with high access costs and serious access qualification. (Xie Ping and Jiao Jinpu, 2003) 
For example in China as a developing country, the minimum requirement of registered capital in 
Chinese commercial banks is very high. Based on the rules in the Law of the People's Republic of 
China on Commercial Banks, the minimum amount of registered capital required for establishing a 
commercial bank shall be USD 120 billion, the minimum amount of registered capital required for 
establishing an city cooperative commercial bank shall be USD 120 million and that for 
establishing a rural cooperative bank USD 6 million, which are respectively 120 times, 12 times 
and 6 times over the registered capital of USD 1 million in the USA. The policy’s limits on 
establishing new financial institution greatly restrict the market access of new financial institution. 
The pattern of strictly limiting domestic capitals’ entry comes into being under the circumstances 
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that China continuously expands its opening-up policy. In recent years, scholars have encouraging 
opening international market and domestic market (Wang Guogang, 2001). 
32B4.8 ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF IMPLEMENTING SOFT BUDGET 
CONSTRAINTS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS 
In most cases, soft budget constraints are incompatible with fundamental principles and beliefs of 
market economy. As many researches shows, for commercial banking industry, soft budget 
constraints might result in many undesirable economic consequencesF 82 F. First, soft budget 
constraints endanger stability of financial system. The bigger a commercial bank is the more 
negative externalities it will cause in case of bankruptcy or bank runs. Soft budget constraints 
policy let commercial banks believe that once it is in trouble, regulatory authorities are more likely 
to intervene by either providing liquidity or government-led reconstruction. Therefore, soft budget 
constraints policy makes market discipline incredible, give commercial banks more bargaining 
power in a game between government and commercial banks, and encourage gambling behavior 
and opportunism of commercial banks. soft budget constraints policy also encourages commercial 
banks to compete excessively and therefore take excessive risks, which are against prudential 
management principle of commercial banks (Stiglitz, 1994), thus making fragile financial system 
more fragile. Also, take Savings and Loans associations (S&Ls) as example. At the beginning of 
1980s, those insolvent S&Ls, which were still operating with supports of regulatory forbearance 
implemented by regulatory authorities, were called by local inhabitants “Zombie”, an African words 
borrowed from African means “living dead”,. The Zombies increased interests rates to attract 
deposits from healthy S&Ls while lowered interests rates of loans, paying no attention to costs of 
funding, and struggling to survive by increasing amounts of assets----because they had nothing 
more to lose but potential net gains by speculation. The vicious competition of the Zombies forced 
healthy S&Ls to compete by increasing deposit interests rates and lowering loan interests’ rates to 
attract deposits. The narrowing gap of profitability of healthy S&Ls finally plunged them into the 
group of Zombies (Mishikin, 1998). It can be seen that practice of soft budget constraints policy of 
S&Ls makes all similar institutions more fragile (Martin. Feldstein, 2000; Stiglitz, 1994). 
Second, practice of soft budget constraints lowers efficiency of monetary policy and independence 
of central bank. When a central bank is forced to act as lender of last resort and provide liquidity to 
insolvent commercial banks resulting from either inadequate liquidity or huge non-performing 
loans, the central bank has to issue base money, which will increase money supply and squeeze 
adjustment space to contract money supply, weakening central bank’s capability of controlling 
amount of base money. For example, a main reason of severe inflation and interests rates slide in 
Eastern Europe during transition was that central banks in these transitional economies were 
forced to provide liquidity to commercial banks, thus abuse their role as lender of last resort. 
                                                        
82 It is worthy to point out here that economic consequences of soft budget constraints of commercial banks are not always bad. Some soft budget 
constraints arrangements of enterprises facilitate the ability of fundraising and increase the liquidity of enterprises (Kornai, 2002; Cui Zhiyuan, 1999). 
For example, compared with unlimited responsibility of unlimited corporations, although limited cooperation have softened budget constraints, it has 
reduced investment risks faced by investors, therefore facilitate transaction in market, facilitate information transmission among investors through 
open market transaction, therefore improve  efficiency of resources allocation of market system. 
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Consequently, concerns about soundness of some commercial banks resulting in temporarily 
breakdown of inter-bank markets, thus forced these central banks to intervene by repurchasing 
huge amounts of treasury bills. Another example is Latvia. In 1995, systemic banking crises had 
impaired public confidence, which was exemplified by 35% downfall of loans and outflow of huge 
capital. The bank of Latvia, the central bank, had to intervene in foreign exchange market. Later, 
although banking crises in Latvia did not result in systemic macroeconomic instability, the 
intervention increased demand for stability and money multiplier, thus made monetary policy more 
complicated. 
Third, soft budget constraints policy lowers commercial banks’ sensitivity to interests rates 
fluctuations, which will deter efficiency of interests rates to allocate resources (Kornai, 1980). If 
commercial banks price loans by risk nature of borrowers, then commercial banks have to spend 
more information-collecting costs, thus disable role of interests rates in reflecting risk premiums. 
The case of ‘Zombie’ in the S&Ls crises proves that commercial bank’s insensitivity to interests 
rates changes will weaken market role in screening and evaluating risks, sharpen adverse 
selection problems, and drag sound financial institutions into crises (Mishikin, 1998). 
Fourth, soft budget constraints policy might weaken market discipline. soft budget constraints 
might weaken depositors’ incentive to exert market discipline by collecting information and 
monitoring banks. Many researchers believed that depositary insurance system is a double-edged 
sword. On one hand, it might increase stability of banking system; on the other hand, it may 
aggravate moral hazard of commercial banks, reducing depositors’ incentive to pay attention to 
soundness of related problem institutions (Cui Zhiyuan, 1999; World Bank, 1998). Although China 
has not established depository insurance system yet, due to implicit central government guarantee, 
depositors need not to worry about safety of deposits. Consequently, soft budget constraints of 
commercial banks weaken depositors’ incentive to monitor, screen, and evaluate risks faced by 
financial institutions that joined depository insurance system. 
Fifth, soft budget constraints of commercial banks, like soft budget constraints of any other 
economic institutions, might aggravate fiscal burdens of central government and weaken 
government’s control of public finance, particularly in case government has already been battered 
by fiscal burdens. Soft budget constraints force governments to contract fiscal expenditure and 
thus threat overall macro-economic stability. For example, due to regulatory forbearance and 
resulting soft budget constraints policy, direct costs of S&Ls crises in USA in 1980s had jumped 
from 70 billion to 140 billion, almost doubled preliminary estimation (Martin Feldstein, 2000). A 
more recent example is Japan. After burst of bubble economy in the end of 1980s, soft budget 
constraints of commercial banks not only dragged resolution of non-performing loans, but also 
impeded speed of economic recovery. 
Sixth, soft budget constraints also severely impede China’s market-oriented financial reforms, 
such as market entry reform and interests rates liberalizationF83F. Loosening market entry standards 
will diverge deposits from state-owned banks, and might plunge the SOCBs into liquidity dilemma. 
                                                        
83 In china, entry costs are very high in banking industry, and entry conditions are very restrictive. These barriers make it difficult to introduce new 
competitive bodies into banking industry (Xie Ping and Jiao Jinpu, 2002). 
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Similarly, interests rates liberalization might narrow gap between savings and loans, thus threaten 
survival of the SOCBs. Largely, it is these concerns that make it difficult to speed China’s 
market-oriented financial reform. Besides, after 20 years reform and development, although China 
has established a series of regulations and rules by integrating experiences of mature market 
economies with realities, due to soft budget constraints of the SOCBs, regulatory authorities have 
to differentiate state-owned financial institutions and non-state-owned financial institutions by 
adapting these rules to the SOCBs. Furthermore, incredibility of punishment also sharpens 
opportunism of commercial banks.  
Because of all these economic consequence of soft budget constraints of the SOCBs, soft budget 
constraints of the SOCBs might aggravate NPLs of the SOCBs. Negative impacts of soft budget 
constraints on non-performing loans of commercial banks can be classified into two types. One is 
that soft budget constraints might increase opportunism of commercial banks and risk-taking 
activities aimed at maximizing profitability, which will increase possibility of making new 
non-performing loans (Stiglitz, 1994). In contrary, soft budget constraints might increase passivity 
of commercial banks by speculating in bad projects “for resurrection”, knowing that government 
will salvage afterwardsF 84 F. The other negative impact is that soft budget constraints might 
strengthen afterward rent-seeking behavior of borrowers, in other words, soft budget constraints 
might increase moral hazard of not only commercial banks, but also that of borrowers 
(Dewatripont, M. AND, and Maskin, E., 1995)F85F. In transitional economies such as China, soft 
budget constraints of commercial banks have been traditionally derived from their function as 
supporter of soft budget constraints of state-owned enterprises. Therefore, borrowers’ moral 
hazard can be more intense under dual soft budget constraints. This point is the leading theme of 
the paper and will be discussed in details in chapter 5. 
33B4.9 CONCLUSION 
This chapter attempts to answer the question why the seriously technically bankrupt SOCBs can 
survive and develop rapidly in such a long time framework from the perspective of soft budget 
constraints, illustrates degree of technical bankruptcy by constructing and calculating the technical 
bankruptcy ratio of the SOCBs from 1994 to 2004, and shows that, ever since commercialization 
reform took momentum in 1994, the SOCBs have been seriously technically bankrupt.  
Analysis shows that, after Kornai, although the concept of soft budget constraints has turned out to 
be very explanatory and been widely used, it has been widely used to analyze those of ordinary 
business except commercial banks and rarely been used to analyze those in which commercial 
                                                        
84 A financial survey released by the PBOC in July shows that the total loans issued by commercial banks in the first half of 2003 are RMB 180 
million, which are equivalent to the total newly issued loans in the year 2002. Analysts of Standard & Poor believed that new loans in the balance 
sheet did not reveal that more funds have been used to sustain economic development, on the contrary, they may be the maintenance costs of the 
NPLs. Loan increase, therefore, exaggerates the growth ratio of newly-issued loans. Nevertheless, it is worthy to make further research to prove 
whether the above-mentioned interpretation is correct. 
85 It is rife for enterprises to take various measures, including bankruptcy and restructuring, to evade bank loans, and there are many examples 
reported by newspapers. According to a survey launched by PBOC, by the end of 2000, among all 62656 restructured enterprises that have 
borrowed from the four SOCBs and Communication Bank, about 51.29% of all the restructured enterprises are proved to evade bank loans. Among 
which, 22296 are SOEs, accounting for 70% of the total. Therefore, SOCBs are the main victim of loan evasion of SOEs. 
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banks serving as body of soft budget constraints rather than as supporter of soft budget 
constraints as had been in the cases of existing researches. The chapter blazes a trail in this area 
by defining soft budget constraints of commercial banks, differentiating those of commercial banks 
from those of ordinary business except commercial banks, and delineating evidences of soft 
budget constraints of commercial banks. In order to deepen understanding of soft budget 
constraints of commercial banks, the chapter also probe into reasons why soft budget constraints 
of the SOCBs have not been noticed in the past and the economic consequence of implementing 
soft budget constraints, thus provides a very useful conceptual framework for further analysis on 
soft budget constraints of commercial banks. The chapter stresses on technical bankruptcy 
situation of the SOCBs, the three expressions of soft budget constraints of the SOCBs, to wit, 
capital injections and policy write-offs by the central government, direct financing from and 
interests rates regulation by the central government, regulatory forbearances, and definition of soft 
budget constraints of commercial banks. The chapter shows that soft budget constraints of the 
SOCBs have been very pervasive and popular in China since 1994. 
The analysis of this chapter indicates that, from perspective of soft budget constraints, reform 
measures for the SOCBs since 1994 can be labeled as “reforms within soft budget constraints”, to 
wit, the SOCBs are immune to credible bankruptcy threats. The government has been pushing 
reforms of the SOCBs forward since 1994, and the purpose of various reform measures taken by 
the central government is to maintain, supplement and intensify soft budget constraints of the 
SOCBs. The central government expects to achieve at least two direct goals by implementing soft 
budget constraints policy of the SOCBs. One is to stabilize the SOCBs, therefore overall banking 
system; the other is to limit NPLs ratios of the SOCBs to acceptable levels. The literature review in 
this chapter reveals that many existing researches and policies regarding reforms of the SOCBs 
have obviously not recognized the importance of soft budget constraints of commercial banks. 
However, compared with mature market economies, soft budget constraints policy is a 
China-specific precondition for analyzing reforms of the SOCBs, and should be a starting point of 
discussing problems of the SOCBs. Besides, because soft budget constraints policy also refers to 
a type of relationships between government and SOEs, thus, soft budget constraints of the 
SOCBs can also be a starting point of explaining relationship between the central government and 
the SOCBs. Therefore, the conceptual framework of soft budget constraints of the SOCBs 
provides not only a coherent explanation for relations and purposes of series of reform measures 
of the SOCBs, but also a useful analytical tool for analyzing many problems that are still perplexing 
the SOCBs, especially the question why NPLs of the SOCBs recur and maintain at abnormal high 
levels since 1994 despite the central government has taken many positive measures followed 
suites of international experiences. 
The analysis on economic consequences of soft budget constraints of commercial banks indicate 
that, high NPLs ratios of the SOCBs might closely connected with recurring nature of NPLs of the 
SOCBs. In the next chapter, by using the conceptual framework of this chapter, we will further 
answer the question why NPLs of the SOCBs have been lingering at high levels after massive 
policy write-offs and capital injections. 
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9BSOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS, ENDOGENOUS 
NATURE OF NPLS OF THE STATE-OWNED 
COMMERCIAL BANKS, AND ROLE OF 
GOVERNMENT IN NON-PERFORMING LOANS 
RESOLUTIONF86 
 
 
34B5.1 INTRODUCTION 
NPLs of the SOCBs have become a crucial factor impeding reform and development of banking 
sector in China. Ever since outbreak of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, the government has 
learned from experiences and lessons of both mature market economies and other transitional 
economies, intensifying resolution of NPLs of the SOCBs constantly, taking various measures to 
dispose stock of NPLs, and making efforts to reduce proportion of NPLs in newly-issued loans. 
However, results are not satisfactoryF87F by far.  
The chapter argues that although all problems of commercial banks will be reflected by nominal 
NPLsF88F, reasons that have incurred those problems are not necessarily the same. Only when 
specific causes of NPLs have been correctly understood, can NPLs problem be solved more 
efficiently, and can the government play a more effective role in NPLs resolution. For analysis 
convenience, NPLs of the SOCBs can be roughly classified into two types based on degree of 
controllability of risks: one is those can not be eradicated, the other is those can be reduced or 
eliminated by improving risks mitigation capability of commercial banksF89F. As for the first type, 
                                                        
86 The main body of the chapter was published in the June issue of the journal of financial research,2004. 
87 As of the end of 2003, the NPLs of commercial banks have been reduced by RMB 194 billion (CBRC, 2004). Although that the average NPLs 
ratio of the four SOCBs have been reduced to 20.36% (CBRC, 2004) from nearly 40% in 1999 (Shi Huaqiang and Peng Xingyun, 2003), the ratio is 
still much higher than that of the international average level. More badly, if the factor that the rate of newly issued loans and absolute value in 2003 
were much higher than those in past years into the consideration, then the fact that NPLs ratio was diluted through increasing loans cannot be 
neglected. In fact, at a news conference held by the State Council News Office in March, 2004, Mr. Liu Mingkang, the chairman of CBRC, has 
mentioned the term of contribution ratio of NPL. The ratio can be used to distinguish the role of share of reduction of stock of NPLs and that of 
increase of newly issued loans in the total reduction of NPLs on the NPLs ratio. Based on the data disclosed by Chairman Liu, the stock reduction of 
stock NPLs contribution ratio in 2003 was about 20%. This means that about 80% of the reduction of NPLs was diluted by newly issued loans, to 
some extent proved  the external guess. 
88 Although that banking regulatory authorities can maneuvered NPLs ratio on the accounting books of commercial banks by so called regulatory 
forbearance, to wit, to change prudential regulatory rules such as loan classification method or standard and tax incentive on loan provisions, 
ultimately NPLs will surface and be booked on accounting books, that means that what regulatory authorities can do is just to defer the timing of 
recognizing NPLs or change the method of booking NPLs. 
89 In the New Capital Accord promulgated by the Basle Committee, the clause on the minimum capital requirement and risks provisioning focus on 
the ineradicable risks, but the credit risks mitigation is targeted at reducing the controllable risks. 
5 
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average NPLs ratioF90F of banking sector can be regarded as an ideal reference. Statistics show that, 
NPLs ratio of the majority of the world top 100 banks can be controlled within 5% (see table 3-14, 
figure 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, 3-4, 3-5, 3-6, 3-7, 3-8, 3-9, 3-10). Therefore, NPLs ratio of 5% is acceptable for 
both commercial banks and banking regulators, and thus can be regarded as a ceiling for risks 
mitigation capacity of commercial banks. Researches revealed that NPLs of commercial banks in 
mature market economies are usually incurred by macroeconomic cyclical fluctuations, and moral 
hazards and adverse selection due to asymmetric information (Mishkin, 1995). Based on incurring 
causes, NPLs ratios exceeding 5% can be further analyzed from two directions: exogenous cause 
or endogenous cause. It is reasonable to assume that when macroeconomic conditions and 
extraneous institutional arrangements are comparable, discrepancy among commercial banks in 
same region or of the same scale can be seen as direct result of different risks mitigation 
capacityF91F. Although NPLs ratios of commercial banks in China and are not fully comparable to 
those in other nations, a comparison can at least help us probing into the preliminary reason why 
NPLs ratios of the SOCBs have been lingering at high levels in the past 10 years. 
There has no consensus on causes of NPLs of the SOCBs. One popular view blamed economic 
transition for inviting huge amounts of NPLs, which can be seen as transition costs (Fan Hengshan, 
2003). The fact that nearly all transitional economies have been suffering from high level of NPLs 
ratios shows that there indeed exists a certain relationship between economic transition and NPLs 
of commercial banks (see table 3—15, figure3-2, 3-3, 3-5, 3-6, 3-8, 3-9). However, the fact that 
NPLs ratios of some commercial banks in China as well as in other transitional economies are 
comparable to those of commercial banks in mature economies proves that transition does not 
necessarily result in high NPLs ratios of commercial banks. Therefore, it needs to analyze further 
the relationship between economic transition and NPLs of commercial banks. Besides, this point 
relatively neglects incentives and moral hazards of government, enterprises and commercial 
banks in process of forming and accumulating NPLs, and assumes unrealistically that government, 
enterprises and commercial banks are all victims of economic transition. Another popular view 
blames institutional particularities of the four SOCBs and SOEs as primary factor of causing high 
NPLs ratios of the SOCBs. For commercial banks, this view always explains from specialty of 
property rights of state-owned (i.e. governance structure) of the SOCBs; from the side of 
enterprises, this view usually analyzes from over-borrowing or policy burdens of SOEs. Although 
the above two views are very insightful, they obviously neglect interrelation among government, 
commercial banks and SOEs. 
Different from the above two popular views, by appealing to conceptual framework of soft budget 
constraints, Shi Huaqiang and Peng Xingyun (2003) argued that soft budget constraints of the 
SOCBs not only increase moral hazards and opportunism of the SOCBs, aggravate soft budget 
                                                        
90 Through comparing the data from transnational banks with the same asset scale in the same international macroeconomics environment, the 
scope of the unmitigated risks can be calculated, because the risks in the transnational banks were fully diversified. 
91 During the 3 years from 2000 to 2003, the NPLs ratio of commercial banks in developed economies was between 0.5% (Luxemburg) and 8.4% 
(Japan), while the that of the developing economies was from 5.3% (Argentina) to 42.9% ( Thailand). In the same period, the NPLs ratio of 
commercial banks in Asian economies and regions was from 4.5% (Hong Kong) to 28.2% (China) with that of China’s SOCBs from 22.4% to 30.5%, 
20% higher than that of the developed economies and 10% higher than that of other transitional economies. There was also big difference among 
the NPLs ratio of different commercial banks in China, with Minsheng Bank’s 2 % lowest NPLs and Agriculture Bank of China and Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China 30.07% and 21% respectively. (The Banker, 2003; CBRC, 2003) 
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constraints of SOEs which have been very serious, but also worsen NPLs of the SOCBs. This 
chapter will follow this logic and further analyze endogenous nature of NPLs of the SOCBs within 
the framework of soft budget constraints from three perspectives: First, sunk costs resulting from 
loans to SOEs and related maintenance costs of sunk costs of SOEs will decide that situation of 
NPLs of the SOCBs will be decided by SOEs reform. Therefore, unless soft budget constraints of 
SOEs being hardened, NPLs of the SOCBs will persist and accumulate; Second, institutional 
arrangement of dual soft budget constraints in China intensifies practices of gambling for 
resurrection by the SOCBs, thus NPLs of the SOCBs will also accumulate quickly. Third, under 
institutional arrangement of dual soft budget constraints, local governments have instinct impulses 
to unduly seize financial resources of the SOCBs. Under influence of above-mentioned three 
mechanisms, which are all endogenously derived from the institutional arrangements of dual soft 
budget constraints, both stock and flow of NPLs of the SOCBs have a endogenous nature, to wit, 
NPLs of the SOCBs are decided by the institutional arrangement of dual soft budget constraints. 
Unless the dual soft budget constraints have been hardened, NPLs of the SOCBs will continue to 
accumulate endogenously. The analysis in this chapter shows that dual soft budget constraints not 
only reduce efficiency of resources allocation, but also distorted incentive mechanism between 
both the central government and local governments and enterprises or between commercial banks 
and enterprises.  
The rest of this chapter is divided into five sections. By applying sunk costs model, section 5.2 
probes into reasons why the SOCBs still issue new loans to poor-performed SOEs after previously 
issued loans cannot be paid back, this is an objective reason; section 5.3 introduces managers’ 
opportunism of both the SOCBs and SOEs into analysis by appealing to gambling for resurrection 
model. The author points out that, although sunk costs will exist as long as commercial banks 
pursue maximum profits, dual soft budget constraints in China have encouraging practices of 
gambling for resurrection of the SOCBs; section 5.4 further includes local governments into 
analysis, analyzes local governments' rational reaction to dual soft budget constraints policy and 
analyzes tragedy of the SOCBs as common land by a formal model. This section indicates that 
extremely high NPLs ratios of the SOCBs can be seen as a direct consequence of unduly using 
financial resources by SOEs with help of local governments; section 5.5 discusses policy 
implications of dual soft budget constraints and endogenous nature of NPLs of the SOCBs.  
35B .2 DUAL SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS AND ENDOGENOUS NATURE OF 
NON-PERFORMING LOANS OF THE STATE-OWNED COMMERCIAL BANKS I: 
INITIAL SUNK COSTS AND THEIR MAINTENANCE COSTS  
Sunk costs refer to investments that cannot be quickly converted into other uses. The concept was 
first used by economists to explain reasons that markets cannot be fully competitive, and is 
borrowed in this chapter to refer to loans that have been issued by banks not according to market 
principle, but by administrative orders, and have been used by borrowers as paid-in capital. By 
eliminating insolvent enterprises based on principles of effective competition and survival of the 
fittest, free market mechanism can effectively allocate resources. However, government’s 
intervention enables loss-making enterprises or enterprises without self-viability to survive. In the 
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case of China, the SOCBs cannot withdraw or transfer all loans from SOEs with poor profitability to 
profitable enterprises freely. Therefore, certain proportion of resources is wasted in loss-making 
enterprises, thus resulting in initial sunk costs reflected by huge NPLs of the SOCBs. For 
convenience of analysis, sunk costs can be classified into initial sunk costs, maintenance costs of 
sunk costs (because without maintenance, sunk costs will definitely turn into NPLs), and 
opportunity costs of sunk costs. Based on causes, sunk costs can also be roughly divided into 
sunk costs resulting from specific policies or practices and sunk costs resulting from institutional 
arrangement such as soft budget constraints of SOEs. This chapter confines its analysis to initial 
sunk costs and their maintenance costs. Sunk costs determine that to add loans to loss-making 
SOEs without self-viability becomes the most rational choice for the SOCBs. Without hardening 
soft budget constraints of SOEs, maintenance costs of initial sunk costs of SOEs will accumulate 
automatically unless soft budget constraints of SOEs had been hardened; this is the first meaning 
of endogenous nature of NPLs of the SOCBs. 
81B5.2.1 Dual Soft Budget Constraints and Formation of Initial Sunk Costs 
soft budget constraints of SOEs had once been very common in planned economy (Kornai, 1986). 
Policy burden is one of the most popular explanations for soft budget constraints of SOEs. In the 
case of China, in order to implement so-called catching-up strategy, government had replaced 
market mechanism with central planning mechanism and established numerous SOEs with no 
comparative advantage and self-viability. After transition to market economy, because policy 
burdens assumed by SOEs have not changed obviously, government has to continue soft budget 
constraints of SOEs (Lin Yifu, 1999; Lin Yifu, Cai Fang and Li Zhou, 1994; Hu Shading, 2001). A 
study made by Zheng Haihang (2001) shows that ever since transition began in 1978, soft budget 
constraints of SOEs in China have not changed fundamentally. 
Thus, soft budget constraints of SOEs have been blamed to be the basic reason for causing huge 
amount of initial sunk costs. Before transition, the MOF had once been the dominant supporter of 
soft budget constraints of SOEs. However, after the transition, the decentralization reform has led 
to decreasing percentage of fiscal revenue to GDP and a shift of roles played by banks and the 
MOF on economic life. Resultantly, the policy combination of strong fiscal authorities and weak 
banking sector in planed economy were replaced by that of poor fiscal authorities and strong 
banking sectorF92F (Zhou Li, 2003). Because fiscal authorities have no adequate resources to 
maintain its traditional role as supporter of soft budget constraints of SOEs (Roland, 1998), 
government has been intensifying its control over state-owned financial system instead and 
replaced the MOF with loans from the SOCBs (CCER, 1999; Zhou Li, 2003). In order to strengthen 
its control over the SOCBs, the central government not only decelerate financial liberalization pace, 
but also banking sector opening-up to domestic investors (Wang Guogang, 2003), which act as a 
systemic soft budget constraints of the SOCBs (Shi Huaqiang and Peng Xingyun, 2003). The time 
lag between commercialized reforms of the SOCBs began from 1995 and market-oriented reform 
                                                        
92 In fact, weak finance is a relative description. In MacKinnon opinion, there are two interpretations for China’s weak finance, one is the lack of 
effective tax supervision system and the other is the continuously high fiscal deficits. This paper’s judgments on weak finance is different from 
MacKinnon’s definition, focus on the changes of fiscal income’s position in national economy. 
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of SOEs began from 1978 facilitated the process of the SOCBs to replace the MOF, and the 
SOCBs finally became supporters of soft budget constraints of SOEs. Without self-viability and 
self-accumulation, SOEs have to depend on loans from the SOCBs and use loans from the 
SOCBs as state allocated capital or paid-in capital. Consequently, the institutional arrangement of 
dual soft budget constraints results in huge amounts of initial sunk costs of the SOCBs. 
160BTable 5-1 Central Fiscal Revenue and Loans of the SOCBs, 1953-2001 
Year 
Central Fiscal Revenue 
(RMB 100 million) 
Outstanding balance of loans 
of the SOCBs      
 (RMB 100 million) Year 
Central Fiscal Revenue
 (RMB 100 million) 
Outstanding balance of the 
SOCBs 
(RMB 100 million) 
1953 213.24 134.6 1978 1132.26 1850 
1954 245.17 184.6 1979 1146.38 2039.6 
1955 249.27 204.2 1980 1159.93 2414.3 
1956 280.19 233.9 1981 1175.79 2860.2 
1957 303.2 277.5 1982 1212.33 3180.6 
1958 379.62 477.7 1983 1366.95 3589.9 
1959 487.12 798.1 1984 1642.86 4766.1 
1960 572.29 969.2 1985 2004.82 5644.2687 
1961 356.06 803.5 1986 2122.01 7226.1381 
1962 313.55 682.1 1987 2199.35 8528.0042 
1963 342.25 568 1988 2357.24 9872.8644 
1964 399.54 578.9 1989 2664.9 11509.4856 
1965 473.32 647.4 1990 2937.1 14442.25 
1966 558.71 755.9 1991 3149.48 17154.67 
1967 419.36 796.6 1992 3483.37 20490.15 
1968 361.25 890.3 1993 4348.95 24965.79 
1969 526.76 945.5 1994 5218.1 26257.93 
1970 662.9 1033.4 1995 6242.2 30913.49 
1971 744.73 1113.9 1996 7407.99 36252.85 
1972 766.56 1145.6 1997 8651.14 44823.66 
1973 809.67 1269 1998 9875.95 53610.97 
1974 783.14 1353.5 1999 11444.08 57456.19 
1975 815.61 1462.7 2000 13395.23 58730.3308 
1976 776.58 1541.8 2001 16386.04 64663.1255 
1977 874.46 1663.3  1132.26 1850 
Source: Hu Shudong (2002). 
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214BFigure 5-1 Proportion of Short-term loans to GDP, 2003 
Source: Zhou Xiaochuan (2005). 
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Source: 
A: Calculated according to the income elasticity value (1986 -1991) under the circumstance that the annual GDP growth rate is 8% 
supposed by Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang. See Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang (1993), P46. 
B: China Statistical Yearbook (1993) (data of 1978-1992); China Statistical Yearbook (2001) (data of 1993-2000) 
C: China Statistical Yearbook (2001) 
215BFigure 5-2 Percentage of Central Fiscal Revenue to GDP, 1978-2000 
Source: Hu Shudong (2000). 
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        216BFigure 5-3 Financial Capacity of the Central Government in China, 1978-1997 
Source: Hu Shudong (2000). 
  
161BTable 5-2 Percentage of Central Fiscal Revenue to GNP, 1978-2000 
Year 
Income to GDP b (Excluding 
Percentage of Debt) 
Income to GDP b (Including 
Percentage of Debt) 
Percentage of Chinese Government Financial 
Revenue (Excluding Debt Incurred) to GDP c 
1978 31.2 31.2 4.9 
1979 26.7 27.6 5.7 
1980 23.3 24.3 6.3 
1981 21.3 22.8 6.4 
1982 20.0 21.6 6.5 
1983 20.1 21.5 8.2 
1984 20.5 21.6 9.2 
1985 20.8 21.8 8.6 
1986 21.9 23.3 7.6 
1987 19.5 21.0 6.2 
1988 16.8 18.7 5.2 
1989 16.7 18.4 4.9 
1990 16.3 18.4 5.3 
1991 15.9 18.2 4.3 
1992 14.7 17.5 3.7 
1993 13.1  2.8 
1994 12.6  6.2 
1995 11.2  5.7 
1996 10.7  5.5 
1997 10.9  5.8 
1998 11.6  6.4 
1999 12.6  7.3 
2000 13.9  7.9 
1995a 13.3 16.2 5.6 
2000a 11.3 14.3 4.9 
Source: 
A: Calculated according to the income elasticity value (1986 -1991) under the circumstance that the annual GDP growth rate is 
8% supposed by Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang. See Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang (1993), P46. 
b: China Statistical Yearbook (1993) (data of 1978-1992); China Statistical Yearbook (2001) (data of 1993-2000) 
c: China Statistical Yearbook (2001) 
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162BTable 5-3 Percentage of Loss to Profits of Independent State-owned Industrial Enterprises 
Year 
Loss       
(RMB 100 Million)
Profits 
(RMB 100 Million) Percentage of loss to profits 
The sum of the Sixth Five-Year Planning period  184.7 3262.7 5.6 
The sum in the Seventh Five-Year Planning period 726.4 3499.9 20.8 
1991 367 402.2 90.9 
1992 369.3 535.1 71.4 
1993 452.6 817.3 55.5 
1994 482.6 829 58.8 
1995 540.6 665.6 96.1 
The sum in the Eighth Five-Year Planning period 2212 3249 70.9 
1996 790.6 412.6 192 
1997 744 450.9 167 
Source: Hu shudong(2003). 
 
163BTable 5-4 Profits and Losses of SOEs, 1997-1999 
Year 
Number of 
enterprises     
(10 Thousand) 
Total profits 
 (RMB 100 Million) 
Earnings 
coverage (%) 
Profits of the Profits 
making enterprises     
(RMB 100 Million) 
Loss of the loss-making 
enterprises 
 (RMB 100 Million) 
1997 26.2 791.2 34.1     
1998 23.8 213.7 31.3 3280.2 -3066.5 
1999 21.7 1145.8 46.5 3290.7 -2144.9 
Note: The profits-making enterprises in 1999 include zero-profits enterprises when calculating the earnings coverage. 
Source; Prepared by author. 
 
164BTable 5-5 Ear-marked Loans of the SOCBs, 1991-1996 
Year 
Total amount of ear-marked loans 
(RMB 100 million) 
Total amount of loans of state-owned 
banks (RMB 100 million) Percentage of earmarked loans (%) 
1991 6781.7 18044.1 37.58 
1992 7410.9 21615.5 34.29 
1993 9322.6 29461.1 35.23 
1994 11485.2 32441.3 35.40 
1995 14159.7 39393.6 35.94 
1996 16440.1 47434.7 34.66 
Source: Prepared by author. 
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165BTable 5-6 Percentage of NPLs to Capital of SOEs, by Regions 
1997 1998 1999 
Region Number of enterprises 
Percentage of NPLs to 
capital Number of enterprises
Percentage of NPLs to 
capital Number of enterprises
Percentage of NPLs to 
capital 
Beijing 12903 9.7 7982 16 2692 21.4 
Tianjin 6183 20.8 5791 31.3 5509 42.5 
Hebei  9008 21.8 7340 40.5 9245 40 
Shanxi  7785 21.2 6640 30.7 6232 33.1 
Inner Mongolia  4976 30 3587 43.2 3042 41.5 
Liaoning  10337 31.8 7636 60.3 5660 61.5 
Jilin  7578 51.6 6083 137.8 5401 162.2 
Heilongjiang  10969 48.1 9313 143 8591 102.9 
Shanghai 17608 8.4 15339 13.8 14496 24.3 
Jiangsu  15913 19 13967 33.8 11215 40.7 
Zhejiang  10531 12.6 8872 19.1 7562 15.9 
Anhui  7004 23.7 6239 44.9 5840 61 
Fujian  8873 11.9 7829 18.6 6726 22.3 
Jiangxi  9710 38.9 8552 97.4 6094 128.8 
Shandong  13951 20.3 11537 37 10287 37.3 
Henan  10395 25.6 9208 52.8 8719 71.7 
Hubei  11381 29.7 9973 69.2 9039 69 
Hunan  9298 36.4 8484 75.1 7518 114 
Guangdong  17399 18 16501 29.4 14750 40.3 
Guangxi  6911 28.7 6641 44.1 7364 58.1 
Hainan  1749 61.3 1327 59.9 1623 45.4 
Chongqing 3274 43.1 2511 84.2 2569 99.5 
Sichuan  8942 25 7232 43.3 6848 44.9 
Guizhou  4952 29.8 4260 48.1 3762 54.4 
Yunnan  6886 9.8 5881 25.9 5204 29.6 
Xizang  525 17.4 571 25.9 582 20.6 
Shanxi  7027 37.9 5594 82.5 4888 80.4 
Gansu  4678 25.2 4139 56.5 4111 62.5 
Qinghai  1352 35.3 1254 125.5 1098 159 
Ningxia  1450 20.7 1237 61.4 989 71 
Xinjiang  4497 26.9 3125 61.6 3079 63.9 
Source: China statistics yearbook. 
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166BTable 5-7 Percentage of NPLs to paid-in Capital of SOEs, by Industry 
Unit: RMB 100 Million 
 Total assets Total liabilities Paid-in capital Liability/Asset ratio 
National total 145288.1 88884.2 53813.2 65.4 
Ⅰ AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY, 
STOCKBREEDING AND 
FISHERIES 
2831.3 2051.4 780 75.2 
Of which:  
Agriculture 1649.8 1240.7 409 77.1 
  Forestry 454.3 275.4 179 63.3 
Stockbreeding 144.4 141.7 2.7 107.9 
Fisheries 246.2 141.4 104.8 61.1 
ⅡINDUSTRIES 82361.2 51927 30434.3 65.7 
Of which:  
Coal Industry 4347.1 2784.7 1562.4 66.8 
  Oil Industry 5437.3 1879.1 3558.2 35.1 
Metallurgical Industry 10414.5 6647.6 3766.9 67.2 
Building Materials Industry 2978 2101.3 876.7 75.7 
Chemical Industry 7262 5015.9 2246.1 72.7 
Forest Industry 515.1 379.2 135.9 77.2 
Food Industry 2431.2 2042.6 388.7 89.8 
Tobacco Industry 1696.9 806.1 890.8 48.2 
Textile Industry 3165.1 2573 592.1 86.4 
Petrochemical Industry 4366.2 3002.2 1364.1 69.8 
Pharmaceutical Industry 1623.4 1011.9 611.5 63.9 
Mechanical Industry 12291.4 8577.9 3713.5 73.9 
War Industry 2553.5 1862.7 690.8 78.5 
Electronic Industry 2849.3 1980.1 869.2 70.8 
Power Industry 15021.3 8051.5 6969.8 54.4 
Ⅲ CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 6347.4 5114.9 1232.5 83.1 
Ⅳ  GEOLOGICAL PROSPECTING 
AND WATER CONSERVANCY 
INDUSTRY  
610.6 194.4 416.1 34.4 
Ⅴ  TRANSPORTAION AND 
WAREHOUSING INDUSTRY 
18374.9 11953.2 6421.7 67.2 
Of Which:  
Railroad Industry 
5843.5 1864 3979.5 32.4 
Road Industry 888 532.2 355.8 67.9 
Waterway Transportation 
Industry 1250.8 896.2 354.6 72.9 
Air Transportation Industry 1678.5 1426 252.5 85.1 
Warehousing Industry 4997.2 5446.4 -449.3 113.7 
Ⅵ  POST AND 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
INDUSTRY 
8967.2 4291.8 4675.4 48.3 
Ⅶ  WHOLESALE AND RETAIL 
SALE TRADE AND CATERING 
TRADE 
19470.1 15884.8 3585.2 85 
Of Which:  
Trade 18472.6 15104.1 3368.5 85.2 
Business Economy and Agent 701.6 579.9 121.7 83.1 
Catering Trade 296 200.8 95.1 74 
Ⅷ REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY 7695.6 6073.5 1622.2 79.5 
Ⅸ SOCIAL SERVICES 3665.2 2123.8 1541.3 61.1 
Source: China statistics yearbook. 
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In the process of forming initial sunk costs, two crucial institutional arrangements have been 
crucial for forming two types of sunk costs respectively. One is the fiscal-allocation-for-commercial 
banks’ loans policy. In transitional period, because SOEs lack self-viability, therefore, most SOEs 
have nearly no self-accumulation, thus policy-related losses could not be compensated by SOEs 
themselves. In 1983 and 1985, government had initiated two separate steps in turn to replace 
fiscal allocation of liquid funds and fixed assets to SOEs by loans from the SOCBs. Accordingly, 
loans from the SOCBs replaced fiscal investment, and thus responsibility of providing funds to 
SOEs, and the SOCBs have become financial supporter of soft budget constraints of SOEs. 
Consequently, a large percentage of loans from the SOCBs have been regarded as paid-in capital 
by enterprises (Zhang Jie, 1998). 
The other institutional arrangement is the time lag between reform of the SOCBs and that of SOEs, 
which facilitates policy-related sunk costs. During economic transition, SOEs with no self-viability 
have to use loans from the SOCBs as paid-in capital. Because of soft budget constraints of SOEs, 
SOEs’ thirstiness for banking loans did not change (Kornai, 1992), and SOEs continue to neglect 
loans costs and use loans inefficiently (Watanabe, 1999; Zhou Xiaochuan, 2004). Meanwhile, 
government’s role as main investor in economic development has not been changed; therefore, 
loans from the SOCBs have become a main tool of government’s macro-adjustment and an 
important complimentary source for shortage of fiscal funds at the same time (Roland, 1998). In 
order to satisfy its own need, government tends to interference management of the SOCBs in form 
of earmarked loans or other policy loans types. According to a survey, since 1990s, earmarked 
loans (policy loans) have accounted for more than 35% of total loans issued by the SOCBs (PBOC, 
1998). Before market-oriented reform began in 1978, there existed no debtor-creditor relationship 
between SOEs and the state specialized banks (Fan Gang and Zhang Shuguang etc., 1993). 
However, after market-oriented reform began, the SOCBs inevitably accumulated policy-related 
sunk costs. Since the middle 1990s when the commercial banks reform and SOEs reform have 
been pushing forward, two types of sunk costs have steadily formed, and ratio of NPLs of the 
SOCBs has increased from 20% in 1995 to about 40% in 1999 (see figure 1). 
82B5.2.2 The Sunk Costs Model 
The Dewatripont and Maskin model (1995) can be adapted to describe mechanism of 
self-accumulation characteristic of sunk costs. Because large amount of sunk costs, commercial 
banks choose to implement soft budget constraints of SOEs and issue new loans to poor 
enterprises rather than implement liquidation. Thus, implementation of soft budget constraints 
rather than liquidation becomes the best choice for commercial banks. The model based on the 
hypothesis that commercial banks pursue maximum profits, and has both incentive and capacity to 
liquidate loss-making enterprises. Enterprises are divided into two types: good enterprises with 
self-viability, and poor enterprises with no self-viability. Due to asymmetric information, banks 
could not distinguish good enterprise from poor enterprises until first-term loan matured. For 
analysis convenience, amount of loans and loan terms of all enterprises are standardized as 1. 
Therefore, when first period loans matured, gross monetary returns of a good enterprise is gI (>0) 
and a private benefits for manager(s) of a good enterprise is Sg (>0), while a poor enterprise yields 
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a zero monetary return, and private benefits for manager(s) of the enterprise would also be zero. 
In such cases, commercial bank could either liquidate the poor enterprise, obtain a liquidation 
value L. In such cases, private benefits for enterprise will be negative, to wit, bS (<0), representing 
a negative utility for manager, or commercial banks can alternatively issue new loans, so make a 
gross returns rI  (>0), and manager of related enterprises will get a positive benefits rS  (>0) at 
the end of period 2. 
Let N stands for number of enterprises, which will decide to submit loans application to banks or 
not. Enterprises are divided into two types: good enterprises with a probability α and poor 
enterprises with a probability of 1-α. despite quality of enterprises, amounts of loans to all projects 
and credit periods of all loans will be standardized to 1. When the first-period loans matured, a 
good enterprise yields a verifiable gross monetary returns gI (>0) and a private benefits for the 
manager of the enterprise is gS (>0), while a poor enterprise yields a zero monetary return. Then, 
commercial bank can either liquidate the enterprise, obtain a liquidation value L, and manager of 
enterprise gets a net private benefits bS (<0), representing the negative utility for the manager, or 
could issue new loans, then gross returns will be rI (>0) and private benefits of manager of 
enterprise will be rS (>0) at the end of period two. 
5.2.2.1 Hypotheses  
(I) before issuing loans in the first period, Bank does not know quality of enterprises. 
(ii) Initial amount of loans to all projects are standardized to one unit of currency. 
(iii) Term of all loans are standardized to one unit of time. 
(iv) No consideration of time discounting. 
(v) Take the maximum gross monetary returns and private benefits of manager of enterprises into 
consideration. 
5.2.2.2 The Model  
Let bS represents gross returns after bank extend new loans to enterprises at the end of period 2, 
and bS < 0; let rS represents private benefits for manager of enterprise after bank extend new 
loans to enterprises at the end of period 2, and rS > 0. Because rS > 0 and bS < 0, then if poor 
enterprise know in advance that it would get new loans, it will submit new loans application; but if 
loss-making enterprise is liquidated by commercial bank, then there will not be no period 2. 
Suppose that rI stands for bank’s gross returns after it extends new loans to enterprises at the 
end of period two, L represents liquidation value when bank liquidates poor enterprise. So long as 
1r r bl S L S+ − > + , bank will extend new loans to poor project; In case 2r rl S+ < , then 
extension of new loans will be inefficient, because poor project gets negative returns, so as to 
reduce ex post expected returns on loans. 
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Therefore, let α stands for probability of good enterprises to all enterprises, gI  be verifiable gross 
monetary returns of good enterprise when loan matured, and gS  be manager’s private benefits 
of good enterprise when loan matured ( gS > 0), so long as expected net returns is positive, project 
will get initial loans: 
( ) ( )( )1 1 2 0q q r rI S I Sα α+ − + − + − >                  (1) 
Hence:  ( )1 2 2q q r r r rl S I S I Sα + − − − + > − −  
( )1 2q q r r r rI S I S I Sα + − − + > − −  
So we can obtain: 
( )
2
1
s r r
q q r r
I S
I S I S
α α − −> > + − − +                          (2) 
The smaller α is, the bigger loss of efficiency incurred by soft budget constraints will be, and when 
α is below threshold value, then enterprise will not get loans. If 1bL S+ <  and sα α>  happen 
simultaneously, poor project will be submitted and bank will finance all projects. When loans 
matured, bank will extend new loans to poor projects, i.e. bank will implement soft budget 
constraints of enterprise, and thus become supporter of soft budget constraints of enterprises. 
In reality, commercial bank usually considers only its own profits, and will not internalize private 
benefits of enterprise manager; therefore, the condition to implement soft budget constraints of 
enterprises by bank will be stricter: 
1rI L− >                                            (3) 
If 2rI < , bank will receive only a proportion of overall initial investment, in order to get initial loans, 
expected net returns must be positive. At this moment, expected net benefits of loan will be: 
( ) ( )( )1 1 2q rI Iα α− + + −         (4) 
(4) Must satisfy: 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 0q rI Iα α− + + − >        (5) 
Hence: 
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2
1
ss r
g r
I
I I
α α −> = − +                                   (6) 
Similarly, if 1L <  and sα α> satisfy simultaneously, bank will provide initial loans for all projects 
and when loans matured, bank has to extend new loans to poor projects, i.e. typical soft budget 
constraints of enterprise happen. At this moment, maintenance costs of initial sunk costs will 
increase continuously, so will NPLs of a bank. 
Because bank could not guarantee not to extend new loans to poor enterprises, therefore this 
incredibility, consequently encourage poor enterprises to submit loan application and get new 
loans. In this case, extension of new loans to loss-making enterprise from an ex ante point of view 
becomes an ex post best choice for commercial banks. It might have been better if banks to 
liquidate poor enterprises, for this promise will have a credible deterring effect for poor enterprises 
in the future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
217BFigure 5-4 Timing and Probability of Decision-making of sunk costs model 
Source: Roland (1999). 
5.2.2.3 Initial Sunk Costs, Maintenance Costs and NPLs of the SOCBs 
 Sunk costs are not unique for China. Even though commercial banks strive to maximize profits in 
market economy, they still have to issue new loans to salvage sunk costs, (Dewatripont, M. and E. 
Maskin, 1995). However, peculiarities of sunk costs in China are as follows. First, sunk costs of 
SOEs are result of systemic institutional arrangement, to wit, the special relationship between 
SOEs and SOCBs, and not made by independent risks evaluation by the SOCBs. Second, huge 
amount of sunk costs have existed for a long period. Therefore, not only stock initial sunk costs 
(first period costs in the model) are huge, but also maintenance costs of initial sunk costs are 
-1 
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-1 
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1-α 
Liquidation
Re-lending 
（Rp, Bp） 
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relatively enormous and keep accumulating. 
Furthermore, soft budget constraints of SOEs encourage SOEs to borrow from the SOCBs as 
much as possible. This phenomenon has not changed significantly (Kornai, 1986). For SOEs, as 
long as soft budget constraints of SOEs are credible, loans from the SOCBs can be seen as 
paid-in capital of SOEs; therefore, SOEs are thirsty to rent-seek loans from the SOCBs. As pointed 
out earlier, because many SOEs lack self-viability, therefore quality of loans to SOEs cannot be 
fundamentally improved. The more loans SOEs obtained, the more sunk costs and maintenance 
costs will incur, and the greater potential NPLs of the SOCBs will beF93 F. Under institutional 
arrangement of the dual soft budget constraints, local governments also have their own stakes; 
therefore, sunk costs also intensify local governments’ incentive to rent-seek the SOCBs (see 
analysis of 5.4). Even though the SOCBs also pursue maximum profits, the behavior of 
rent-seeking the respective vested interests makes the maintenance costs of sunk costs, i.e. the 
flow of sunk costs endogenously derived from the institutional arrangement of dual soft budget 
constraints , which is the first aspect of the endogenous nature of NPLs of the SOCBs. 
It is worthy to point out that nominal NPLs of the SOCBs do not equal the plus of sunk costs and 
maintenance costs of SOEs. As long as soft budget constraints of SOEs continue to exist, at least 
a proportion of sunk costs of SOEs those should have been forced to go bankruptcy long time ago 
would not be transformed into nominal real NPLsF94F. Therefore, this part of NPLs can be regarded 
as technical NPLs. When SOEs are still in operation, maintenance costs of sunk costs will incur 
new sunk costs; and when SOEs go bankrupt, sunk costs and maintenance costs will be 
converted into real NPLs. In addition, in case of reconstruction, it is quite possible that much sunk 
costs will be transformed into real NPLs due to pervasive practice of SOEs’ evasion of banking 
loans. Generally speaking, the following relationship exists: NPLs on books<the sum of initial sunk 
costs plus maintenance costs< gross liabilities of loss-making enterprises. Due to historic reasons 
and oligopoly structure of banking industry of China (Xie Ping and Jiao Jinpu, 2003), the SOCBs 
bear the absolute majority of NPLs of SOEs. It was shown by a study (PBC, 2003) that 80% of 
NPLs of the SOCBs was brought about by external factors, among which by poor management 
accounted for nearly 60%, policy factor 10%, and various industry restructure 10%. If the figures 
are reliable, it is estimated that sunk costs account for a large part of NPLs of the SOCBs. In fact, 
NPLs of RMB 1400 billion written off from the SOCBs in 1999 were only part of the total sunk 
costsF95F of the SOCBs. This analysis shows that potential NPLs of the SOCBs in China are far 
worse than nominal figures. With the deepening of SOEs reform and improvement of bankruptcy 
mechanism, the amount of NPLs of the SOCBs is likely to bounce back to the record high level. 
As a crucial concept, sunk costs can explain why the ratio of NPLs of the SOCBs are much higher 
than those of foreign banks with the same scale, and also the primary reason for difference 
                                                        
93 This is a primary reason of government’s worry about the high growth rate of NPLs in 2003, the period when economy developed at a high 
speed. Another related reason is the concern about the impulse of the SOCBs to reduce the NPLs ratio throng issuing new loans. 
94 Nominal NPLs and real NPLs are different. For example, degree of elasticity of the risk-based loan classification will greatly affect nominal  
NPLs.  
95 The NPLs write-off are those issued before 1995 and accumulated before the end of 1998. If we assume that the loss ratio of NPLs is 25%, it 
can be calculated that as of the end of 1998, SOCBs have more than RMB 2400 billion sunk costs. Based on this calculation, the rippling-off of 
RMB 1400 billion is only a fraction of the whole stock sunk costs. 
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between the ratio of NPLs of the SOCBs and those of domestic joint-equity commercial banks. 
The sunk costs can also explain the objective reason that the SOCBs continue to issue new loans 
to regions with high NPLs ratio or continue to add loans to industries with high ratio of NPLs. By 
using the concept of sunk costs, we can also conclude that ratios of NPLs in different regions will 
vary greatly due to different levels of sunk costs. Meanwhile, the endogenous nature of sunk costs 
also indicates that sunk costs resolution and reform of the SOCBs are largely resulted from reform 
of SOEs. The NPLs of the SOCBs cannot be reduced just by strengthening official banking 
supervision, helping the SOCBs to go public, and increasing internal control of the SOCBs. 
36B5.3 DUAL SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS AND ENDOGENOUS NATURE OF 
NON-PERFORMING LOANS OF THE STATE-OWNED COMMERCIAL BANKS II: 
GAMBLING FOR RESURRECTION BY COMMERCIAL BANKS  
The sunk costs explain the objective reason that the SOCBs continue to issue new loans to SOEs 
without self-viability and serve as supporters of soft budget constraints of SOEs. In the analysis of 
the endogenous nature of sunk costs, it is assumed that commercial banks pursue maximum 
profits. However, as soft budget constraints are a negative incentive mechanism, it is unrealistic to 
neglect SOCBs’ reaction to sunk costs. In case of soft budget constraints of the SOCBs, 
commercial banks are inclined to speculate for resurrection (Mitchell, J., 1997), i.e. owing to the 
stable expectation that government will make ex post intervention and rescue insolvent 
commercial banks or SOEs. When commercial banks are facing the choices of whether to 
liquidate or refinance loss-making enterprises or not, they will choose to implement soft budget 
constraints, to wit, either to issue new loans to the loss-making enterprises or to encourage them 
to repay old loans by borrowing new ones rather than to be liquidated. In such cases, the reason 
that the SOCBs choose to be supporters of soft budget constraints of SOEs is not only comparison 
between maintenance costs of sunk costs and bankruptcy returns but rational expectation of the 
dual soft budget constraints. This chapter will analyze the incentive of dual soft budget constraints 
for the tendency of gambling for resurrection of commercial banks, which is the second aspect of 
the so-called endogenous nature of NPLs of the SOCBs. 
83B5.3.1 Gambling for Resurrection by Commercial Banks 
The negativity model of Mitchell (1997) describes the gambling for resurrection phenomenon of 
commercial banksF96F. Based on that model, the paper does not consider the game between 
government and banks, but takes the expectation of commercial banks’ dual soft budget 
constraints into account. Suppose there are n projects in period 1 and they are classified into two 
types: good or poor. Suppose the set-up funding costs and credit period of all the projects are the 
same. When loans mature, poor projects will not produce any gross returns. In such cases, banks 
can liquidate them to get a liquidation value L, or to issue new loans to them. Refinancing may 
bring positive gross returns for banks or a new liquidation value ( )r rL L L< , i.e. refinancing could 
not ensure a positive gross returns at the end of period 2, on the contrary, liquidation value might 
                                                        
96 Owing to the limitation of space, see detailed analysis in Mitchell (1997). 
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be lower. At the beginning of the period 2, soft budget constraints of SOEs make banks be short of 
both capacity and means to liquidate loss-making enterprises and be passive. To wit to say, banks’ 
refinancing of the loss-making enterprises accords with their maximum utility. Bank managers will 
take no responsibility for failure of gambling for resurrection, yet might gain short-term returns 
such as quick personal promotion or other implicit personal utilities. 
Commercial banks’ standard of refinancing loss-making enterprises is no longer completely 
judged by possible benefits from refinancing or liquidation. Dual soft budget constraints will 
externalize gambling costs of commercial banks, i.e. SOCBs need not to pay for gambling for 
resurrection failures while can benefits from success of gambling for resurrections. Resultantly, the 
SOCBs’ stable expectation for soft budget constraints encourages gambling for resurrection of 
commercial banks. It is definitely the case when commercial banks pursue to maximize their own 
utility, rather than maximum profitsF97F. 
84B5.3.2 Model of Gambling for Resurrection  
5.3.2.1 Description   
Initially, n is the number of enterprises, and these enterprises build projects and decide whether to 
submit them to banks for funding. The enterprises are of two types: good (with probability α) and 
poor. No matter the quality of the enterprises, the set-up funding costs of all projects are the same, 
so are the credit periods of the loans. When the loan gets mature, a good enterprise will yield a 
verifiable gross monetary returns gI (>0) and a private benefit gS  (>0) for the manager of the 
enterprise, while a poor enterprise will yield a zero monetary returns unless the manager makes 
optimal efforts. In case that the manager indeed makes sufficient efforts, poor enterprise will also 
get the same verifiable gross monetary returns gI (>0) and manger’s private benefit gS (>0) as 
the good one, eliminating the effort costs. If the manager does not make efforts, there will be no 
gross returns in the poor enterprise. At this time, bank could liquidate the enterprise’s assets, in 
which case it obtains a liquidation value L and the enterprise gets a zero private benefit; or the 
bank may also choose to refinance the enterprise by injecting additional capital. In the case of 
refinancing, the probability of positive gross returns rI is p, or in contrast, a new liquidation value 
rL comes out. However, in both cases, manager may get private benefit rS (>0). Different from 
the model of soft budget constraints, without the guarantee of positive gross returns at the end of 
period 2, refinancing may result in the decline of liquidation value. 
                                                        
97 The maximum utility of the SOCBs and the maximum profit of commercial banks are two different concepts. The examples that commercial 
banks pursue the interests of their own at the expense of maximum profit can be found everywhere. For example, SOCBs keep their own economic 
entities; managers seek consumption at their posts and so on. On one hand, as the operator, the president of commercial bank is confined to the 
incentive of money, i.e. the president struggle for the personal maximum monetary income; on the other hand, the president is also restricted by the 
incentive of administrative rank, to wit to say, the president seeks the personal maximum political utility. Under the circumstances of dual incentives, 
when the explicit income of president increases by a big margin, the pressure of unofficial institution will be confronted with, such as the income of 
managers of SOEs and officers in the same rank. Under this pressure, instead of seeking explicit income, the president of state-owned bank will 
purse the material consumption or use public fund, which is exposed to the public such as houses, cars and offices. 
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5.3.2.2 Hypotheses  
(I) Bank does not learn the type of enterprises beforehand. 
(ii) The set-up funding costs (equal to the initial loan and initial investment) of all projects are one 
unit of currency. 
(iii) The natural credit periods of all enterprises could be standardized as one unit of time. 
(iv) No time discounting. 
(v) Take the maximum sum of gross monetary returns and private benefit into consideration. 
(vi) Provided that 0r gS S> > , if the expectation of the poor enterprise is liquidation, manager will 
make efforts, and if the expectation is refinancing, manager will not make efforts. 
Where: 
gS = manager’s private benefit of the good enterprise when loan matures; or manager’s private 
benefit of the poor enterprise when the manager indeed makes optimal level efforts; ( gS  > 0) 
rS =manager’s private benefit after bank’s refinancing to enterprises at the end of period 2 ( rS > 0) 
(Vii) provided that C (D) is the convex function of D 
Where 
C (D) = costs of the government’s inspection on whether the bank keeps the negative attitude or 
not in a probability of D 
D = probability of government’s inspection on whether the bank keeps the negative attitude or not 
(viii) Government’s inspection happens after the bank’s decision on whether refinance or not. 
(ix) Bank’s net returns on loans I can be negative. 
Where 
I =bank’s net returns on loans 
5.3.2.3 The Model 
Now, it is necessary to consider the game between government and banks. The Government may 
decide to supervise banks, to investigate if the banks, as creditors, are applying actively for 
bankruptcy, which is to investigate if the banks want to liquidate poor enterprises or try to keep 
negative attitude. The reason that banks keep negative attitude is that banks get the benefit from 
the improvement of liquidation, but do not suffer from its decline. To wit to say, banks may choose 
to speculate for resurrection. The probability D and costs C (D) of government’s inspection should 
be decided beforehand. Having investigated the banks decision of whether to refinance or not, 
government can fire chairperson if evidence manifests the negative perfunctory behavior of banks. 
Initially, government decides the probability D and the costs C (D). The bank issues loans to 
project and the enterprise of poor project decides the effort level. After a period of time, when loan 
matures, the bank decides to liquidate the enterprise at a probability of q, where q is the probability 
of the bank’s decision on whether to refinance the poor project or not. Then government 
supervises banks and dismisses the passive chairperson. After two units of time, the government 
injects K capital, which will be decided endogenously to reorganize the asset structure of the bank. 
Where K is the costs of government’s reorganizing asset structure of bank. Owing to the 
endowment insurance, the negative net value of the bank has to be compensated by the 
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government. The government confronts the choices of inspection costs and ex post reorganizing 
costs. 
The optimization of Government’s utilization will be: 
( )Min C D K+  
. . 1 0s t K + ≥                         (7) 
Bank’s returns will be max {0, I} +ρ, and when I<0, bank’s loss will be compensated. 
Where 
ρ =private benefits of manager of bank 
Hence, K＝max{0, -I }. If the loss of dismissal of bank’s chairperson is ρ, however, the removal of 
the chairperson could not necessarily improve the financial conditions of the bank. Based on the 
ninth hypothesis, it has been too late to withdraw the refinancing when negativity has been 
discovered 
It is obvious that the necessary and sufficient condition of soft budget constraints of enterprise is: 
( )1 r gq S S− ≥                      (8) 
Provided that r gS S>  hard budget constraints of enterprise will stand only under sufficient active 
condition. However, behavior of the bank affects its financial conditions. When implemented hard 
budget constraint of enterprise, bank’s utility will be: 
1 gI ρ− + +                                          (9) 
Where 
gI  = verifiable gross monetary returns of good enterprise when loan matured, or verifiable gross 
monetary returns of poor enterprises eliminating effort costs when its manager indeed makes 
optimal efforts. 
If enterprise makes efforts, bank’s utility will be: 
( ){ }( )max 1 1 ,0gq I Lα α ρ⎡ ⎤− + + − + +⎣ ⎦  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1 1 1 1 1g rD p I Iα α α ρ⎡ ⎤+ + + − − − +⎣ ⎦               (10) 
Where 
α = percentage of the good enterprises in all enterprises 
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rI = bank’s gross returns after issued new loans to enterprises at the end of period 2 
P= probability of bank’s gross returns after issued new loans to enterprises at the end of period 2 
If rI  stands for the returns brought by issuance of new loans, then net returns of the banks will 
be: 
( ) ( )1 1 1g rI Iα α+ − − −                               (11) 
In another case, having realized that money will never be paid back, banks are not so fortunate. 
The net returns of negative banks now will be: 
( )( )1 1 1g rI Lα α+ − − −                                (12) 
Where 
rL = liquidation value when bank liquidates the enterprise’s assets after issued new loans to 
enterprises by the end of period two ( )rL L< . 
L= liquidation value if bank liquidate enterprise when loans matured. 
Provided that α is not too high and rL  is low enough, there may be in a negative cash position. 
When there has soft budget constraints of enterprise, government’s returns will be: 
( ) ( ){ }max 0,1 1gC D g I Lα α− − − − −  
( ) ( ) ( ){ }1 max 0, 1 1 1g rq p I Lα α⎡ ⎤− − − − − −⎣ ⎦             (13) 
Asset reorganizing value depends directly on q rather than D, but q itself depends on D. 
If there had hard budget constraints of enterprise, then government’s returns will be -C (DH). 
Provided: 
( )( )1 1 1 0g rI Lα α+ − − − >                           (14) 
Therefore, bank’s net returns will be negative in case of passivity. In this case, it is must reorganize 
the bank. 
To simplify the model, it is also assumed that: 
( )1 1 0gI Lα α− − − <                                 (15) 
To wit, when bank behaves actively; there is no need to reorganize the bank’s assets. 
A more important hypothesis is: 
1rL L− <                                            (16) 
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Hence government’s utility increases along with the degree of active behaviors of bank. 
In case D≥0, bank is willing to choose q =1 provided that: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1 1 1 1 1 1g g rI L D p I I pα α ρ α α⎡ ⎤− + + − + > − − − − − +⎣ ⎦  
To wit: 
ραα
αα
+−−−+
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DD         (17) 
In case there exist endowment insurance and punishment such as being fired, which will be 
carried out when negative behaviors are discovered,  then bank’s decision is mainly based on 
expected returns of gambling for resurrection. 
When DD
~< , bank will choose q =0. The government’s best choice in this range is D=0. Once 
DD ~=  is satisfied, bank will choose q=1. Government will never get any benefit from the 
choice DD
~< . The government has dual choices: either choose payment costs C( D~ ), which will 
lead to hard budget constraints and no capital reorganizing, or not to supervise and control banks, 
implement soft budget constraints of enterprise and correspondent ex post assets restructure. 
If: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 1 1g rC D p I Lα α⎡ ⎤< − − + + − −⎣ ⎦%            (18) 
There must be hard budget constraints; otherwise, soft budget constraints exist. 
[ ] 0]1)1)(1([~ 2 <+−−−+−= −ρααρ rg IIpdDd           (19) 
Therefore, the higher manager’s private benefits are the lower needed capturing probability of 
preventing manager’s gambling for resurrection is. This is a result of the threat of being fired. 
Besides: 
0
~
<αd
Dd
                                           (20) 
Therefore, the more losses a bank suffers from good loans, the lower expected net returns of 
refinancing poor enterprises is in case of restructuring assets. 
Essentially, gambling for resurrection is typical opportunism. Although both sunk costs and 
gambling for resurrection are finally expressed by issuing new loans to loss-making enterprises, 
the standards used by commercial banks to evaluate future benefits and costs are different. 
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Simply speaking, if evaluation standard is rI >2, then banks issue new loans to loss-making 
enterprises due to maintenance costs of sunk costs; if a bank has already known 2rI < but still 
issue new loans to loss-making enterprises, then the bank hopes to gamble for resurrection. In the 
latter case, banks are usually typical risk-lovers. 
However, capability of a commercial bank to gambling for resurrection also has a ceiling. 
Therefore, bank has to prioritize orders to refinance loss-making enterprises in period 1. 
Suppose jw represents weight of factor j, j=1, 2, 3…n. 1jw =∑ ; i jv represents the evaluation 
value of i enterprise of factor j, i=1…n; j=1, 2, 3…n; Hence, comprehensive evaluation value vi of i 
enterprise is: 
i j i jv w v=∑  
soft budget constraints of the SOCBs determine that the maximization of commercial banks’ own 
utility endogenously derive from government’s preference, therefore, standards of refinancing 
commercial banks depends on government’s evaluation standard and requirements. 
85B .3.3 Gambling for Resurrection, Impulse to Issue More Loans, and Accumulation of NPLs 
According to evaluation standard to issue new loans or to roll credits period, maintenance costs of 
sunk costs and gambling for resurrection can be theoretically distinguished. The maintenance 
costs of sunk costs are based on objective condition: P≥0.5; and the latter one is a speculation, 
P≤0.5. However, except for specific conditions, it is difficult to distinguish the two in most cases 
due to asymmetric information. Even commercial banks themselves could not distinguish 
sometimes. However, it is quite necessary to distinguish in theory to take effective measures. 
Of course, like sunk costs, gambling for resurrection is not unique to China, too. However, in 
mature market economy, gambling for resurrection by commercial banks is constrained not only 
by their capital but also by many macroeconomic institutional arrangementsF98F. While in China, soft 
budget constraints of commercial banks spur the SOCBs to speculate without any constraints. 
First, with expectation for dual soft budget constraints, commercial banks prefer high risks 
insensitively, resulting in excessive risks taking or over-competition (Shi Huaqiang and Peng 
Xingyun, 2003). With the expectation of dual soft budget constraints, the SOCBs tend to gamble 
for resurrection or take excessive risks, which will be finally exemplified by strong impulse to issue 
                                                        
98 These constraint mechanisms include mechanism that decentralized structure of bank confines the Gambling on resurrection of commercial 
banks through increasing the ex post inefficiency (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995; Huang Haizhou and Xu Chenggang, 1998), the mechanism that 
the complete competition among private departments leads to the result that the expected benefit of transferring new loans to enterprises with 
advantages is bigger than the maintenance benefit of sunk costs (Berglof and Roland, 1997). 
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more loansF99 F by issuing new loans to loss-making enterprises, issuing evergreen loans, or 
allowing enterprises to pay old loans by borrowing new loans due to the following reasons. First, 
the SOCBs can enjoy huge interests spreads provided by the central bank as supporters of soft 
budget constraints of the SOEs (Shi Huaqiang and Peng Xingyun, 2003). Second, current benefits 
of the SOCBs will increase by issuing more loans. Thirdly, nominal ratio of NPLs of the SOCBs will 
be lowered by issuing new loans, to meet regulatory requirements. If commercial banks, as special 
business of managing risks, are strongly motivated to take risks or gambling for resurrection, then 
it is inevitable that ratios of NPLs of the SOCBs will grow. 
Second, the dual soft budget constraints strengthen SOCBs’ impulse to gamble for resurrection on 
SOEs. The SOCBs rent-seek soft budget constraints of SOE ex post. In such cases, the 
assumption will be different, even although results are the same as those of sunk costs. In case of 
sunk costs, commercial banks are pursuing maximum profits; while in case of gambling for 
resurrection, commercial banks are pursing maximum utility instead of maximum profits. Therefore, 
commercial banks’ role as supporters of soft budget constraints of SOEs has been consolidated. 
Third, loans by the SOCBs bear three prominent characteristics due to their gambling for 
resurrection and risk preference. Firstly, loans issued to SOEs, especially to the loss making ones 
are more than necessary maintenance costs of initial sunk costs. Secondly, as a special form of 
soft budget constraints, the principle of too big to fail endogenously determines that commercial 
banks have impulses to seek more savings and issue more loans without considering costsF100F. In 
the model of sunk costs, the SOCBs do not have alternatives but have to be captured by issuing 
new loans to loss-making enterprises. However, in the model of gambling for resurrection, the 
SOCBs do that just because of opportunism. Thirdly, the dual soft budget constraints  determines 
that when the SOCBs issue new loans to loss-making enterprises, they have the same preference 
as the government, so the SOCBs prefer to issue loans to big enterprises, to issue long-term loans 
and to issue loans to monopolized business. Besides, when the SOCBs issue loans, they make 
decisions based on speculation for soft budget constraints of SOEs rather than evaluation of risks 
and returns of issuing loans to the enterprise. All these features result in excessively appalling 
NPLs of the SOCBs, which exceeded permission of risk-control technology and management 
level. 
The formation and enhancement of gambling for resurrection reveal the dynamic mechanism in 
which the dual roles of the SOCBs are mutually intensified, thus worsening NPLs of the SOCBsF101F. 
In addition, the model of gambling for resurrection reveals a subjective reason why amounts of 
                                                        
99 For example, although the regulatory authorities took measures over and over again, the growth rate of loans of commercial banks in 2003 and 
2004 were all lingering at a high level. 
100 The impulse of commercial banks to expand the size of the cake is related to the current incentive system of loan managers, such as, the profit 
will be calculated into the current income statements, the hysteretic of NPLs and the inevitable relations between NPLs ratio and current income, 
etc. 
101 The dual soft budget constraints  may also result in the negative characteristic of commercial banks towards risks (Michael, 1997). The 
negativity refers to the behaviors of commercial banks without making use of their advantages and taking positive measures, but acting as safely as 
they can. For instance, along with the strengthening of banking supervision, the SOCBs have not improved their own discretion towards risks, but 
merely taken safe measures such as issuing loans reluctantly, which can be called negative gambling, to distinguish from positive gambling. As 
space is limited, the paper just analyzes the positive gambling. 
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loans issued to non-state economy is not proportionate with their importance in national economy. 
37B5.4 DUAL SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS AND ENDOGENOUS NATURE OF 
NON-PERFORMING LOANS OF THE STATE-OWNED COMMERCIAL BANKS III: 
TRAGEDY OF COMMON LAND FOR THE STATE-OWNED COMMERCIAL BANKS  
In the above analysis of sunk costs and gambling for resurrection, it is explicitly assumed that the 
central government and local governments share the same utility functionF102F. However, in reality, 
decentralization of fiscal resources and centralization of banking industry after the economic 
transition result in incompatible incentives and asymmetric responsibility between the central 
government and local governments, with local governments have strong impulse to unduly use 
financial resources controlled by the SOCBs. The decentralization reform, on one hand, endows 
local governments with the responsibility of economic development and acting as nominal 
supporters of SOEs; on the other hand makes the SOCBs become real supporter of soft budget 
constraints of SOEs. Meanwhile, financial centralization reform makes the SOCBs become typical 
public land for local governments. The fact that branches of the SOCBs are established and 
managed as governmental agency encourages local governments to free ride and grab for loans 
of the SOCBs. That increases control costs of central government to implement soft budget 
constraints of the SOCBs, further accumulates risks of the SOCBs, forces central government to 
further centralize banking sector, and plunges into following vicious circle: soft budget constraints 
of the SOCBs----free-riding by local governments or gambling for resurrection by the 
SOCBs----evasion of loans of the SOCBs----further unduly usage of the SOCBs by local 
governments----accumulation of NPLs in the SOCBs----further centralization of financial resources 
and soft budget constraints of the SOCBs----further accumulation of NPLs. This analysis is the 
third aspect of endogenous nature of NPLs of the SOCBs in this chapter. 
86B5.4.1 Fiscal decentralizationF103F，Banking Centralization,F104F and Intensification of the Dual 
Soft budget constraints  
The essence of fiscal decentralization is a process in which role of the central government is 
replaced by local governments (Zhang Jie, 1998). Decentralization endows local governments 
with more economic responsibilities, and accordingly, differentiates utility function of the central 
government from that of local governments. Local governments are not only providers of local 
                                                        
102 In the neoclassical economy, government is conceptualized as a neutral arbitrator who has the capacity of interfering the market process so as 
to rectify various kinds of market failures. However, it is indicated in the research of new institutional economics that government has its own 
interests and every governmental institution may have its goal which reflects the respective interest, and the game in the course of political and 
economical struggle reflects the complex mutual relations between the conflicting public-owned interests and between the privately owned interests. 
Both soft budget constraints and rent-seeking economics are analytical frameworks of the studies in this process. As pointed out by Aoki Masahiko 
(1997) that it was very meaningful to understand the Eastern Asian economy to clearly indicate the interest factors of government and analyze the 
influences of these factors on the relations between government and non-government departments. 
103 Professor Qian Yingyi (1998) used fiscal federalism to refer to the phenomenon. 
104 In fact, as pointed out by Wu Xiaoling, the vice president of the PBOC, focusing the economic structure reform of decentralization and interest 
concessions, the financial structural reform in China also get started from the separation of the profit between government and SOEs (Wu Xiaoling, 
1998). However, since the year 1993, there have existed a centralization tendency in the field of macroeconomic financing adjustment, which 
becomes more and more obvious. 
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public goods, but also active economic managers responsible for improving investment 
environment, attracting investment and actively involving in operation of enterprises within  
judiciary. Besides, due to time lag of economic adjustment and SOEs reform, the M-style industrial 
structure among provinces formed in planed economy has not been changedF105F. Because SOEs 
are a main channel for local employment and other social responsibilities, local governments have 
strong incentives to implement soft budget constraints of SOEs (Lin Yifu, 1999, 2003; Hu Shudong, 
2001). Furthermore, other institutional arrangements, such as peer competition among local 
governments and performance evaluation standards used by central government evaluate local 
governments focus too much on local economic development, all these also encourages local 
protectionism. 
Contrary to fiscal decentralization, the central government has been centralizing banking industry. 
The central government formulates unified banking regulatory rules and laws, directly supervises 
financial institutions throughout the country, and controls all financial institutions, instruments, and 
other financial resources. By the end of 2003, the central government still controlled more than 
80% of financial assets (Wang Guogang, 2003). 
Because commercial banks have very strong externalities (IMF, 1997; Mishkin, 1995), the 
institutional arrangements of banking centralization and soft budget constraints of the SOCBs in 
China force the central government to shoulder all possible negative externalities brought by 
banks’ bankruptcyF106F. Furthermore, due to oligopoly structure of banking industry, the state-owned 
nature and the SOCBs’ role as supporters of soft budget constraints of SOEs, soft budget 
constraints of the SOCBs has been strengthened since 1990s (Shi Huaqiang and Peng Xingyun, 
2003). 
87B5.4.2 Dual Soft Budget Constraints, Tragedy of Common land, and Endogenous Nature of 
NPLs of the State-owned Commercial Banks (SOCBs) 
Fiscal decentralization and banking industry centralization have aggravated burdens of the central 
government to continue soft budget constraints of SOEsF107F(see figure 5-7, figure 5-8, and figure 
5-9). The combination of the two institutional arrangements has strongly motivated local 
governments to struggle for financial supports of the SOCBs. Soft budget constraints of the 
SOCBs and banking centralization determine that it is the central government, not local 
                                                        
105 Since the reform, the branches or lines (controlled directly by central government or specified ministry) in China collapsed rapidly, but the areas 
or blocks (controlled directly by local government or related bureaus) were intensified because of the gradualism reform strategy. 
106 It is completely the same theory with that in planned economy government constantly controlled the autonomy in the management of SOEs, in 
the circumstances of asymmetric information the supervision cost of central government is quite high. In order to strengthen the control over SOEs 
and avoid the encroachment of enterprise residual, government had to continuously deprive enterprises of autonomy in management (Hu Shudong, 
2001), the most typical institutional arrangement was the policy of unified revenue and expenditure in those years, under which every enterprise 
actually became a workshop of the country. 
107 Since the market-oriented reform, the four SOCBs have continuously withdrawn and merged the institutions in villages and towns, and transfer 
them to cities, especially large cities. As the centralization of authority to the upper banks, especially to the provincial banks and central bank, 
capital and loan-issuing are also more and more concentrated in cities and enterprises of large-scale, and each commercial bank competitively 
issue loans to large-scale enterprises, large projects, especially the listed corporations, enterprises with advantages and enterprises in the 
monopoly industries such as posts industry, telecommunication industry, electronic industry and transportation industries and so on. 
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governments that shoulders responsibility of maintaining financial stabilityF 108 F, and local 
governments have strong incentives to plunder more financial resources of the SOCBs, because 
local governments can externalize costs while internalize benefits. Therefore, both SOEs and local 
governments stretch out their looting hands on the SOCBs (Olson, 1993; IMF, 1998), which have a 
nature of public goodsF109F. 
Banking industry centralization increases marginal costs for local governments to get maintenance 
costs of SOEs within their jurisdiction from the SOCBs. In order to maximize utility, local 
governments have to change modes of unduly using resources of the SOCBs. In the past, local 
governments struggled for explicit rights to issue money (Fan Gang and Zhang Shuguang, etc., 
1994), and had strong impulses to establish more financial organizations within judiciary (Zhang 
Jie, 1998), and to manipulate or control local financial institutions (Lao Haiyan, 2004). However, 
since mid-1990s, in order to mitigate and prevent financial risks, the central government has been 
strengthening its control over financial resources through banking industry centralization reform by 
revoking rights of branches of central bank to issue loans directly to commercial banks, 
establishing trans-provincial branches, centralizing credits approval rights of branches of the 
SOCBs to headquarter, enforcing lifelong liability for banking staff to issue loans, with a view to 
increasing marginal costs for local governments to unduly use state-owned financial resources. 
Under institutional arrangement of dual soft budget constraints, by helping local SOEs or 
enterprises with different ownership those may help to maximize local governments’ utility, local 
governments make rational choice to grab for stock sunk costs within judiciary by evading loans 
from the SOCBsF110F. The pervasive phenomenon that the SOCBs won cases in court while getting 
no effective execution off court can be seen as an effective alternative for local governments and 
SOEs to evade loans of the SOCBsF111F. 
From aspect of the central government, to evade loans of the SOCBs merely changed distribution 
                                                        
108 Although the current regulatory authorities gradually strengthened the responsibilities and burdens of the local governments in the process of 
dealing with regional financial crises and restructuring regional problematic financial institutions, such as the reform of rural credit cooperatives, the 
problem of incentive and incompatibility with the goal of safeguarding the financial stability was not be systematically resolved from the aspect of 
institutional arrangement. 
109 The financial resources of the SOCBs become the ‘meat of Sanzang’. In fact, the reason for tragedy of the common land is the same as the 
reason that in order to compete the investment, local governments and SOEs conversely forced the central government to expand credit quota, so 
as to seize the right of money issuance possessed by local governments and the right of money issuance indirectly possessed by enterprises in the 
1980’s, both the reasons are the will of local governments to expand their own controllable resources. For local governments and SOEs can 
internalize benefits while externalize costs (such as the crisis of banks or inflation, etc.), i.e. other brother provinces, cities and regions share the 
pressures and costs of inflation results from expanding credit and growing monetary supply, thus with the help of the specified banks, the local 
governments could continuously implement soft budget constraints to the SOEs or the enterprises government prefers within the region. As the 
deepening of the reform of commercial banks, local governments’ behavior of unduly using the resources of the SOCBs is confined, but the will of 
local governments’ implementing soft budget constraints is not weaken consequently, which induce a great numbers of contradictions. For example, 
in the process of commercializing management of the SOCBs, owing to the consideration of economic benefit, SOCBs dismantled some branches 
whose economic performance was bad. However, the great resentment of local governments was incurred, they were not cooperative and even put 
pressures on that and intervened directly. 
110 See the investigation of People’s bank of China (1999) for the detailed information. The main bodies of the evasion of banking loans are SOEs 
and the main victims are SOCBs. 
111 As is indicated in a study of People’s bank of China, the banks’ behavior of legally recovering loans is usually trapped in the awkward condition 
of winning in court while getting no effective execution. For example, from 1997 to May in 2001, in the city of Huzhou, the accumulated objects of 
behavior were RMB 1787.12 million and the winning rate is 97.7%, while the real execution rate was only 28.6% and the expense was as high as 
RMB 24.7 million (Almanac of China's Finance and Banking, 2002). 
 149
of sunk costs among SOEs, and local social stability and employment target of local government 
are not completely incompatible with that of central government, so the central government 
tolerates loans evasion by SOEs and local governments to a certain degree. However, when total 
utility of soft budget constraints of the SOCBs plus utility of soft budget constraints of SOEs cannot 
maximize, that means, the central government will initiate measuresF 112 Fto correct. So NPLs 
incurring from sunk costs cannot necessarily be mitigated by neither strengthening supervision nor 
increasing internal control of commercial banks, nor can NPLs caused by tragedy of the SOCBs. 
Localization of both judiciary system and local branches of the SOCBs facilitates loans evasion, 
and involvement of local governments to expedite transformation of sunk costs into NPLs of the 
SOCBs. Therefore, despite ratios of newly issued loans are very high, NPLs ratios of the SOCBs 
have also remained at a high level.  
For analysis convenience, the chapter classifies local state-owned enterprises into three 
categories, namely A, B, and C. In which, A stands for those enterprises whose repayment rate of 
due loans is above 80%, or at least be regarded as so by both commercial banks and regulatory 
organization. In other words, enterprises fall into this category have sound reputation and ranking, 
and commercial banks are eager to extend credits, especially long-term loans. In contrast to 
enterprises in type A, enterprises in type C are those whose repayment rate is assumed to be 
below 50%. In reality, outstanding loans of enterprises in this type have already become classified 
loans, and those enterprises are in industries that has no prospects. Type B are those whose 
repayment rate is between 50% and 80%. In reality, enterprises in type B account for the majority 
of local enterprises. In the chapter, their repayment rate is assumed to beα . In fact, enterprises in 
type B are the focus of both sunk costs model and speculation for resurrection model. In the 
following analysis, the thesis assumes that there is no strict distinction between type A and type B. 
enterprises in type B can be classified into type A at the end of term one If their repayment ratios 
were satisfactory, or enterprises in type A can be degraded into type B if their repayment ratios 
were unsatisfactory. However, in contrast to the conversion of type A and type B, there is 
distinction between type B and type C. Although there might be some type C enterprises can be 
classified into type B, due to the fact that enterprises in type C will be liquidated, the chapter 
assumes that enterprises in type C will have no chance to be promoted to type B.   
The previous models do not take utility function of local government into consideration, and 
assumes that local governments and central government share the same utility function. 
Nevertheless, in reality, utility functions of the two are not the same. Local governments struggle 
for loans for regional economic development leading to undue usage of financial resources. Their 
methods can be summarized as the following two: first, local government tries to lower repayment 
rate α  to benefit from sunk costs; second, local governments compete for loans for new projects, 
which can be represented by β . Local government needs to strike balance between maintaining 
sunk costs and getting new loans, and α is determined by the balance. Based on the above 
                                                        
112 For example, in the year of 2001, State Department issued the notice of strengthening the management of the financial claims, establishing 
the institution of preventing and sanctioning the evasion of financial debt to order local governments not to evade the banking loans through 
administrative measure. 
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analysis, the paper assumes that the local government may acquiesce in or encourage local 
enterprises with repayment capacity not to pay loans to the SOCBs to lower α to below potential 
repayment rate 
*α of that region. Meanwhile, local governments can also take various measures 
such as to transfer assets from loss-making enterprises or to weigh down liquidation value in case 
of liquidation. This section will analyze how local governments determine a favorable repayment 
rates by striking a balance between returns from new projects loans and maintaining old ones. 
Different from the Dewatripont and Maskin model, the model in this section neglects liquidation, 
because the model assumes local governments will not liquidate enterprises due to local 
employment consideration (see figure 5-5). 
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218BFigure 5-5 Timing and Probability of Decision-making of tragedy of the SOCBs as common land model 
Theoretically, the precondition to issue new loans β  is different from that to issue initial loans. 
The model assumes that repayment rate of β is
*
βα , and introduces proportional coefficient kβ . 
Therefore, when 
* *
βα α> , 1kβ > , and When * *βα α< ， 1kβ < . In this model, as banks will deal 
with not only individual enterprise (enterprises), but also local governments, which sometimes act 
as representative of local enterprises. Banks determine loans to lend to a region in the next period 
byα , which is determined by local government and not by returns of new loans. Based on 
presumption that α will finally be determined by the game between local government and banks, 
although new loans may influence loan structure of a region to affect repayment rateα , this 
influence is too small and can neglect. Because the operating condition of loans depends onα , 
banks will reasonably assume that returns of new loan β  will be the same as initial inputs, so we 
can combine them into initial investment. The model also assumes that g p pB B B′< < , where the 
smallest stands for utility of repayment utility of initial loans, the second stands for utility of loans of 
period 2, and the largest stands for utility of non-repayment:  
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( )( )( ) ( )1 1 1l g p pU B qB q B kβα α β α⎡ ⎤′ ⎡ ⎤= + + − − +⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦  
The condition of the first order is: 
( )( )( )( ) ( )( )( )1 1 1 1 0g p p g p p kB qB q B k B qB q B ββ ββ α α α∂⎡ ⎤′ ′− + − + + + + − − =⎣ ⎦ ∂  
By taking the above equation as ordinary differential equation of kβ β : 
( )( )( ) ( ) ( )11 1 sg p p p p
ck
B qB q B qB q Bβ
β α αα= − >′ ′− + − + + −
  
Where: 
C = undetermined coefficient 
The above equation represents curvesτ in figure 5-6, in which curves do not intercept. In the 
figure, the bigger c is, the higher the curve will be. In reality, with the same repayment rate, the 
bigger c represent that more loans a new project will get. Based on the above analysis, local 
governments wish a bigger c. 
α
kβ β
10 *α
Γ
4τ
1τ
3τ
α・
2τ
 
219BFigure 5-6 β α−  curve 
If curveΓ（curve β α− ）determined by banks coincided with a certain curveτ , so long as *α α≤ , 
it is in differential to local governments. In such cases, the model fails to determine value of α  
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adopted by local governments. 
If Γ  does not coincide with any curveτ , then we will have: 
( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )*Max 1 1 1 , , sg p p p pc k B qB q B qB q Bββ α α β α α α⎡ ⎤′ ′= + − + − + + − ∈Γ > >⎣ ⎦%  
Therefore, when c c= %，α α= % , c% will satisfy curve 2τ  in figure5-6. Utility of local government 
will be maximized: 
( ) ( )Max 1 1l g pU B B kβα α β α⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= + − +⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦% %    
β  Stands for q’s increasing function, whose one order condition is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )1 1 1 1 0p p g p p kB B k B qB q B qββ βα β α α ∂⎡ ⎤′ ′− − + + + + − − =⎣ ⎦ ∂  
By regarding the above equation as the ordinary differential equation of q, we get:  
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )1 1 sp p g p
ck q q q
B B q B Bβ
β α α α= >′ ′− − + + −   
By comparing the above equation with ( )kβ β α , it is clear that β  changes withα  and q in a 
similar style. 
The above analysis shows that part of loan B will be converted to NPLs. Therefore, NPLs could 
not be eliminated; otherwise, loan B will have to be totally converted into loan A. However, if loan 
quality of new projects is better than that of previous projects, the conversion will dilute NPLs. 
Thus, the condition of good quality of new loans, to wit * *βα α> , is the precondition that loan B will 
be converted into good loans. 
When the precondition is satisfied, excluding the amount of loan B that have not been converted to 
loan C, to wit to say, entire loan B will either be repaid or be maintained, then the amount of loan B 
to be reduced will be: 
qα +  
New project loans converting into loans B will be: 
( )1 qβ α− −  
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When loan B decreases, then:   
( )1q qα β α+ > − − , 
To wit: 
( )1 1
q
q
αβ β α
+< = − −  
This means that conversion of NPLs has speed limitation and cannot be hasty. If we put 
*α α= into the above equation, then:  
( )
* *
2 * *1
q
q
αβ β α
+< = − −  
Like *α , *q also stands for possible repayment level determined by local economic performance. 
Obviously, 1 2β β< . The difference is a result of local government’s preference for sunk costs. 
Therefore, conversion speed of NPLs is also constrained by specific historical conditions of 
different places. 
In sum, conversion to NPLs is limited by both local economic level and historical situations. These 
imply that role of government in NPLs resolution has to adjust and cannot be resolved quickly.  
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220BFigure 5-7 Percentage of Fiscal Revenue and Expenditure of Central and Local Governments, 1978-2000 
 
Source: Prepared by author. 
コメント [a4]: Look again at this 
sentence, see if you prefer the prior 
or latter change. 
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221BFigure 5-8 Fiscal Capacity and Financial Capacity of Central Government in China 
 
Source: Prepared by author. 
 
167BTable 5-8 Central Financial Capacity, 1978-1998  
Year 
Deposits of the SOCBs to 
GDP 
Loans of the SOCBs to GDP 
(%) 
Total amount of deposits and Loans of the 
SOCBs/GDP (%) 
1978 40 52 92 
1979 40 51 90 
1980 43 55 98 
1981 44 58 102 
1982 45 58 103 
1983 48 59 106 
1984 52 65 116 
1985 47 66 113 
1986 55 77 131 
1987 56 76 133 
1988 51 70 121 
1989 54 73 127 
1990 62 79 141 
1991 69 83 153 
1992 73 82 155 
1993 67 76 143 
1994 67 69 136 
1995 70 67 137 
1996 74 68 143 
1997 81 76 157 
1998 89 79 170 
Source: Calculated according to the Comprehensive statistical data and materials on 50 years of new China. 
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168BTable 5-9 Central and Local Budgetary Revenue, 1978-2003 
 Percentage(%) Percentage(%) Year National (100 Million Yuan) 
Central  Local Central Local 
1978 1132.26  175.77   956.49  15.5  84.5  
1980 1159.93  284.45   875.48  24.5  75.5  
1985 2004.82  769.63   1235.19  38.4  61.6  
1989 2664.90  822.52   1842.38  30.9  69.1  
1990 2937.10  992.42   1944.68  33.8  66.2  
1991 3149.48  938.25   2211.23  29.8  70.2  
1992 3483.37  979.51   2503.86  28.1  71.9  
1993 4348.95  957.51   3391.44  22.0  78.0  
1994 5218.10  2906.50   2311.60  55.7  44.3  
1995 6242.20  3256.62   2985.58  52.2  47.8  
1996 7407.99  3661.07   3746.92  49.4  50.6  
1997 8651.14  4226.92   4424.22  48.9  51.1  
1998 9875.95  4892.00   4983.95  49.5  50.5  
1999 11444.08  5849.21   5594.87  51.1  48.9  
2000 13395.23  6989.17   6406.06  52.2  47.8  
2001 16386.04  8582.74   7803.30  52.4  47.6  
2002 18903.64  10388.64   8515.00  55.0  45.0  
2003 21715.25  11865.27   9849.98  54.6  45.4  
Note: 
A: The central and local revenues in the table represent the income from central and local level government themselves. 
B: The data in the table excludes the revenue of domestic and foreign debt. 
Source: The China Statistical Yearbook (2004) 
 
169BTable 5-10 Percentage of Fiscal revenue and expenditure of the Central and Local Governments, 
1978-2000 
Year 
Percentage of Fiscal 
Revenue of the Central 
Government 
Percentage of Fiscal 
Revenue of Local 
Governments 
Percentage of Expenditure 
of The Central 
Government 
Percentage of 
Expenditure Of Local 
Governments 
1978 15.5 84.5 47.4 52.6 
1979 20.2 79.8 51.1 48.9 
1980 24.5 75.5 54.3 45.7 
1981 26.5 73.5 55.0 45.0 
1982 28.6 71.4 53.0 47.0 
1983 35.8 64.2 53.9 46.1 
1984 40.5 59.5 52.5 47.5 
1985 38.4 61.6 39.7 60.3 
1986 36.7 63.3 37.9 62.1 
1987 33.5 66.5 37.4 62.6 
1988 32.9 67.1 33.9 66.1 
1989 30.9 69.1 31.5 68.5 
1990 33.8 66.2 32.6 67.4 
1991 29.8 70.2 32.2 67.8 
1992 28.1 71.9 31.3 68.7 
1993 22.0 78.0 28.3 71.7 
1994 55.7 44.3 30.3 69.7 
1995 52.2 47.8 29.2 70.8 
1996 49.4 50.6 27.1 72.9 
1997 48.9 51.1 27.4 72.6 
1998 49.5 50.5 28.9 71.1 
1999 51.1 48.9 31.5 68.5 
2000 52.2 47.8 34.7 65.3 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2001) 
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38B5.5 ENDOGENOUS NATURE OF NON-PERFORMING LOANS OF THE 
STATE-OWNED COMMERICIAL BANKS AND ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN 
NON-PERFORMING LOANS RESOLUTION 
Analysis on endogenous nature of NPLs of the SOCBs by using dual soft budget constraints 
analytical framework has answer the question why NPLs of the SOCBs recur and maintain at high 
level after the central government has taken many positive measures followed suites of 
international experiences. The paper originally analyzes endogenous nature of NPLs of the 
SOCBs from perspective of the dual soft budget constraints, and shows that the NPLs of SOCBs 
are not only different from that of developed economies, but also from that of other developing 
economies and transitional economies.  
The endogenous nature of NPLs of the SOCBs determines that NPLs of the SOCBs will last for a 
long time, because result of sunk costs and gambling for resurrection of the SOCBs will gradually 
surface. Although intensified risk management by commercial banks may limit gambling for 
resurrection or rent seeking of manager of commercial banks, maintenance costs of sunk costs 
and gambling for resurrection behavior will further increase sunk costs and consequently raises 
NPLs in future. Along with implementation of the Law of Bankruptcy and gradual hardening soft 
budget constraints of the SOEs, large proportion of related enterprises’ liabilities will be converted 
into nominal NPLs of the SOCBs. Besides, tragedy of the SOCBs as common land indicates that 
neither unilateral reform of the SOCBs nor unilateral banking supervision cannot eliminate NPLs 
caused by tragedy of the SOCBs as common land, unless targets of the central government and 
that of local governments in financial stability are compatible. The above two features determine 
that the NPLs of the SOCBs will last for a long period. Therefore, self-accumulation nature of sunk 
costs determines that NPLs of the SOCBs inevitably remain at a high level in long period. 
Therefore, despite various measures have been taken by regulatory authorities since 1990s, ratios 
of NPLs of the SOCBs still maintain at high level. For example, in 2000 after write-offs of NPLs 
incurred by policy-related factors, average nominal ratio of NPLs of the SOCBs was dropped by 
10%. Since then, although banking supervision has been strengthening, NPLs of the SOCBs still 
maintain at high levels (see chapter 3). 
Accordingly, the endogenous nature of NPLs of the SOCBs determines that NPLs resolution of the 
SOCBs cannot simply follow suite of those set by other economies, but should target at the 
endogenous nature and find correspondent creative methods. Policy implications for the 
government in NPLs resolution are as follows:  
First, banking regulatory authorities should not regard lowering of NPLs of SOCBs as outset of 
forming and implementing financial policies, but should regard them as an endogenous result of 
series of policies aimed at hardening soft budget constraints of both the SOCBs and SOEs. The 
policies focusing on lowering NPLs of the SOCBs implemented by banking regulatory authorities 
at current stage presumes implicitly that strengthening banking supervision will lead to lowering of 
NPLs. However, the fact that the NPLs ratios of the SOCBs have been rising along with gradual 
strengthening of banking supervision in the past ten years defied the presumption. To integrate 
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lowering of NPLs of the SOCBs with strengthening of banking supervision will make people 
believe that NPLs are a result of poor banking management. The nature of endogenous of NPLs 
of the SOCBs predicts that the direct result of the practice of administrative intervention and order 
of lowering NPLs of SOCBs as implemented by China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) is 
to force SOCBs to create many ways, such as by issuing evergreen loans, or by extending term of 
issued loans to postpone the realization of NPLs, or by increasing dramatically the amount of 
new-issued loans to dilute the NPLs ratio, to circumvent the administrative orders. After its 
foundation on April, 2003, the newly established CBRC has repeatedly ordering the SOCBs to 
lower their NPLs both in absolute amount and in ratio by a standard set by CBRC, however, 
without changing of the soft budget constraints of SOCBs; the order turns out to stimulate SOCBs 
to issue more loans. In order to do that, the SOCBs have to loosen screening standard and, 
therefore, more potential NPLs might be created for the future. act, the NPLs ratio of the SOCBs 
had been rising since as early as October of 2003.Therefore, the per suggests that the key to 
resolute NPLs of the SOCBs is to create favored policy environments by supplying institutional 
incentive to sever the vicious spiral cycle of generation of new NPLs in the SOCBs. The dual soft 
budget constraints analytical framework itself also contains means of hardening soft budget 
constraints of SOEs and the SOCBs to NPLs of the SOCBs, the order of hardening soft budget 
constraints of SOCBs and SOEs, and possible means to harden. Just as we pointed out earlier, 
SOCBs have been playing dual role in the dual SBC. One is a supporter of soft budget constraints 
of SOEs; the other is body of soft budget constraints of SOCBs. The soft budget constraints of the 
SOCBs differentiate central government’s target in banking stability from that of local 
governments’, and soft budget constraints of the SOCBs stimulate the SOCBs to take advantage 
of soft budget constraints to pursue self-interests such as speculation for resurrection. Therefore, 
hardening soft budget constraints of the SOCBs should become an outset of breaking the vicious 
spiral of continued accumulation of NPLs in the SOCBs. In other words, hardening of soft budget 
constraints of the SOCBs endogenously hardens the soft budget constraints of SOEs. Because 
soft budget constraints are relationships between government and SOEs and government and 
SOCBs, so hardening both soft budget constraints of SOEs and the SOCBs cannot success 
without active involvement of both central government and local governments.  
Second, the endogenous nature of NPLs of the SOCBs also indicates that it is inadequate to 
dispose NPLs of the SOCBs in China by imitating experiences of market economies. The paper 
emphasizes the importance of hardening dual soft budget constraints for disposing NPLs of the 
SOCBs. It has two policy implications for the current comprehensive reform framework of the 
SOCBs focusing on reorganization and going public: First, the dual soft budget constraints 
determine the endogenous nature of NPLs of the SOCBs. Therefore, decrease of NPLs should be 
seen as endogenous result of a series of arrangements and political plans of hardening the dual 
soft budget constraints, and should not be seen as main intention of supervision policies. The 
current supervision policies focusing on decreasing the NPLs of the SOCBs imply a hypothesis 
that the intensifying supervision on banks can effectively cut down NPLs of the SOCBs. However, 
this hypothesis could not explain the fact that China has enforced supervision for 10 years during 
which NPLs of the SOCBs have been increasing. Moreover, combining banking supervision with 
decrease of NPLs of the SOCBs together will give people an impression that NPLs are solely 
caused by poor management of the SOCBs. However, the endogenous nature of NPLs of the 
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SOCBs determines that administrative measures by banking regulatory authorities to decrease 
NPLs of the SOCBs can only be effective in a short term, because the SOCBs can maneuver 
nominal NPLs by rolling credit terms or repaying old loans by borrowing new ones, which may also 
reduce nominal ratio of NPLs. After the establishment of the CBRC, it has been focusing on double 
decrease of NPLs, which means to decrease both the gross NPLs and their ratios. The 
endogenous nature of NPLs of the SOCBs indicates that under the circumstances of intact dual 
soft budget constraints, the pressure to decrease ratio of NPLs becomes an impetus for the 
SOCBs to expand loans, which could result in NPLs and even threaten financial stability during 
macroeconomic adjustment periods. In fact, as early as October 2003, when growth rate of loans 
of the SOCBs was extremely high, ratios of NPLs of the SOCBs were also increasing (CBRC, 
2003). 
Current comprehensive reforms of the SOCBs by resorting to re-organize and public-listing have 
no direct and necessary relationships with constant decrease of the ratios of NPLs. In order to 
satisfy requirements of going public, government has injected capital and wrote off stock NPLs 
from the SOCBs. It is believed that after going public, as long as regulatory authority reinforces 
banking supervision and sets up scientific evaluation standard in accordance with international 
standard, ratio of NPLs of the SOCBs can be limited within a reasonable range. However, the 
above points are questioned by the endogenous nature of NPLs of the SOCBs derived from the 
dual soft budget constraints. Could going public sufficiently limit NPLs of the SOCBs? Whether 
NPLs of the SOCBs rebound in a short term? In fact, as long as the policy of soft budget 
constraints of the SOCBsF113F continues without other necessary measures, going public might 
further reinforce expectation of soft budget constraints of commercial banks, thus capital injection 
could not stop NPLs induced by gambling for resurrection of the SOCBs. Besides, intensified 
externalities of the SOCBs also strengthens expectation of soft budget constraints of the SOCBs 
by local governments, so that re-organizing and going public may not improve incompatibility of 
central-local governments’ attitudes towards financial stability. Therefore, without weakening the 
expectation of dual soft budget constraints, the endogenous nature of the NPLs of the SOCBs 
could not be eliminated. In case of China, one of the most important roles of government in NPLs 
resolution is to harden soft budget constraints of the SOCBs. 
39B5.6 CONCLUSION 
The chapter lays emphasis on influence of dual soft budget constraints on expectations of the 
SOCBs, SOEs and local governments, and attempts to answer the following questions: first, 
institutional arrangements of transforming soft budget constraints of SOEs into NPLs of the 
SOCBs; second, reasons that the SOCBs are still acting as supporters of soft budget constraints 
of SOEs after policy wrote-offs of policy-related business in 1994 after the commercialization 
reform of the state specialized banks began; third, reasons that enterprises hope to evade banking 
loans and successfully break a symbiosis relations with the SOCBs who have been supporters of 
                                                        
113 The soft budget constraints in nature is an incentive mechanism. Therefore, the soft budget constraints in this paper sometimes only refers to 
systemic expectation, to wit to say the regulatory authorities’ implementation of soft budget constraints is expected to happen, which does not 
happen actually. 
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soft budget constraints of SOEs.  
The analysis of this chapter proves that soft budget constraints of the SOCBs are crucial 
institutional arrangements for continued accumulation of NPLs of the SOCBsF114F. The inevitability 
nature imposed by sunk costs and opportunism of commercial banks explains why the SOCBs still 
have been serving as supporters of soft budget constraints of SOEs after their market-oriented 
reform was initiated and non-state-owned enterprises have played important roles in economy. 
The above analysis has been forwarded by including free-riding financial stability provided by 
central government and over-using financial resources of the SOCBs by local governments at 
various levels. The analysis indicates that the dual soft budget constraints will influence 
accumulation of NPLs of the SOCBs from two aspects. One is that soft budget constraints of 
commercial banks weaken self-viability of commercial banks; the other is that soft budget 
constraints of SOEs weaken self-viability of SOEs. Even if managers of the SOCBs have no 
opportunism or moral hazards, sunk costs decide that to issue new loans to loss-making 
enterprises or those with no self-viability is the best choice for the SOCBs with enormous 
previously issued loans and became sunk costs. Therefore, NPLs of the SOCBs are inevitable 
when the SOCBs still act as supporters of soft budget constraints of SOEs. Sunk costs are not 
unique to China, even in mature market economies, commercial banks are also forced to 
refinance many obvious unprofitable enterprises when considering sunk costs. Therefore, the dual 
roles of the SOCBs are mutually intensified. Due to failure of internalizing speculation costs, soft 
budget constraints of the SOCBs result in insensibility of SOCBs to risks of SOEs, strong path 
dependence by issuing loans to SOEs, and gambling for resurrection on SOEs. 
Answers to these questions are crucial for NPLs resolution and banking risks mitigation, and can 
serve as premises for discussing ways to harden soft budget constraints of the SOCBs. The 
chapter concludes that because NPLs of the SOCBs have been endogenously derived from 
institutional arrangements of dual soft budget constraints, therefore, so long as authorities make 
continuous efforts to harden budget constraints of both the SOCBs and SOEs, it is impossible to 
stop accumulation of NPLs of the SOCBs. Because cases of dual soft budget constraints 
combination are very limited, there are few researches on NPLs of the SOCBs from perspective of 
soft budget constraints, and this chapter blazes a trail in this area. 
The originality of the chapter is that it analyzes internal and external institutional arrangements of 
the SOCBs within a unified framework of dual soft budget constraints, reveals the mutually 
interacted and intensified relations between soft budget constraints of the SOCBs and soft budget 
constraints of SOEs, and indicates the self-accumulation mechanism of NPLs of the SOCBs by 
adapting to the sunk costs model and the gambling for resurrection model. Therefore, the paper 
provides an original explanation for relationship between stock of NPLs and flow of NPLs of the 
SOCBs, and thus provides an conceptual framework for discussing role of government in NPLs 
                                                        
114 Here the phrase of institutional arrangement indeed refers to that the dual soft budget constraints  in China is a subjective institutional 
arrangement, but not the result of natural institution evolvement. Moreover, the existence and intensification of the dual soft budget constraints  
need a series supporting measures, so as to last for a long period of time. The current policies and measures of reform in China do not orient the 
goal of hardening soft budget constraints; on the contrary, many measures further intensify the expectation on soft budget constraints, such as 
debt-to-equity swap and a series of measures of mitigating and preventing financial risks taken by commercial banks. 
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resolution in the case of China.
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10BPRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP, POLICY 
BURDENS, AND NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES: 
REASONS TO IMPLEMENT SOFT BUDGET 
CONSTRAINTS OF THE STATE-OWNED 
COMMERCIAL BANKS 
 
The endogenous nature of NPLs implies that formation and accumulation of NPLs of the SOCBs 
will persist and recur unless the soft budget constraints have been hardened. Otherwise, NPLs of 
the SOCBs are inevitable when the SOCBs still act as supporters of soft budget constraints of 
SOEs. Therefore, in the case of China, role of government in NPLs resolution should be to harden 
soft budget constraints of commercial banks, especially those of the SOCBs. However, China has 
implemented soft budget constraints of the SOCBs for many years, therefore, it is very necessary 
to probe into the specific reasons for having to implement the soft budget constraints policy, which 
have not been explored yet.  
The rest of the chapter is as follows. 6.1 probes into effect of the special principal-agent 
relationship of the state-owned commercial banks and the implementation of soft budget 
constraints of commercial banks; 6.2 discusses policy burdens of the state owned commercial 
banks and the effects; 6.3 focuses on the too big to fail problem in the case of China; 6.4 
summarizes the features of soft budget constraints of the SOCBs; 6.5 is conclusion. 
40B6.1 PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATION AND SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS OF THE 
STATE-OWNED COMMERCIAL BANKS  
The central government directly controls not only the four SOCBs but also many joint-stock 
commercial banks (See table 6-21). The direct or indirect state-owned nature of commercial banks 
gives the central government incentives to implement soft budget constraints. 
According to the firm theory, each economic organization can be seen as a group of contracts, 
which sets up a series of principal-agent relationship among participants. The efficiency of an 
enterprise depends on the compatibility of participant interests. Therefore, whether an enterprise 
can maximize utilities such as outputs or profits depends on the effort of agents, which are 
determined by principal’s constraints and incentives. Different from ordinary industrial and 
commercial enterprises, a commercial bank has two levels of principal-agent relationships. One is 
between owner and managerial personnel, and the other is between depositor and commercial 
bank. 
6 
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In order to protect the interests of principals, principals of both levels will have to supervise the 
common agent, to wit, managerial personnel of commercial banks, therefore, forming two types of 
supervisions, namely, property rights supervision by owners and market supervision by depositors. 
The purpose of property right supervision is to maximize owners’ interests and the purpose of 
market supervision is to maximize depositors’ interests. In case of the SOCBs, banks have not 
been reformed into joint stock ones, with stable soft budget constraints expectation, agents’ action 
constrained only by owners’ supervision. Therefore, management of the SOCBs can be seen as 
making optimal choices by managing as agent within these constraints. The management of 
commercial banks should reflect not only maximized interests of agents but also demands of 
principals. The supervisions and constraints imposed by principals are of great significance for 
standardizing action and improving efficiency of management. 
However, in the principal-agent relationship of the SOCBs, the central government, as the principal, 
experiences conflict of interests between role of property rights owners and the role of 
macroeconomic manager. Therefore, government pursues to maximize owner’s equity as well as 
social welfare, which include maintaining social stability and economic growth. In order to 
maximize its own utilization function, the central government as principal requires the SOCBs to 
assume the following two tasks: first, the SOCBs are required to maximize owners’ equity; at the 
same time, the central government requires the SOCBs to support macroeconomic policy by 
providing financial subsidies to SOEs, supporting macroeconomic reforms, and sustaining 
economic growth. The extreme measure of facilitating all these goals is to internalize commercial 
banks as one part of the government administrative framework as had been practiced in planned 
economies. 
Faced with two tasks of the SOCBs, maximization of the utility function of the central government 
depends on the maximization of overall utilities of the two tasks rather than sum of maximization of 
each task, especially in case the two tasks are in conflict of interests. Among the three goals, to wit, 
profit of the SOCBs, macroeconomic growth and social stability, the central government prefers 
the last two, which in turn requests the SOCBs to support economic policy of the government, 
push forward reforms and economic development. 
The special principal-agent relationship of the SOCBs also determines that, as owner of the 
SOCBs, the government has to shoulder all responsibilities related with property rights, such as to 
bear all potential losses and provide bailouts in case of insolvency. Therefore, soft budget 
constraints of the SOCBs is just a responsibility affiliated with ownership that government has to 
take up, and this type of support can only be provided only when central government acts as 
owner of the SOCBs. 
In the principal–agent relationship of the SOCBs, the SOCBs, as agent, face with multiple targets, 
whose actions will be affected by following factors: (I) parameters for different tasks assigned by 
principal; (ii) difficulty of evaluating these targets; (iii) maximization of agent’s utility function. In 
order to ensure that the SOCBs as agent will faithfully assume responsibilities in macroeconomic 
management, the central government has provided special incentives and control measures, to wit, 
officialdom for managers of the SOCBs, which can only be provided by government (see table 6-1). 
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Under such institutional arrangements, the rational choice for the SOCBs is to accord with 
demands of the government, and it ensures that the government and the SOCBs can maximize 
their utility simultaneously. By making full use of soft budget constraints policy, managers of the 
SOCBs not only satisfy demands of the principal, but also maximize their own utility, which 
includes incumbent consumption and possible promotion in future. Deviation happens to these 
two roles, therefore, it is difficult for the SOCBs to maximize profits. Finally, the SOCBs have 
become tools of the central government to satisfy needs of public interests with inefficient 
allocation of credit resources.  
170BTable 6-1 Governors of the SOCBs and Their Position after Promotion in the Central Government 
Banks Governor New Position 
Zhang Xiao (Female) Member of Standing Committee of the People’s Congress 
ICCB Liu Linghuan Vice governor of the PBOC, Vice Secretary of the Party Committee; Standing Member of the CPPCC, 
Chairman of the Subcommittee of Economy 
Ma Yongwei Director of the PICC, general manger, secretary of Party Leadership Group, Director of the PICC group, 
general manager, secretary of  the Party Leadership Group；Chairman of the CIRC, Secretary of the Party 
Committee 
Shi Jiliang Member of the CPPCC, vice chairman of the CBRC 
He Linxiang Governor of the ABC 
ABC 
Shang Fulin Chairman of the CSRC, Secretary of the Party Committee 
BOC Liu Mingkang Chairman of the CBRC, Secretary of the Party Committee 
Zhou Daojiong Vice governor of the China Development Bank, chairman of the CBRC, Representative of the 9th National 
People's Congress, member of the Financial and Economic Committee of the people’s congress, special 
commissioner of the State Council 
Wang Qishan Standing Committee of the CPC Guangdong Provincial Committee, vice governor of Guangdong Province, 
Secretary of the Party Leadership Group and Director of the Economic Restructuring Office of the State 
Council, secretary of the CPC Hainan Provincial Committee, Deputy Secretary of the CPC Beijing Municipal 
Committee, Vice Mayor of Beijing (Acting Mayor of Beijing), Mayor of Beijing 
CCB 
Zhou Xiaochuan Chairman of the CSR, Governor of the PBOC 
Source: Prepared by the author. 
There exists a long-term implicit contract relationship between the government and the SOCBs in 
soft budget constraints of the SOCBs. (Zhang Jun, 1994) This implicit contract can be seen as a 
series of commitment between the government and the SOCBs, in which the SOCBs have to 
provide all forms of support for the SOEs in exchange for governmental commitment and 
guarantee of bearing all risks of credits. Therefore, the implicit contract between the government 
and the SOCBs has a nature of “special insurance”. The government can compensate the SOCBs’ 
losses caused by government’s control of the SOCBs by implementing the soft budget constraints, 
which will not increase fiscal burdens of the central government in short term. 
In the institutional arrangement of soft budget constraints of the SOCBs, the SOCBs have become 
an important tool of maintaining state capacity, and the safety of the four SOCBs will bear great 
implication for economic situation of the whole country. One research done by Zhang Jie(2000) 
shows that, in the case that the government reputation has been regarded as paid-in capital, the 
capital structure of the state-owned banks has following features: 
E=rs. D 
Where, E stands for total capital, rs stands for government reputation, and D stands for household 
deposits. In case the government reputation is 100%, then rs=1, therefore E=D. It implies that 
household deposits can be used as capital (can also see the above analysis about the expression 
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of soft budget constraints of the SOCBs in chapter 4). 
Thus, in the case that government reputation can be seen as paid-in capital, even if the net paid-in 
capital of the SOCBs is negative, normal operation of the state-owned banks will not be affected. 
However, in case the government withdrew its reputation, that means rs=0, meanwhile, if E<0, the 
SOCBs have to go bankruptcy as other commercial banks.  
In the policy of soft budget constraints of the SOCBs, the four state-owned commercial banks are 
always regarded as an integrated one and cannot be divided into irrelevant individual banks. If one 
of the SOCBs has reputation risks, it will spillover to others. Therefore, the government has to 
implement an undifferentiated policy of soft budget constraints in all the SOCBs. This indivisibility 
between business reputation of the SOCBs and the governmental reputation determines the 
non-withdrawal feature of government reputation. The government cannot violate the contract to 
protect its own rights and interests. The comparison between explicit depository insurance system 
and the soft budget constraints shows that: the depository insurance is related with the concept of 
western limited government that assumes limited responsibilities and the insurance is positive 
measure based on rules; while the soft budget constraints is related with the concept of unlimited 
government that assumes unlimited responsibilities and is a passive measure based on 
governmental decisions. 
Furthermore, in the special principal-agent relationship of the SOCBs, it is reasonable for 
regulatory authorities to implement regulatory forbearance. There exists a principle-agent relation 
between banking regulatory agencies and taxpayers, who are the final undertakers of the banking 
regulatory costs. In this contractual relationship, considering the interests of the taxpayers, the 
banking regulatory authorities should strictly reduce the amount of assets with excessive risks, 
implement requirements of adequate capital adequacy, and prevent insolvent institutions from 
operating, so as not to impair the interests of depositors or hamper the development of banking 
industry.  
171BTable 6-2 Economic and Financial Structure in China, 1992-1999 
Year State-owned Sector（％） State-owned Business（％） State-owned Banks (%) 
1992 51.4 41.3 82.1 
1993 46.9 37.5 80.3 
1994 37.3 31.8 80.2 
1995 33.9 29.8 73.2 
1996 36.2 27.3 69.1 
1997 31.5 23.3 79.2 
1998 28.2 20.7 79.1 
1999 27.3 19.3 78.6 
Source: a, The 2000 of China Statistical Yearbook (China Statistical Press, 2001),The 2000 of China Financial Outlook (China Financial Publishing House, 
2001) b, Yan Qingmin, The research on Risk Revaluation and Precaution System on China’s Banking Industry, (China Financial Publishing House, March 
2005),15 
However, in order to avoid criticism of imperfect supervision, regulators often conduct regulatory 
forbearance by lowering capital adequacy requirement or relaxing constraints on amount of assets 
with excessive risks, with a view to covering  up problems of the insolvent banks and hoping that 
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those problems will disappear by themselves. Thus, in order to safeguard political interests, 
regulators, who are assigned by the government, have purposely lowered regulation standards. 
Therefore, when regulators and taxpayers have different understandings about minimizing 
regulatory costs, regulatory forbearance will occur. So, regulatory forbearance is a kind of moral 
hazards for regulators. Institutional arrangements of economies dominated by administrative 
power have provided convenience to implement regulatory forbearance. Some economies whose 
regulatory mode is mainly administrative provide regulators with rights flexible space, which 
provides institutional convenience for regulatory forbearance.  
41B6.2 POLICY BURDENS AND SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS OF THE 
STATE-OWNED COMMERCIAL BANKS 
88B6.2.1 State-owned Commercial Banks as Actual Supporter of Soft Budget Constraints of 
State-owned Enterprises  
China has implemented a gradually transitional policy since its economic transition (Ronald, 2003). 
However, it is different from other transitional economies. As the government adopted the strategy 
of "catching-up and forging-ahead" development in planned economy, SOEs have shouldered a 
large amount of policy burdens. Therefore, although SOEs without viability have no comparative 
advantages after the economic transition, the government has to continue its policy of soft budget 
constraints for SOEs (Lin Yifu, 1999; Lin Yifu, Cai Fang and Li Zhou, 1994, Hu Shudong, 2001) 
(see table 6-3). A research made by Zheng Haihang in 2001 proved that even after 20 years of 
economic transition, the policy of soft budget constraints for SOEs has no obvious change. Many 
loss-making SOEs with no viability are still in operation and obtain a large proportion of loans (see 
table 6-4). The reform of the SOEs in China belongs to an incremental reform. Therefore, the 
government has realized a flourishing development of township enterprises by providing 
spontaneous incentives to market players without changing stakes of the SOEs. 
In the process of transition, fiscal decentralization has been continuously weakening the fiscal 
capability of the central government, which used to be the supporter of soft budget constraints for 
SOEs in the planned economy (Zhou Xiaochuan, 2005). In order to continue soft budget 
constraints of SOEs, the central government has requested local governments to manage and 
supervise some SOEs, to alleviate fiscal burdens of the central government. 
Meanwhile, the roles of the SOCBs and that of the MOF in economic development changed 
fundamentally, and the combination of “strong fiscal capacity and weak banking capacity” was 
replace by “weak fiscal capacity and strong banking capacity” (Hu Shudong,  ;Zhao Yi, 2000,). 
However, the reform in the financial sector in China lagged behind that of the SOEs (Ronald, 
1998). Because the fiscal capacity has been weakened, the government then has strengthened its 
control of the SOCBs to provide financial supports to SOEs. Thus, while fiscal authorities have no 
adequate resources to pursue its traditional role as supporters of soft budget constraints for SOEs, 
the financial reform that lagged behind the reform of SOEs has enabled the SOCBs to replace 
fiscal authority and act as real supporters of soft budget constraints of SOEs. After 1983, the 
government started to support the state-owned enterprises by facilitating bank loans mainly to the 
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SOCBs instead of fiscal allocations, and loans from the SOCBs to private enterprise have been 
very limited (see table 6-4 and table 6-5). Therefore, the SOCBs have accumulated nearly all 
economic transition costs during that processF115F.  
172BTable 6-3 Comparison with Ratio of Debts to Assets for Different Types of Enterprises (%) 
  
Type 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1999 
All enterprises 59.68 66.66 64.86 64.81 64.59 61.9 
State-owned enterprise 60.37 67.84 65.62 65.12 65.37 62 
Collective-owned enterprise 65.94 70.03 70.86 71.43 70.84 66.6 
Stock-holding enterprise 28.56 53.91 54.9 56.55 56.89 52.6 
Enterprise with foreign capital 46.83 62.63 54.55 56.86 57.1 56.6 
HK, Macao and Taiwan invested enterprises 57.99 61.7 62.19 63.77 63.44 59.1 
Source:  
a, calculated with relevant statistics from the 2000 Yearbook of China Industrial Economics Statistical  
b, Yan Qingmin, The research on Risk Revaluation and Precaution System on China’s Banking Industry, (China Financial Publishing House), March 2005, 
46 
 
 
173BTable 6-4 SOCBs’ Loans to Private Enterprises 
                                                                                    (Unit: RMB 100 million) 
Year Loan Outstanding Year Loan Outstanding Year Loan Outstanding 
1988 19.33 1993 32.87 1998 202.3 
1989 15.37 1994 52.34 1999 292.24 
1990 15.26 1995 32.35 2000 340.79 
1991 16.3 1996 51.2 2001 425.94 
1992 22.32 1997 156.92 2002 392.41 
Source: Analyze the Reform on SOE from Macroeconomic View (Economic and Science Press June 2004), 180 
                                                        
115 Opinions of Fan Hengshan from Institutional Reform Office of State Council. (Fang Qiyi, 2003) 
174BTable 6-5 Percentage of Loans to the Non-state-owned Sectors Provided by Financial Institutions 
Year Urban Collectives 
Urban 
Individuals 
Township 
Enterprises 
Foreign Invested 
Enterprises Agriculture 
All Non-state-owned 
Departments 
State-owned 
Departments 
1984        
1985 4.95 0.17 5.63  6.85 17.6 82.4 
1986 5.11 0.13 6.82  6.68 18.94 81.06 
1987 5.47 0.16 7.25  7.28 20.16 79.84 
1988 5.58 0.17 7.59  7.19 20.53 79.47 
1989 5.15 0.11 7.39  7.12 19.97 80.03 
1990 4.93 0.09 7.42  7.17 19.61 80.39 
1991 4.74 0.08 7.63  7.39 19.84 80.16 
1992 5.77 0.26 7.16  7.54 20.73 79.27 
1993 5.96 0.33 8.22  6.47 20.98 79.02 
1994 5.08 0.38  1.94 11.38 18.78 81.22 
1995 4.26 0.39  1.98 5.99 12.62 87.38 
1996 4.31 0.46  2.2 11.65 18.62 81.38 
1997 11.1 0.52 6.72 2.52 4.42 25.28 74.72 
1998 9.74 0.55 6.45 2.87 5.14 24.76 75.24 
1999 10.72 0.62 6.57 3.19 5.11 26.21 73.79 
2000 10.5 0.65 6.5 3.3 5.1 25.9 74.1 
2001        
2002        
2003        
 
Source:  
a，data from 1985 to 1991 is quoted from table 13.9 byＭckinnon (1993) Data from 1992 to 1996 are calculated according to the data in China’s Financial 
Outlook (1994 to 2000). The author estimates the data in 2004.  
b, Zhang Jie, The Financial Intermediary and State-owned Banks in the Economic Transition, (China Renmin University Press, 2003), 65 
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When the fiscal authority has no adequate resources to bear these burdens, the SOCBs have 
become the actual supporter of soft budget constraints on SOEs (Shi and Peng Xingyun, 2003). 
Actually, the SOCBs have dual roles in soft budget constraints policy, to wit, they are not only body 
of soft budget constraints of the SOCBs, but also real supporter of soft budget constraints of SOEs. 
Accordingly, in the case the SOCBs were on brink of insolvency, they will turn to the excuse that 
the reason is not bad management but policy burdens resulted from role as supporter of soft 
budget constraints on SOEsF116F, and the government has the obligation to try its best to rescue 
these SOCBs. Take the example of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Commercial 
Banks promulgated in 1995, which stipulates that the SOCBs should issue earmarked loansF117F to 
special projects approved by the State Council, while the State Council should adopt 
corresponding measures to make up for future losses. Thus, it can be seen that the SOCBs’ role 
as actual supporter of soft budget constraints of SOEs has strengthened soft budget constraints of 
SOCBs. 
The SOCBs’ role as actual supporters of soft budget constraints of SOEs can be illustrated by a 
type of loans called “closed loans”. In this system, the SOCBs should provide working capital as 
long as the enterprise can operate and produce marketable products. Closed loans have been 
implemented to solve problems of inefficient working capital of SOEs. Banks can provide closed 
loans to the SOEs whose net value is negative while even only one workshop can operate 
normally and produce the marketable products. However, practices prove that the SOCBs have 
taken on excessive risks from the closed loans, which are not really closed. Furthermore, many 
factors like product quality, price, and market competitiveness will influence judgment of whether a 
product is marketable. Therefore, it is very difficult to implement effective external supervisions. 
Under the circumstance where enterprises totally depend on banking loans for working capital, 
market risks will undoubtedly incur NPLs of the SOCBs. Zhou Xiaochuan (2004) pointed out that 
lack of equity capital of SOEs led to the banking supply system of the working capital in the SOEs. 
Before the Law of the People's Republic of China on Commercial Banks was promulgated, 
autonomy of the SOCBs has not been realized, and many policy loans have been issued by 
administrative intervention (See table 6-6). Especially before the establishment of the national 
policy banks 1n 1994, each of the SOCBs had issued many policy loans. Among them, some 
loans were approved by formal documents, such as cotton and cotton raisers loan, the discounted 
loans to the forest industry in 1986, poverty alleviation loan in 1988, and salary loan in 1995 (see 
table 6-11). Many policy loans are issued to enterprise projects with high risks and supported by 
governments. An investigation by the PBOC in 2000 revealed that earmarked loans of the four 
SOCBs had directly affected their operation profits and loan quality. According to reports of the 
                                                        
116 In order to realize the separation of policy finance and commercial finance and the commercialization of the four SOCBs, China has 
established three policy banks in 1994. But these four SOCBs bore a lot of policy businesses and social responsibilities, such as issuing salary 
loans, loans for stability and solidarity and so on. To maintain the loss of SOEs is an important aspect of the policy business bore by the wholly 
SOCBs. 
117 According to Article 7 in the General Provisions of Loans promulgated from the Law of the People's Republic of China on Commercial Banks, 
earmarked loans refer to the loans extended by the wholly SOCBs. The State Council has approved many remedy measures to the possible loss 
incurred from the loans. 
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four SOCBs, at the end of 31 December 2005, the outstanding balance of special loan had 
amounted to almost RMB 800 billion, among which more than RMB 200 billion were directed loans 
and RMB 550 billion were policy loans (such as salary loans to loss-making enterprises). Among 
those earmarked loans of more than RMB 800 billion, 70% were NPLs and outstanding balance of 
the NPLs was RMB 500 billion. 
 
176BTable 6-7 Financial Profile of 5000 Household Industrial Enterprises in China 
                                                                                                  (Unit :%) 
Year Current Ratio Debt to Asset Ratio 
Turnover Ratio of 
Current Assets 
Profits Ratio of Sale 
Costs Average Loan Ratio b Fb 
1994 106.86 65.22 1.28 6.95 10.98 7.16 
1995 103.89 62.99 1.43 5.16 11.74 7.4 
1996 109.26 58.14 1.5 5.58 11.7 6.8 
1997 104.43 60.66 1.3 4.21 10.6 6.43 
1998 102.21 61.46 1.16 2.47 7.6 4.67 
1999 103.55 58.09 1.18 3.83 6.3 3.66 
2000 108.24 57.75 1.27 8.22 5.94 3.43 
Source: Statistical Quarterly Report of People’s Bank of China (January, 1997 to February 2001)  
 
 
175BTable 6-6 Earmarked Loans of the SOCBs, 1990 
                                                                                     (Unit: RMB 100 million) 
Item 
Purchasing Loans to 
Staple Farm Produce 
Purchasing Loans to 
Export Goods 
Loans to National 
Mandatory Fixed Asset
Government 
Special Loans Total 
Outstanding Balance of 
loans until the End of 1990 1417 855 1516 300 4088 
Percentage in the 
Outstanding Balance of 
Loans Banks 
9.3 5.6 10 1.9 27 
Added Value of Banking 
Loans in 1990 394 343 342 70 1149 
Added Banking Loans in 
1990 14.4 12.5 12.5 1.8 42 
Interests Rates  
Lower than the 
working capital 
interests rate 
Lower than the 
working capital 
interests rate 
Preferential margin 
from 10% to 30% Discount 
  
Source: 
a: Diversification of Investment Subject and Model, (China Financial Publishing House 1993),121 ; Li Xiaoxi ,China’s Banking Risk and Prevention in 21st 
Century, (Guangdong Economic Press 1999), 99 
b: Yan Qingmin , The research on Risk Revaluation and Precaution System on China’s Banking Industry, (China Financial Publishing House, March 
2005), 48 
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177BTable 6-8 External Financing Amount and Structure of Enterprise in China, 1978-2003      
                                                                       （Unit：100million and %）  
Year 
Indirect Financing 
Amount 
Percentage of 
Indirect Financing 
Outstanding Balance of 
Direct Financing 
Percentage of 
Direct Financing 
1978  1890.4  － － － 
1979  2082.5  － － － 
1980  2488.1  － － － 
1981  2951.6  － － － 
1982  3291.0  － － － 
1983  2737.3  － － － 
1984  5089.3  － － － 
1985  6271.7  － － － 
1986  8116.5  99.9  9.9  0.1  
1987  9766.1  99.5  45.7  0.5  
1988  11425.0  98.9  123.5  1.1  
1989  14360.1  98.8  169.8  1.2  
1990  17680.7  98.7  241.3  1.4  
1991  21337.8  98.2  382.0  1.8  
1992  26332.9  96.6  922.9  3.4  
1993  32943.1  96.5  1179.7  3.5  
1994  40810.1  97.2  1159.2  2.8  
1995  50538.0  97.7  1209.2  2.3  
1996  61152.8  97.7  1454.7  2.3  
1997  74914.1  95.5  3566.0  4.5  
1998  86524.1  94.8  4760.0  5.2  
1999  93734.3  94.0  6033.3  6.1  
2000  99371.1  91.3  9517.3  8.7  
2001  112314.7  89.7  12127.4  10.3  
2002  131293.9  88.6  15495.2  11.4  
2003  158996.2  86.6  22098.8  13.4  
Illustration: 
A: Data of outstanding balance of indirect financing from 1978 to 1988 come from state banks and loans of rural credit cooperative. Data from 1989 to 
2003 come from loans of financial institution. The reason lies in the non-integrated statistic data and relatively small amount of loans in the financial 
institutions, such as trust investment corporations, financial leasing corporations and other commercial banks. 
B: The outstanding balance of indirect financing from 2001 to 2003 deducts the outstanding balance of resident consumption loan, the same with those 
other years. Furthermore, the outstanding balance of loans to the resident sector such as farmer loans should be deducted. Nevertheless, it is hard to 
deduct these outstanding balances of loans because of little statistic data, which will overestimate the percentage of the indirect financing. This effect 
will not become obvious, because the amount of balance outstanding of consumption loan balance and of farmer loan each year is relatively low before 
2000. Therefore, the data in the table can roughly reflect the external financing scale and structure of China.  
C: It is not until 1986 that the official statistic data of outstanding balance of enterprise bond appeared and not until 1987 that official statistic data of 
outstanding balance of stock came into being because of statistic reasons. In 1997, the undue balance of commercial bill was used, so the direct 
financing amount in 1986 included only enterprise bond balance and the direct financing balance from 1987 to 1996 included outstanding balance of 
enterprise and stock. The outstanding balance of direct financing from 1997 to 2003 contained undue balances of commercial bill, enterprise bond and 
stock. The outstanding balance of stock refers to the accumulated amount of A share. Enterprise bonds in 2002 and 2003 included only issuing amount 
rather than redemption amount, which combined both the balance amount in one year and the issuing amount before that year together as the 
calculated amount of that year. 
Source: 
a：Every issue of the Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking, from 1986 to 2003, Quarterly report of People’s Bank of China, first issue of 2004, 
China’s securities and future yearbook  2003, China Financial Statistic (1952-1996), China’s Financial Market Statistics(1997-2000), China’s Monetary 
Policy Implementation Report (2001-2003), the related materials from the investigation and statistic department of the PBOC. 
b：Li Jian, Structural Problem of China's Financial Development（China Renmin University Press, 2004, 247）. 
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89B6.2.2 The Quasi-public Nature of Payment and Settlement  
The SOCBs have been assuming quasi-public functions of payment and settlement in many 
regions by acting as an agent for fiscal appropriation, issuing loans for policy banks and other 
financial institutions, collecting or paying funds in production investment and life for residents and 
enterprises, for the rural insurance business, fund transferring and settlement, opening banking 
card network, issuing banking card, dealing with discount business and bill financing business 
(banking acceptance bills and commercial bills) and so on. 
In some less developed provinces of Inner Mongolia, Guizhou, Tibet, Qinghai, Ningxia and so on, 
the SOCBs are main financial institutions or even the only banking organization in those regions 
(see table 6-10), assuming policy responsibility of developing the minority-ethnic regions and 
subsidizing the poverty-stricken regions. The loan types of the SOCBs for the former revolutionary 
base region, regions inhabited by minority groups, remote and border regions and poverty-stricken 
regions are as follows: specific discount loan for poverty relief issued by the ABC, loans for 
economic development in less developed regions issued by the ABC, the specific discount loans 
for poverty relief in pasturing region issued by the ABC, the county enterprise specific loans issued 
by the ICBC, gold equipment loans, agriculture development loans, non-discount loans for poverty 
relief, minority ethnical trade and medical loans, loans for minority ethnical development, loans of 
grain and cotton, loans for the basic subsistence of poor staffs in enterprises, and coal loans. 
178BTable 6-9 Types of Policy Lending in China 
Type of policy lending Description 
Contract purchasing loans of important farm 
produce and byproducts of grain, oil and cotton Loan of grain and cotton 
Long-term economic development loan 
Agriculture development loan, scientific development loan, infrastructure 
development loan, economic development loan for former revolutionary base 
region, regions inhabited by minority nationalities, remote and border regions and 
poverty-stricken regions, loans to less developed regions 
Specific reserve loans to important items Specific loans to grain reserve, specific reserve loans from central or local governments 
Specific loans to importantly supported- project 
Specific discount loan for poverty relief, specific non-discount loan for poverty 
relief, welfare industry loan, gold equipment loans, and specific loans for county 
enterprise 
Loan to important construction project Loans for basic construction, loans to technological upgrading 
Buyer credit and seller credit for supporting the 
export of large mechanical and electronic 
products 
 
Policy-oriented credit for housing  
Loans for stability and solidarity Salary loans, loans for the enterprise poor staffs of the basic subsistence, loans for trade and medicine, production loans for ethnical minority area 
Source: prepared by the author 
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179BTable 6-10 Branches of the Joint-stock Commercial Banks in China, 2004 
CITIC Industrial Bank 
Industrial 
Bank Co.,  
LTD Huaxia Bank Minsheng Bank Pudong Development Bank China Merchants Bank 
Shenzhen Development 
Bank 
Everbright 
Bank 
(2003) 
Guangdong 
Development 
Bank（2005）
Region Province Branch Number Province Province Branch Number Province Branch Number Province Branch Number Province Branch Number Province Branch Number Province Province 
Beijing Beijing  Beijing Headquarter 30 Beijing 40 Beijing 20 Beijing 28 Beijing 12 Beijing Beijing 
Tianjin Tianjin  Tianjin   Tianjin 1 Tianjin 8 Tianjin 12 Tianjin 8 Tianjin  
Hebei Hebei   Shijiazhuang 10 Shijiazhuang 10       Shijiazhuang  
Shanxi    Taiyuan 10 Taiyuan 11 Taiyuan 1     Taiyuan  
Inner 
Mongolia                
Liaoning Liaoning  Shenyang Dalian Shenyang 18 Dalian 9 
Dalian 
Shenyang 10 
Dalian 
Shenyang 29 Dalian 6 
Dalian 
Shenyang 
Dalian 
Shenyang 
Jilin              Changchun  
Hei Leijiang        Ha'erbin 1 Ha'erbin 6   Hei Lonjiang Daqing 
Shanghai Shanghai  Shanghai Shanghai 18 Shanghai 27 Shanghai 439 Shanghai 37 Shanghai 23 Shanghai Shanghai 
Jiangsu Jiangsu  Nanjing Nanjing 30 Nanjing 11 Nanjing Suzhou 36 
Nanjing 
Suzhou 
Wuxi 
26 Nanjing 9 Nanjing Suzhou 
Nanjing 
Wuxi 
Zhejiang Zhejiang  Hangzhou Ningbo 
Wenzhou 
Hangzhou 23 
Ningbo 
Hangzhou 17 
Ningbo 
Wenzhou 
Hangzhou
49 
Hangzhou 
Ningbo 
Wenzhou 
Shaoxing 
27 
Hangzhou
Ningbo 
Wenzhou
28 Hangzho Ningbo 
Hangzhou 
Ningbo 
Wenzhou 
Anhui Anhui       Wuhu 2 Hefei 6   Hefei  
Fujian Fujian  Fujian   Fuzhou 8  Fuzhou Xiamen 12   
Fuzhou 
Xiamen  
Jiangxi         
 
Nanchang 9     
Shandong Shandong  Ji'nan Ji'nan Qingdao 33 Ji'nan 7 
Ji'nan 
Qingdao 7 
Ji'nan 
Qingdao 
Yantai 
22 Ji'nan Qingdao 9 
Ji'nan 
Qingdao 
Yantai 
 
Henan Henan       Zhengzhou 10 Zhengzhou 4   Zhengzhou
Zhengzhou 
Xinyang 
Anyang 
Hubei Hubei  Wuhan Wuhan 12 Wuhan 15 Wuhan 3 Wuhan 19   Wuhan Wuhan 
Hunan Hunan  Changsha     Changsha 1 Changsha 11   Changsha  
Guangdong Guangdong  Shenzhen Guangzhou 
Shenzhen 
Guangzhou 19 
Shenzhen
Guangzhou
Shantou 
42 ShenzhenGuangzhou 22 
Shenzhen 
Guangzhou 
Dongwan 
89 
Shenzhen
Guangzhou
Zhuhai 
Foshan
123 Shenzhen Guangzhou 17 
Guangxi              Nanning  
Sources: annual report of every joint-stock commercial bank. 
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90B6.2.3 Responsibility of Maintaining Financial Stability  
An efficient financial system depends on a flexible market entry and exit mechanism to realize the 
full competition among these financial institutions. Until now, China’s regulatory authority has paid 
too much attention to market entry of financial institution, resultantly; market entry costs have been 
excessively high. Nevertheless, China has not established a perfect exit mechanism, despite the 
Regulation of Canceling the Financial Institution was promulgated by the PBOC in 2001(Xieping 
and Jiao Jinpu, 2003).  
Therefore, when a financial institution is in difficulties, regulatory authorities always require 
another comparatively healthy financial institution to take over. The administrative exit mechanism 
in China not only weakens the budgetary constraints of the rescued financial institution, but also 
strengthens soft budget constraints of the financial institutions that provide help by increasing the 
bargaining power with the government. For example, the China Agriculture Development Trust 
and Investment Corporation had been legally closed by the PBOC and been entrusted to the CCB 
on 4 January 1997. After the closure of the China Agriculture Development Trust and Investment 
Corporation, its non-performing assets and liabilities were taken over by the Cinda AMC, while 
other comparatively good assets and liabilities were taken over by the CCB, some of which were 
transferred to the MOF, the ABC and the BOC. The CCB became the creditor entity and took over 
all legal procedures of creditors and debtors of the bankrupt China Agriculture Development Trust 
and Investment Corporation.  
Another example is the Hainan Development Bank. In May 1997, Chen Qi, who was the director of 
urban credit union in Haikou fled. So the depositors struggled to draw their deposits and led to 
panic, which spread to dozens of urban credit unions soon. By the end of 30 July 1997, the 34 
urban credit unions in 14 counties and towns in Hainan had become insolvent, with total liabilities 
of RMB 14.153 billion and total asset of no more than RMB 13.7 billion. In August 1997, the 
Hainan branch of the PBOC decided to maintain one of the credit unions, close the other five, and 
merge the other 28 credit unions into the Hainan Development Bank. On 22 March 1998, after 
providing RMB 4 billion loans, the PBOC decided not to provide supports to the Hainan 
Development Bank any more, and the Hainan Development Bank could not liquidate all liabilities 
by itself. On July 21, 1998, the Sate Council and the PBOC decided to close down the Hainan 
Development Bank and entrust it to the ICBC.  
In the above bailout examples, both the CCB and the ICBC had assumed policy burden of 
maintaining financial stability, which strengthened their negotiation capability with the government 
and they can enjoy soft budget constraints of the SOCBs in case they are in difficulties (see table 
6-20). 
91B6.2.4 Main Instrument and Channel for National Credit Rationing 
Before 1998, the PBOC controlled the credit activity and credit quota in every sector of the national 
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economy by setting the credit scale. Therefore, direct control is a main model in our financial 
macro-control. There was no central banking system before 1984 in planed economy. The 
investment and even working capital of the enterprise were arranged by planning and funds of 
SOEs were totally depended on banking loan and governmental appropriation, so credit planning 
was the main monetary policy at that time.  
When monetary policy was transmitted through credit channels, administrative transmission 
mechanism was under direct control of non-balanced credit rationing. In 1984 when the PBOC 
specialized in the function of central banks, the financial reform began to speed up. Monetary 
transmission mechanism also adopted a dual-directed control model of both direct and indirect 
controls, which bore great differences with the direct control mechanism. The credit ceiling played 
a final role in the dual-directed control model because of system reasons. The four SOCBs 
became main the target of credit quota control and main operator of credit plans, as they played a 
dominant role in the financial institution. Therefore, they would directly affect result of 
macro-control policy.  
On January 1, 1998, the financial control experienced an important transition from direct control to 
non-direct control. China formally canceled the loan ceiling control of commercial banks and 
adopted the control of ratio of assets and liabilities in the commercial banks. Since 1998, a 
breakthrough has been made in the control mechanism of Chinese monetary policy, realizing the 
transition from direct control to indirect control by abolishing the control on loan ceiling system for 
commercial banks, reforming the depository reserve system and expanding open market business. 
Means of monetary policy transmitting from central bank to commercial banks have changed as 
followings: the signal of amount has been transmitted to commercial banks indirectly without 
central bank’s direct intervention or control of issuing loans for the commercial banks. The 
refinancing of commercial banks depends on demands of these commercial banks rather than 
determination of the central bank.  
At present, the monetary transmission mechanism is in the following process: the PBOC→ 
commercial banks, other financial institutions and financial market → the investment and 
consuming behavior of macroeconomic entity → national income. The central banks’ intentions of 
increasing or decreasing money supply are realized by affecting central bank financing and 
discounting costs of the commercial banks. The monetary policy tool mainly includes required 
deposits reserve ratio, discounting ratio, financing ratio, interest rates and the interest rates of 
deposit and loaning of the commercial banks, which are realized by adjusting reserves of 
commercial banks. From the aspect of base money supply, although base money is created by the 
central bank, supply amounts depend to some extent on the amount of vault cash of commercial 
banks. Therefore, commercial banks not only act as an intermediary of supplying money but also 
affect issuing amount of base money. Meanwhile, deposit deviation of commercial banks is 
important for monetary policy practice. Provided that reserve system exists and clients do not 
withdraw all deposits, original deposits in commercial banks may create more derivative deposits 
through assets, which plays a critical role in the amount of circulating currency (Xu Jianwei, 
2001).So as indirect finance is an important part of China’s financial system (see table 6-7 and 
table 6-8), commercial banks play an important role in transmission of monetary policy (see table 
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6-11). Therefore, whether the central bank can realize anticipated monetary policy target mainly 
depends on whether the SOCBs have a positive, flexible and timely reflection on monetary policy 
of the central bank. That means the SOCBs act as a connecting linkage in implementation of 
monetary policy and as a main transmission hinge in transmission mechanism of China’s 
monetary policy (Song Fangxiu, 2002). 
180BTable 6-11 Financing Structure in China 
(Unit：RMB 100 million） 
Financing Balance of Securities Market 
Year 
Outstanding 
Balance of 
Financing (a) 
Outstanding 
Balance of 
Loans (b) 
Bond Outstanding 
Balance (c)  
Financing Outstanding 
Balance of Stock Financing (d)
Outstanding Balance of 
Financing in Monetary 
Market (e) 
Indirect 
Financing 
b/a 
1995 58,405.16 50,538 3,969.91 1,473.25 2,424 86.53 
1996 72,053.74 61,152.8 4,959.16 2,051.78 3,890 84.87 
1997 89,447.65 74,914.1 6,029.95 3,903.60 4,600 83.75 
1998 103,925.77 86,524.1 8,442.63 5,118.04 3,841 83.26 
1999 116,561.67 93,734.3 11,320.63 6,430.74 5,076 80.42 
2000 130,313.21 99,371.1 13,881.63 9,615.48 7,445 76.26 
2001 152,282.99 112,314.7 16,626.63 11,368.66 11,973 73.75 
2002 180,433.32 131,293.93 20,669.73  12,330.66 16,139 72.77 
Note: 
I: The data in this table are the outstanding balance of financing at the end of year, which refer to the stock. 
ii: Bonds include treasury bonds and enterprise bonds. Share includes A share, B share, H share and N share financing from domestic and foreign country. 
The occurring amount of bills represents the financing balance in the monetary market. (As the data are not very correlated, if the occurring amount 
substitutes the balance, which will overestimate the financing amount in the bill market, the total financing amount will become larger and the percentage of 
the indirect financing will be underestimated, but it will not affect the change trend of the indirect financing. 
Source: Analyze the Reform on SOE from the Macroeconomic View (Economic and Science Press, June 2004), 58 
42B6.3 EXTERNALITIES, TOO BIG TO FAIL, AND THE SOFT BUDGET 
CONSTRAINTS OF THE STATE-OWNED COMMERCIAL BANKS 
There exist not only the generic reasons but also special mechanism in the formation of the soft 
budget constraints of commercial banks. As far as the generic reasons for the soft budget 
constraints of commercial banks are concerned, modern banking industry is a special enterprise of 
absorbing deposits and issuing loans. So some banking businesses, such as absorbing deposits 
and providing settlement services indeed take on the characteristic of quasi-public goods (World 
Bank, 1993). Moreover, government will prefer to support these banks. 
92B6.3.1 Externalities, Quasi-public Goods and the Principle of Too Big to Fail (TBTF) 
The commercial banks, as a special enterprise in operating monetary credit business, possess the 
following peculiarities: Many services and products provided by the commercial banks, such as 
payment and settlement, take on the characteristic of quasi-public goods (IMF, 998). When 
financial enterprises are faced with serious loss or even bankruptcy and rescued or financed by 
the regulatory agency, social costs of the financial enterprises will be more than private costs by 
private costs spilling over to the social cost, which means the partial or whole costs are borne by 
the society. More seriously, if the exit of individual finance evolved in the financial crisis, it will 
create the credit interruption, hamper the payment, settlement, investment and consumption in the 
real economic sector and incur the chain reaction such as unsound economic expectation. The 
national economy is deeply shocked, as the idle assets caused by more unemployment lead to the 
 175
loss with multiple effects; the economic outputs are far lower than the potential outputs, the 
economic aggregate decreases and the living standards of the people deteriorated. The financial 
negative externalities formed by the exit of financial enterprise and the financial crisis may reach 
staggering figure. For example, the loss caused by the American Savings & Loan Association 
crisis reached 3% of that year’s GDP in the 1980s.The average public bailout costs in the bank 
crisis in the Northern European economies was 5% of the GDP in the beginning of 1990s, even 
17% of the GDP in Venezuela. Since the financial crisis in the Southeast Asia broke out, every 
country had injected large amount of capital to rescue the banking industry It is estimated that 
expenditures of banking capital readjustment in the ASEAN economies account for more than 
30% of their GDP.  That of Indonesia accounts for 40% of the GDP with about US$ 39 billion. 
(Yang Deyong, 2004) 
93B6.3.2 Bankruptcy of Commercial Banks and the Domino Effects 
The commercial banks, different from many other industrial and commercial enterprises, have 
strong negative externalities. 
Financial externalities refer to external economic returns spilled from private costs or private 
benefits to the third party. Sound commercial banks can provide fund and effective system of 
payment and settlement and transmit monetary policy; therefore, sound commercial banks bring 
about positive externalities. In the contrary, when commercial banks are insolvent and faced with 
bankruptcy or liquidation, bankruptcy or run of one commercial bank with asymmetric information 
may lead to a series of bank runs and bankruptcy, possibly leading to a systemic financial crisis. At 
that time, commercial banks bring about negative externalities (World Bank, 1998) 
When private costs are more than social costs or private benefit is less than social benefits, 
financial industry will gain positive externalities. In addition, when private costs are less than social 
costs or private benefits are less than social benefits, then negative externalities arises. So 
financial negative externalities equals private costs minus social costs, to wit: 
E(X,Y)=Cp(X,Z)-Cs(X,Z) 
Cp(X, Z) refers to private costs; Cs(X, Z) refers to social costs. X and Z are vectors of economic 
activities. So emphasis should be put on private costs and social costs in reviewing the financial 
negative externalities. 
One of profound lessons learnt from the serious economic crisis in the 1930s is that the finance 
has strong negative externalities. Therefore, the laws for the market exist of financial institutions 
are different from those of other enterprises. (Cui Zhiyuan, 1999) Many beneficial attempts have 
been made to give full play to the market role and reduce the negative externalities of bankruptcy 
in the commercial banks in the economies in mature market economy for a long period. In terms of 
the technical bankruptcy procedures, regulatory authorities of every country will not close them or 
let them go bankruptcy, which is different from the bankruptcy procedures of other business 
enterprises. Rather, they adopt every kind of effective measures of reorganization and rectification 
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and try their best to prevent banks from bankruptcy by rectifying them (Chen Xiaomin, Wang 
Xiaoqiu and Peng Haiyan, 2000). 
The characteristic of strong externalities gives a prominence to the soft budget constraints of 
commercial banks, which is more common than that in other economic organizationsF118F. As a 
research report from the World Bank (1997, P8) revealed, banking system has played a core role 
in the economy. Therefore, no government will allow the bankruptcy of banks to spread or render 
no help to systemic bankruptcy. This kind of public intervention is determined by political and 
economic factors. The difference in treating banks and other enterprises will affect the 
promulgation of macroeconomic and prudential policy, in which the government will act as the 
lender of last resort to provide fund support and guarantee for the debts of the banks directly or 
indirectly. The macroeconomic situation’s effect on the banking system arouses attention due to 
the following two reasons: first, the banking system with sound operation is very important for 
effectively implementing the macroeconomic policy. Secondly, the weakness in the banking 
system without any rectification will pose a threat to the macroeconomic stability. 
Generally speaking, the larger one individual commercial bank becomes, the stronger its negative 
externalities brought by the bankruptcy is. In dealing with such crisis in the financial institution, it is 
possible for the government to adopt the measures of supervision forbearance and even the 
principle of too big to fail (Mishkin, 1998). Even a developed market economy such as America will 
adopt regulatory forbearance. As a result, when commercial banks faced financial or liquidity 
difficulties, the government will lower the financial requirement including the capital base or 
request the central bank to act as the lender of last resort or rescue the commercial banks through 
issuing the base money. It is pointed out that the principle of TBTF not only applies to the banks 
but also to the enterprises, which has strong negative externalities. For example, the Rockefeller 
was provided with dollar loan guarantee in 1971. Moreover, in 1981 the Chrysler was provided 
with loan guarantee of US$12 billion by government when it was at brink of bankruptcy. 
94B6.3.3 Too Big to Fail Problem and the State-owned Commercial Banks 
As many market economies, soft budget constraints of the SOCBs in China are direct result of too 
big to fail. Here “too big” is not an absolute concept, but a relative concept compared with other 
banks in a financial system. The meaning of too big to fail for the four SOCBs in China’s case can 
be described as follows: 
6.3.3.1 A Typical Oligarchic Monopolized Banking MarketF119F.  
The four SOCBs hold almost 70% of total assets, 70% of total deposits and 77% of loans in 
                                                        
118 The general reasons that the soft budget constraints of commercial banks are more serious than those of general industrial and commercial 
enterprises and the analysis of the particular reasons of the formation of soft budget constraints of the SOCBs were explained in the paper written 
by Shi and Peng Xingyun (2003). The example of soft budget constraints of the SOCBs recently is that the Japanese government injected capital to 
the Risona banks, the fifth largest banking group. In order to prevent the closedown of that bank and maintain the safety of the whole financial 
system, Japanese government nationalized Ashikaga Bank in December 2003. 
119 Xie Ping and Jiao Jinpu, 2002. For example, although the economic performances of the SOCBs in China are not good enough, they ranked 
the top 20 among the world 1000 banks in terms of one tier capital and asset. 
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China’s banking industry (See table 6-12, table 6-15, table 6-16 and table 6-19). Even in the world, 
the scale of China’s SOCBs has strong strength (See table 6-14). This makes SOCBs play a core 
role in China’s economic development and have a strong negative externalities in the bankruptcy. 
Therefore, the financial risks in China are very concentrated. 
As the SOCBs have the same owner, they share similar structure and nature. In case that any one 
of the SOCBs was in trouble and got no government help, the practice will send a signal that the 
same risk will spread to the other SOCBs with large amount of NPLs. Under single ownership and 
concentrated financial structure, domino effects and banking runs will result in more contagion 
than that in a mature market economy. So in the case that one China’s SOCB is insolvent, the 
government is forced to bailout, thus greatly strengthening expectations for too big to fail for the 
SOCBs (Shi and Peng xingyun, 2003). 
181BTable 6-12 Percentage of Residential Retail Deposits to the Total Deposits in the SOCBs 
Year National Retail Deposit （100 million RMB） 
Retail Deposit of SOCBs 
（100 million RMB） 
Percentage of Resident Retail Deposits of 
SOCBs to the Total（%） 
1959 68.30  47.30  69.25  
1964 55.50  44.80  80.72  
1969 75.90  61.00  80.37  
1974 136.50  105.80  77.51  
1979 281.00  202.60  72.10  
1984 1,214.70  776.60  63.93  
1989 5,196.40  3,630.08  69.86  
1994 21,518.80  14,841.68  68.97  
1999 59,621.80  41,011.28  68.79  
Notes: The SOCBs include the ICBC, the ABC, the BOC, the CBC, the Bank of Communication and the CITC Industrial Bank. 
Sources: Page 54 in Analyze the Reform on SOE from Macroeconomic View published by Economic and Science Press in June 2004. 
6.3.3.2 Indirect Finance Plays an Important Role in Financial Market 
Researches shows that concentration of product providing is a main reason for soft budget 
constraints (Ilya Segal, 1998). This finding is greatly adaptable in soft budget constraints of 
China’s commercial banks. Although baking’s role in some industrial economies has been 
weakening, banks still have played an important role in most developed economies and 
transitional economies. In recent years, the stock market and monetary market have achieved 
rapid development, but financing structures of enterprises are still very simple. From 1996 to 2001, 
loans accounted for 89% averagely in enterprise financing, while stock accounts for only 8% (Wu 
Jinglian, 2002). Therefore, China’s financial assets are concentrated in commercial banks. The 
excessive amount of indirect financing in China further consolidates the dominant position of the 
SOCBs in financial market and arise people’s expectation for too big too fail. 
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182BTable 6-13 Comparison of Staff Number of 20 World Banks and the Four SOCBs of China 
Staff Number 
Bank Country 2001 2002 
Citigroup USA 268000 252500 
Bank of America Corp. USA 142670 133944 
J.P. Morgan Chase USA 95812 94335 
HSBC Holding Britain 170000 184405 
Crédit Agricole France 102259 95537 
Deutsche Bank German 94782 77442 
Bank One Corp. USA 73519 73685 
BNP Paribas France 85194 87685 
HypoVereinsbank German 69520 65926 
Wachovia Corp. USA 80782 80778 
Wells Fargo USA 127493 127500 
UBS Swiss land 69985 69061 
Fleet Boston USA 50280 50290 
Credit Suisse Swiss land 79699 78457 
U.S.Bancorp USA 52042 52046 
Zurich Financial Services Swiss land 76630 67824 
SunTrust Banks USA 27603 27600 
MBNA USA 26097 26100 
Fifth third Bancorp USA 19115 19119 
National City Corp. USA 32371 32371 
ICCB China 429709 405558 
ABC China 490999 415126 
BOC China 184529 174919 
CCB China 419157 306809 
Note: The data of the four SOCBs come from Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking in 2002 and 2003; data of other banks in 2001 are derived from the 
top 500 ranked in fortune in 2002 and from State Statistic Bureau. The data in 2002 are derived from the top 500 ranked in fortune and comes from fortune 
in 4th issue 2003 and Economic Daily, 17 August 2003 
 
183BTable 6-14 Ranking of the Four SOCBs in Top 1000 Banks 
Bank 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
ICCB 6 10 7 6 10 
BOC 18 21 18 18 21 
ABC 88 20 21 88 20 
CCB 65 32 29 65 32 
Bank of Communications 129 130 108 129 130 
CITC Industrial Bank NA NA 318 NA NA 
Source: Analyze the Reform on SOE from Macroeconomic View (Economic and Science Press June 2004), 279 
 
184BTable 6-15 Total Assets of the SOCBs and its Percentage 
Year 
Total Asset of Financial Institution 
(RMB 100 million) 
Total Asset of the SOCBs 
(RMB 100 million) 
Percentage of SOCBs Total 
Asset 
1995 62,628.80  46,818.29  74.76  
1996 76,971.20  55,329.00  71.88  
1997 94,181.49  62,722.73  66.60  
1998 110,420.54  74,676.12  67.63  
1999 123,230.61  84,115.98  68.26  
2000 135,483.70  122,388.97  90.33  
2001 154,876.10  131,771.23  85.03  
2002 184,024.52  146,516.37  79.62  
Note: 
The SOCBs include the ICCB, the ABC, the BOC, the CCB, the Bank of Communications and the CITC Industrial Bank. The data in 1995 come from 
China Financial Statistics (1952-1996); the data from 1996 to 1999 come from China Financial Statistics (1997-1999). In addition, the asses of the 
SOCBs are summed up by every SOBC; the data from 2000 to 2002 come from the Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking in 2002 and every annual 
report of banks in 2002. 
Source: Analyze the Reform on SOE from Macroeconomic View (Economic and Science Press June 2004), 43 
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185BTable 6-16 Percentage of Deposits and Loans of the SOCBs  
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Deposits 74.50 72.23 65.31 65.05 65.54 66.28 67.07 67.70 74.15 71.46 69.37 
Loans 80.09 78.25 66.92 63.87 62.11 62.77 64.96 64.54 67.40 65.68 65.52 
Note: The SOCBs include the ICCB, the ABC, the BOC, the CCB, the Bank of Communications and the CITC Industrial Bank.  
Source: Analyze the Reform on SOE from Macroeconomic View (Economic and Science Press June 2004), 44 
  
6.3.3.3 Branches of the SOCBs Are Located Throughout China with Large Number of Staffs 
(see table 6-13 and table 6-18). 
186BTable 6-17 Structure of China’s Banks in 2001 
Number 
Total Asset* 
（RMB1billion） 
Market 
Share 
(%) 
Outstanding 
Balance of Loans
(RMB1 billion) 
Market
Share
(%) 
Outstanding Balance of 
Deposits 
 (RMB1billion) 
Market 
Share 
(%) 
SOCBs 4 12208 62.6 7058 60.5 9736 69.9 
Policy Banks 3 1772 9.1 1571 13.5 32 0.2 
Joint-stock Commercial Banks 10 2402 12.3 1054 9.0 1596 11.5 
Urban credit Unions 
(City Commercial Banks) 
1049 
(109) 856 4.4 550 4.7 781 5.6 
Rural Credit Cooperatives 37270 1875 9.6 1274 10.9 1727 12.4 
Foreign-funded Banks 177 374 1.9 154 1.3 64 0.5 
Total        
Note: *The total assets of urban credit unions and rural credit cooperatives are different from the statistical data published by People’s Bank of China, because 
here the others in the liabilities are summed up into the total assets as negative assets. The total asset of the SOCBs is more than the figure published by the 
People’s Bank of China, because the latter is counted by subtracting the account current.  
Source: Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking, 2002 
 
187BTable 6-18 Comparison of Institutional Number and Staff Number 
                                                                                             （Unit: ％）  
1999 2000 2001 2002 
Year Institution Staff Institution Staff Institution Staff Institution Staff 
People’s Bank of China 2.27 8.75 1.71 8.74 1.88 8.89 2.05 9.08 
SOCBs 94.45 86.32 95.23 85.46 94.70 61.86 93.89 83.91 
Policy Banks 2.14 2.77 1.74 3.21 2.12 3.85 2.14 3.49 
Other Joint-stock Banks 1.14 2.16 1.32 2.59 1.30 25.40 1.92 3.52 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Notes: 
The SOCBs include ICCB, ABC, BOC, CCB, Bank of Communications, CITC Industrial Bank。 Other joint-stock commercial banks include China Everbright 
Bank, Hua Xia Bank, Guangdong Development Bank, Shenzhen Development Bank, China Commercial Bank, Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, 
Industrial Bank Co., Ltd, China Minsheng Banking Corp., LTD. 
Source: Analyze the Reform on SOE from Macroeconomic View (Economic and Science Press June 2004), 47  
 
 180
188BTable 6-19 Percentage and Amount of Deposits, Loans and Assets in Financial Institutions (as of Sep. 2004) 
 
Asset 
(RMB billion) 
Loan 
(RMB billion) 
Deposit 
(RMB billion) 
Percentage 
of Assets 
Percentage 
of Loans 
Percentage 
of Deposits 
Financial Institutions 28245.85 17296.62 23136.36 100 100 100 
State-Owned Commercial Banks 16488.66 10188.64 13949.12 58.38 58.91 60.29 
Joint-stock Commercial Banks 4471.55 2792.82 3463.1 15.83 16.15 14.97 
City Commercial Banks 1589.89 893.12 1253.84 5.63 5.16 5.42 
Urban Credit Corporative 1591.1 974.2 1390.5 0.56 0.56 0.60 
Rural Credit Cooperative 29644.2 20213.8 26517.3 10.50 11.69 11.46 
Sources: The People's Bank of China quarterly statistical bulletin, 2004-04; the financial institutions refer to deposit money banks, including: 1)state-owned 
commercial banks: Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Agriculture Bank of China, Bank of China, China Construction Bank 2) Agricultural 
Development Bank of China 3)other commercial banks: Bank of Communications, CITIC Industrial Bank, Everbright Bank of China, Huaxia Bank Co., Ltd., 
Guangdong Development Bank, Shenzhen Development Bank, China Merchants Bank, Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, Fujian Industrial Bank, China 
Minsheng Banking Corporation Ltd., Yantai Housing Savings Bank 4)City Commercial Banks 5)Rural Commercial banks 6)Foreign Banks 7)Urban credit 
cooperatives 8) Rural Credit Cooperatives 9) Finance Corporation. 
43B6.4 THE FEATURES OF SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS OF THE STATE-OWNED 
COMMERCIAL BANKS IN CHINA 
soft budget constraints of commercial banks is not unique to China or to transitional economies, 
but exist in all economies including economies with a perfect market mechanism like the USAF120F, 
but with different degree, evidence and duration. Compared with market economies and 
transitional counterparts, soft budget constraints of the SOCBs in China are characterized by 
complicated causes, degree of severity and long duration. If enactment of the Law of the People's 
Republic of China on Commercial Banks and separations of policy-related banks from commercial 
banks in 1994 are regarded as the start of soft budget constraints of the SOCBs, then soft budget 
constraints of the SOCBs have been implemented for at least 10 years. Few economies could 
implement soft budget constraints in such a long period without incurring systemic banking crisis. 
Soft budget constraints of the SOCBs mainly bear following characteristics:  
Dual Soft Budget Constraints and Their Mutual Intensification 
Researches show that soft budget constraints of SOEs in planed economy have not changed 
dramatically since transition began (Zheng Jianghuai, 2000). Lin Yifu and his co-workers (1994, 
1997, and 1999) analyzed reasons why policy burdens of enterprises in transitional economies are 
heavy. They believed that there was not necessary causality between the ownership of enterprises 
and its soft budget constraints and that the policy burden was the basic reason for the formation of 
the soft budget constraints of enterprises. Lin Yifu and his co-workers further argued that the 
implementation of “catching-up and forging-ahead” strategy, which violated the comparative 
advantages, was the main reason for the formation of policy burdens (Lin Yifu et al.). 
During the gradual reform in China, reforms on commercial banks have not yet been implemented 
dramatically (Roland, 2000). There existed stable expectations of soft budget constraints in the 
SOCBs (Shi and Peng Xingyun, 2003). If the enacting of Law of the People's Republic of China 
`on Commercial Banks in 1994 and the separations of policy-related banks from commercial 
                                                        
120 See Cui Zhiyuan (1999) about the special regulations and practices of US law in banking bankruptcy and the discussion on the influences of 
the soft budget constraints  of commercial banks. 
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banks are regarded as the start of soft budget constraints of the SOCBs, it has been 10 years 
since soft budget constraints of the SOCBs was implemented. As a result, China specific political 
combination of dual soft budget constraints has formed (Shi, 2004). Among the main reasons for 
the formation of the soft budget constraints of the SOCBs, SOEs’ role as the supporter of soft 
budget not only intensified the expectation of soft budget constraints of commercial banks, but 
also placed the SOCBs in the center position of dual soft budget constraints (Shi, 2004).  
The coexistence of dual soft budget constraints composed by the soft budget constraints of 
enterprises and the soft budget constraints of the SOCBs is a prominent phenomenon during the 
transition period in China. At present, it is rare to combine dual soft budget constraints politically. 
Even in the East European economies which are also in the transitional period, most of these 
economies implemented the big bang reform on banking sector in the early stage of transition, 
prior to the rapid privatization and banking reform. They thoroughly resolve the problem of sunk 
costs of SOEs. Therefore, the differences on the degrees of implementation of dual soft budget 
constraints between China and these East European economies are obvious. Although the soft 
budget constraints of SOEs exist in some market economies, it is rare to witness the systematic 
soft budget constraints of enterprises and the long-term coexistence of soft budget constraints of 
enterprises and those of banks. Compared with both enterprises and commercial banks in East 
European economies in transition period, the soft budget constraints in China are more serious. 
The main reason lies in the prominent distinction between transition paths of East European 
economies and China: the usual reform path of Eastern Europe economies is the big-bang 
privatization, while China’s gradual financial reform has not yet achieved substantial improvement. 
This distinction results in the prominent discrepancy on orientations, goals and paths among 
different transition economies (Roland, 2000). 
Complicated Causes  
Although commercial banks in both market economies and transitional economies have 
implemented soft budget constraints with different degrees, soft budget constraints of the SOCBs 
are undoubtedly one of the most serious one due to the following two aspects. One is that soft 
budget constraints of the SOCBs in China resulted not only from the “too big to fail” reason, but 
was also endogenously derived from their role as supporters of soft budget constraints of SOEs, 
which in turn greatly intensified the soft budget constraints of the SOCBs (Shi Huaqiang and Peng 
Xingyun, 2003). This understanding helps us distinguish soft budget constraints of the SOCBs in 
China from those of commercial banks in market economies. The other aspect is that the 
long-term coexistence and interaction of soft budget constraints of the SOCBs and SOEs resulted 
in a combination of high NPLs ratio of the SOCBs and high GDP growth rates. Even compared 
with other transitional economies, financial liberalization in China is still unique (see chapter 7). In 
contrast with the strategy of big bang taken by other transitional economies at the early stage of 
transition, the financial sector in China is the last area to be reformed (Roland, 2000). The above 
two aspects deteriorate the condition of soft budget constraints of commercial banks in China. 
Expectations of Systemic Soft Budget Constraints of Commercial Banks and the 
Self-intensification and Vicious Circle of Soft Budget Constraints of Commercial Banks 
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There exist stable expectations of soft budget constraints in China. Both the depositors and 
commercial banks believe that government will not stand by when SOCBs face difficulties. The 
previous aids from the central government continually intensified those expectations. For instance, 
the government injected RMB 270 billion capitals in 1997 for the first time, and in 1999 with the 
establishment of the four AMCs, RMB 1400 billion NPLs were written off after implementing 
debt-to-equity swap to the large-scale SOEs. The government once declared definitely that it 
would no longer help to peel off the NPLs of the SOCBs; the SOCBs should take measures to 
dispose the NPLs by themselves. However, the large-scale capital injections into the BOC and the 
ICBC implied the inefficacy of the government promises. Since the year 1999, in order to enforce 
the control over finance, the soft budget constraints of commercial banks have been further 
intensified and nearly no financial institution was shut down (see the dissertation for the basic 
conditions of closing down a financial institution in China), and the inefficacy of government 
promises intensified the expectations on soft budget constraints of the SOCBs. From different 
aspects, the following three facts imply the stable expectations on soft budget constraints of 
commercial banks in China:  
Although the deposit reserve system of commercial banks has not been built, the guarantee of 
national credit brought from the soft budget constraints of the SOCBs makes the public believe 
that government will offer full guarantee for deposits in the SOCBs. The soft budget constraints of 
the SOCBs mislead the pubic that the probability of closing down a large-scale bank is smaller 
than that of a small-scale bank. In this case, without considering the operational conditions of the 
SOCBs, the public believes that the risk of a large-scale bank is smaller than that of a small-scale 
one. Therefore, the unstated deposit issuance system places the small-scale banks in a rather 
unequal position in the competition with the state-owned banks. Under the circumstances that the 
SOCBs bear the highest ratio of NPLs around the world, household deposits still continuously flow 
into the SOCBs (see figure 4-6), which provides adequate liquidity to the SOCBs. 
The expectations on soft budget constraints results in the spread of soft budget constraints policy. 
Under the unstated issuance system, without a systematical crisis disposal mechanism and 
regulations planned in advance, government could not take measures in time and the advantage 
of disposing crisis could probably be delayed, which increases the crisis disposal costs. Under the 
long-term policy of implementing soft budget constraints of the SOCBs, the stability of the SOCBs, 
largely depends on the support from the government, but not fully depends on the credit of the 
SOCBs. Therefore, any lag or weakening evidence of the governmental supporting desire could 
lead to a banking crisis, especially in the decline stage of the economic cycle. Because of the 
complicated debtor-creditor relationship between SOCBs and other financial institutions, the crisis 
in other financial institutions could spread to the SOCBs. This consideration results in the fact that 
the central government actually becomes supporter of soft budget constraints of medium or 
small-scale banks and stock companies and bears the risk for them. 
The policy of soft budget constraints of commercial banks leads to local governments’ inclination 
of unduly using financial resources. Expansion of scope of soft budget constraints of commercial 
banks makes local governments believe that when local branches meet crises the central 
government will bail them out. This expectation incurs contention for number of local financial 
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institutions and real rights to control the SOCBs local branches by local governments. Regions 
also apply to building regional banking institutions (Bohai Bank, Northeast Development Bank, 
Shenzhen Development Bank, Shanghai PuDong Development Bank, Fujian Industrial Bank, 
etc.). 
The continued intensification of soft budget constraints of commercial banks resulted in the 
continual expansion of the scope of soft budget constraints, from SOCBs to joint-stock commercial 
banks, urban credit cooperative and rural credit cooperative (see table 6-20). 
From a historical angle, most city commercial banks are born out of local credit cooperatives. In 
fact, they are joint-stock enterprises reorganized from 2,194 urban credit cooperatives, rural credit 
cooperatives (located in towns) and some local financial service institutions. Since 1994, under the 
uniform deployment of the PBOC, urban credit cooperatives have been gradually reorganized into 
urban cooperative banks, and then renamed as city commercial banks. Basically speaking, no 
new joint-stock bank was approved by government after 1997, and through the means of merger, 
the capacities of mitigating and preventing risks of the original insolvent credit cooperatives were 
temporally intensified. Partial risks in banking sector were resolved by merger and acquisition. 
In the process of financial reform of setting up city commercial banks, when the city commercial 
banks are constructed, with the consideration of mitigating local financial risk, central government 
set the regulation that local governments are in the position of control. According to the article two 
of the Regulation on Urban Credit Co-operatives that was made based on Law of Corporation and 
Commercial Bank, city commercial banks are commercial banks in the form of joint stock Limited 
Corporation. The joint-stock limited corporation accords with the requirements of modern 
enterprise system and their contributors share the same nature. Their largest shareholder is local 
finance, to wit the local government and nearly all the other shareholders are local state-owned 
enterprises, as well as individual businesses and city households (both account very small 
percentage of the total shares), which were the original shareholders of urban credit cooperatives. 
In other words, the state-owned components take the majority of shares and their contributors 
come from the same city. As a result, local governments are in the position of control. 
Even after 10 years of renovation, the city commercial banks and urban credit cooperatives had 
their respective institutions in 2004. Their overall ratios of the NPLs reached as high as 12% and 
35%, and the capital adequacy ratio was below 2%. In 2003, among the 110 city commercial 
banks nationwide, 73% had no profits, the NPLs ratios of some banks were still over 50%, and the 
loan rate of a single customer was hundreds of times higher, many city commercial banks, urban 
credit cooperatives and rural credit cooperatives were at the brink of technical bankruptcy.  
44B6.5 CONCLUSION 
Formation of soft budget constraints has both general and specific reasons. On the general 
reasons part, formation of soft budget constraints is due to a large extent to quasi-public goods 
nature of the banking industry, to wit, banks are special enterprises, and many serves offered by 
commercial banks, such as savings and settlement, are quasi-public goods in nature. Therefore, 
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governments are apt to offer support to commercial banks. Due to the quasi-public goods nature of 
banking industry, banking industry has strong negative externalities. When commercial banks are 
in good condition, they can channel funds to support economic development and growth, provide 
an efficient settlement system, and transmit monetary policy. In this regard, normal operation of 
commercial banks has positive externalities. Nevertheless, due to asymmetrical information, 
insolvency or bankruptcy of a commercial bank can result in systemic banking crises. In this 
regard, commercial banks have huge negative externalities (World Bank, 1998). It is negative 
externalities of commercial banks that explains why soft budget constraints resulting from 
regulatory forbearance still exists in mature market economies such as the USA. Generally 
speaking, the larger an individual bank is, the more negative externalities its bankruptcy or 
insolvency will be, and it’s more likely for government to conduct regulatory forbearance including 
soft budget constraints. When a big commercial bank is facing financial dilemma or liquidity 
difficulties, regulatory authorities tend to lower capital requirements or ask the central bank to 
provide liquidity to bail out the problem bank. 
In China, soft budget constraints of the SOCBs have been further strengthened by their role as 
supporters of soft budget constraints of state-owned enterprises. In China, the SOCBs are bodies 
of soft budget constraints themselves, and supporters of soft budget constraints of state-owned 
enterprises. As supporters of state-owned enterprises, commercial banks in China have to provide 
financial supports to state-owned enterprises. In transitional period, government’s control over 
fiscal resources has been weakened, resulting in stronger banking sector vs. weaker fiscal sector. 
Therefore, when fiscal authority cannot continue to be supporter of soft budget constraints of 
state-owned enterprises, government has strengthened its control over state-owned commercial 
banks to facilitate transfer of financial surplus to state-owned enterprises favored by government, 
leaving the SOCBs shouldering responsibility of supporters of soft budget constraints of SOEs. As 
many experts have already pointed out, non-performing loans have reflected all reform costs since 
the implementation of opening-up policy 1n 1978. It is supporters of soft budget constraints of 
state-owned enterprises that give SOCBs an excuse. The SOCBs can claim that their huge 
non-performing loans are not solely caused by poor internal management problemsF121F. Therefore, 
when commercial banks are in trouble, it is incumbent upon government to salvageF122F. 
Highly centralized banking-oriented financial structure also strengthens soft budget constraints of 
commercial banks. Researches prove that centralization of products is a main reason for soft 
budget constraints of commercial banks (Ilya Segal, 1988). The research is very pertinent to 
commercial banks of China. Although role of banking industry has been weakened in some 
developed countries, it is still playing very important roles in many developing and transitional 
economies. In recent years, in spite of strikingly rapid development of stock markets and money 
                                                        
121 In 1994, in order to separate policy loans from commercial banks, and to realize the market-oriented reform of SOCBs, 
China has established three policy banks, namely, the State Development Bank (SDB), the China Agricultural Development 
Bank (CADB), and the China Import and Export Bank (CIEB). However, the four SOCBs thereafter still have to shoulder 
many policy loans and many social responsibilities, such as the issuance of Salary Loan, State Stability Loan, and the like, 
that should be carried out by government. Therefore, to keep the already insolvent SOEs alive is an important policy business 
that SOCBs still have to shoulder. 
122 The article 41 of the People’s Bank of China Law stipulates, “SOEs are expected to issue loans to designated projects 
certified by the State Council. The loss or NPLs incurred therefore should be compensated by the State Council accordingly.” 
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markets, funding structure of enterprises is still highly reliant on commercial banks. During the six 
years from 1996 to 2001, average banking loans account for 89% of financing amount of 
enterprises, while stock market accounts for only 8% (Wu Jinglian, 2002). Accordingly, majority of 
financial assets concentrates on banks, with the four state-owned commercial banks accounting 
for 70% of total banking assets, 70% of total banking deposits and 77% of total loans (see chapter 
2).  
Thirdly, government’s role as the sole owner also strengthens soft budget constraints of the 
SOCBs. The fact that government is the sole owner makes depositors believe that when the 
SOCBs are in trouble, it is incumbent upon government to step in and bailout, and therefore, to 
deposit with the SOCBs are safer. The government’s repeated supports have strengthening this 
perception. It is the implicit national guarantee that makes the SOCBs immune to bank runs or 
panics. In contrary, despite the SOCBs have been technically bankrupt for many years, deposits 
continue to flood in, equipping the SOCBs with adequate liquidity. Therefore, with national 
guarantees, even depositors have become underlying supporters of soft budget constraints of the 
SOCBsF123F. 
Besides, because the SOCBs are owned by the central government, they are, to some extent, 
homogeneous. When one has some trouble, without government bailout, market may 
misunderstand and believe that others are facing the same problems. Therefore, the state-owned 
and highly concentrated financial structure makes domino effects brought by bankruptcy of 
commercial bank are more turbulent than that those in a market economy with diversified 
ownership and diffused commercial banking structure. Therefore, compared with developed 
market economies, the central government’s motive to bailout will be more intense. 
Furthermore, in the case of China, the practices that the SOCBs are forced to be supporters of soft 
budget constraints of other commercial banks also strengthen soft budget constraints of the 
SOCBs. An efficient financial market depends on consummate entry and exit mechanisms to 
maintain adequate competition and efficiency. Even to date, China’s regulatory authorities still 
overstress importance of market entry and high entry costs, while no market exit mechanism has 
been established (Xie Ping and Jiao Jinpu, 2003). In the case where one financial institution 
became insolvent, the common practice of regulatory authorities is to facilitate another 
comparatively healthier financial institution to absorb huge non-performing assets of the problem 
institution. For example, in 1995, when Hainan Development Bank, a regional joint-stock 
commercial bank, was forced to go bankrupt, the government coordinated the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China (CICB) to be the receiver. This government-dominated market exit 
mechanism will not only weakens budget constraints of salvaged institutions by endowing the 
receiver bank more powers to negotiate with government for compensation or preferential 
treatments, but also will strengthen soft budget constraints expectation of problem institutions.  
Analysis of reasons to implement soft budget constraints of the SOCBs in this chapter has very 
important policy implication for ongoing banking reform in China. Now the SOCBs have all set up 
                                                        
123 In recent years, runs on branches of SOCBs decreased significantly. This reflects the increased depositor’s confidence in 
state guarantee for the SOCBs.  
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specific public listing schedules and reform process is expected to speed upF124F. After 20 years of 
reform, China has finally come to strike rings of ownership issue that once was taboo; this is a 
giant leap forward. Analysis of the chapter implies that transformation of ownership itself, such as 
public listing or privatization, is helpful to ameliorate the internal management of commercial 
banks (World Bank, 1997); however, ownership transformation can mitigate soft budget 
constraints resulting from special principal-agent relationship, while soft budget problem resulting 
from policy burdens and too big to fail of the SOCBs cannot be eliminated or mitigated.  
This is a big lesson drawn from experiences of East European and former Soviet Bloc economies 
in their course of economic transition. The experiences of these economies showed that, after 
privatization, the once prevalent soft budget problem turned out to be strengthened rather than 
weakened (World Bank, 1997). The case of Taiwan also demonstrates the same lesson. After 
being publicly listed for many years (the so-called MinYingHua in Taiwanese), the problem of soft 
budget has not been eliminated. By delving into the analytical framework of soft budget constraints, 
we hereby contend that the issue of soft budget constraints should be accentuated and that 
measures targeted at resolving soft budget constraints of the SOCBs should be put in place at the 
next round of financial reforms. 
  
                                                        
124 Since the beginning of 2003, the chief executive officers of the big four SOCBs  have expressed their desire to try to be the first SOCBs to list 
publicly. However, their public-listing schemes are different. Among which, CICB wish to go public as a complete unit, while CCB wishes to go 
public by dividing into two parts and allows the better part of the bank go public –listing first. BOC wishes to go public-listing overseas. 
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189BTable 6-20 Equity Characteristic and NPLs Ratios of Joint-Stock Commercial Banks 
 NPLs ratio (%) 
Bank 
Time of 
Establishment Main Shareholders Percentage Equity Characteristic 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Central Finance 23.74 
Local Finance 25.64 Bank of 
Communications Apr.1987 
Enterprise and Institution 
Legal Person 50.62 
State-owned shares are in the control 
position     
the NPLs 
ratio 
decreased 
by 3.47 
 14.22 13.31  
China Merchants Shipping 
Co., Ltd. 24.36 
Ocean Shipping Group Corp. 
of China 11.68 
Guangzhou Marine 
Transportation Group Co., 
Ltd 
7.38 
China Merchants 
Bank Apr.1987 
Other 105 shareholders 56.58 
Established by the Merchant Bureau 
exclusively; the shareholding system 
reform was completed in 1989 and at 
the end of 1999, there were totally 
108 shareholders  
   19.55 13.62 10.25 5.99 3.15 2.87 
CITIC Industrial 
Bank Apr.1987 CITIC Group 100 
The only bank which was exclusively 
possessed by enterprises group       10.35 8.12 5.96 
Shenzhen Investment 
Management Company 8.96 
Shenzhen International Trust 
& Investment Corp 5.5 
Shenzhen Social Security 
Administrative Bureau 4.02 
Shenzhen 
Development Bank Dec. 1987 
Other shareholders 81.52 
It was reconstructed from six credit 
cooperatives in Shenzhen；In 1988 it 
went public in the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange, the percentage of tradable 
shares is 69.06%, the local 
government is in the control position
7.32 17.76 20.49 23.52 21.76 14.84 10.29 8.49 11.41 
Fujian Provincial Finance 
Bureau 51 
Huamin Group 6.67 
China Merchants Shipping 
Co.,Ltd 3.2 
Industrial Bank Aug. 1988 
Other 129 shareholders 39.13 
    
decrea
sed by 
2.32 
compar
ing to 
that of 
last 
year
7.37 4.14
Doubtf
ul 
3.13, 
Loss 
3.47
Doubt
ful 
2.13, 
Loss 
2.49
Doubtful 
2.05, 
Loss 2.5
Bank of China 8.89 
Yuehai group 5.62 
Guangdong 
Development Bank
Sep. 1988 
Guangdong Provincial  
Finance Bureau 5.03 
Share ownership was diversified          
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Other shareholders 80.46 
Everbright Group 31.14 
Everbright Holdings (Hong 
Kong Listed Company) 20 
China National Tobacco 
Corporation 7.86 
Everbright Bank of 
China Aug. 1992 
Other shareholders 41 
Exclusively established by the 
Everbright Group; the shareholding 
reform was completed in 1997; 
currently the bank has 24% foreign 
capital share, among which the Asian 
Development Bank has 3.29%. 
     
The 
NPLs 
ratio 
decre
ased 
by 5.8
Doubtf
ul 
12.45, 
Loss 
13.13
Doubt
ful 
7.5, 
Loss 
9.34
 
Shanghai Financial Bureau 8.26 
Shanghai Industrial 
Investment (Holding) Co., Ltd 8.22 
Shanghai International Trust 
& Investment Co., Ltd 6.97 
Shanghai Pudong 
Development Bank Jan. 1993 
Other shareholders 76.55 
In 1999, the Shanghai Pudong 
Development Bank went public in the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange; the 
percentage of tradable shares is 
16.6%. 
  9 8.9 10.7 7.57 3.38
Doubt
ful 
1.92, 
Loss 
2.53
2.45 
Shougang Group 20 
Shandong Province Electric 
Power Company 16 
Yuxi Hongta Group 14 
Hua Xia Bank. Jan. 1992 
Other 30 shareholders 50 
The Huaxia Bank was reorganized 
from Shou Gang Finance 
Corporation; the shareholding reform 
was completed in 1995; and the 
current 33 shareholders are all 
enterprises legal persons. 
    5.33 7.05 5.97 4.23 3.96 
Sichuan New Hope 
Agriculture Corp. 7.98 
Orient Group Co.,Ltd 7.51 
China Fanhai Holdings 
Co.,Ltd 7.51 
China Minsheng 
Banking Corp., Ltd. Jan. 1996 
Other 46 shareholders 77 
The China Minsheng Banking Co., 
Ltd. is the first bank, which is invested 
by the non-state-owned enterprise 
the percentage of stock holdings of 
non-state-owned enterprises, is 
73.6%. 
 1.94 6.12 8.72 5.72 4.25 2.04 1.29 1.31 
Source：Xue Junbo, Discussion on the Alienation and Correction of Joint-stock Commerical Bank, (The study of finance and economics, October 2002)；Annual bulletin of banks in past years; Almanac of China's Finance and Banking 
2000-2004. 
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11BGRADUALISM OF FINANCIAL REFORM AND 
FORMATION OF DUAL SOFT BUDGET 
CONSTRAINTS 
 
Since 1978, market-oriented financial reform in China has gained momentum. Nowadays, China 
has sped up opening-up policy in financial sector by continuously deepening financial 
marketization. Thus, during this transitional period, it is very necessary to summarize experiences 
and lessons, probe into theoretical rationale and basis for China’s gradual financial reform, and 
envision prospect of China’s financial marketization.  
Generally speaking, financial marketization includes four components: capital marketization，
banking marketization， interests rate liberalization and foreign exchange liberalization and 
currency convertibility (Peng Xingyun 2003). Among which, capital marketization not only allows 
price to be determined by supply and demand, but also allows funds to flow freely. Capital 
marketization means that it is the automatic market screening mechanism, rather than government, 
that allocates capital to the most needed enterprises or departments. Banking marketization is to 
deregulate governmental control of banking industry by abolishing many restrictions on market 
entry, allowing non-governmental departments to engage in banking business, realizing 
marketization of banking operation, protecting banks’ operation by regulations and laws rather 
than direct administrative controls. Interests rates liberalization enables government to give up 
administrative interference, abolishes ruling on ceiling and floor of interests rates, and allows 
supply and demand of market fund to determine interests rates. Due to the fact that there are 
various financial instruments with different interests rates, therefore, interests rates liberalization is 
to liberalize interests rate system. Foreign exchange and currency liberalization means that 
exchange rate is determined by supply and demand in foreign exchange market rather than 
government maneuver. The marketization of currency convertibility, which is composed of current 
account convertibility and capital account convertibility, means that foreign currency holders can 
convert one foreign currency into another main international reserve currency freely.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. 7.1 summarizes different impetus and results of 
7 
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financial marketization; 7.2 probes into underlying rationale of gradual financial marketization from 
perspective of the Washington consensus and evolutionary-institutionalism; 7.3 discusses 
underlying rationale of gradual financial marketization from the perspective of historical and 
financial development; 7.4 examines the relationship between gradual financial reform and 
formation of the dual soft budget constraints in the case of China; 7.5 further discusses the 
importance of interests rate reform and money market development for financial marketization 
reform within the dual soft budget constraints; 7.6 is conclusion. 
45B7.1 GRADUALISM OF FINANCIAL MARKETIZATION: IMPETUSES AND RESULTS  
Since 1970s, the whole world has competed to implement financial marketization reform, and 
since 1990s, China, Russia and the other former socialist economies in the East Europe have 
initiated a new round of financial marketization reform. From a theoretical aspect, there are three 
impetuses, namely, external shocks, learning, and ideology and structure, which have different 
effects on timing and agenda of financial marketization, to push financial marketization forward 
(Adbul Abiad and Ashoka Mody, 2003). External shock compels government with a direct 
regulation on the financial market to adopt other measures to promote financial marketization 
immediately. And after a financial crisis, a lot of reform measures of marketization will usually be 
formulated to build a sound financial risk diversification mechanism. For example, Japan initiated 
the “big bang” financial reform after the 1997 Southeast Asian financial crisis, and USA gave up 
the regulation Q of the interests rates after the Savings and Loans Association crisis in late 1980s. 
Another impetus for financial marketization is learning. If learning could bring benefits to or alter 
balance of power of interests groups, then, learning, as a lasting process, becomes an impetus for 
reform and makes further reforms possible. For example, although Japan’s “big bang” reform 
resulted directly from financial crisis, the mode of reform was also deeply affected by the “big 
bang” reform of the UK. Davies and Douglass North believe that, if an institutional innovation can 
bring enough incentives and economy of scale, and in accordance with government’s policy, then 
the time lag for government’s intervention in innovation will be greatly shortened. Therefore, for 
developing economies which are concentrating on promoting economic development or forming a 
new institutional structure as soon as possible, it is feasible not only to promote domestic financial 
marketization reform by learning from experiences of financial development in the mature 
economies and combining with their own financial structure, but also to push forward the transition 
of financial institution through the governmental induced institutional changes. Therefore, in our 
opinion, the financial marketization reform through learning is a process of learning and imitating. 
Finally, the ideology may affect the financial marketization either independently or along with other 
causes. For example, the sudden change of ideology in Russia and East European economies led 
to the rapid marketization reform in the financial sector. 
Different impetus for financial marketization reform results in different paths and agenda. Abdul 
Abiad and Ashoka Mody’ research found that the impact on the financial process of the shock of 
the external shocks and learning was much greater than that of ideology. Nevertheless, impetus 
for the financial marketization can also come from government’s efforts to seek a new and more 
balanced institutional arrangement. In such a case, financial marketization reform is only a 
necessary part of a comprehensive reform rather than the whole component of marketization 
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reform. Besides, financial marketization reforms caused by financial crisis tend to be passive and 
radical. For example, after the 1997 Asia financial crises, those suffered economies gave up their 
fixed exchange rates quickly to adopt floating exchange system. However, for transitional 
economies at the initial stage of the reform, learning and ideology usually play a more obvious role 
in promoting the financial marketization reform. No matter what specific causes are, the financial 
marketization reform is always the efforts made by the government to seek new institutional 
balance. The main difference is that those reforms caused by external shocks are passive, while 
government takes a leading position in those reforms caused by learning and ideology in forming 
institutional balance. Furthermore, government may choose radical or gradual approach to push 
forward marketization reform to realize different results. 
No matter what impetus caused financial marketization reform, a well known fact is that different 
agenda and paths lead to different results. Take China and Russia as examples. By the end of 
2003, Russia's GDP and industrial output was still 20% and 35%lower than they were in 1990, the 
year just before the reform (O.T. Bogolov，2004). In contrast to the doldrums of Russia, China has 
maintained steady growth rates since the opening up policy. Although experienced some 
economic cycles, China’s GDP per capita in 2003 reached US$1,090 and GDP exceeded US$1 
trillion in 2000. During the two and half a decade reform, China’s GDP has increased from RMB 
362.4 billion in 1978 to RMB 11669.4 trillion in the 2003, with an average annual growth rate of 
more than 7%, witnessed stable price levels and enjoyed high saving rate of more than 30%. The 
abundant financial residues provide strong fund support for China’s gradual marketization reform. 
There are many explanations for the failures of Russia’s marketization reform. The architects of 
the reform affirmed that all reform measures were correct and it is the heavy legacy and the 
particularity of Russia’s reality that led to the failure. However, critics pointed out that the reform 
neglected the role of government as an important organizer. They believe that it is the choice of 
shock theropy instead of choosing gradual transition which is featured by building an effective 
market infrastructure and reforming people’s ideology that led the failure of Russia. Bogomolov 
(2004) claimed that it is the wrong decision in political aspect that played a decisive role in the 
failure and the latter interruption of Russia’s marketization reform. Paul.G. Hare (2004) believed 
that it was the mistake and bias in the early period of transition that affected the direction of 
institutional development and it was the negligence of building a related institution and focusing 
only on privatization in the early period of the reform that inevitably plunged the transitional 
economy into disorder, a lthough there demands for new institution. 
China’s comparative success in marketization reform also arouses many economists’ attentions. 
Among which, Jeffrey Sachs and Hu Yongtai (1994）thought that the differences of performance in 
China and Russia's reform were mainly caused by different economic structure. There are a great 
number of implicit unsubsidized unemployed peasants in China’s vast agriculture sector, and the 
flow of those unsubsidized unemployed peasants has been promoting economic development in 
China. This analysis implies that China’s success has no relationship with the gradualism. Li Yang 
(1992) argued that a key factor for the success of China’s gradual reform was the government‘s 
appropriate subsidies to compensate people whose interests are damaged to win their supports. 
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Naughton (1994）and Fan Gang (1994), however, believed that China's success should be 
accredited with the dual-track approach, which developing new institutions without fundamentally 
restructuring the old ones, thus realizing economic growth outside the planned economy. Similarly,,  
Haughton argued that China’s dual-track transition deregulated state monopoly and allowed the 
emerging industry to win market entry opportunities, thus intensified competition and formed a 
sound cycle in China’s reform. As far as the above opinions concerned, to seek supports and to 
adopt dual-track approach has obviously become important factors for maintaining the sustainable 
development of China’s economic and financial reform. 
Other economists also emphasized impact of macroeconomic environment on the financial 
marketization reform. R.J.Mckinnon and E.S.Show stressed the importance of macroeconomic 
stability in their early financial marketization reform theory. In their opinion, it is the high inflation 
rate that resulted in low depository rates in many developing economies. In order to pay positive 
returns for depositors, government should strictly control currency issuance. In order to control the 
currency issuance and curb inflation in the developing economies, government’s deficits should be 
controlled, which are heavily financed by lending from central bank or over-drafting. Therefore, R.J 
McKinnon and E.S.Show implicitly concludes that an unstable macroeconomic environment will 
put financial marketization reform into dilemma. After transition process began in some economies, 
some researches did many empirical studies, and found that at the beginning of transition, high 
inflation and huge fiscal deficit can play a decisive role in curbing economic growth; while for 
economies that obtained stability soon after transition, market-oriented systemic reform will play a 
crucial role with the macroeconomic stability as a precondition for economic growth, and 
market-oriented institutional reform will play an important continuous role in economic 
development. For example, a research by Havrylyshyn and Van Rooden on correlation between 
institutional reform and economic performance reveals that macroeconomic stability and 
institutional reform are key factors in promoting GDP’s growth. In addition, institutional reform can 
be divided into structural reform and systemic reform (Oleg.T.Bogomolov, 2004). The structural 
reform refers to the price marketization, trade marketization, exchange rate liberalization and 
banking and financial marketization, while systemic reform means the changes of legal system 
and political system in the society, which is generally measured by the extent of legal and political 
marketization. Zhang Jie（1998）believed that the great difference of the reform results between 
China and Russia was due to different saving rates. China’s long-term high saving rate leads to its 
success, while the big slump of the saving rates in Russia and East European economies resulted 
in their failure. 
However, macroeconomic stability and differences of saving rates might be result of different 
marketization strategies. For example Peng Xingyun（2002）argued that difference in saving rates 
was right the result rather than the reason of different financial marketization strategies. Irrational 
order of financial marketization leads to liquidity difficulty of banks, forcing concerned central 
banks to bail out by issuing large amount of currency. Undisciplined currency issuance and excess 
liquidity resulted in hyperinflation, further lower the saving rates of these economies and trigger 
economic collapse.  
 193
Therefore, for marketization reform in transitional economies, it is very natural to be interested in 
finding out what reform path can create balanced macroeconomic stability?  
46B7. 2 WASHINGTON CONSENSUS, EVOLUTIONARY-INSTITUTIONALISM THEORY, 
AND GRADUAL FINANCIAL MARKETIZATION 
There exists similarity in the transition direction in the economies with planned economy, to wit to 
substitute the new institution for the old one and to forsake the traditional highly-centralized 
planned economic system totally, thus building a new financial institution arrangement based on 
the market economy.（Cheng Wei,2004） But a different path arrangement is adopted in the 
economies with transition economy, giving rise to two totally different transitional paths: radical 
transition and gradual transition. 
95B7.2.1 Washington consensus and radical marketization reform 
The radical transition is an institutional change within the framework of the Washington Consensus 
in a forceful and comprehensive way, to realize the “big bang” reform, which includes the price 
marketization, privatization of property right and economic stabilization and fundamentally denies 
the past institutional order. There are several theoretical supports for the Washington Consensus. 
Firstly, by deducting the “big bang” marketization, the general equilibrium theory requires all prices 
to become market-oriented at the same time, otherwise it will lead to a distorted price. Secondly, in 
the comparative economic system, J.Kornai emphasizes the complementarities of every factor in 
the economic system and the indivisibility of the whole system. A famous theory is that you cannot 
select the optimal parts from the market system and planned system into one basket, because the 
economic system is not a supermarket but an integrated and inseparable one. Thirdly, in public 
choice theory, J.M.Buchanan believes that an overstaffed government hampers the economic 
development, so the marketization should realize a rapid and large privatization through smashing 
the state power. Fourthly, in modern monetarism theory, Milton Friedman believes that inflation is a 
currency phenomenon happening at any time. The increase of currency supply in the emerging 
market is caused by budgetary deficits and lack of a sound financial market, in which a stable 
macroeconomic policy can be formulated.  
In the initial period of economic marketization within the transitional economy, the Washington 
Consensus became very popular in some economies, which carried out a package of “big bang” 
marketization reforms. According to the explanation by Jeffrey Sachs, the shock therapy is as 
follows: to adopt strict monetary tightening policy, to strictly control the scale of currency issuance 
and credit, to reduce the fiscal deficit to curb the inflation, to abolish the price subsidy and 
liberalize the price system decided by the market supply and demand, to realize a free 
convertibility of currency and build a free trade system by abolishing the restriction on the foreign 
trade, to break off the monopoly of some sectors and give up the restriction on the privatized 
departments, to restructure the SOEs and realize the privatization as soon as possible so as to 
build a mixed economy on the basis of private ownership. Therefore, price marketization, 
privatization and macro economic stability are three pillars of the Washington Consensus. 
Proponents of the Washington Consensus think that as a successful marketization reform can 
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create an immediate result of increasing efficiency, the reform should take a radical shock therapy 
like a big bang. This kind of reform means to realize the price marketization and enterprise 
privatization at the same time without sequences. In summary, among those three components, 
stable macroeconomic is a prerequisite, the economic marketization is the core and privatization 
acts as a basic. (Zhang Jun，1997) 
However, some unexpected and unsuccessful results appear after the adoption of the shock 
therapy in some economies. The reforms in East European economies and Russia brought 
disastrous impacts to their financial systems. With the failure of the Washington Consensus and 
the research on the ten years’ experience and lessons, the evolutionary-institutionalism theory 
develops from strengthen to strengthen. It is gradually known that transition not only refers to the 
marketization, privatization and stability, but also means that a successful market economy should 
have enough institution support. Furthermore, transition not only refers to that of price and market 
emphasized in the Washington Consensus but also focuses of institutional building in a micro 
level. 
96B7.2.2 gradual marketization and evolutionary-institutionalism 
The theory about transitional nations believes that market economy is a more efficient system than 
the planned economy and that as soon as the planned economy is over, a new market economy 
will take the place of it quickly and stably. However, the complexity in the transitional process 
makes people realize that it is crucial for the success of reform to establish and maintain a new 
institution. McMillan (1997) thought that market was an operational institution based on rule of law. 
Under the circumstances of asymmetrical information, only a set of explicit trading rules can 
guarantee the normal market operation, which means that the institution and organization of the 
market can play a role of sharing information and providing incentive measures. 
The evolutionary-institutionalism theory is rooted from the following three theories: a) the 
institutional economics which is provided by modern microeconomics theory reveals the 
development of non-cooperative game theory; b) evolutionary approach to economics; c) a 
philosophical skepticism influenced by Ronald Coase，Douglass North and John Williamson who 
are the main representatives of institutional economics making great contribution. The modern 
microeconomic theory, especially the development of game with incomplete information theory 
also provides new analysis evidences for institutional evolution. George Akerlof，Michael Spence 
and Joseph E. Stiglitz also make important contribution to the imperfect information theory. They 
believe that a sound market operation should be based on complete information. The conservative 
politicians think that in a complicated society where every person masters limited information, 
social economic system should filter into the process and accumulate individual information, and 
finally form a stock of information and knowledge. From accumulative developments of information 
and knowledge stock, the change of society should be evolutional. Evolutional method of 
economics developed by Nelson, Winther and CJ Meurell point out there exist diversified economy 
and non-diversified economy，which are impossible to organize on a whole. From the philosophical 
skepticism on the social project developed by Friedrich A. Hayek and Karl Popper, the 
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evolutionary-institutionist especially emphasize the relative innocence of economic and social 
system and its transition, the uncertainty of social engineering and the revolt against large 
institutions change in any form. 
Furthermore, we should pay attention to the peculiarity of institution. As a social arrangement, 
economic institutions bear the following characteristics: (a) institution is the rules governing modes 
of economic behavior, which run counter to individual preferences in a short term; (b) institution is 
a common expectation formed by customs, trust, rules and regulations; (c) institution refers to a 
wide consensus reached under the condition that the economy is considered as transaction 
process of repeated game in which most types of transactions occur for many times; and (d) 
institution has the nature of anonymity, which means that the function of a given institution should 
not be dependent upon the economic agents of transaction activities seeking some related 
institution. Paul.G. Hare (2004). The above characteristics determine the institution’s nature of 
public goods. This nature makes it hard to create an optimal institutional supply based on the 
market mechanism in the transitional process. Under these conditions, the government must play 
an important role to create economic system that cannot be built by market, to standardize the 
public preferences. However, not any new institution is suitable for any country (Paul. Hare. 2004). 
So the transition of financial market institutions is a process of seeking institutional balance on the 
basis of their national conditions, instead of transplanting any sound institution from one country to 
another, which is likely to have bad results. 
Besides the reasons for the gradual financial marketization from the institutional evolutionist 
prospective, there are two advantages of gradual financial marketization implied by the research. 
(Dewartripont and Roland, 1992, 1993) Firstly, with the precondition that the government had 
enough power to arrange the agenda, if the costs for compensating the people whose interests 
are damaged in the reform are too high, the government should adopt a gradual reform. Secondly, 
the gradual reform lowers the uncertainty to some extent, thus increasing the reform’s feasibility. 
The aggregate uncertainty brought by the reform may be positive, which can produce high returns 
and increase the efficiency, and may be negative, resulting in the decline of the total demand, the 
increase of the unemployment and even the fall of the output. However, if the marketization reform 
is in a gradual manner，once the negative aggregate uncertainty appears, the costs of changing 
the situation will be less than that in the “big bang” reform. To wit why the gradualism may reduce 
the test costs and relax the ex ante feasibility constraints brought by the aggregate uncertainty. 
Obviously, China’s reform concept of having a bold try reflects the above characteristics.  
47B .3 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT, AND GRADUAL 
FINANCIAL MARKETIZATION 
In the above sector, we analyze the gradual financial marketization from the institutional evolution 
perspective. In the following part, we will research into the logic of the financial marketization from 
the historical perspective and financial development. 
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97B .3.1 Supply-led and demand-followed financial development  
Patrick (1966) identified two financial development paths as supply-leading one and 
demand-following one. Financial development may be promoted by the demand of economic 
entity or by the pursuit of higher profits through developing new financial products, to increase 
financial demand through increasing supply. The demand-following development is viewed as a 
passive reaction to the demand of financial service in the economic entity. It is resulted from 
continual expansion of the market scope and increasing diversified products that requiring to 
diversify the risks more effectively and to better control the transaction costs, thus promoting the 
financial development. The demand-following financial development, which is prior to the demand 
of financial service from the economic entity, plays a positive and active role in the economic 
growth. During the demand-following financial development, financial institutions take the initiative 
to mobilize the resources lagging behind in the traditional department to the modern department 
that can promote the economic growth, to increase the efficiency of resource allocation. 
In Patrick opinion, differences of financial development paths exist in different stages of economic 
development. In the early stage of economic development in the developing economies, 
supply-leading financial development takes a leading role, which is particularly demonstrated by 
the fact that financial reform supported by the government provides financing channels for those 
effective technological innovations. After entering the mature stage, economic development is 
dominated by the demand-following financial development. The wider the development gap 
between the developing economies and developed economies becomes, the more likely the 
developing economies are to imitate the supply-leading financial development path for promoting 
the growth and development of the economic entity. This is the financial marketization reform 
through learning mentioned above. 
Actually, it is impossible and unscientific to confine the demand-following or supply-leading 
financial development to a certain stage. In reality, the supply-leading financial development and 
demand-following one always intertwine with each other, which depend on each other and 
promote mutually. However, historically speaking, any financial instrument or financial organization 
follows the demand-following development path in the beginning, and gradually evolves into the 
supply-leading financial development, by advancing its financial departments initially and further 
promoting the growth and development of its economic entity. It is because that the financial 
organization has the idiosyncrasy of profits-seeking possessed by all the economic agents and 
can display its own subjective initiatives and continuously develop new financial products and 
instruments in order to maximize the profits, which stimulates entity’s demand for the new financial 
instrument and financial service, promotes financial industry’s own development that be 
independent of the development of economic entity to some extent. 
98B7.3.2 Prospective from endogenous financial development theory 
The theory of endogenous financial development clarifies how the financial organization and 
financial market evolve with the change of per capita income level. It believes that the change of 
the financial structure endogenously derives from the economic growth and development. 
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Greenwood Jeremy and Boyan Jovanovic (1990), Greenwood Jeremy and Bruce Smith (1997) 
and Ross Levine (1993) believed that in the early stage of economic development when the per 
capita income and wealth are very limited, people were not rich enough to pay the fixed entry fee, 
even when they accumulated enough capital, they were not provided with enough incentives to 
make use of the financial intermediary or financial market because of the low transaction volume 
and high unit costs of the transaction. The lack of demand for the financial service makes the 
supply hard to develop, much less the existence basis of the financial intermediary or the financial 
market. As the economic development enters a certain stage, the people becoming rich first 
whose income and wealth reach the critical value are encouraged to pay the fixed entry fee to 
make use of the financial intermediary institution and financial market. With the further economic 
development, more and more people whose income and wealth reaching the critical value make 
use of the financial intermediary and financial market, to further promote their development. The 
demand for the financial intermediary service develops with the income level, implying that both 
demands for the financial services and the developments of the financial intermediary 
endogenously derive from the economic growth and development. 
In the endogenous financial development theory, there are different demands for the financial 
service in different stages of economic development. In the initial stage, people without enough 
per capital income and wealth are just able to establish a financial intermediary to reduce the 
information and transaction costs, so they have a low demand for other financial organizations, 
financial services and financial instruments. As the economy develops and the national income 
level increases, people whose per capita income and wealth reaching a certain level are able to be 
encouraged to engage in the financial market activities positively. So the higher the per capita 
income, the more developed and brisk the financial market becomes. Moreover, from the 
endogenous financial theory perspective, the relationship between financial market and financial 
intermediary varies in different development stages. In the early period of economic development, 
the financial market and financial intermediary implement and promote each other mutually. The 
development of the financial market, largely, depends on the exploration of these potential saving 
resources in the economic society in the early period of economic development. The competition 
in the financial market does not reduce fund resources of financial intermediary but benefits from 
the development of the financial market. Furthermore, the efficiency of the financial intermediary is 
relatively high compare to that of the financial market. Therefore, the banking-led financial system 
has a high efficiency without external interference, in which the financial intermediaries including 
banks take a dominant position in the financial activity. The potential saving resources in the whole 
society are fully allocated with the further development of the financial market, which transfers the 
saving resources from the financial intermediary to the financial market. Greenwood and Boyan 
Jovanovic (1990) believed that the financial intermediary network may need higher costs, so there 
exits a mutually cycle relationship between economic growth and financial development. The 
financial intermediary may not only benefit from the economic growth but also be beneficial to the 
growth of the economic entity and change of the economic structure. Levy（1993）emphasized that 
economic growth may even affect the type of the financial intermediary supported by the economy. 
When the per capita real income is very low, the simple financial intermediary will be chosen with 
the purpose of mobilizing the savings, diversifying the risks and managing the risks of liquidity. The 
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increase of the per capita income makes the economic system develop into a more complicated 
financial intermediary whose main functions are changing costs, such as supervising the invested 
project and identifying the most effective innovation with high costs. So the fixed costs are needed 
to establish a financial intermediary. The mutual improvement of the financial development and 
economic growth may arouse a “threshold effect”. 
The endogenous financial development theory analyzes the constraint condition of changes in the 
financial structure from the perspective of financial asset demander. It reviews how the investor’s 
demands for the financial service and financial asset are affected by the per capital income level 
and entry costs of financial service. Although this theory discusses the role and effect of the 
financial intermediary and financial markets from the aspect of the asset portfolio, it fails to analyze 
the initial conditions and paths depended by the financial intermediary, capital market and financial 
opening up thoroughly, which means to analyze the paths of financial development and structure 
changes from the aspect of people who lack of fund. 
99B7.3.3 Historical perspective of enterprise financing means 
The analysis of the economic history proves that enterprises do not mainly depend on the external 
financing before banks exits, which are mainly through internal equity financing under the 
proprietorship and partnership. In comparison with the external financing, the control rights in the 
proprietorship and partnership are in the hands of the proprietor and partner without professional 
manager market and the separation of the ownership and control. So before the existence of 
banks, the financing means of the proprietorship and partnership are control-directed, whose 
agency costs of operation is internalized by proprietor and partner with low moral hazards and 
adverse selection risks. 
There are problems of investment vision and diversification in the proprietorship and partnership. If 
conflicts exit between the time of gaining net income flow invested by the owner and consumption 
process expected by him, the problem of investment vision will appear. If the time preference of 
the capital owner reflects his desire for the consumption rather than accept the current market 
interest rates to increase the savings, he will not be stimulated to increase the investment even in 
the profitable field. It is known that the proprietors have to spend a lot of time and financial 
resources on his enterprise in the proprietorship with high risks caused by the undue dependence 
on the human resource of sole proprietor and inside financing, which is very different from the 
investment in the security portfolio. There are large limitations on the expansion of the 
proprietorship and partnership because of the high transaction costs in the external financing. On 
one hand, the proprietor and partner do not have enough saving balances; on the other hand, it is 
almost impossible for the proprietor and partner to transfer the capital balance to different regions, 
which is restricted by the geography. By combining resources of several people to reduce the 
financial constraints faced by the enterprise, it is possible for the partnership to gain the scale 
advantage. Once the proportion of the asset invested by every partner is small, the partnership 
can be viewed as an opportunity of reducing the risk occurred to the costs, which cannot get rid of 
the problem about common ownership. The partner of the enterprise is always not only a residual 
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claimant but also a main decision-maker. There is still not specialized manager market. In such an 
operation model that the shareholders mange their own company without employing professional 
managers, all the residual claimants, also as the main decision-makers, are responsible for their 
act by their own wealth, so as to reduce the agency costs greatly. However, it is easily imagined 
that the enterprise experiences a low efficient operation without professional management. 
In order to overcome the disadvantages of financing, the indirect financing, which mainly refers to 
the banking credit, comes into being. As the financial intermediary, banks enjoy strong advantages 
of solving the asymmetric information, lowering the transaction costs, providing the liquidity and 
maintaining the continuity of material capital investment, which also endogenously derives from 
the economic development. As the saving and investment separate from each other, the external 
financing of banking credit incurs higher agency costs. The financial fragility is accelerated by the 
asymmetric information that gained by banks in screening the borrowers, the exiting adverse 
selection as well as moral hazard in the financing process. Although Aoki Masahiko（1995）
believed that the advantages of the supervision system centered on the banks lie in that the 
control right transfers from the insider to the lending banks because of the insolvency. But in the 
arm’s length financing arrangement of the contingent governance, with the relatively low ex ante 
governance of the banks, crediting banks can control enterprises only when potential 
principal-agency risks expose. Therefore, this kind of arm’s length financing has a high agency 
costs. The proprietorship and partnership can effectively overcome the barriers of indivisible 
material capital investment even without the agency risks in the external financing. However, at 
that time without separation of the ownership and control, there is no professional manager market. 
In addition, people’s talent and financial residues are not symmetrical in the economic distribution 
and the financing arrangement without manager market makes economic growth rate far lower 
than the potential growth rate. 
When the arm’s length financing develops to a certain extent, the financial development will be 
faced with two crucial problems of financial stability and economic growth, which are to reduce the 
agency costs through appropriate institutional arrangement and to make managerial ability and 
capital transaction display their own advantages after the separation of ownership and control. 
This separation arouses another two problems to be solved, which are the incentives and 
constrains of the managerial personnel and to increase the efficiency of the corporate governance. 
Although these two problems arouse from external financing, they still depend on the related 
financial arrangement in some extent and are solved by the forced institution of ownership 
protection. The financial structure with different demands determines different governance 
structures of enterprises. This needs the combination of the arm’s length financing and indirect 
control-oriented financing. The change of financing makes enterprise system evolve into a modern 
corporate system, which transforms the direct-control financing into the indirect control-oriented 
financing of issuing the external equity. Then the opportunism of the managerial personnel can be 
constrained through information feedback function under the market mechanism and proxy 
contest in the manager market. 
In order to attract external equity investors, it is very important to adopt an institutional 
arrangement with limited liability. If the liability is unlimited, once the stockholders sell the stocks, 
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the potential stock buyer will care about the financial condition of the related corporation. Under 
the unlimited liability system, the bearer stock cannot be traded, so the stock buyer will pay higher 
costs for the information collection and transaction. However, a limited liability system can 
overcome the difficulties mentioned above, which not only ensures the normal operation of the 
enterprise but also changes people’s anticipation for the future’s situation of the enterprise into the 
evaluation pressure, which are fully reflected in the current security value and managerial decision 
of the enterprise. However, it is the institutional arrangement with limited liability that gives 
prominence to the adverse selection, moral hazard and insider control problem, as the ownership 
and control separate with each other in the external equity financing. Compared with the external 
equity financing, the debt financing has fixed financing costs and constrains of the term. The high 
costs of bankruptcy constrain the manager in the enterprise. However, the eternity of equity 
financing provides convenience for the managers’ opportunism and wide insider control. In order 
to strengthen the insider control, the corporate balancing mechanism is established which is made 
up of shareholder meeting, board of director and board of supervision, but it fails to provide an 
information mechanism reflecting the operational changes of the enterprise at any moment. 
Then the secondary market comes into being，which not only provides liquidity for the investors but 
also continuously evaluates the enterprise performances. For the corporation with diversified 
equity, the stock price fluctuation can reveal the managerial quality and business achievement, 
and the constraints of the managers can be strengthened through the proxy contest. In the public 
corporation, the residual claim is enjoyed by the outside shareholders, which can be traded by the 
stockholders freely with low transaction costs. This kind of residual claim structure is an incentive 
for the large-scale venture capital. As the residual claim rights of the common stock are rarely 
limited, the potential conflict between utility maximization enjoyed by the stockholder and the 
maximization of the market value of the corporation would be minimized. When the stocks can be 
evaluated fairly and traded with lower costs, the owner can trade stocks for the financial securities 
whose flexible cash flow matches his consumption preference. So the main concern of the owner 
relates to the maximization of the share values. Another prominent advantage of public 
corporation lies in that the shareholder may choose security portfolio by purchasing stocks and 
other financial instruments from more than one corporation. The asset diversification helps the 
owner lower the costs of assuming the risks, which brings advantageous financing conditions of 
the large-scale venture capital. 
Therefore, the external equity financing leads to the specialized division of bearing the risks and 
corporate management. The specialization of bearing the risks creates an effective market for 
residual claim, which evaluates the corporate and unclearly evaluates the act performance of the 
agent and manager. Similarly, the professional manager market is created with the separation of 
the decision and risk bearing, which constrains the act of the agent and manger. In addition, the 
manager talents make the proxy contests more seriously. The common stock holder can exert the 
right of voting directly, whose right stems from the residual claim and be reflected cheaply through 
brisk capital market. The financial stability can be improved with the price fluctuation of the capital 
market revealing the operation information of the corporate and the agency costs being reduced 
through proxy contest. 
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The above analysis implies that the financial development can be divided as demand-following 
one and supply-leading one. The former one must be based on the latter one. The change of the 
financial structure stems from the development of the economic entity endogenously. The 
historical change of the financing means for an enterprise is also a process of seeking new 
contracts and institutional balances. Therefore, the financial marketization reform should be 
viewed as changes of the financial structures, which can be included in the economic entity. So 
different development stages of economic entity determine will different financial structures. 
Therefore, the government-induced financial institutional transition, as a supply-leading financial 
development, should be gradual rather than radical. Therefore, we draw a logical conclusion 
through our analysis of the financial marketization reform from the perspective of historical and 
financial development. 
48B7.4 GRADULISM FINANCIAL REFORM AND FORMATION OF DUAL SOFT 
BUDGET CONSTRAINTS 
100B7.4.1 Gradual Financial Marketization in China and Formation of Dual Soft Budget 
Constraints 
Since the financial marketization can only be realized in a gradual manner, the reformers have to 
face a great problem of marketization order. In the opinions of economists such as Roland G 
(1994), as strong aggregate uncertainties exist in the marketization reform, the gradual reform 
should begin with the field in which most people have high expectations for the results and 
postpone the field in which reform may affect the majority’s interests. Next, Roland’s theory of 
gradual reform adopts a strategy of avoiding the important aspect and dwelling on the less 
important ones. It is not from the aspect of interdependence between every institution, every 
financial structure, financial structure and economic structure that explores the sequence of 
economic and financial marketization. Zhang Jun (1997) believed that when the institutional 
structure of production couldn’t be reformed very quickly, especially in the transitional period with 
immature development and softened budget constraints in enterprises, the reform on the pricing 
system had important implications for the production and economic growth and had direct impact 
on the aggregate pricing level. The price marginal marketization not only makes price become a 
passive calculation tool but also acts as a signal to adjust enterprise’s production mix marginally. 
To wit to say, in his research of real sector, top priority should be given to the price marketization. 
With differences in the real sector and financial sector, other economists put forward their ideas 
about marketization order in those sectors. They believe that financial market can be adjusted 
more quickly than commodity market, and cannot be adjusted with the same speed as other 
markets. The successful reform in real sector becomes a precondition for the reform in financial 
sector, so it is necessary to maintain the policy of restraining finance in the first stage of economic 
marketization and to conduct the tool competitive reform in the second stage, during which real 
sector will be segmented into different reforms step by step and financial marketization reform will 
be introduced gradually.  
R.J.Mckinnon and E.S.Show are the founder of financial restraint theory and firstly introduce the 
financial marketization theory. During their early theories about financial marketization reform, 
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although they emphasized the importance of monetary and fiscal control and foreign trade 
marketization in financial reform, they did not put forward the internal marketization order in the 
financial sector. Their implicit conclusion was that with sound fiscal control and foreign trade 
marketization, “big bang” marketization reform could be conducted in the financial sector. In fact, 
many financial liberalized states in early period, including South Korea, conducted their financial 
reforms under the guidance of above theory. In book of the Order of Economic Marketization : 
Financial Control in the Transition to a Market Economy, the order of economic marketization 
referred by R.J.Mckinnon meant a sequence that was necessary for stabilizing the environment in 
supporting the financial reform, which didn’t have substantial difference with previous theories, 
such as that the government was required to have strong fiscal and monetary control capacity 
conducted in the foreign trade marketization and in the financial marketization . Subsequently 
R.J.Mckinnon also emphasized that marketization in financial sector should be followed by that of 
real sector such as pricing and so on. Obviously, the order theory mentioned by R.J.Mckinnon did 
not concern the order of internal finance systematically. However, we should admit that the fiscal 
and monetary control and foreign trade marketization bear great importance to the gradual 
marketization in financial sector. However, what we concern more is how government can realize 
the purpose of controlling money and whether a stable money control needs a correct order of 
financial gradual marketization or not. 
The financial marketization reform should consider the political and ideological constraints and 
become a strategy with aesthetic results in conducting a gradual reform. As the marketization 
reform is a process of redistributing interests, how to fully compensate the damaged interests 
group to lessen the resistance in the reform is one of the important conditions to successfully push 
forward the reform. As for a large country like China, one wiser method is to provide large amount 
of subsidies to seek supporters for the reform. (Li Yang, 1992) It becomes a necessity to control 
the inflation, thus providing more stable expected returns ratio for depositors. Overall, from those 
aspects mentioned above government’s effective control on money supply and strict disciplines of 
money issuance play an important role in gradual marketization reform in the financial sector. 
Furthermore, most scholars who support the gradual marketization believe that the marketization 
in real sector should precede that in financial marketization. However, we believe that the 
marketization reform in real sector makes it possible to seek support in financial sector. The 
financial sector provides financing support for the marketization in real sector; more importantly, its 
gradual marketization acts as an important basis of the marketization in real sector. Therefore, it is 
impossible to separate the real sector and financial sector into two different stages in the overall 
economic marketization. One option to wit more realistic is that priority should be put on the 
marketization in real economic sector in the early period of economic marketization, while it is 
transferred to the financial sector in the latter period of economic marketization.  
As early as the 1970s, marketization reform had been initiated in the real economic sector in a 
large scale in China. Yang Ruilong(1998), Huang Shaoan (1999), Zhou Ye’an (2000) and Deng 
Hongtu (2004) gave interpretations to the institutional evolutions in China from different angles. 
However broadly speaking, China’s economic transition developed from the real sector to the 
financial sector. After the price marketization in real sector was over, large-scale marketization 
reform is conducted in the financial sector since the middle 1990s, forming a unique order pattern 
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of China’s marketization reform. During the evolution process of China’s financial institution, 
multi-games were conducted among local governments and central government, all financial 
micro-participants and regulatory authorities in various governmental levels. 
As for the evolutional path of China’s financial marketization institution, we believe that the reform 
on financial institutions develops from non-regular finance to regular finance, which has same 
theoretical basis with those of Zhou Ye’an (2000). Financial institutional innovation of extra-system 
is firstly conducted in the private level to compensate the marginal shortage of capital within 
system. In the initial period of developing capital market in the private level, the government strictly 
cracked down on the innovations obeying their goals and adopted acquiesce attitude towards 
financing institution, whose real economic performances were not clear enough. If that institution 
could realize the Pareto improvement innovation of financing institution, the government would 
revise the current institutional arrangement, expand the acting boundary of financial activities 
allowed by the regular governmental institutions and combine the previous extra-system capital 
market into the regular capital market within the system, to realize the goal of governmental 
decision-making. In the initial period of financial institutional innovation, the government chose just 
partial innovations, which meant making pilot reforms in special zone, and decided whether to 
further expand the reform or not based on the results of those pilot reforms. This evolution process 
of institution is same with the overall view about China’s gradual reform. Furthermore, the financial 
institutional innovation conducted spontaneously in private level instead of having compulsory 
institutional innovation by the government, may greatly reduce the risks of institutional innovation 
or at least confine the risks within partial scope. If the government found that the incomes from 
financial innovation in private level actually were more than the reforming costs, the government 
would positively take part in the institutional innovation, which provided political support for the 
spread of institutional innovation and lessened the political obstacles and implementation costs for 
institutional innovation. 
101B7.4.2 Dual soft budget constraints and Gradual Financial Marketization 
In the process of gradual reform, how to compensate appropriately the damaged interests group 
indeed becomes one of the key factors determining the success of gradual reform. Except for 
providing fiscal subsidies, the government tightly controls the state-owned financial system 
through providing financial subsidies by means of cheap credit, finally forming dual soft budget 
constraints. The soft budget constraints refer to economic phenomenon that one economic 
organization can survive from the bailout of external organization when facing financial difficulty. 
The forming of soft budget constraints needs at least two main bodies: body of soft budget 
constraints and supporter of soft budget constraints (Kornai, 2002) The body of soft budget 
constraints refers to the organizations those can’t continue to exist without external bailout, if the 
organization‘s income is less than expenditure and deficit appears under the precondition of 
limited natural endowment and income. The supporter usually refers to the organization controlled 
by government, which can transfer resources directly to bailout the body of soft budget constraints 
in difficulty.  
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Shi Huaqiang and Peng Xingyun (彭兴韵, 2003) point out that China’s commercial banks in 
transitional economy play a dual role as both body of soft budget constraints and supporter of soft 
budget constraints on SOEs. As the body of soft budget constraints, commercial banks should be 
constrained by their own resources in the process of seeking maximized interests. When 
commercial banks are insolvent, they go bankruptcy and liquidated based on the market principles. 
The contrast of weak fiscal authority and strong banks appeared in China’s transition to the market 
economy. Under the circumstances that government plays a continuingly less role in fiscal control 
and the fiscal authority is hard to maintain the role as supporter of soft budget constraints, 
government will strengthen its control on the SOCBs, to finance the enterprise that it had 
preference. Therefore, the commercial banks act as the supporter of soft budget constraints on 
SOEs. As the supporter of soft budget constraints on SOE, the commercial banks assume the 
obligations of financing for SOEs. The problems in the commercial banks are not just aroused by 
unsound internal management, but the result that government compels commercial banks to be 
supporters of soft budget constraints on SOEs. Therefore, when SOCBs, as supporters of soft 
budget constraints on SOE meet many difficulties, the government has the obligation to bailout by 
all means, which leads the soft budget constraints of commercial banks in the transitional period. It 
can be seen that the dual soft budget constraints refer to the SOCBs that become supporters of 
soft budget constraints on reforming enterprises and conversely their own soft budget constraints 
as well.   
In order to analyze the impact of dual soft budget constraints on China’s financial gradual 
marketization reform, it is necessary for us to review the process of reforming SOEs. Since the 
early 1980s, the reform experienced four stages: government appropriations being replaced by 
loans, substitution of tax payment for profits delivery, contracting system and joint stock 
restructuring. The policy of government appropriations being replaced by loans means to 
transform the state’s within-budgetary investments on the enterprises into loans of commercial 
banks. That fundamentally changes enterprises’ nature of fund sourcing. The relationship of 
borrowing and lending between enterprises and banks is established, which shows that fund has 
price like commodity. In order to adapt to the financing reform that government appropriations 
being replaced by loans, four state-owned specialized banks were set up, while the PBOC acted 
as the central bank. At the same time, that policy did not change the distribution relations between 
enterprises and government. Enterprises turned in their profits to the government, so they were 
just subordinate to the government, not an independent entity engaging in production and 
operation. In addition, governmental ministries did not wholly serve for the public interests. The 
policy of substitution of tax payment for profits delivery overcomes the above limitations, changing 
the enterprises’ profits turned in to the government for their taxations paid to the government. That 
means substantial changes take place in the enterprise nature, as they give prominence to 
government’s role only as the state machine of engaging in the distribution and re-distribution of 
national income by means of taxation and transfer payment rather than act as the owner of 
enterprises in participating the distribution of enterprises’ residues.  
The government appropriations being replaced by loans or substitution of tax payment for profits 
delivery has not bring great changes to enterprise’s operational mechanism, especially for the 
reform on the incentive mechanism of enterprise’s managerial personnel. The contracting system 
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later on surpasses the single financing relationship and relationship of interests’ distribution. That 
system began to note that the success of enterprise reform is depended on providing enough 
incentive mechanism and residual claim rights to the managerial personnel of enterprises. 
However, although the managerial personnel of enterprises have a more advantageous position in 
contract system than the policy of substitution of tax payment for profits delivery, the contract 
system is just a reform on distribution relationship without penetrating into the property relationship 
of enterprises, finally exposing adverse effects such as shortsighted enterprise acts. Based on 
summarizing experiences and lessons in the past several periods, China systematically initiated 
the reform on enterprise’s property right structure and governance structure in the early 1990s, 
based on market economy principles. So it is required that government’s control on enterprises is 
gradually reduced and appraisal mechanism of marketization and information disclosure 
mechanism are established for enterprise through capital market development. Under such a 
background, Shanghai Securities Exchange and Shenzhen Securities Exchange were set up at 
the end of 1991 and in the early 1992 respectively. After the development of capital market, the 
restructured joint-stock enterprises initially established enterprise governance organizational 
structure, including shareholder meeting, board of directors and board of supervisors. Based on 
the regulatory requirements, the listed companies should disclose related financial statements and 
some important activities in time. Furthermore, some intermediary agencies including accounting 
firms, auditing firms and lawyer firms also took part in the process of listed enterprises’ 
governance. All of these have played an important role in improving governance of China’s listed 
enterprises and increasing information transparence, solving the asymmetrical information 
between investors and enterprises. Besides disclosing above information, the stock exchange and 
fluctuation of stock prices in secondary market conveyed some important information to some 
extent. 
Although the credit relationship of paying back what you borrowed was established between 
enterprises and banks through the policy of government appropriations being replaced by loans or 
substitution in the initial period of reform, that relationship has not been fully marketized, which 
was still a process of allocating resources under the strong executive control of government. As 
mentioned above, in the face of marketization reform, the state-owned enterprises that developed 
from plan economy still need governmental subsidies, whose form changed gradually from 
previous fiscal subsidies to provide financial subsidies through commercial banks’ cheap loans 
under the governmental control on state-owned commercial banks. The main means of financial 
subsidies was that government provided cheap loans to enterprises or industries they preferred 
whose interests rates were greatly lower than market clearing equilibrium interests rates. 
Therefore, the SOCBs had to assume large amount of financing obligations from government. 
Even the corporation governance structure that oriented towards capital market was established in 
China, the government has not given up the controlling rights on the SOCBs timely. The transition 
from fiscal subsidies to financial subsidies and the strict control on state-owned financial system 
become important reasons for maintaining rapid growth and stability for almost thirty years during 
the marketization reform process. At the same time, as enterprises received fund under the 
condition the SOEs and the state-owned banks have similar ownership, the loans to SOEs from 
banks were considered as quasi-fiscal capital to be unlimitedly used. Furthermore, government 
must deal well with the relationship among reform, development and stability in the marketization 
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reform. However, all the reforms in China take stability as top priority. When stability arouses 
conflicts with market principles, government will sacrifice market principles temporarily for the sake 
of maintaining stability, such as issuing loans for stability and solidarity. So multi-faceted 
government actions further strengthen soft budget constraint nature of loans to SOEs (see table 
7-1).  
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190BTable 7-1 Main Stages of Financial Reform and Enterprise Reform in China, 1978--2005 
 Enterprise Reform Interests Rates Reform Monetary Regulation Mechanism Banking Reform 
1978-1983 
Policy of decentralization and 
interests concessions was adopted for 
SOEs, which were allowed to retain 
portion of profits 
   
1984-1987 Substitution of tax payment for profits delivery was put into place in SOEs.    
1984 
central fiscal appropriations were 
replaced by loans from commercial 
banks to SOEs 
 The PBOC specialized in the function of central bank. The four SOCBs were set up 
1987-1991 SOEs conducted contracting system    
1992 
Large-scale joint-stock reforms were 
conducted on SOEs. Securities 
Exchanges were established 
   
1994    Three policy banks were set up, divesting policy businesses from state-owned banks
1996  A unified inter-bank market came into being in China. The central banks initiated to regulate base money in open market.  
1998  Inter-bank bond market established 
The credit scale control was cancelled. 
The monetary policies were operated 
through open market, rediscount ratio and 
required deposit ratio 
Ratios of asset and liability in commercial 
banks were managed 
1999  
The loan rates of financial institutions to small enterprise had 
an upper float of 20% based on required loan rates and 10% to 
large enterprise. From September, the loan rates to small 
enterprises had an upper float of 30% and 10% to large and 
medium sized enterprises. 
 
Asset management companies were set up, 
peeling of RMB1400 billion non-performing 
assets from the four SOCBs 
2000  Deposit and loan rates of foreign currency were loosened   
2003    
USD45 billion foreign exchange reserve 
was injected into the CCB and the BOC, 
which readjusted organizational structure 
and had joint-stock reforms 
2004   ceiling of loan rates and floor of deposit rates were loosened   
2005 Share-trading reform   
Capital was injected into the ICBC to write 
off non-performing assets. The CCB IPO 
made debut in Hong Kong and went public 
in 2005 
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The soft budget constraints of enterprises are resulted from state-owned property rights. Therefore, 
the hardening of soft budget constraints for enterprises will bring changes to the current situation 
of property rights in state-owned enterprises. In the following table, we may find that China’s 
financial reform lagged behind that of enterprises. In the discussions about which should be 
reformed first: enterprises or banks, China’s practices gave us the answer. The dual soft budget 
constraints provide theoretical support for the reforming order in China. Therefore, the sell of 
partial state-owned property rights means hardening enterprises’ budgetary constraints, thus 
becoming necessary steps of preparing for state-owned banks’ reforms. In the aspect of changing 
property rights structure, China mainly depends on the pioneering development of capital market 
and introduced non-state-owned property rights by conducting joint-stock reforms on SOEs, which 
can change the soft budget constraints of enterprises. To wit not only the needs of marketization in 
real economic sector but also those of marketization in financial sector. Only when the budgetary 
constraints in real sector reached to some extents, to wit to say that only when the state-owned 
banks are not considered as the supporters of soft budget constraints for SOEs, can state-owned 
banks conduct marketization reforms. Furthermore, reforms on state-owned banks’ budgetary 
constraints will always be reflected through their further softening. Therefore, we find that before 
reforms on state-owned banks, China peeled off large amount of non-performing assets and 
injected capital before conducting the organizational and structural reforms on SOCBs in 
accordance with requirements of modern corporation governance. 
Therefore, the dual soft budget constraints mean that as the marketization reform in real sector 
has not synchronized the process of hardening its soft budget constraints, government’s soft 
budget constraints in financial sector may last for a long time after enterprises in real sector are 
fully marketized. To wit the reason that the marketization reform in China’s banking sector lags 
behind that of SOEs. In other words, based on China’s reforming logics, only when reforms on 
enterprises in real sector make them become independent entity in market and alter the soft 
budget constraints, can the government promote marketization reform in financial sector gradually. 
Through above analysis it is not difficult for us to understand why joint-stock reforms on SOCBs 
have not been conducted until 2004 in China.  
Overall, China’s reform in financial sector echoed to the demand of reforming financial institutions 
in the process of reforming in the real sector largely. In this sense, it belongs to demand-following 
financial reform. One of important characteristics in China’s financial reform is that it develops 
under the dual soft budget constraints, which further determines the gradual nature of financial 
reform and determines the long period experienced in financial reform.  
49B7.5 INTERESTS RATES REFORM AND MONETARY MARKET DEVELOPMENT 
WITHIN THE DUAL SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS 
There are two prominent characteristics of financial institutions’ arrangement under the dual soft 
budget constraints. One character is that the central bank directly controls the credit direction and 
scale of state-owned banks through credit allocation, and the other is the state-owned banks have 
not the basis and rights of risk pricing. However, financial marketization reform will totally change 
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those situations. The last stage in gradual financial marketization reform under dual soft budget 
constraints witnesses marketization reform on state-owned banks. So before state-owned banks 
conducted marketization reform, it is required to reform on the monetary control system at first, 
changing from previously having a direct control on credit scale to the indirect regulatory 
mechanism that mainly depended on the open market operation. Under the marketization system 
after resolving dual soft budget constraints, commercial banks will manage their balance sheets 
and liquidity based on balancing income and risks. 
So the reform on the monetary market and interests rates have important implications for the 
marketization reform on state-owned banks in the gradual financial marketization reform under 
dual soft budget constraints. Before the overall marketization in banking sector, the central bank of 
China has set up monetary market mainly composing of inter-bank borrowing market and bond 
repurchase market. It is in the early 1980s that commercial banks spontaneously conducted 
inter-bank borrowing operation, to avoid control of credit scale and to expand asset business. After 
1990s, repurchase market came to the fore again, which can avoid the control of credit scale. As 
the inter-bank borrowing market and repurchase market developed rapidly, the government united 
the bond repurchase market segmented in every city’s securities exchange centers into 
exchanges in operating bonds and repurchase in 1995. In 1998, the central bank also transferred 
inter-bank bond operation from exchanges to a newly established specialized market. Chinese 
monetary market has achieved rapid development in just a few years. During that period, the 
transaction volume of monetary market rapidly expanded and the interests rates in monetary 
market became one of the fields with the highest extent of interests rates liberalization in China. 
The interests rates in monetary market become the barometer of fund’s supply and demand and 
even macroeconomic trend. (Li Yang(李扬), Peng Xingyun（彭兴韵）, 2001) On this basis, in 1998 
when the traditional control on credit scale was given up, commercial banks conducted the 
management on ratios of asset and liability. At the same time, the central bank began to set up an 
operational framework of indirect monetary policy mainly in open market. At present, it has 
become a main means of monetary regulation for the central banks to conduct open market 
operations by mainly repurchasing or issuing central notes in inter-bank market. Until then the 
asset business of commercial banks was mainly constrained by required deposit reserve ratio and 
ratio of asset and liability. The asset allocation structure of commercial banks is mainly depended 
on its own balance of asset risks and incomes. 
The development in monetary market not only provides central bank with a sound operational 
platform in the marketization reform of monetary regulation mechanism, but also creates positive 
conditions for the gradual interests rates liberalization. The reform on interests rates liberalization 
becomes not only a necessary part of marketization reform in commercial banks, but also one of 
the important steps for changing dual soft budget constraints. Only by establishing an interests 
rate mechanism determined by supply and demand can the loans of commercial banks get 
enough risk compensations. The SOEs that get credit support will not get the spread subsidies 
regulated by the interests rates. The changes of fund’s supply and demand can better reflect the 
indirect intention of monetary regulation and further increase the transmission efficiency of 
monetary policy. Overall, the development of monetary market and reform on interests rates 
liberalization should precede the marketization reform on state-owned banks.  
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The overall final goal of gradual reform on interests rates liberalization is to establish the interests 
rates forming mechanism determined by supply and demand in the market, under which the 
central bank regulates and directs market interests rates by monetary policy instruments, which 
allows market mechanism to play a leading role in allocating financial resources. In the January 
1996 when the national inter-bank market was established, the PBC gathered all kinds of 
information about trading volume, interests rates maturity in inter-bank market by using computer 
network system, and created a unified China inter-bank offered rate (CHIBOR) on the average 
weighted basis. In order to make interests rates determined by supply and demand of money and 
push forward the reform on interests rates liberalization, the PBC canceled the ceiling limits on 
inter-bank rates on June 1 1996, with a view to finally building conditions of realizing a market 
balanced interests rates. That was an important measure to promote and perfect China’s 
inter-bank market. As the bond repurchase rates were initially not controlled by the PBC, those 
rates were highly marketized even after establishing a unified exchange repurchase market and 
banking repurchase market. Nowadays as the issuing rates of inter-bank, repurchase, bond 
discount or governmental bonds have been highly marketized, interests rates in inter-bank market 
contain more macroeconomic information, which provide benchmarks for the central bank to judge 
money supply or demand, formulate and implement related monetary policies. The deposit and 
loan rates become the emphasis and core of interests rates liberalization in China. 
The overall pattern of deposit and loan rates liberalization is that interests rates’ reform on foreign 
currency before that domestic currency, loans before deposits, long-term and large amount before 
short-term and small amount. China took a pilot reform on deposit and loan rates liberalization in 
rural areas, in which financial institutions were allowed to adopt limited floating deposit and loan 
rates in the beginning. In 1998, financial institutions have increased the floating band of loan rates 
to small enterprises from 10% to 20%. The highest ceiling margin of loan rates in rural credit 
unions has increased from 40% to 50%. In 1999, the loan rates of financial institutions under the 
county level were allowed to have an upper flow within a band of 30%. In the same year loan rates 
had an upper float within a band of 30%, which is not only applicable for small enterprise but also 
medium enterprises. The pilot reforms were further expanded in 2002. At the same time the variety 
of loan rates were simplified, most preferential loan rates were cancelled and system of personal 
housing loan rates was improved. In 2003 on the basis of summarizing the experience of pilot 
reforms in rural credit unions, pilot fields were expanded step by step and deposit rates may have 
an upper float within a band of 30% on the benchmark rates basis ( no higher than 50%). On 28 
October 2004, the central banks loosed the ceiling of loan rates and floor of deposit rates while 
adjusting required loan rates. The fluctuation margins of deposit and loan rates were expanded. 
Although the interests rates were liberalized within some limits, that provides some margins for 
risk pricing for financial institutions.  
50B7.6 CONCLUSION 
The financial reform in China comes from firstly demands in real sector reform for financial 
services and related financial institutions. Furthermore, financial reforms in China are not caused 
by external shocks of crisis, but caused by spontaneous learning. In this sense, it is reflected as 
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seeking-followed development to some extent. The reform in real sector is gradual, which 
determines the same nature of the financial demand from reform and development in real sector. 
Reform in financial sector is required to only adapt the gradual reform in real sector. Furthermore, 
China’s financial reform develops deeply under the dual soft budget constraints formed by fiscal 
decentralization, in face of the demand aroused in the gradual reform under dual soft budget 
constraints in real sector. This is the main difference between China and other transitional 
economies in terms of marketization reform path and is an important cause of maintaining stability 
in China’s gradual financial reform. From this aspect, the experiences of China’s financial reform 
fully demonstrated that financial reform should adapt to that in real sector, otherwise inappropriate 
financial reform may bring imponderable consequences to macro-economy and financial system.  
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12BCONCLUSION: SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS, 
ENDOGENOUS NATURE OF NON-PERFORMING 
LOANS OF THE STATE-OWNED COMMERCIAL 
BANKS, AND ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN 
NON-PERFORMING LOANS RESOLUTION125     
 
51B8.1 ENDOGENOUS NATURE OF NON-PERFORMING LOANS OF THE 
STATE-OWNED COMMERICIAL BANKS AND ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 
The paper originally analyzes endogenous nature of NPLs of the SOCBs from perspective of the 
dual soft budget constraints, and shows that NPLs of the SOCBs are not only different from that of 
developed economies, but also from that of other developing economies and transitional 
economies. Analysis on endogenous nature of NPLs of the SOCBs has answered why NPLs of 
the SOCBs recur and maintain at high level after the central government has taken many positive 
measures followed suites of international experiences.  
The endogenous nature of NPLs of the SOCBs determines that NPLs of the SOCBs will last for a 
long time, because result of sunk costs and gambling for resurrection of the SOCBs will gradually 
surface. Although intensified risk management by commercial banks may limit gambling for 
resurrection or rent-seeking behavior of commercial banks to some extent, maintenance costs of 
sunk costs will definitely add sunk costs and consequently raise NPLs. Along with implementation 
of the Law of Bankruptcy and gradual hardening soft budget constraints of the SOEs, large 
proportion of related enterprises’ liabilities will be reflected in nominal NPLs of the SOCBs. 
Besides, tragedy of the SOCBs as common land model indicates that, both unilateral reform of the 
SOCBs and unilateral intensified banking supervision cannot eliminate NPLs caused by tragedy of 
the SOCBs as common land, unless interests of the central government and interests of local 
governments are compatible in financial stability. Therefore, both maintenance costs of sunk costs 
and tragedy of the SOCBs as common land determine that NPLs of the SOCBs will remain at high 
levels in a long period. Therefore, since 1990s, despite various measures have been taken by 
regulatory authorities, NPLs ratios of the SOCBs have maintaining at high levels. For example, 
after write-offs of policy-incurred NPLs in 2000, average nominal NPLs ratios of the SOCBs were 
dropped by 10%. Since then, although banking supervision has been strengthening, NPLs ratios 
of the SOCBs have maintaining at high levels (see chapter 3). 
8 
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The analysis of the thesis proves that soft budget constraints of the SOCBs are crucial institutional 
arrangements for continued accumulation of NPLs of the SOCBs.F126F The inevitability imposed by 
sunk costs and opportunism of commercial banks explains why the SOCBs still serve as 
supporters of soft budget constraints of SOEs after market-oriented commercial bank reform was 
initiated and non-state owned enterprises have already playing important role in economy. The 
above analysis will be more complicated by including free-riding financial stability provided by 
central government and over-using financial resources of the SOCBs by local governments. The 
analysis indicates that the dual soft budget constraints will influence accumulation of NPLs of the 
SOCBs from two aspects. One is that soft budget constraints of commercial banks weaken 
self-viability of commercial banks; the other is that soft budget constraints of SOEs weaken 
self-viability of SOEs. If managers of the SOCBs have no opportunism or moral hazards, sunk 
costs decide that to issue new loans to loss-making enterprises or those with no self-viability 
becomes the best choice for the SOCBs with enormous loans issued previously and became sunk 
costs. Therefore, NPLs of the SOCBs are inevitable when the SOCBs still act as supporters of soft 
budget constraints of SOEs. Sunk costs are not unique to China, even in mature market 
economies, commercial banks are also forced to refinance many obvious unprofitable enterprises 
when considering sunk costs. Therefore, the dual roles of the SOCBs are mutually intensified. Due 
to failure of internalizing speculation costs, soft budget constraints of the SOCBs result in 
insensibility of SOCBs to risks of SOEs, strong path dependence, and gambling for resurrection on 
SOEs. 
Accordingly, endogenous nature of NPLs of the SOCBs determines that resolution of NPLs of the 
SOCBs should not simply mimic other economies, but should target at the endogenous nature 
and find correspondent creative methods. Policy implications for role of the government in NPLs 
resolution are as follows:  
First, banking regulatory authorities should not regard lowering of NPLs ratios of the SOCBs as 
target of forming and implementing policies, but should regard them as endogenous results of 
series of policies aimed at hardening soft budget constraints of both the SOCBs and SOEs. The 
policies focusing on reducing NPLs of the SOCBs at current stage implemented by banking 
regulatory authorities presume implicitly that strengthening banking supervision will result in 
reduction of NPLs. However, the fact that NPLs ratios of the SOCBs have been rising along with 
gradual strengthening of banking supervision in the past ten years defied the presumption. To 
integrate reduction of NPLs of the SOCBs with strengthening of banking supervision will make 
people believe that NPLs are resulted from poor banking management. After its foundation on 
April, 2003, the newly established China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) has repeatedly 
ordered the SOCBs to lower their NPLs ratios both in absolute amount and in ratios, however, 
without changing soft budget constraints of the SOCBs, these orders turn out to stimulate SOCBs 
to take many measures, such as to issue more loans, to issue evergreen loans, or to extend terms 
of issued loans to postpone reflection of NPLs on account, to circumvent the administrative orders. 
                                                        
126 Here the phrase of institutional arrangement indeed refers to that the dual soft budget constraints  in China is a subjective institutional 
arrangement, but not the result of natural institution evolvement. Moreover, the existence and intensification of the dual soft budget constraints  
need a series supporting measures, so as to last for a long period of time. The current policies and measures of reform in China do not orient the 
goal of hardening soft budget constraints; on the contrary, many measures further intensify the expectation on soft budget constraints, such as 
debt-to-equity swap and a series of measures of mitigating and preventing financial risks taken by commercial banks. 
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By doing these, the SOCBs loosened screening standards and consequently, more potential NPLs 
might be created for the future. NPLs ratios of the SOCBs had been rising since October 2003. 
Therefore, the paper suggests that an important role the government is supposed to play is to 
create favored policy environments by supplying institutional incentive to sever vicious cycle of 
generating new NPLs in the SOCBs. The dual soft budget constraints analytical framework itself 
also implied order and means of hardening soft budget constraints of SOEs and the SOCBs. Just 
as we pointed out earlier, the SOCBs have been playing dual roles in the dual soft budget 
constraints. One is supporter of soft budget constraints of SOEs; the other is body of soft budget 
constraints of the SOCBs. Soft budget constraints of the SOCBs differentiate the central 
government from local governments in banking stability, and soft budget constraints of SOEs 
stimulate the SOCBs to take advantage of soft budget constraints to pursue self-interests such as 
speculation for resurrection. Therefore, hardening soft budget constraints of the SOCBs should 
become outset of stopping continued accumulation of NPLs of the SOCBs. In other words, 
hardening soft budget constraints of the SOCBs will endogenously harden soft budget constraints 
of SOEs. Because soft budget constraints are relationships between government and SOEs and 
government and SOCBs, so hardening soft budget constraints of SOEs and the SOCBs cannot 
success without active involvement of the central government and local governments.  
Second, the endogenous nature of NPLs of the SOCBs also indicates that it is inadequate to 
dispose NPLs of the SOCBs in China by imitating experiences of market economies. The paper 
emphasizes importance of hardening dual soft budget constraints for resolution of NPLs of the 
SOCBs. It has two policy implications for current comprehensive reform framework of the SOCBs 
focusing on reorganization and going public: First, the dual soft budget constraints determine the 
endogenous nature of NPLs of the SOCBs. Therefore, decrease of NPLs should be seen as 
endogenous result of a series of arrangements and political plans of hardening the dual soft 
budget constraints, and should not be seen as main intention of supervision policies. The current 
supervision policies focusing on decreasing the NPLs of the SOCBs imply a hypothesis that the 
intensifying supervision on banks can effectively cut down NPLs of the SOCBs. However, this 
hypothesis could not explain the fact that China has enforced supervision for 10 years during 
which NPLs of the SOCBs have been increasing. Moreover, combining banking supervision with 
decrease of NPLs of the SOCBs together will give people an impression that NPLs are solely 
caused by poor management of the SOCBs. However, the endogenous nature of NPLs of the 
SOCBs determines that administrative measures by banking regulatory authorities to decrease 
NPLs of the SOCBs can only be effective in a short term, because the SOCBs can maneuver 
nominal NPLs by rolling credit terms or repaying old loans by borrowing new ones, which may also 
reduce nominal ratio of NPLs. After the establishment of the CBRC, it has been focusing on double 
decrease of NPLs, which means to decrease both the gross NPLs and their ratios. The 
endogenous nature of NPLs of the SOCBs indicates that under the circumstances of intact dual 
soft budget constraints, the pressure to decrease ratio of NPLs becomes an impetus for the 
SOCBs to expand loans, which could result in NPLs and even threaten financial stability during 
macroeconomic adjustment periods. In fact, as early as October 2003, when growth rate of loans 
of the SOCBs was extremely high, ratios of NPLs of the SOCBs were also increasing (CBRC, 
2003). 
Current comprehensive reforms of the SOCBs by resorting to re-organize and public-listing have 
no direct and necessary relationships with constant decrease of the ratios of NPLs. In order to 
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satisfy requirements of going public, government has injected capital and wrote off stock NPLs 
from the SOCBs. It is believed that after going public, as long as regulatory authority reinforces 
banking supervision and sets up scientific evaluation standard in accordance with international 
standard, ratio of NPLs of the SOCBs can be limited within a reasonable range. However, the 
above points are challenged by endogenous nature of NPLs of the SOCBs derived from the dual 
soft budget constraints. Could going public sufficiently limit NPLs of the SOCBs? Will NPLs of the 
SOCBs rebound in a short term? In fact, as long as the policy of soft budget constraints of the 
SOCBsF127F continues without other necessary measures, going public might further reinforce 
expectation of soft budget constraints of commercial banks, thus capital injection could not stop 
NPLs induced by gambling for resurrection of the SOCBs. Besides, intensified externalities of the 
SOCBs also strengthens expectation of soft budget constraints of the SOCBs by local 
governments, so that re-organizing and going public may not improve incompatibility of 
central-local governments’ attitudes towards financial stability. Therefore, without weakening the 
expectation of dual soft budget constraints, the endogenous nature of the NPLs of the SOCBs 
could not be eliminated. In case of China, one of the most important roles of government in NPLs 
resolution is to harden soft budget constraints of the SOCBs. 
The thesis lays emphasis on influence of dual soft budget constraints on expectations of the 
SOCBs, SOEs and local governments, and attempts to answer the following questions: first, 
institutional arrangements of transforming soft budget constraints of SOEs into NPLs of the 
SOCBs; second, reasons that the SOCBs are still acting as supporters of soft budget constraints 
of SOEs after policy wrote-offs of policy-related business in 1994 when commercialization reform 
of the state specialized banks began; third, reasons that enterprises hope to evade banking loans 
and successfully break a symbiosis relations between the SOCBs and SOEs when the SOCBs are 
supporters of soft budget constraints of SOEs. Answers to these questions are crucial for NPLs 
resolution and banking risks mitigation, and can serve as premises for discussing ways to harden 
soft budget constraints of the SOCBs. The chapter concludes that because NPLs of the SOCBs 
have been endogenously derived from institutional arrangements of dual soft budget constraints, 
therefore, so long as authorities make continuous efforts to harden budget constraints of both the 
SOCBs and SOEs, it is impossible to stop accumulation of NPLs of the SOCBs. Because cases of 
dual soft budget constraints combination are very limited, there are few researches on NPLs of the 
SOCBs from perspective of soft budget constraints, and this chapter blazes a trail in this area. 
52B8.2 HARDENING SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS AND REFORM OF THE 
STATE-OWNED COMMERCIAL BANKS  
In a certain period, although soft budget constraints are important institutional arrangements and 
there are many examples of soft budget constraints even in market economies, hardening soft 
budget constraints should be gradually implemented owing to at least three reasons. First, soft 
budget constraints may fulfill a short-term equilibrium in banking industry, but this equilibrium will 
                                                        
127 The soft budget constraints in nature is an incentive mechanism. Therefore, the soft budget constraints in this paper sometimes only refers to 
systemic expectation, to wit to say the regulatory authorities’ implementation of soft budget constraints is expected to happen, which does not 
happen actually. 
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sacrifice overall economic inefficiency. Second, the central government has a tolerant ceiling, and 
costs for implementing soft budget constraints are too much to maximize utility of the central 
government in a long run. The later to solve, the higher costs will be. Third, soft budget constraints 
are essentially incentive mechanisms. Along with other institutional arrangements, soft budget 
constraints help main players of market to form stable expectations and speculation, therefore 
distort incentive mechanism of main bodies of market. Hardening soft budget constraints, can 
force insolvent enterprises to go bankruptcy and create conditions for necessary economic 
renewal and growth (A.J.Isakson, 1996). Therefore, hardening soft budget constraints of the 
SOCBs is a precondition for an efficient market economy.  
Concerning ways to harden soft budget constraints of commercial banks, there are two dominant 
views about approaches, namely, Washington consensus and evolutionary-institutionalism 
perspective (Roland, 1999). The Washington consensus believes that hardening soft budget 
constraints is an exogenous policy choice, which can be introduced into policy framework at 
discretion of central government. In other words, this view believes that once government realizes 
the importance, it can successfully harden soft budget constraints of commercial banks overnight. 
In contrast, for believers of evolutionary-institutionalism perspective, hardening soft budget 
constraints is a variable endogenously depended on credibility of bankruptcy threats, and 
therefore, Hardening soft budget constraints is a result of interaction of policies. The paper argues 
that each view stresses one side of hardening soft budget constraints of commercial banks. The 
Washington consensus emphasizes importance of political willingness and determination in 
hardening soft budget constraints of commercial banks, while evolutionary-institutionalism 
emphasizes importance of coordination and cooperation between reform programs aiming at 
hardening soft budget constraints of commercial banks. When we discuss soft budget constraints 
of commercial banks in China, we need to consider not only general causes of soft budget 
constraints of commercial banks, but also specific causes of soft budget constraints of the SOCBs. 
Furthermore, we need to pay attention to not only soft budget constraints of commercial banks, but 
also to the SOCBs’ role as supporters of soft budget constraints of SOEs. Therefore, reform 
policies should not only aim at fundamental institutional construction of hardening soft budget 
constraints of commercial banks, but also focus on those institutional constructions targeted at 
hardening soft budget constraints of China.  
First, regulatory authority should change its understanding of financial stability. For a long time, our 
understanding of financial stability overstresses positive externalities of financial stability and 
sacrifices economic efficiency. However, the research of soft budget constraints of commercial 
banks shows that bankruptcy is an integrated component of a competitive and innovative market 
mechanism. Financial stability should not aim at “zero failure” of financial institutions. Soft budget 
constraints of commercial banks will distort incentive mechanism of financial market and implicitly 
punish sound banks. China has to balance financial stability and market discipline. However, not to 
pursue “zero failure” does not mean that regulatory authority is not obliged to reduce number of 
failure financial institutions or to minimize negative externalities imposed by bankruptcy of banks. 
Quite contrary, regulatory authority should invest huge regulatory resources to reduce number of 
failing institutions or to reduce negative externalities. Although regulatory authority cannot 
eradicate financial crises, it can lessen frequency and reduce affected areas of financial crises, to 
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alleviate direct consequences of financial crises. 
Another issue associated with changes of understanding toward financial stability is to emphasize 
role of market discipline. In order to achieve this, regulatory authorities need to focus on at least 
two issues. One is to choose right regulation targets. The role of regulatory authority is 
complimentary to market, not to replace it. The other is to stress importance of information 
disclosure. There exists very serious asymmetrical information in the financial market, which 
results in adverse selection and moral hazard. Therefore, one important role of regulatory authority 
is to encourage timely, accurate, and adequate information disclosure, ensure accuracy and 
comparability of disclosed information, keep a level playing ground, and punish market participants 
who violated rules. Regulatory authorities need to foster an institutional basis to facilitate role of 
market discipline.  
Second, regulatory authority should take effective measures to emancipate the SOCBs from the 
role of supporter of soft budget constraints of SOEs. In dual soft budget constraints, the SOCBs 
are not only body of soft budget constraints of SOCBs, but also supporters of soft budget 
constraints of SOEs. Supporters of soft budget constraints of SOEs include fiscal supporter and 
credits supporter. The former by providing subsidy or preferential tax treatment; while the latter is 
by requiring government-controlled banks to provide credit lines to unqualified but 
government-favored SOEs, in case enterprises fail to repay loans and banks have no effective 
tools to force borrowers to pay loans. In transitional period, share of fiscal revenue to national 
allocation has been decreasing (See figure 5-2, table 5-2). When fiscal authority is unable to act as 
supporters of soft budget constraints of SOEs，the central government has to strengthen its control 
over the SOCBs ,and transfer fiscal burdens of SOEs to banks, especially the SOCBs (Tang 
Xiaoqing(汤小青), 2002). The role as actual supporter of soft budget constraints of SOEs in turn 
strengthens soft budget constraints of commercial banks. Therefore, hardening soft budget 
constraints of commercial banks needs to weaken banks’ role as supporter of soft budget 
constraints of SOEs, to ensure marketed-oriented reforms of commercial banks, and to reduce 
moral hazards of policy banks by transferring all policy loans to three policy banks. 
To weaken role of the SOCBs as supporter of soft budget constraints of SOEs need to implement 
a fundamental market-oriented reform simultaneously. By taking the Romania financial reform for 
example, Perottiand Carare (1997) shows that lagging behind of reform on SOEs leads to 
deterioration of non-performing loans of banks. A reasonable implication for his conclusion is that 
the sooner to strengthen the soft budget constraints of both SOEs and SOCBs, the less costs will 
incur. 
Third, government should withdraw from direct financial institutions management. This is an 
important institutional arrangement for changing understanding of financial stability and strip-off 
role of the SOCBs as supporters of soft budget constraints of SOEs. The analysis in this paper 
shows that state ownership of the four SOCBs is the property base of soft budget constraints of 
the SOCBs. State ownership not only hampers establishment of a modern management structure 
within SOCBs, but also provides implicit national guarantees for the SOCBs, giving the SOCBs 
adequate liquidity by attracting new deposits. The SOCBs have huge non-performing loans, poor 
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profitability, and low capital adequate ratios. Besides, just as some researchers have pointed out, 
state-ownership is the root of the “brotherhood competition” among the big four SOCBsF125F (Xie 
Ping（谢平）, 2003). Based on this, governmental withdrawal has an uncommon implication for 
hardening the soft budget constraints of SOCBs. Government should withdraw from SOCBs as 
well as city commercial banks. A precondition for withdrawal from direct involvement in commercial 
banks is an effective resolution of existing non-performing loans. Researching of the banking 
reform of the former Eastern transitional economies such as Hungary and Czech shows that, soft 
budget constraints is increasing with the accumulation of non-performing loans (Anderson and 
Kegels, 1997). The paper also shows that huge NPLs have strengthened the soft budget 
constraints of SOCBs, so it is very necessary to take various measures to resolute the NPLsF126F. At 
the current stage, the resolution of NPLs through the four AMCs has born some certain effectsF127F. 
Several key issues associated with the resolution of NPLs include curbing the accumulation of the 
NPL flow, resolution of the NPL stock and measures, which can ensure commercial banks to 
absorb new NPLs in a timely and dynamic way. 
Fourth, lowering concentration degree of banking industry and avoiding depending on banks too 
much. From perspective of common causes of soft budget constraints of commercial banks, 
hardening soft budget constraints of commercial banks need to lower negative externalities of 
individual commercial bank or those of bankruptcy. The more concentrated a commercial bank is 
more externalities its bankruptcy may bring and more regulatory forbearance it may get from 
regulatory authorities. Consequently, more regulatory forbearance a commercial bank obtains, 
more likely the bank does not abide by prudential principles and take advantage of soft budget 
constraints. Therefore, it is very necessary to lower concentration degree of banking industry and 
avoid depending too much on banks for financing.  
Dwatripon and Maskin（1995）shows that a decentralized financial structure is superior to a 
concentrated one in that the latter will absorb negative externalities of individual banks' bankruptcy. 
Financial crises in the 1980s also show that decentralized and multi-level banking system in such 
economies as USA is better than concentrated banking system in economies as Japan. The 
lessons gained from experiences of the Eastern European transitional economies also show that 
decentralized banking structure is an important mechanism of hardening soft budget constraints of 
commercial banks.  
However, it does not mean that the smaller a bank, the better is. The nature of banking industry 
requires a commercial bank to have certain scale of economy to absorb risks (James Kolari and 
Asghar Zardkoohi, 1987). This has special implication for China’s city commercial banks reform. 
Now China has more than 110 city commercial banks and still has very restrictive geographical 
restraints regarding geographic areas in which city commercial banks can establish branches and 
operate. From perspective of resisting financial risks and increasing competition, regulatory 
                                                        
125 Max Webb (1988) points out that “free market….is incompatible with family ethics…market, in nature, has no connection with fraternity, and is 
opposed to the community based on blood or fraternity.” 
126 At the current stage, the main methods employed by SOCBs to resolute NPLs include loan restructure, debt equity swap, write-off, bankruptcy 
application, confiscate collateral, and many other tools. 
127 By the end of June 2003, the total NPLs disposed by the four AMCs were 361.84 billion RMB. 
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authorities should loosen geographical restraints for selected city commercial banks with stable 
profitability and sound internal management, and permit city commercial banks to obtain capital 
through capital market. Thus, by introducing competition, help city banks merge to certain degree. 
Fifth, establishment of more mature market exit mechanism for financial institutions. An effective 
market exit mechanism helps to harden soft budget constraints of commercial banks. An effective 
market exit mechanism not only alleviates negative externalities of individual bank failures, but 
also assuages incentives for regulatory authorities to implement soft budget constraints. Lack of 
effective exit mechanism facilitates commercial banks with poor management to escape market 
punishment, resulting in incredibility of financial regulations. Lack of effective exit mechanism can 
also aggravate expectation of soft budget constraints of commercial banks. In the case of China, , 
once a commercial bank is at verge of bankruptcy, regulatory authorities without an effective 
market exit mechanisms used to arrange other healthy commercial banks to be receiver, who, 
encumbered by heavy financial burdens, may become a new soft budget constraints body 
themselves later. Establishment of effective market exit mechanism requires introduction of real 
market rules, which, by competition, exerting market discipline and realizing effective resources 
allocationF 128 F. Besides, establishment of effective market exit mechanism also requires 
establishment of risks separation measures, which can lessen negative effects brought by 
individual market failure. 
Depository insurance system is an important institutional arrangement to minimize negative 
externalities brought by bank failures. Practices of depository insurance system shows that this 
arrangement has enhanced stability of financial system in many economies. Nevertheless, 
effectiveness of depository insurance system depends on certain preconditions. Researches have 
shown that, in economies with weak regulation, poor enforceability of contracts, and rifle 
corruption, explicit depository insurance scheme will encourage excessive risk-taking of 
commercial banks, therefore, loosening market discipline and increasing fragility of financial 
system (World Bank, 2002). This conclusion is very pertinent to china’s ongoing financial reforms. 
From perspective of soft budget constraints of commercial banks, China needs to review 
introduction of depository insurance, and to judge needs to contain banking crises and to increase 
market discipline. Another key factor is design of insurance scheme. A badly designed insurance 
scheme will aggravate existing agent-principle problem, moral hazards, and adverse selection. On 
the contrary, a well-designed insurance scheme can enhance stability of financial system by 
increasing internal control of commercial banks, increasing efficiency of banking regulations, and 
strengthening market discipline (World Bank, 2002; Mishikin, 1998). 
                                                        
128 Financial institutions are different from general enterprises. In many economies such as the USA, the exit stages for financial institutions are 
different from general business (Cui Zhiyuan, 1999). This realization is one of the most profund lessons taken from the experience of the Great 
Depression in 1930s. Mature market economies have attempting to balance market discipline and negative externalities, and have gained many 
valuable lessons that can be adapted to the context of China. 
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53B8.3 CHALLENGES FOR HARDENING SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS AND ROLE 
OF GOVERNMENT  
Within framework of dual soft budget constraints, the thesis argues that a key to solve endogenous 
nature of NPLs of the SOCBs is to create a favorable policy environment and provide institutional 
impetus. The analytical framework of dual soft budget itself also implies relation, sequence and 
approach of hardening dual soft budget constraints. The analysis mentioned above shows that the 
SOCBs have been playing dual roles as supporters of the soft budget constraints of SOEs and 
bodies of the soft budget constraints of the SOCBs. Among which, soft budget constraints of the 
SOCBs lead the SOCBs to utilize sunk costs to maximize its own interests and sharpen 
incompatibility of goal in safeguarding financial stability between the central government and local 
governments. In dual soft budget constraints, soft budget constraints of the SOCBs endogenously 
determine soft budget constraints of SOEs. Therefore, hardening soft budget constraints of the 
SOCBs should be regarded as a starting point for breaking the revolving vicious circle of NPLs 
accumulation. Only when soft budget constraints of the SOCBs have been hardened, can 
commercial banks be encouraged to harden soft budget constraints of SOEs. 
Furthermore, because soft budget constraints is essentially a kind of relationship between 
government and enterprises or relationship between government and commercial banks (Kornai, 
1996), therefore, both hardening soft budget constraints of the SOCBs and hardening soft budget 
constraints of SOEs could not success without active involvement of government. Moreover, sunk 
costs, gambling for resurrection, and tragedy of the SOCBs as common land each reveals an 
aspect of complicatedness of NPLs of the SOCBs and determine that the government has to play 
a more active role in NPLs resolution. 
However, difficulties are that, hardening soft budget constraints of SOCBs does not coincide with 
maximization of utility function of the central government. As sole owner of the SOCBs, the central 
government tends to maximize returns from the SOCBs. In order to realize this target, the central 
government has to expect the SOCBs to manage by market economy principles. However, as 
macroeconomic administrator, the central government also pursues social stability, economic 
growth，equality, SOEs reform, and many other social targets alike. Therefore, the central 
government has to gain financial subsidy from the SOCBs to support unviable SOEs, to obtain 
financial resources to facilitate economic growth, and to maximize employment. In order to realize 
these targets, the central government has to intervene by ordering the SOCBs to loosen budget 
constraint or giving up autonomy (an extreme example is, in planned economy, the central 
government had regarded the then specialized banks as departments of government). The two 
goals of central government above have not always compatible, and cannot always be realized 
simultaneously. Accordingly, the central government has a tolerance range for soft budget 
constraints of the SOCBs, and the tolerance range changes with government’s perception about 
maximum total utility. Only when soft budget constraints of the SOCBs endanger central 
government’s total utilities, will the central government order local governments and SOEs to stop 
evading banking loans.  
More worse, not only the central government, but also other market players does not have 
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adequate incentive to harden soft budget constraints of the SOCBs, because all have vested 
interests in soft budget constraints of the SOCBs. Among which, SOEs can get financial subsidies 
from the SOCBs and be kept afloat, the SOCBs are secured by soft budget constraints to attract 
new deposits, maintain public confidence, and maximize utility of their own; depositors regard soft 
budget constraints of the SOCBs as implicit deposits insurance. Therefore, all players have no 
incentive to break soft budget constraints of the SOCBs.  
However, analysis of the thesis indicated that, in order to solve NPL problem of the SOCBs 
completely, the Chinese government has to design a forward-looking banking reform program, 
focusing on hardening soft budget constraints of the SOCBs, encourage the SOCBs to harden soft 
budget constraints of SOEs, internalizing returns and responsibilities of local governments in 
designing financial stability policy to cut off origin of the endogenous nature of NPLs of the SOCBs, 
establish endogenous constraint mechanism of NPLs of the SOCBs, and reinforce capacity and 
incentive of the SOCBs to absorb and resolute NPLs. Otherwise, without eliminating endogenous 
nature of NPLs of the SOCBs, even if NPLs ratios are reduced to an acceptable level in short  
term, they will recur. This point has been ignored in current comprehensive SOCBs reform. 
Although the central government do not have enough impetus to harden soft budget constraints of 
the SOCBs, the dilemma is, hardening soft budget constraints must be provided by the central 
government (regulatory authorities), due to fact that soft budget constraints are essentially kind of 
incentive mechanism and have the characteristic of public goods. Therefore, to harden soft budget 
constraints of the SOCBs, regulatory authorities should break stable expectation of soft budget 
constraints of commercial banks. One possible breakthrough is to divide the four SOCBs into 
several medium or small-sized banks, to enhance credibility of bankruptcy threats, increase costs 
of local governments to overuse public resources of the SOCBs and rebuild incentive mechanism 
of commercial banks. 
Therefore, effects of current comprehensive SOCBs reform package focusing on policy NPLs 
write-offs, capital injections, introduction of strategic investors, and public listing, will largely 
depend on compatibility of incentive of involved interests bodies, such as the central government, 
local governments, SOEs and the SOCBs. Fortunately, Zhou Xiaochuan (周小川，2004), governor 
of the People's Bank of China, has been emphasizing importance of introducing effective 
bankruptcy mechanism for the SOCBs reform on many occasions, which signaled that senior 
officials have already realized significance of hardening soft budget constraints of commercial 
banks. 
54B8.4 FOLLOW-UP RESEARCHES 
To sum up, analysis of the paper stresses the importance of hardening dual soft budget constraints, 
especial soft budget constraints of the SOCBs, which have obviously been neglected in the 
current SOCBs reform package, in improving risks control incentive and ability. Based on this 
understanding, the paper argues that resolution of NPLs of the SOCBs is a long-term task and 
requires the central government to design a more forward-looking reform package aimed at 
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hardening soft budget constraints of SOCBs. This in turn will force the SOCBs to harden soft 
budget constraints of SOEs. Future reform measures should also consider benefits and 
responsibilities of local governments, sever endogenous nature of NPLs of SOCBs, and break 
vicious cycle of NPLs accumulation by establishing an autonomous self-refraining and 
self-assimilation mechanism for the SOCBs. Otherwise, NPLs of the SOCBs will recur. Thus, 
taking these as reference, current reform measures emphases only the SOCBs reform. The 
success of China’s banking reform will largely depends on credibility of bankruptcy threats 
imposed by the central government and compatibility of incentive of the central government, local 
governments, SOEs, and the SOCBs. 
Because target of this thesis is to find and prove what should be role of government in NPLs 
resolution in the case of China, therefore, the thesis does not propose ideal detailed policy 
suggestions. Besides, because political and economic relationship in China is very complicated 
and unique, and the country is ongoing unprecedented transformation, it is unrealistic to analyze 
all these factors within one thesis.  
However, a deeper and clearer understanding of ways to harden soft budget constraints of the 
SOCBs will undoubtedly enrich insights into the NPLs problem of the SOCBs and correspondent 
role of the Chinese government accordingly. In regarding to ways of hardening soft budget 
constraints of the SOCBs，there are many policy suggestions. Some researchers advocate 
introducing private banks by lowering entry barriers (Xu Dianqing（徐滇庆）, 2002). However, the 
Russian example proved that if the original banking structure has been very concentrated, a hasty 
and comprehensive introduction of private banks may bring serious and unwanted negative 
economic consequences. Another view is to restructure the big four SOCBs by dismantling them 
into several medium to small sized commercial banks (Peng Xingyun, 2002). But some scholars, 
such as Wu Jinglian, believed that this will impede further reform and lay excessive pressure on 
remaining part of the SOCBs (Wu Jinglian(吴敬琏), 2003). Li Yang (李扬，2003), a former member 
of the monetary committee of the PBOC, also opposed the dismantling proposal from perspective 
of international competition. Therefore, a very important follow-up topic is how to harden soft 
budget constraints of the SOCBs. 
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